Monday, January 02, 2017

Why God Allows Pain, my answer to Draper

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Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists Author(s): Paul Draper Source: Noûs, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Jun., 1989), pp. 331-350 Published by: Wiley Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2215486 accessed 12/24/16

 http://www.apologeticsinthechurch.com/uploads/7/4/5/6/7456646/pain_and_pleasure.pdf



disclaimer: my views on God's motives are always theoretical, accept for the assumption of God's love


Paul Draper is a major philosopher in this day, he is one of the top two or three atheist philosophers,. He is the real deal, No mere Dawkings but a real thinker and formidable. He's a favorite of the Secular Outpost crowd. His major argument is the evidential argumnet on theodicy,. I know i'll probably fail but i take my turn as trying to whack his argument. My real goal is to hold my own, As Billy Abraham said of his great debate with Schubert Ogden "I attacked his destroyer iwth ny nine sweeper." At least he had a mine sweeper. I attack Draper's destroyer with my dilapidated tug boat.


I will argue in this paper that our knowledge about pain and pleasure creates an epistemic problem for theists. The problem is not that some proposition about pain and pleasure can be shown to be both true and logically inconsistent with theism. Rather, the problem is evidential. A statement reporting the observations and testimony upon which our knowledge about pain and pleasure is based bears a certain significant negative evidential relation to theism.' And because of this, we have a prima facie good epistemic reason to reject theism-that is, a reason that is sufficient for rejecting theism unless overridden by other reasons for not rejecting theism.[1] [2]

In other words we can't prove God has moral reasons for allowing POE and POP. He calls it epistemic and says the problem is evidential. So I assume he's saying we don't have good evidence, This is a catch 22 because to have good evidence we have to have something empirical to study if we had empirical evidence of God there would be no need to prove that God had good reasons,He would be God and that's all he needs, Now I do not way that as a  divine command guy, not the kind who thinks God is arbitrarily right all the because as God he can make evil good and so on,I say that because as the creator of all the basis of reality he would have the inside track in knowing good from evil and right from wrong even though it is not arbitrary and has a reasoned rationale.

So the argument is a chatch 22 because if we had the evidence he seeks we wouldn't need it. But God is not given in sense data, and thus is not empirical, We have no ready made undeniable proof of God.,That's why it's called a "belief," That's not to say we don't have good reasons for belief, it is to say that I suspect Draper is playing games with concepts of evidence. Notice his standard is  "we have a prima facie good epistemic reason to reject theism..." He's not demanding actual proof but a PF reason. That means we can meet the standard after all. That is to say the PF standard works both ways,If that's the standard he feels can live up to then it's also the standard he has to accept if I meet it,

He goes on to say  "a reason that is sufficient for rejecting theism unless overridden by other reasons for not rejecting theism." I can definatley give reasons for not rejecting it. I will ma,e a couple of proviso's: (1) by "theism" I include Panentheism; (2) I don't have to prove X is the case only that i have rational warrant for belief.

I find Draper's challenge to theism to be somewhat narrowly focused, although probably not as narrow as Dawkins.

There exists an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect person who created the Universe. I will use the word "God" as a title rather than as a proper name, and I will stipulate that necessary and sufficient conditions for bearing this title are that one be an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect person who created the Universe. Given this (probably technical) use of the term "God," theism is the statement that God exists. [3]
He is ruling out Tillich's view, probably without knowing it, because he stipulates God is "a person." Then he includes the omnis with no discussion as to their modern understanding, That's going to figure into a an understanding of defense for theiodicy since most of the blaming of God for pain and suffering assumes God is totally free to end all such suffering regardless of other goals.

He constricts a view Hypothesis of Indifference, (HI) with which to compare theistic views. He says essentially there or may not be such supernatural intetieds but ifso they are indifferent to human pain or evil. They are not donig evil they are just not conscenred,

Unlike theism, HI does not entail, that supernatural beings exist and so is consistent with naturalism. But HI is also consistent with the existence of supernatural beings. What makes HI inconsistent with theism is that it entails that, if supernatural beings do exist, then no action performed by them is motivated by a direct concern for our well-being. Now let "O" stand for a statement reporting both the observations one has made of humans and animals experiencing pain or pleasure and the testimony one has encountered concerning the observations others have made of sentient beings experiencing pain or pleasure. [4]

The problem here is really two fold. First, it's not really an argument to support atheism because it would allow for a God provided God is  not concerned, Said another way he limits his view of what God could be to the fundamentalist view so that any liberal modern view such as process theology or Tilllich's view of God as being itself would go under the category of indifferent even though neither process theologians nor Tillich would  understand God as indifferent, Secondly, if there is an indifferent God that's still God and thus atheism is false. This leads me to wonder ab out the ultimate bottom line of his argument, what is the final reasoning rumination? It can't be to support the view that there is no God. It's apparently just to disingender positive feelings for God. He does intimate that his ultimate goal is the rejection of theism,whatever that means, [5] That still leaves us hanging with the problematic situation that there may well be reason to believe in God but God woudl not qualify as theism so it's unclear as to how he would score that in relation to his argument,

Therefore I am going to show that there are good reasons to believe in God, to accept that God is not indifferent but am using the Tillich view of God so Draper's arguments don't apply, First I will show what my alternative is, and then show how Draper's argument fails to disprove my view. This will demonstrate that  we have a prima facie good epistemic reason to believe in God weather or not we codifier it theism...

The ultimate issue is an evidently based warrant for belief (which is how I interpret a PF reason to believe. Given what's already been said about this standard I think the defense that I will put up, my twist on FWD, counts as evidence because it not only fits in with the larger evidential scheme that I argue from but it also demonstrates in its own right that God can have rational reasons, I will briefly discuss two other kinds of evidence, but only go into details on the soteriological drama,

Soteriological Drama

My view is called "Soteriologiocal Drama," please read the link to the whole idea.[6] It begins with observations:

(1) The assumption that God wants a "moral universe" and that this value outweighs all others.

The idea that God wants a moral universe I take from my basic view of God and morality. Following in the footsteps of Joseph Fletcher (Situation Ethics) I assume that love is the background of the moral universe (this is also an Augustinian view). I also assume that there is a deeply ontological connection between love and Being. Axiomatically, in my view point, love is the basic impitus of Being itself. Thus, it seems reasonable to me that, if morality is an upshot of love, or if love motivates moral behavior, then the creation of a moral universe is essential. 

(2) that internal "seeking" leads to greater internalization of values than forced compliance or complaisance that would be the result of intimidation. 
That's a pretty fair assumption. We all know that people will a lot more to achieve a goal they truly beileve in than one they merely feel forced or obligated to follow but couldn't care less about. 
(3)the the drama or the big mystery is the only way to accomplish that end. 
The pursuit of the value system becomes a search of the heart for ultimate meaning,that ensures that people continue to seek it until it has been fully internalized. 
I don't think those are unreasonable assumptions, They are pretty standard.

The argument itself.


(1)God's purpose in creation: to create a Moral Universe, that is one in which free moral agents willingly choose the Good. 
(2) Moral choice requires absolutely that choice be free (thus free will is necessitated). 
(3) Allowance of free choices requires the risk that the chooser will make evil choices 
(4)The possibility of evil choices is a risk God must run, thus the value of free outweighs all other considerations, since without there would be no moral universe and the purpose of creation would be thwarted. 

This leaves the atheist in the position of demanding to know why God doesn't just tell everyone that he's there, and that he requires moral behavior, and what that entails. Thus there would be no mystery and people would be much less inclined to sin. 
This is the point where Soteriological Drama figures into it. Argument on Soteriological Drama: 

(5) Life is a "Drama" not for the sake of entertainment, but in the sense that a dramatic tension exists between our ordinary observations of life on a daily basis, and the ultiamte goals, ends and purposes for which we are on this earth. 
(6) Clearly God wants us to seek on a level other than the obvious, daily, demonstrative level or he would have made the situation more plain to us 
(7) We can assume that the reason for the "big mystery" is the internalization of choices. If God appeared to the world in open objective fashion and laid down the rules, we would probably all try to follow them, but we would not want to follow them. Thus our obedience would be lip service and not from the heart. 
(8) therefore, God wants a heart felt response which is internationalized value system that comes through the search for existential answers; that search is phenomenological; introspective, internal, not amenable to ordinary demonstrative evidence. 

In other words, we are part of a great drama and our actions and our dilemmas and our choices are all part of the way we respond to the situation as characters in a drama. 
This theory also explains why God doesn't often regenerate limbs in healing the sick. That would be a dead giveaway. God creates criteria under which healing takes place, that criteria can't negate the overall plan of a search. 
One might object that this couldn't outweigh babies dying or the horrors of war or the all the countless injustices and outrages that must be allowed and that permeate human history. It may seem at first glance that free will is petty compared to human suffering. But I am advocating free will for the sake any sort of pleasure or imagined moral victory that accrues from having free will, it's a totally pragmatic issue; that internalizing the value of the good requires that one choose to do so, and free will is essential if choice is required. Thus it is not a capricious or selfish defense of free will, not a matter of choosing our advantage or our pleasure over that of dying babies, but of choosing the key to saving the babies in the long run,and to understanding why we want to save them, and to care about saving them, and to actually choosing their saving over our own good. 

If I understand him correctly I think he's saying we know that biological organisms avoid pain and seek pleasure but we have no proof of any kind that there are moral reasons that excuse allowing pain,[7] Moreover, given the nature of biology it makes more sense to to think any kind of SN being that may have created the universe is indifferent to pain merely cause there is so much pain,

Mystical Experiece Provides both unshakable empirical evidence for the reality of God and for the love (compassion and concern) of God. This is backed by certain empirically based arguments taht I develop in my book The Trace of God.[8] This is more empirically based than  anything Draper offers. It may well constitute the evidentail aspect they seek.

From this background ai derive my founding observation:

(1) The assumption that God wants a "moral universe" and that this value outweighs all others.
The direct implication both of the transformative experience behind the observation establishes the goodness of Gd and the loving nature of God. Since that gives us a reason to believe in God we can trust that reason despite the seeming evidence to the contrary in Pain and suffering, That is a dimension with which Draper does not deal, we can know God is worthy of trust. Thus being worthy of trust we need not be necessarily certain of God';specific reasons,

Nevvertheless we can go further because we have a valid theoretical rationale,to explain God's preseasons in terms of the soteriological drama. That term means the dramna of salvation is based upon the need to seek for truth in order to internalize the values of the good. That means the search must be inviolable. So God can't clear the world of pain and suffering,If God did that there woudl be no search, None of the three counter thedocieies taht Draper answers include this facet.


this should count as PF evidence because it givs a logical rationale for god's allowance for pain while fitting into the larger framework that shows us god cares. However deep the depths of pain and evil in this would it is not gratuitous and does not outweigh my reasons for belief.,Whatever abstract logical victories Draper wins he does not ofer a final reason for abandoning belief that outweighs my PF reasons for beloief.


Sources

[1] Paul Draper, Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists Author(s): Paul Draper Source: Noûs, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Jun., 1989), pp. 331-350 Published by: Wiley Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2215486 accessed 12/24/16, 331
PDF:http://www.apologeticsinthechurch.com/uploads/7/4/5/6/7456646/pain_and_pleasure.pdf
(accessed 12/20/16)


[2] Jeff Lowder, "Index:Draper's Evidential Argument"Secular OUTPOST ,December 7, 2014,blog
http://www.patheos.com/blogs/secularoutpost/2014/12/07/index-app/


[3] Draper, op cit,331

[4] Ibid 332

[5] Ibid 334

[6] Joseph Hinman, ",Soteriologocal Drama," The Religious a priori, on line resource, URL
http://religiousapriori.blogspot.com/2011/04/answer-to-theodicy-soteriological-drama.html 
accessed 1/2/17


[7] Deaper, op ciot336















11 comments:

Jason Thibodeau said...

"if there is an indifferent God that's still God and thus atheism is false."

Joe,
I think that this is an important error. I certainly understand your point and I have a great deal of sympathy for it, but nonetheless I think it is wrong. 'Theism' and 'God' constantly threaten to be moving targets (and thus so does 'atheism'). Because the world is a complex place, our concepts and categories need to be up to that complexity.

Suppose we define 'atheism' as follows:

Atheism: the claim that there is no God.

What does this amount to? Imagine the following world:

W1: a world in which there is no creator, no omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent person, but in which beings such as Thor (of Marvel comics) and Kal El exist.

Is atheism true in W1? I would say that it is, but your view suggests that atheism is false in W2. Why? Because arguably Thor and Kal El are gods. They certainly would have been recognized as such by the ancient Greeks. They are very powerful, can control the forces of nature, live indefinitely, cannot be killed (at least not in the normal way), etc. (I even understand that Kal El will soon be rising from the dead).

Of course no atheist is going to claim that she knows that there are no gods in this sense (or, if she does claim this, she is wrong).

Now consider,

W2: a world in which there is no creator of the universe, no omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent person, and no gods in the Ancient Greek sense, and no gods in the superhero sense. There is a ground of all being, which is a non-conscious and morally neutral force.

Is atheism true in W2? Well, perhaps not if we understand 'God' to refer to the ground of all being. But I don't think that atheists take themselves to be denying the possibility that there is a ground of all being.

I think that the vagueness of the term 'God' requires that when we are engaged in systematic intellectual pursuit we need to be very careful and to specify what we are talking about. The God that I don't believe in is an omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent person. There is no such being. But, having acknowledged this, I can also acknowledge that I don't know whether other types of similar beings (beings that people sometimes use the word 'god' to talk about) exist. I strongly suspect that Draper agrees with this.

One further point: in order to evaluate an argument like Draper's, we have to be clear about what his target is. His target is the almighty person (i.e., an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent creator). What we should be asking is whether Draper's argument successfully shows that there is an epistemic problem for people who believe in an almighty person. Even if his argument does not show that Tillich's god does not exist, it is still an important and successful argument since it justifies atheism (understood as the belief that there is no almighty person).

Atheism is a very simple and not very interesting claim: it is the claim that there is no almighty person. It is pretty obviously a true claim and should not require much defense. But it is consistent with the existence of supernatural beings and, more interestingly, with some kind of ultimate reality a proper relationship with which constitutes the greatest good for human beings. I think that the proper role for philosophy of religion is to explore these other possibilities, not simply to engage in counter apologetics.

Jason Thibodeau said...

"(2) Moral choice requires absolutely that choice be free (thus free will is necessitated). "

If free choice is so important, then why is it that, in this world, our choices are so unfree and constrained?

Any evaluation of your argument requires that we consider whether humans have the kind of free will that your theodicy requires. I don't think that we do. Human choices are a product (or, to put the point in a slightly weaker form, strongly influenced by) our beliefs, desires, and inclinations. None of these things are typically under conscious control. We do not normally choose our beliefs, we don't typically choose our desires, and only extremely rarely do we choose our inclinations.

A human child is born with a collection of desires, inclinations, and with capacities to acquire new desires, inclinations and beliefs. In short, human children are born into this world with a nature. And we have absolutely no control over the nature we are born with. Given the power that inclinations and desires have over our choices, I think that it would be a gross exaggeration to claim that human children make unconstrained choices. But the choices that children make when they are children influence the kind of adults they become. Thus, to a large extent, the choices of an adult human are constrained by the (unfree) choices that the adult made when she was a child.

Here is just one example: no American child chooses to believe that an appropriate and good life involves getting an education, finding a job, finding an appropriate life-partner, and having a family. Nobody chooses to believe that this is the kind of life we should live; we just find ourselves with this belief. The vast majority of Americans pursue this kind of life. Why? To put it simply, we are indoctrinated by our parents, our family, our friends, and our culture to believe that this is the kind of life worth pursuing. But indoctrination is a process whereby a person's choices are externally constrained. Given the nature of a human being, being indoctrinated into a culture entails that certain possibilities never occur to us. A choice that occurs after a process of indoctrination is thus not an unconstrained choice, it is not truly free.

And, of course, it is impossible for a child (anyone under 25 years old) to have the requisite experiences that could form the basis of an informed choice about what kind of life is worth pursuing. Given our limitations, we both cannot help but be indoctrinated and, even if we had the capacity to make a truly unconstrained choice, we would lack the requisite knowledge upon which to make such a choice.

Many people find that, once they have made their "choices", for example, to pursue the American Dream, that what they end up with (even when they have a good job, a house, and a loving family) is not satisfying. Many people regret their former choices and wish that those former choices were not so constrained (by their false beliefs, misplaced desires, unhealthy inclinations, etc.). It seems appropriate, therefore, to acknowledge the kind of constrained choices that humans are capable of is a rather mixed bad. Most of us believe that we would be better off with a greater degree of freedom.

So here is the challenge to your view: If free choice is so important to God, then why are our choices so unfree and constrained?

Eric Sotnak said...

“despite the seeming evidence to the contrary in Pain and suffering”

I notice that this acknowledges about half of the evidential argument from evil: it acknowledges that evil (or pain and suffering) constitutes at least prima facie evidence against the existence of a caring God. So the remaining question is whether there are good reasons to reject theistic claims that such evidence is, in fact, defeated.

But I think Draper’s argument hinges on a very powerful intuition that is not easily overcome: that if you were to predict how the world would look under theism and under HI, the reality seems a better fit to HI than to theism.

Suppose you were going to walk through a dangerous forest. One hypothesis is that you are on your own, and the other is that an all-powerful protector will be watching over you. But you find yourself fighting off wild animals with no sign of the protector. As your throat is being torn out by a predator, do you think to yourself, “I guess there was no protector” or do you think “I guess the protector wanted to help me develop my courage by conquering this forest on my own. I’m sorry I failed him.”

Joe Hinman said...

"if there is an indifferent God that's still God and thus atheism is false."

Joe,
I think that this is an important error. I certainly understand your point and I have a great deal of sympathy for it, but nonetheless I think it is wrong. 'Theism' and 'God' constantly threaten to be moving targets (and thus so does 'atheism'). Because the world is a complex place, our concepts and categories need to be up to that complexity.

Suppose we define 'atheism' as follows:

Atheism: the claim that there is no God.

Hey Jason, thanks for your comments man, welcome to the blog. But you are comparijng theism to ahteisnm, I am saying one need not be a theist to believe in God, I am moreof a pan-EN-theist. Some pan-en-theists believe God is impersonal,. I believe that God is personal but in a higher sense on a higher level. Of those who believe God is impersonal, I think they are as much God believers. they bleieve there is a God but "he" is just not personal.

Joe Hinman said...

Jason if I understand your view I think atheism would be true either in W1 or W2 but i don't consider Greek God's to be God.In my view God must be necessary not contingent thus can't have parents or an origin,I don't accept comic book heroes as worthy of worship, even though I collect gold-bronze age comics,

I think that the vagueness of the term 'God' requires that when we are engaged in systematic intellectual pursuit we need to be very careful and to specify what we are talking about. The God that I don't believe in is an omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent person. There is no such being. But, having acknowledged this, I can also acknowledge that I don't know whether other types of similar beings (beings that people sometimes use the word 'god' to talk about) exist. I strongly suspect that Draper agrees with this.

I an usually pretty quick to specify that my view are greatly influenced by those of Paul Tillich.There are extremely clear and specific ideas o God in both theology and phil R, Whitehead, Tillich, Hartshorne, one need only become familiar with theology.

One further point: in order to evaluate an argument like Draper's, we have to be clear about what his target is. His target is the almighty person (i.e., an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent creator). What we should be asking is whether Draper's argument successfully shows that there is an epistemic problem for people who believe in an almighty person. Even if his argument does not show that Tillich's god does not exist, it is still an important and successful argument since it justifies atheism (understood as the belief that there is no almighty person).

You also have some major problems with the concept of 'all mighty": that has unclearity, One probable is it's not the meaning of omnipotence according to the Greek etm usually ranslated that way. does almighty nean being able to do anything including non sense?or does it mean being able to do more than anyone else,?

Atheism is a very simple and not very interesting claim: it is the claim that there is no almighty person. It is pretty obviously a true claim and should not require much defense. But it is consistent with the existence of supernatural beings and, more interestingly, with some kind of ultimate reality a proper relationship with which constitutes the greatest good for human beings. I think that the proper role for philosophy of religion is to explore these other possibilities, not simply to engage in counter apologetics.

the claim is interesting because it's so problematic, i don't think almighty cuts it. One could be almighty perhaps and have presents and be contingent, that's not really the concept i associate with God it'is not what Christian theology is getting at,

Joe Hinman said...

But I think Draper’s argument hinges on a very powerful intuition that is not easily overcome: that if you were to predict how the world would look under theism and under HI, the reality seems a better fit to HI than to theism.

there is a problem with going by appearance (you said Draper has an intuition that's not appurtenance, apprentices can be deceiving. A Bible verse says: "we walk by faith and not by sight." I would argue that the mystic's intuition about God's reality and goodness is more trustworthy than Drapers because it's empirically linked to transformative effects and fits the epistemic criteria of judgement we live by.

Suppose you were going to walk through a dangerous forest. One hypothesis is that you are on your own, and the other is that an all-powerful protector will be watching over you. But you find yourself fighting off wild animals with no sign of the protector. As your throat is being torn out by a predator, do you think to yourself, “I guess there was no protector” or do you think “I guess the protector wanted to help me develop my courage by conquering this forest on my own. I’m sorry I failed him.”

the problem is I keep beating the beasts when i call upon the protector and beat them against overwhelming odds.

Joe Hinman said...

So here is the challenge to your view: If free choice is so important to God, then why are our choices so unfree and constrained?

It's not. i don't buy the neuroscience determinism craze. I agree with Jean-Paul Sartre we are compelled to be free. I see quotes all the time by major thinkers and researchers dealing with the issue of free will who say science is nowhere near disproving free will.

Eric Sotnak said...

"the problem is I keep beating the beasts when i call upon the protector and beat them against overwhelming odds."

This claim is subject to empirical verification. All we need to do is to compare the rate at which those who call upon the protector survive compared to those who don't. If those who do survive at a statistically significant higher rate, then we have evidence for the existence of the protector. Similarly, it seems if those who call out to God to be spared from pain and suffering and illness experience those at a statistically significant lower rate than those who don't we have empirical evidence for a caring God. But there is the problem. The best studies we have show not only that the rain falleth upon both the just and the unjust, but that the just are no drier than the unjust.

Jason Thibodeau said...

"It's not. i don't buy the neuroscience determinism craze. I agree with Jean-Paul Sartre we are compelled to be free. I see quotes all the time by major thinkers and researchers dealing with the issue of free will who say science is nowhere near disproving free will."

I'm not sure I understand what you are saying. Are you saying that, contrary to observation and our own experiences, human choices are not constrained in the ways that I described? Are you saying that human choices are not constrained at all?

Note that I did not defend determinism, nor am I convinced that it is true. But my claim that human choices are constrained is true regardless of the truth of determinism.

Joe Hinman said...

Eric Sotnak said...
"the problem is I keep beating the beasts when i call upon the protector and beat them against overwhelming odds."

This claim is subject to empirical verification. All we need to do is to compare the rate at which those who call upon the protector survive compared to those who don't. If those who do survive at a statistically significant higher rate, then we have evidence for the existence of the protector. Similarly, it seems if those who call out to God to be spared from pain and suffering and illness experience those at a statistically significant lower rate than those who don't we have empirical evidence for a caring God. But there is the problem. The best studies we have show not only that the rain falleth upon both the just and the unjust, but that the just are no drier than the unjust.
5:52 AM

I don't think it works that way, You are assuming God has to work like on.off switch instead of having his own ideas about things, Secondly, that's just gainsaying the whole soteriologoical Drama, the point o that was That God can't just fix stuff every time there's a problem.So there have to be certain zones you have ot be in the zone so to speak.,But the variables are too complex to fix a quantitative analysis,

so the answer is I dont' claim proof.I claim warrant, The examples my life and others --such as Lourdes--indicates there is a reality there can't be denied,It can't be used as proof and I didn't advance it as proof.



Joe Hinman said...


Jason Thibodeau said...
"It's not. i don't buy the neuroscience determinism craze. I agree with Jean-Paul Sartre we are compelled to be free. I see quotes all the time by major thinkers and researchers dealing with the issue of free will who say science is nowhere near disproving free will."

I'm not sure I understand what you are saying. Are you saying that, contrary to observation and our own experiences, human choices are not constrained in the ways that I described? Are you saying that human choices are not constrained at all?


contained is not a negation of free will.One could be a compatiobalist for example.Or it could be that none of those constraints are actually negating the will.

Note that I did not defend determinism, nor am I convinced that it is true. But my claim that human choices are constrained is true regardless of the truth of determinism.

yes but we can still make moral decisions,

8:23 AM
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