Sunday, January 08, 2017

Why Does God Allow Pain and suffering (p2) More on Draper

Photobucket 
Björnstrand and Thulin in
Bergmann's Winter Light
 
They look like they are suffering to me.





A week ago I did a piece on Paul Draper's evidetial challenge [1] on theodicy, He is working on comparing his theory of Indifference to the construal of theism. The universe appears to be more the product of indifference than of a caring God. Draper pastes together a string of false assumptions abased upon non-faith oriented assumptions, as to the appearance of pain and suffering and their place in the biological world.
Allow me to explain. HI entails that, if pain and pleasure exist, then they are not the result of malevolent or benevolent actions performed by nonhuman persons. So on HI, the moral difference between pain and pleasure and other parts of organic systems gives us no antecedent reason to believe that pain and pleasure will not play the same biological role that other parts of organic systems play. Indeed, a biological explanation of pain and pleasure is just the sort of explanation that one would expect on HI. [2]
He is saying take the obvious appearance of biological function because we don't see an obvious spiritual reason there must not be one, but since God is ultimately responsible for all that is we should expect that there would be an obvious means of connecting it to God.
But theism entails that God is responsible for the existence of any pain and pleasure in the world. Since God is morally perfect, He would have good moral reasons for producing pleasure even if it is never biologically useful, and He would not permit pain unless He had, not just a biological reason, but also a morally sufficient reason to do so. And since God is omnipotent and omniscient, He could create goal-directed organic systems (including humans) without biologically useful pain and pleasure.[3]
So because pain and pleasure don't serve an obvious biological function then they must not be allowed by Go, thus there must not be  God.Although Draper is sophisticated to make it so blunt. Because biological function is more obviously associated with naturalism and not with theism it's more probable that the lack of biological function is indicative of an indifferent origin and thus it's less likely there is a God.
 So theism entails both that God does not This content downloaded from 199.19.144.37 on Mon, 13 Apr 2015 18:57:14 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions PAIN AND PLEASURE 337 need biologically useful pain and pleasure to produce human goaldirected organic systems and that, if human pain and pleasure exist, then God had good moral reasons for producing them, reasons that, for all we know antecedently, might very well be inconsistent with pain and pleasure systematically contributing to the biological goals of human organisms. Therefore, we would have much less reason on theism than on HI to be surprised if it turned out that human pain and pleasure differed from other parts of organic systems by not systematically contributing to the biological goals of those systems. Hence, since 01 reports that the pain and pleasure experienced by humans (who are moral agents) do contribute in this way, P(O1/HI) is much greater than P(Ol/theism)[4]

Of course the problem with this is that it asserts that the only aspect of reality that is worth considering is the physical. There ca';t be a spiritual reality so there's no point in looking for spiritual benefits. Of course there could well be health benefits to belief that hes merely overlooking or refuses to accept, but aside from that his argument is merely self blinding, he just refuses to look through the telescope.  Moreover, not just spiritual value to pain but the fact of it as a necessary allowance given the necessity of free will.This is what the soteriological drama indicates, that God can't go around fixing it all because it would negate the search and that's more important,So indirectly that does amount to a spiritual value to suffering. God wants us to seek truth and go through a moment of decision where we accept the truth of Jesus and give our lives to him,The fruit of the search is that we internalize the values of the good that we learn from the search, But if God's existence is so obvious fro the nature of the world that one need not wonder about it then there's no need for a search. without internalization of the values we will resent God's truth and give lip service but not accept in the heart, it's all about the heart and that's the spiritual reality that the naturalist learns to ignore and pretend is not real.


There's another aspect the Soteriologiocal Drama that is misconstrued by atheists, This came out on the comment section on Secular Outpost where Draper';s argument was discussed and i took part, pushing my SD on then. 


From a quick read of the Drama theodicy, it just sounds like a variant of the character building response - God allows the possibility for evils because this is entailed by a universe with free creatures who are able to internalise moral values. The most obvious objection would be how narrow the scope of such an explanation would be - what about cases of suffering like Rowe's fawn, or the existence of evils which prevent moral growth (mental illnesses, psychopathy, etc)?[5]





  • you are mistaking the need to not blow the search with the idea that each and every individual case to process the same results, every single person doesn't does not have to come out learning what he/she should in order for the project as a whole to be worthwhile.
    As for trying to stick SD with suffering builds character i hate that idea too,I do not think they are the same thing at all, Nothing in the character building argumnet says we are searching for truth, I don't convince of internalizing the values as the same process as suffering builds character, it's not the suffering that is the point of the drama but the search for truth; the suffering must be allowed to preserve the search in the SD idea. The argument doesn't turn on suffering,[6]


    Sources

    [1] Joseph Hinman, "Why Does God Allow Pain and Suffering:Answering Paul Draper," Metacrock's Blog, (Jan 2, 2017) URL:
    http://metacrock.blogspot.com/2017/01/why-god-allows-pain-my-answer-to-draper.htmlaccessede 1/7/17
    [2] Paul Draper, Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists Author(s): Paul Draper Source: Noûs, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Jun., 1989), pp. 331-350 Published by: Wiley Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2215486 accessed 12/24/16, 331
    PDF:http://www.apologeticsinthechurch.com/uploads/7/4/5/6/7456646/pain_and_pleasure.pdf
    (accessed 12/20/16) 336-37

    [3] Ibid

    [4] Ibid
    [5] , "A Very Unscientific Survey of Some Popular Responses to the Problem of Evil," (December 23, 2016) URL
    http://www.patheos.com/blogs/secularoutpost/2016/12/23/unscientific-survey-popular-responses-problem-evil/#disqus_thread (accessed 1/7/17)

    [6] Ibid


     






    5 comments:

    Joe Hinman said...

    my article on CADRE blog

    The nature of Biblical Revelation

    Ryan M said...

    "So because pain and pleasure don't serve an obvious biological function then they must not be allowed by Go, thus there must not be God"

    It appears after all this time, you still do not understand Draper's argument. You appear to lay it out like this:

    1. If theism is true, then there is moral justification for sentient being's feelings of pain and pleasure.
    2. It is not the case that there is moral justification for sentient being's feelings of pain and pleasure.
    3. Therefore, theism is not true.

    That is not Draper's argument. Draper's argument is the following:

    O1 = moral agents experiencing pain and pleasure that have biological utility.

    O2 = non moral agents experiencing pain and pleasure that have biological utility.

    O3 = sentient beings experiencing pain and pleasure that have no known biological utility.

    T = theism

    HI = hypothesis of indifference

    Draper's argument:

    1. O1 is more probable given HI than T.
    2. O2 is more probable given HI than T.
    3. O3 is more probable given HI than T.
    4. If O1, O2 and O3 are more probable given HI than T, then if all else is equal then HI is more probable than T.
    5. All else is equal.
    6. Therefore, HI is more probable than T.

    Nothing you have wrote disputes any of the above premises used by Draper. Draper's argument is not a deductive one which refutes the truth of theism. Rather, Draper's argument is probabilistic. You could theoretically agree with premises 1 through 4 but argue against premise 5 to refute the argument. Instead, you confuse Draper as saying O1, O2 and O3 are all logically incompatible with theism.

    Joe Hinman said...

    "So because pain and pleasure don't serve an obvious biological function then they must not be allowed by Go, thus there must not be God"

    It appears after all this time, you still do not understand Draper's argument. You appear to lay it out like this:

    1. If theism is true, then there is moral justification for sentient being's feelings of pain and pleasure.
    2. It is not the case that there is moral justification for sentient being's feelings of pain and pleasure.
    3. Therefore, theism is not true.

    No that is false,, that is not my conception of his argument.,you read those quota i copied because are very clear, he is saying it serves a biological function not any other kind of function we can see so there is no reason to assume anything other than either indifference or no god.

    That is not Draper's argument. Draper's argument is the following:

    O1 = moral agents experiencing pain and pleasure that have biological utility.

    O2 = non moral agents experiencing pain and pleasure that have biological utility.

    O3 = sentient beings experiencing pain and pleasure that have no known biological utility.

    T = theism

    HI = hypothesis of indifference

    Draper's argument:

    that is not meaningful because its not compete sentence,

    sentient beings experiencing pain and pleasure that have no known biological utility.
    what about them?


    1. O1 is more probable given HI than T.
    2. O2 is more probable given HI than T.
    3. O3 is more probable given HI than T.
    4. If O1, O2 and O3 are more probable given HI than T, then if all else is equal then HI is more probable than T.
    5. All else is equal.
    6. Therefore, HI is more probable than T.


    can you make a real sentence out of that? that's just tghe head spinlanyone whio is lost in the maze of alphabet soup is lost. Mystification of technique,

    Nothing you have wrote disputes any of the above premises used by Draper. Draper's argument is not a deductive one which refutes the truth of theism. Rather, Draper's argument is probabilistic. You could theoretically agree with premises 1 through 4 but argue against premise 5 to refute the argument. Instead, you confuse Draper as saying O1, O2 and O3 are all logically incompatible with theism.

    those are meaingless premises. Drapper writes a qhole essay in esposotpry prose. that's where teh meaninglies, nbot in choppy half setneces that sdon't refer to anything beyond gthesmelves,01 = !01. so what?

    look at teh long quote I broke up there he says exactly waht I sadi he does,

    Joe Hinman said...


    But theism entails that God is responsible for the existence of any pain and pleasure in the world. Since God is morally perfect, He would have good moral reasons for producing pleasure even if it is never biologically useful, and He would not permit pain unless He had, not just a biological reason, but also a morally sufficient reason to do so. And since God is omnipotent and omniscient, He could create goal-directed organic systems (including humans) without biologically useful pain and pleasure.[3]

    So theism entails both that God does not This content downloaded from 199.19.144.37 on Mon, 13 Apr 2015 18:57:14 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions PAIN AND PLEASURE 337 need biologically useful pain and pleasure to produce human goaldirected organic systems and that, if human pain and pleasure exist, then God had good moral reasons for producing them, reasons that, for all we know antecedently, might very well be inconsistent with pain and pleasure systematically contributing to the biological goals of human organisms. Therefore, we would have much less reason on theism than on HI to be surprised if it turned out that human pain and pleasure differed from other parts of organic systems by not systematically contributing to the biological goals of those systems. Hence, since 01 reports that the pain and pleasure experienced by humans (who are moral agents) do contribute in this way, P(O1/HI) is much greater than P(Ol/theism)[4]

    how does that differ from my version"?

    my version: he is saying it serves a biological function not any other kind of function we can see so there is no reason to assume anything other than either indifference or no god.

    show me in expository prose how the quote above--not your reconstruction of numbered incomplete sentences-- but the actual quotes that Draper wrote fail tally with description?

    Joe Hinman said...

    . O1 is more probable given HI than T.

    that means HI (indifference) or whatever of the O1 is is more probable than theism. and why? of the reasons I picked out in using the quotes I used,so this really is not even demonstrating a problem withy jyview,