No Will Greater Than My Own?

The other night I received an IM from a guy who posts on a certain message board. He's an atheist and we had exchanged a few barbs here and there, but didn't really know each other. He didn't attack me, he was polite enough but he said some very disturbing things. First he began with a lot of break the ice sort of questions, such as was I a YEC and what did I think about it? We got into a very shallow exchange about God arguments, by that I mean neither of us got into it deeply enough to say anything profound. Then he began to say that if God was real, he would still choose to go to hell. Why? He said he hates God. He said in no uncertain terms as he proceeded to issue forth the most blasphemous stream of bilge, complete with all sorts of imagined violations of God's body, I'm suer the reader can fill in the blanks. I asked him way he felt that way he said "no evidence." Well, I told him, he's bordering on abusive lanague and what he said if he could do it would definitely get him in put in jail. No one says stuff like that just because there's no evidence. That's pure hate, no one hates something (or someone) just because you can't prove they exist. He said "I hate dictators."

Now I can well imagine things one would say about why God might be considered a dictator, especially the God of the OT. But I asked him Why is God a dictator. The answer floored me. I expected him to say wiping out the Amalekite babies and such, but instead he says "he tells people what to do." I ventured the theory that a dictator is more than just someone who tells people what to do. God, in so far as he created us, might actually be in a valid position to tell us what to do. He seemed not to understand that concept. I don't think this guy speaks for all atheists. I think he might be just a fringe element, but it made me think. A week or so latter I had a discussion on my boards and it was enough like a lot of other discussions of that topic (moral issues, grounding of ethical axioms) that I have to wonder, do the atheists of this generation, the gen xer atheists really understand the concept of authority? Has no one ever introduced them to the notion that there might be a valid authority that really has the right to tell one what to do?

I am sure that atheists can understand this concept, what I'm not sure is that it has been sufficiently pounded into their heads to the extent that they are willing to actually take it seriously. The Xaths are the product of the selfish, hedonistic seventies and the "go along get along" "we generation" eighties, via their parents. That should make them more docile toward authority, but it also means they may never have been taught that there's a valid reason to think of a will higher than their own. They may resent a will that others purport to know but for which they can find no overt empirical demonstration. Following rules of a system is one thing, but submitting to the unseen is another. This is not something that we can reason about intellectually, its' a cultural difference, a generation gap, and there may be no way to bridge it. What was the discussion on my boards that made me wonder about all this?

The issue was advanced by an atheist friend that morality is genetic. Of course they have no data and certainly have no empirical proof, but sometimes atheists are content with speculation and assumptions, when it suites their side. So the argument is advanced, morality is genetic. we have genes to tell us right from wrong, thus we need no appeal to God. But the Christians counter with the bit a bout objective ethics. So it becomes the usual hum drum argument, "tastes great, less..." I mean, objective moralist vs. no need for God. I argued that objective morality is not the issue. The real issue is grounding of ethical axioms. Morality is not objective, but axioms can be grounded or ungrounded. God provides grounding because he created the universe and thus, is the author of its purpose. But the atheists counter by saying that being author doesn't give God any privilege at all. They are free to do as they please because if God was really kind he would have created them as robots so they wouldn't have worry about moral choices. I have seen this argued a hundred times. I've seen it argued on every major atheist board from CARM to Sec Web.

Many atheists will give it a long protracted argument; so what if God created me. That doesn't give him the right to tell me what to do. He's no more special than a drunk in bar on Saturday night. But every time I try to argue that God is necessary to ground axioms many of them chime in with "no he can't because he doesn't exist." This is merely circular reasoning. They are confusing the distinction between the effects of God's hypothetical existence upon meta ethics, and the actual fact of God's existence. Clearly this is circular since the answer to the question "if God did exist what difference would it make to morality?" Just cannot be "God doesn't doesn't exist so he can't make any difference." Then we spend about fives posts going "If he exists," "but he doesn't exist," "if he exists," "but he doesn't exists..."

I think the problem is it just never occurred to them to ground their moral axioms in some higher authority because they have always been taught to think of themselves as the ultimate authority. I wonder if perhaps they are coming at this from the stand point of consumers. They can understand following rules, but ultimately no other will can be imposed upon them since for each one he/she is the final authority and the only one to whom he/she must answer. If one worships the self, the highest blasphemy is that I am not the center of the universe.This is why my argument about the atonement as solidarity is as big a scandal to them as the financial transaction model or any other model. They see no logic in it and no sense. For the willingness of God to be in solidarity with them would be major blasphemy because God dares to put himself on equal grund with them. This must be what Paul meant when he said there would come a future generation that would be lovers of selves rather than of God.

Of course there are exceptions. There are valid concerns, I am not saying there are not. One such valid concern is wiping out the Amalekties. I am not saying that there aren't problematic Bible issues that have to be dealt with. But when push comes to shove the major cultural difference is, I think, that this nrew trend of atheism, while not very significant numerically, may represent the coming to fruition of many issues unresolved revolving around the ego in the modern age. As modern people we see ourselves as individual units, with rights, invested with a total package of personhood; a package that includes right, privileges, and revolves around the "punctual self" as the center of all navigation in the world. We see this tendency to center self in the world and make the world go around it in the Descartes and in the philosophy of modern world. I think, therefore, I am. I am the center, my perceptions determine reality. There is no tribe, there is no higher power there's only what I want and what I can get and what I have to put up with to get it.

Of course they realize that they have to cooperate. Of course they realize that we can't all be the center so we have to work together, that's why they have teleological ethics. Ethical means can't be based upon duty and obligation, that would necessitate another will than my own. I have to form a corporate will for the purpose of cooperating in society so not duty, but outcome becomes the major sticking point for moral value. That outcome revolves around soft values, like greatest good for greatest number, or avoiding pain since we can't impose anything upon anyone. Outcome ethics always leads to a disaster because it proceeds from the premise that there is no duty to impose and the only obligation is to cooperate so we can all have what we want. It can easily lead to the sacrifice of a small helpless group to support the cooperation for the greater number, because after all, the greatest good is getting what I want. Thus Regan's contra war of the eighties could be justified upon utilitarian grounds; and utilitarians supported the salve trade, because the "ignoble" black man had to be sacrificed to support the greater good (white people making money). I am not saying that atheists are on a par with slave traders. Please don't misunderstand me. This is not an argument about atheists not having morals. Atheists can have morals but they can't ground their axioms. They have to coast on Christian memories to ground their axioms.

There could be no stronger grounding than the authorization of the author of the universe. But we cannot move into this through winning rational arguments. One sees on message boards the bitter result of trying to confront the secular minded hoards with logic and theology. We have to find some new way around it. We have to get our bearings again. We are spoiled to live in a society which coasts on Christian memories. We have to find again the way Paul did it. We have to find out how to live in the power of God. We have to show the power and love of God to a pagan world. But it should help to understand the intellectual basis of the struggle.

Anatomy of Argument: A Well Trod Atheist Fallacy

 


 The other day on CARM we were having a discussion about the Euthephro Dilemma. This is the question about is there a higher standard to which God must adhere in shaping morality, or in other wrodsd, is it Good because God says it or does God say it because it's good. The Atheist will shape the question so that the only available answers are either that God manufactures good based upon arbitrary whims, or he has to follow an higher standard and thus is not the highest reality. Out this discussion came the comments below:

Originally Posted by NoctambulantJoycean

No, not really. There is empirical evidence that theists simply (unconsciously) project their moral beliefs onto God, as opposed to God communicating anything to them. They also more easily project their feelings onto God since religious experience involves a breakdown on the "self/other" distinction.

Meta:
 The assumptions you make about religious experience are per conceived by reductionist premise. The sense of the numinous is empirical and embodied sense of God's love and goodness. that in itself is reason enough to assume it.

Noctam:

Here's a sampling of the relevant data:
"Believers' Estimates of God's Beliefs are More Egocentric than Estimates of Other People's Beliefs."
"Was He Happy? Cultural Difference in Conceptions of Jesus."
"Creating God in Our Image: The Role of Self-Projection in Estimating God’s Beliefs."
"How Christians Reconcile Their Personal Political Views and the Teachings of Their Faith: Projection as a Means of Dissonance Reduction."
page 1001 of "The New Synthesis in Moral Psychology."

And if you prefer video to text:
Youtube, AntiCitizenX’s “Psychology of Belief” series
Youtube, KnownNoMore’s video “Against Religious Experience…”

Meta:

that doesn't really prove anything. If humans are made in God's image than that probably pertains to consciousness. lots of reasons to assume God is the source of consciousnesses. essentially any argument for panpsychism is an argument for God's consciousness.


Noctam:

I've noticed that a lot of theists on CARM (especially you) start screaming out buzz-words like "scientism!" and "reductionism!" whenever your views are criticized. It's tiresome. It basically amounts to a defense-mechanism you employ so your beliefs don't have to meet the same epistemic standards as everything else. That's not going to fly anymore (by the way, I'm a property dualist regarding qualia, so your charge of a "reductionist premise" I'm using is laughable. Please stop assuming stuff.)

Meta:

That could be a valid complaint that I speak over your head and I should be more considerate. It doesn't really damage my arguments taht youa re unread and don'tknow the termenology in the field. Maybe you should be more humble and seek to learn more before eneter into discussion.

Noctam:

Moving on, I really don't care what possible scenarios you can make up (ex: we're made in God's image, panpsychism implies God's conscious, numinous, blah blah blah). No. As Duhem's thesis in philosophy of science shows, one can make up any number of ad hoc, unfounded, possible explanations to protect one's pet idea. But if you resort to that, no one would and should take you seriously. So instead of just giving me possible explanations theists made up, give me plausible ones supported by evidence and not just your bare assertions. I'm getting tired of some theists like you acting as if the same epistemic standards that apply in philosophy and science in general don't apply to you.

 Meta:

 There are couple of things wrong with this particular display of ignorance.I must say I more enjoy your scientist schtick. First of all, to characterize well known ancient doctrinal potions in Christianity as "ad hoc" makes you look so unread. anyone exhibiting the knowledge I see in your arguments would be well enough read to know that image dei is an ancient doctrine. calling it ad hock well that's like saying "waiter! this Gazpacho soup is cold, send it back!"

Secondly, you didn't answer the argument. instead you merely mock and ridicule my beliefs. that is not an answer. I told you honestly and directly why I think you are wrong. the answer to that cant' be "well your ideas are silly and I don't bleieve them." I know you don't bleieve it that's kind of like betting the question! calling my beliefs names is not disproving them.


 Noctam:

So stop dodging empircal data by saying "that doesn't prove anything" (I hear that same line from AIDS denialists or other such sorts of people who are unwilling to change their beliefs regardless of the evidence you present them; yes, I'm comparing you to them). Stop accusing people who use scientific evidence to reach conclusions of being "reductionists." And start providing evidence for your claims and not just using implicit reference to properly basic beliefs, or "embodied sense of God's love and goodness," or ... as epistemic cop-outs (or really just ad hoc methods of begging the question and reducing the burden of proof for you and increasing it for everyone else) so you don't ever have to revise your beliefs.

 Meta:

 That sounds like an argument but it's not. the bit about "made up" is question betting. All you are really saying is 'I dont' believe that so it must be wrong." I didn't make it up it's an ancinet doctrine It's not just made up it's a valid bleief within a larger belief system and it answers the issue.

All scinece can do is offer explanations. Science is about proving things. So for you to gain say the notion of offering explanations is silly. You have no empirical data that disproves God or that proves morality is an independent standard. Just refusing to allow me to defend my beliefs by referencing what they are neither logical nor empirical. The experiences of the sense of the numinous are empirical, that is the mystical sense of God's reality is experienced directly. To the extent that it is always linked with the sense of God's reality it can be regarded as the co-determinate of God, that is the trace, the track the footprint of God in the snow of human experience. Thus we can regard mystical experience as experience of the divine and we can regard that as empirical.



 Noctam:

Sorry I had to be so firm. But I'm getting sick-and-tired of these tactics some theists like you employ. If you're not willing to revise your beliefs in light of new evidence and find ad hoc methods of disregardig evidence, don't expect people to take you seriously.

Meta:

I don't take atheist ridicule seriously, and since you are not willing to try and understand my bleiefs in terms of their inner logic there is basis for discussion.


What started all of this is the Euthyphro dilemma. That's not something science can prove empirically. in fact it pertains to a theistic system. The dilemma basic boils down to this: are the gods good becuase they are gods, or are they gods becuase they are good? In other words do they follow a higher standard to which they must submit. If so then something is higher than the gods.Of course Euthyphro was Socrates major foil that's why its set in the metaphysical system of Greek Mythology, and the fates are the weavers of the higher standard. it makes sense to ask questions of this sort in a Polytheistic system where the gods are contingent and not ultimate basis of all reality. It makes no sense to even consider it in a Christian system where "God" is the term we give to the basis of all that is. In that case there cannot be a higher standard.

The answer that I have brought to this question in terms of the Christian God has always been that the "higher standard" is actually God's own character, which is love. Thus I see love as the background of th moral universe. There is no standard higher than God because the moral standard to which he adheres is his own character and that all boils down to love as the basis of ethics.

Now looking at his specific claims. In terms of the anatomy of discussion he's doing the following

(1) substituting mockdry and reidicle for refuation

(2) He's begging the question and calling it "emprical evidence."

(3) He's trying to privilege his position with reference to the fortress of facts.

On the surface this all appears like he's given reasoned comments but in reality he's merely evoking ideology. He doesn't actually present any evidence he only presents the threat of evidence. We don't have to prove every detail of our belief system. We only have to show that belief is warranted by sound and valid arguemnts.

The Euthyphro Dilemma

The Euthyphro Dilemma

have theology: Will Argue

Originally Posted (on CARM) by MikeWC

This is a long post. The final paragraph is a summary of the argument, if you wish to just straight to it.

The Euthyphro dilemma can be briefly stated this way: either morality comes entirely from God, in which case it is changeable according to his will, or it comes from outside God, in which case God is unnecessary.

Actually I think he stated it wrong. I don't think the second horn of the dilemma is that if it comes from out of God morality is "unnecessary," but that God is not supreme. One thing that's going to figure big in my answer is this fact: The Euthyphro dilemma was applicable to the Greek gods only becuase they were not God in the sense that the Bible God is God, nor were they God in the sense that the God of Aquinas or Anslem is God or. Greek gods were contingent beings, they were not eternal, they were products of prior beings. God in the Christian sense is the eternal necessary aspect of all being. Thus That God is necessary and not contingent, and is not the produce of prior condition.

That makes a big difference because it is only the contingency of the Greek gods that gives them their relative nature and thus enables the Fates to outrank them in terms of power. That's where the entire dilemma stems from, that Zeus was subject to the fates. The God of Abraham, of Issac and of Jacob is not subject to any fates. The God of Christianity freed humanity from the cruelty of fate, and still frees us form determinism. This is so becuase the eternal necessary aspect of all being, is bigger than any deterministic aspect of being, which is only a contingency HE created in the first place.

Mike WC says:

There is an increasingly popular refutation of the old Euthyphro dilemma among apologists. It is an attempt to split the horns of the dilemma by creating a third alternative. The alternative is to identity the Good wholly with God's nature: being Good is one of God's essential attributes.

Without meaning to boast I think I really do I am the person who started that answer. I don't remember ever seeing it on the net before I gave it. Once I argued it a few times on prominent atheist boards people began to talk about it. In any case, "being good" is not a mere attribute of God as though it's on a par with being short or tall, fat or thin, it's based upon the nature of God. That is certainly no exaggeration; in the Christian tradition God is the basis of the good which stems from God's nature as love. St. Augustine said love is the background of the moral universe, and by that meant that God, as truth itself, as being itself is the basis upon which the good has meaning. Augustine put the forms in the mind of God, so anything like "the good" that under Plato would be a product of the forums would be a product of the Mind of God.

Mike WC: "This idea is meant to dissolve the dilemma by taking the pros of each horn, while eliminating the cons. Morality is not changeable according to God's will, because it lies eternally in his nature. And it is not outside God for the same reason." Here he more or less gets it right. What it really does is bring out the distinction between eternal necessary being vs. contingent beings. The contingent beings who are called "gods" only because they are more powerful than mortals and last longer (although they can die and hey have origins so they are not eternal), can't supply the ultimate basis for philosophical grounding that eternal necessary being does supply.

In answer to this point Mike says:

My argument is that this just creates a new dilemma. This refutation of Euthyphro depends on God having both a will and a nature. This may seem trivial, but let's draw out the consequences.In order for the refutation to stand, there must be a clear division between God's will and God's nature. If no such division exists, then then all this refutation has done is accept the first horn: God could change morality through his will.

I don't think there has to be a "clear division." There seems to be no problem with asserting that a consciousness has both a will and a nature. They are clearly two separate things, but one would be in line with the other as a nature would always govern the limits and capacity of a will. How could on demand something apart form one's own nature? Will is usually thought of as an expression of a nature. He is certainly going to have to furnish a reason for us to think this would be the case.

The problem with this atheist position is, ironically, it's Calvinistic-like implications. Calvin emphasized the will of God over and above creative wisdom (creative wisdom is God's nature). Like the good little fundies that atheists are they want o split off the will from nature when in reality will is just an aspect of nature. Think about it. The nature of a thing is the way it is. Now how can will be part of the way God is without being part of his nature?

Mike WC:

However, if this division is too rigid, then it falls to the second horn: you are positing a God that is, in effect, split. There is a divine will, and then there is a divine nature. The divine will answers wholly to the divine nature, which has no will of its own. When God issues a moral command, there is a gap between the decision to issue the command and the source of the command.

This is merely a false dilemma. The will of any being is part of that being's nature and works according to that nature. The nature of God is primarily love, so the will of God is based upon love. Are we ever given a reson to think that God's will is out of line with his nature? I think not. Ah but Mike shoots back with this classic assertion:

If God's nature has no will of its own, then it is it not collapsible into a Good outside and above God's will? And then, why can't humans just by pass God's will and just talk about the Good? In other words, the gap between will and nature is just a different version of the second horn of Euthyphro.Notice, he has not yet expalined by God can't have a will of his own as part of his nature?

This is what we call "begging the question." He's merely asserting a conclusion which he basis his premise, the conclusion that he wants to come to, then uses it as a premise to justify coming to it. In this classic move of circular reasoning he asserts the very point under contention as though it's a proof of his position (thus begging the question). If God's nature has no will of it own, he asserts. The problem there is it does, that's the whole point I've been making. Moreover, he can give us no other reason to assume this is the case except that "If this was the case. I would be right." God's nature has a will of it's own, it's called "God's will." That's what will is, it's an expression of our nature. There's no point in asserting that the nature has a second will that's in contradiction to the first will? Why assert that? He gives us no reason.

He asserts that the "gap between will and nature is just a different version of the second horn of the" dilemma. No it's not. Why would that be? The second horn is that there's a standard independent of God. Since that standard is God himself, it's not separate; WC is trying to turn that into a whole seperate person with real reason for doing so, there's no assume it. He asserts that this second is the gap but what gap? He has to first suggest why there would be a gap and has no done so.

Mike WC:

Perhaps you could say that God's nature is unknowable for humans, outside of God's willing revelation of himself. This does not solve the problem, however. If God has exclusive and exhaustive knowledge of his own nature, we must accept one of two interpretations of this.

We know God's nature; it's love. We know this through God's self revelation to us and our empirical experience of God's presence. It's a false dilemma. There is no dilemma. God moves to bring people into the sphere of his love. God is about love; this furnishes the background of the moral universe. He doesn't just hand down laws from on high,they are not arbitrary whims. The real problem of the dilemma is that on the one hand if good is just God's command with no independent standard then God is arbitrary and good is just a whim. If God is independent of the standard then he's not fully in charge and so is not God. The position I have taken resolves the problem because it says God's commands are not independent of Go but neither are they arbitrary whims, they are manifestations of purpose and wisdom in creation which harken form God's loving nature, that is the basis of the good. That is an answer we could not get from the Geek gods.

The rule keeping aspect of morality didn't work, and God tells us it didn't work (of he knew it wouldn't it was only a a ruse to show us why we have to internalize the values of the good--see Jer. 31/Heb 1:1). We employ the moral law placed inside us and we filter it through cultural constructs. That's what makes ethical and the morality of a culture, but the background against which all ethical moves are played out is God's divine love, aka agape. 2) God's nature is an object separate from his will,
conjecture not in evidence. That is merely the upshot of the subject/object dichotomy. He needs to learn some phenomenology becuase that just reduces God to an object. We can experience God's nature. We may not understand it intellectually but we can experience and we can intuit it. That's what mystics are about.

Mike asserts: "This is perhaps the only way out for the apologist, to claim that the Good is essentially unknowable for humans." God is beyond our understanding but that doesn't mean he's unknowable. you are confusing experiential knowledge with book learning and facts.

Mike WC

This does not solve the logical problem of there being a gap between God's commands and the source of those commands, however. Humans would be incapable of bypassing God's commands and revelation, but this is not because of a logical impossibility, but rather the infinitude of humanity.

Again he asserts a gap without giving us any reason to think there is one. He can imagine one based upon skepticism that is a far cry from proving there is one. It's just a product of his hermeneutic of skepticism. Logically linking God's commands to his nature f love resolves the problem complete because it means the standards is not separate from God nor is it an arbitrary whim, and there is basic reason ever given to imagine a gap. What I've said aboe about love as the background of the moral universe shows that a gap is not really possible becuase the whole concept of the moral apart form God's love is impossible. It would have no meaning as a moral universe. The moral law that God has placed upon our hearts is God's command in line with God's nature, God is not forging a moral law as a subject of higher power but is translating what is in his heart. speaking metaphorically of "heart."

The knowability issue is not really much of an issue. God is beyond our understanding intellectually but that's kind of knowledge we need to live morally. The kind of knolwedge we need is empirical knowledge of God's love and revelation knowledge of god's commands, although that is placed on the heart is available though natural theology. There are many theological methods and systems that would answer this arguemnt. One of them majors is the Eastern orthodox concept of mystical union which turns upon apoplectic theology (negative--don't say that it is but what ti's not).

Euthyphro dilemma is only an issue where God is contingent and there is a higher power. There is no higher power than the eternal necesasry aspect of being. In the OT he's called "I Am." In the NT he's called "Our father who art in Heaven."

The Euthephro Dilemma

 The Euthyphro  Dilemma
 
 have theology: Will Argue

Originally Posted (on CARM) by MikeWC

This is a long post. The final paragraph is a summary of the argument, if you wish to just straight to it.

The Euthyphro dilemma can be briefly stated this way: either morality comes entirely from God, in which case it is changeable according to his will, or it comes from outside God, in which case God is unnecessary.

 Actually I think he stated it wrong. I don't think the second horn of the dilemma is that if it comes from out of God morality is "unnecessary," but that God is not supreme. One thing that's going to figure big in my answer is this fact: The Euthyphro dilemma was applicable to the Greek gods only becuase they were not God in the sense that the Bible God is God, nor were they God in the sense that the God of Aquinas or Anslem is God or. Greek gods were contingent beings, they were not eternal, they were products of prior beings. God in the Christian sense is the eternal necessary aspect of all being. Thus That God is necessary and not contingent, and is not the produce of prior condition.

That makes a big difference because it is only the contingency of the Greek gods that gives them their relative nature and thus enables the Fates to outrank them in terms of power. That's where the entire dilemma stems from, that Zeus was subject to the fates. The God of Abraham, of Issac and of Jacob is not subject to any fates. The God of Christianity freed humanity from the cruelty of fate, and still frees us form determinism. This is so becuase the eternal necessary aspect of all being, is bigger than any deterministic aspect of being, which is only a contingency HE created in the first place.

Mike WC says:

There is an increasingly popular refutation of the old Euthyphro dilemma among apologists. It is an attempt to split the horns of the dilemma by creating a third alternative. The alternative is to identity the Good wholly with God's nature: being Good is one of God's essential attributes.

Without meaning to boast I think I really do I am the person who started that answer. I don't remember ever seeing it on the net before I gave it. Once I argued it a few times on prominent atheist boards people began to talk about it. In any case, "being good" is not a mere attribute of God as though it's on a par with being short or tall, fat or thin, it's based upon the nature of God. That is certainly no exaggeration; in the Christian tradition God is the basis of the good which stems from God's nature as love. St. Augustine said love is the background of the moral universe, and by that meant that God, as truth itself, as being itself is the basis upon which the good has meaning. Augustine put the forms in the mind of God, so anything like "the good" that under Plato would be a product of the forums would be a product of the Mind of God.

Mike WC: "This idea is meant to dissolve the dilemma by taking the pros of each horn, while eliminating the cons. Morality is not changeable according to God's will, because it lies eternally in his nature. And it is not outside God for the same reason." Here he more or less gets it right. What it really does is bring out the distinction between eternal necessary being vs. contingent beings. The contingent beings who are called "gods" only because they are more powerful than mortals and last longer (although they can die and hey have origins so they are not eternal), can't supply the ultimate basis for philosophical grounding that eternal necessary being does supply.

In answer to this point Mike says:

My argument is that this just creates a new dilemma. This refutation of Euthyphro depends on God having both a will and a nature. This may seem trivial, but let's draw out the consequences.In order for the refutation to stand, there must be a clear division between God's will and God's nature. If no such division exists, then then all this refutation has done is accept the first horn: God could change morality through his will. 

 I don't think there has to be a "clear division." There seems to be no problem with asserting that a consciousness has both a  will and a nature. They are clearly two separate things, but one would be in line with the other as a nature would always govern the limits and capacity of a will. How could on demand something apart form one's own nature?  Will is usually thought of as an expression of a nature. He is certainly going to have to furnish a reason for us to think this would be the case.

The problem with this atheist position  is, ironically, it's Calvinistic-like implications. Calvin emphasized the will of God over and above creative wisdom (creative wisdom is God's nature). Like the good little fundies that atheists are they want o split off the will from nature when in reality will is just an aspect of nature. Think about it. The nature of a thing is the way it is. Now how can will be part of the way God is without being part of his nature?

Mike WC:

However, if this division is too rigid, then it falls to the second horn: you are positing a God that is, in effect, split. There is a divine will, and then there is a divine nature. The divine will answers wholly to the divine nature, which has no will of its own. When God issues a moral command, there is a gap between the decision to issue the command and the source of the command.

This is merely a false dilemma. The will of any being is part of that being's nature and works according to that nature. The nature of God is primarily love, so the will of God is based upon love. Are we ever given a reson to think that God's will is out of line with his nature? I think not. Ah but Mike shoots back with this classic assertion:

If God's nature has no will of its own, then it is it not collapsible into a Good outside and above God's will? And then, why can't humans just by pass God's will and just talk about the Good? In other words, the gap between will and nature is just a different version of the second horn of Euthyphro.Notice, he has not yet expalined by God can't have a will of his own as part of his nature?

This is what we call "begging the question." He's merely asserting a conclusion which he basis his premise, the conclusion that he wants to come to, then uses it as a premise to justify coming to it. In this classic move of circular reasoning he asserts the very point under contention as though it's a proof of his position (thus begging the question). If God's nature has no will of it own, he asserts. The problem there is it does, that's the whole point I've been making. Moreover, he can give us no other reason to assume this is the case except that "If this was the case. I would be right." God's nature has a will of it's own, it's called "God's will." That's what will is, it's an expression of our nature. There's no point in asserting that the nature has a second will that's in contradiction to the first will? Why assert that? He gives us no reason.

He asserts that the "gap  between will and nature is just a different version of the second horn of the" dilemma. No it's not. Why would that be? The second horn is that there's a standard independent of God. Since that standard is God himself, it's not separate; WC is trying to turn that into a whole seperate person with real reason for doing so, there's no assume it.  He asserts that this second is the gap but what gap? He has to first suggest why there would be a gap and has no done so.

Mike WC:

Perhaps you could say that God's nature is unknowable for humans, outside of God's willing revelation of himself. This does not solve the problem, however. If God has exclusive and exhaustive knowledge of his own nature, we must accept one of two interpretations of this.

 We know God's nature; it's love. We know this through God's self revelation to us and our empirical experience of God's presence. It's a false dilemma. There is no dilemma. God moves to bring people into the sphere of his love. God is about love; this furnishes the background of the moral universe. He doesn't just hand down laws from on high,they are not arbitrary whims. The real problem of the dilemma is that on the one hand if good is just God's command with no independent standard then God is arbitrary and good is just a whim. If God is independent of the standard then he's not fully in charge and so is not God. The position I have taken resolves the problem because it says God's commands are not independent of Go but neither are they arbitrary whims, they are manifestations of purpose and wisdom in creation which harken form God's loving nature, that is the basis of the good. That is an answer we could not get from the Geek gods.

The rule keeping aspect of morality didn't work, and God tells us it didn't work (of he knew it wouldn't it was only a a ruse to show us why we have to internalize the values of the good--see Jer. 31/Heb 1:1). We employ the moral law placed inside us and we filter it through cultural constructs. That's what makes ethical and the morality of a culture, but the background against which all ethical moves are played out is God's divine love, aka agape. 2) God's nature is an object separate from his will,
conjecture not in evidence. That is merely the upshot of the subject/object dichotomy. He needs to learn some phenomenology becuase that just reduces God to an object. We can experience God's nature. We may not understand it intellectually  but we can experience and we can intuit it. That's what mystics are about.

Mike asserts: "This is perhaps the only way out for the apologist, to claim that the Good is essentially unknowable for humans."  God is beyond our understanding but that doesn't mean he's unknowable. you are confusing experiential knowledge with book learning and facts.

Mike WC

This does not solve the logical problem of there being a gap between God's commands and the source of those commands, however. Humans would be incapable of bypassing God's commands and revelation, but this is not because of a logical impossibility, but rather the infinitude of humanity.

Again he asserts a gap without giving us any reason to think there is one. He can imagine one based upon skepticism that is a far cry from proving there is one. It's just a product of his hermeneutic of skepticism. Logically linking God's commands to his nature f love resolves the problem complete because it means the standards is not separate from God nor is it an arbitrary whim, and there is basic  reason ever given to imagine a gap. What I've said aboe about love as the background of the moral universe shows that a gap is not really possible becuase the whole concept of the moral apart form God's love is impossible. It would have no meaning as a moral universe. The moral law that God has placed upon our hearts is God's command in line with God's nature, God is not forging a moral law as a subject of higher power but is translating what is in his heart. speaking metaphorically of "heart."

The knowability issue is not really much of an issue. God is beyond our understanding intellectually but that's kind of knowledge we need to live morally. The kind of knolwedge we need is empirical knowledge of God's love and revelation knowledge of god's commands, although that is placed on the heart is available though natural  theology. There are many theological methods and systems that would answer this arguemnt. One of them majors is the Eastern orthodox concept of mystical union which turns upon apoplectic theology (negative--don't say that it is but what ti's not).

Euthyphro  dilemma is only an issue where God is contingent and there is a higher power. There is no higher power than the eternal necesasry aspect of being. In the OT he's called "I Am." In the NT he's called "Our father who art in Heaven."

Culture Wars Have Left Deep Devide.

One thing I see from arguing with atheists on message board is that a certain segment of our population has no cocnept of God as the concept relates to Judeo-Christian theology. What is more telling is that this segment can't understand the concept of morality either. The first piece of evidence of evidence I would ike to sumbmit is A debate I was having on a message board about the moral argument. The issue that God is the perfect moral judge, and being all knowing has the ability to understand the heart. The issue became muddled because they kept expecting me to argue for "objective morality," which I don't do. The real issue came up when several of them kept arguing that God's "opinion" is no better than theirs! Several of them argued this way and seemed almost stunned that I "couldn't understand it." Nothing speaks like hte horses mouth:

Humble Thinker:
post 20

People claim that without warrant to conveniently support their argument. One could just as easily claim that He is simply treated as a super man, but a man nonetheless, but you obviously would not accept that. This is the "upshot" you are talking about. Why don't you understand that?

This guy actually wants to say that God is literally a man! When I try to point out that the Christain concpet of God is not only that God si "more powerful," not just the most powerful, but the basis of all that is, duh...water off a duck's back. Means nothing. They can't even ponder the phrase.

The related issue is that they can't understand morality. I can grasp consideration the question "why do we need an ought?" My definition of morality is "the realm of ought." morality is the area of ethics where oughts apply more stridently to personal behavior. X is what we ought or ought not do. Yet my moral arguemnt asserts as a premise that there is a universal sense of moral motions, that all cultures embrace the concept of the ought in behavior.

Argument:

(1) Humans are possessed of moral motions which we find to be real and important. We cannot deny the senes of moral outrage over "evil" or the sense that one "ought" to do that which we find "good."

(2) Such moral moral motions can be understood as grounded in terms of behavior in our genetic endowment, but no explanation can tell us why we find them moral or how to justify them as "ought's."

(3) Genetic explanations only provide an understanding of behavior, they do not offer the basis of a moral dimension.

(4) Social contract theory offers only relativism that can be changed or ignored in the shifting sands of social necessity and politics.

(5) matters of feeling are merely matters of taste and should be ignored as subjective (the atheist dread of the subjective).

(6) God is the only source of grounding which works as a regulative concept for our moral axioms and at the same time actually explains the deep seated nature of moral motions.


The augment turns on its explanatory value; this version is based upon C.S. Lewis with Kantian overtones.

That allows demanding of the argument, "prove there is a reason to attach an ought to behavior." Yet an atheist known as 1337 argues that it's begging the questoin to assume the ought.

Begging the question in my own words: The conclusion is embedded in the question/premise.

1337 (post 38)

Begging the question in my own words: The conclusion is embedded in the question/premise.This is what you have done here. You've assigned the word "ought" to morality which implies that there is a reason. You've discounted naturalism as a means to give reason for our morality and you can't have a reason for something above and beyond naturalism without appealing to god. So by assuming that we "ought" to behave certain ways is a premise that has god embedded in it already, but the premise hasn't been proven yet. It's like a loaded question.

I did in fact discount naturalism and I gave reasons as to why that was the case. I argued Hume's fork, you can't derive an ought from an is. Premise one "human are possessed of moral motions which we find important." Is not a logical proposition but an empirical statement. Thus it can't be begging the question because it's not a logically deduced premise. It's a statement aobut human behavior based upon observation of humanity. For evidence I site the list of cultures that place stricture upon lying, stealing, murder and other such disvalues, presented in the appendix to C.S. Lewis's The Abolition of Man. That removes it form the realm of questoin begging and makes it an observation tired to what people actually value.
This preempts asking "how do you know that the "ought" ought to be part of morality?" (dig the irony and self contradiction). I can understand the idea of asking such questions but the only real challenge would be to the empirical nature of the observation, which she doesn't do.

In both cases it seems both of these people have missed something foundational to Western culture that anyone in my youth would have understood implicitly. This is not to say taht kids in my young day did not question morality. Are you kidding? I was a kid in the 60s. this was the era of new morality. People back then certnly knew how to question authority. God is not just any authority. God is the basis of all authority. Yet it's more than just an issue of authority. It seems the very concept of God is missing from that guy's very brain. He wants to think that if we don't think of God as a big man then we are begging the question or special pleading (even stupider). No one who understands the concept can fail to see this si the nature of God belief. We believe God is the transcendent signified. this is what we believe in. This has been the concept of God for thousands of years, to think it was structured to avoid charges of special pleading which never eixted until modern tiems. is crazy. To think that God is a man is even crazier. They are actually trying to pull God out of haven and force humanity upon him so that he comes under the jurisdiction of science.

In addition to not understanding the concept of God they don't seem to understand the concept of ought or the concept of a phenomenological description. To say that the majority of humans value the concept of the ought is not something one can charge with special pleading. Either people do value the ought or they don't.If they do, the arguemnt assumes they do, so that premise stands. If it stands or falls it must do so on the basis of empirical data not logical heuristic. I have written on atheist watch why it's not special pleading either.

Not only is there good evidence that is empirical, regardless of social science's assertions to the contrary, but we also see the same value at work amid the very people who are trying to deny he value of morality. When the politically correct types insert tems such as "PC" they are basically making thier own version of the ought. "Correctness" is just another way of saying "ought." However it's phrased. If we say "it's immoral to be unfair to gays"or if we say "I's oppressive to be unfair to gays" we are still saying "one should not be unfair ro a certain group." There is an ought. For good old 1337 (such a beautiful name,I wonder if "she" (if she is a she) would let me call her "13") to say "this argument is a fallacy" is another way of sayign "one ought not to argue this." They are going t use their words to put themselves in control. yet the same concept is lurking behind their very critique of the concept.

This is the all the upshot of the culture wars. Those who opposes God and hate God belief are bereft of the concept and so removed form the former culture that they can't understand the issues because the basic ground level assumptions that stem from understanding the God concept are just not there. That is the great tribulation. Just as the images of the great trib depict total persecution of Chrsitians and total victory for the anti-Christ, that's what we see shaping up now. Not a literal fulfillment in end times senerios, perhaps, but the removal of the very cocnept of God such that they cannot comprehend what believers are saying. Another biblical metaphor would be Babel. The pride and arrogance of modern mans has so corrupted the language, language is culture, that even the very concept of God is gone! Even in such a stark time human nature still demonstrates the moral law written on the heart (Rom 2:6-14).

Shall We Begin Lynching Athesits?

Upon What do we Base Moral Judgment, How do We Know Right And Wrong?


why do I say tank man made
a moral commitment?

On my message boards, Doxa Forums Fleetmouse and I were discussing Richard Rorty. Back in graduate school I studied Rorty pertty carefully, at least in terms of his work Contingency,Irony, Solidarity. I was jabbering about my memories, that was time when I was on top of my game and I knew that work, I knew every word in the book and the margins of my copy were a huge palemcest. My views about Rorty and that book were pretty negative, shaped by the professor of the class I'm sure. I stated that CIS seems to leave one with the idea that the immedicate comminity is the only basis for morality standards and that being moral or ethical is a matter of "go along get along." As an example I used the idea that if one lived in Soutern U.S. in 1900 lynching black people on trumped up reasons would be considered moral by the community. Fleetmouse likes Rorty so he was prompted to stick up for him. He issues this challenge:

could you please explain to me why lynching is absolutely wrong without making any reference whatsoever to your own beliefs, belief system, personal preference or culture?

It struck me that since he's not willing to just agree that lynching is a universal disapprobation and thus that would be a litmus test for Rorty, instead he wanted me to prove it's wrong. He wants a neutral account of why it's wrong that is divorced from any arguable sense that is. That's not possible. We all share a constitutive sense that it is wrong, that should guide us in the litmus test of Rorty. Nevertheless, we can't demonstrate the truth of that value without appeal to belief or systems becuase it is the product of such, or least if not casual than indicatively related to it.

The question implies that there's no basis for saying that's wrong. The implication is that if you have to defend the view that it's wrong by means of appeal to a belief or something that must be argued then there's no basis for saying it's wrong. That is a total contradiction to the way atheists have been answering the question since I've been on message boards (questions like it, the meta-ethical question of "what is the basis of right and wrong). Atheists in general always reflect one of three basic foundations for moral judgment:

(1) personal feeling
(2) social contract
(3) genetics

I argue against these in various ways, I don't consider them as valid basis by themselves for an ethical system. Yet I fully expected a defence of one of these, and instead got an implication that there is no basis. I don't imagine that Fleetmouse doesn't accept the intrinsic wrongness of lynching, so I gave him credit for that realization. He would be repulsed by it and he wouldn't do it. He wants to play this little game where I go though the spelling out of why it's wrong ect ect the fact that he wants to do implies that there really is no answer.

If he's seeking to let Rorty off the Hook he's doing it at the expense of some of he most cherished truths of human morality. The fact is we should all be able to agree that it is wrong to lynch even if we can't spell out why or provide indubitable scientific data to prove it. Where does the absurd notion come from that this must be disconnected from belief or it's wrong? First of all the question itself is impossible. To ask one to explain why something is wrong apart from beliefs, systems, and culture is like saying "explain why it's wrong without any reference to why it's wrong! Beliefs and systems are not negations of some empirical ethics we can glean from scinece. There's no such thing as empirical ethics or ethics gleaned form scinece. moral motions and ethical judgments are about beliefs. There's no shame in that. The assumption that belief is intrinsically wrong, the implication being that there's some empirical truth to be found scientifically apart form bleief, is just crazy. I think the desire to ground all knowledge in scinece is the culprit lurking behind the problem here.

In his wonderful ground breaking work Sources of the Self, Charles Taylor discusses the relation of ethics to our concepts of person-hood and self. All ethical views, like views of the self are based up construct built form constituent parts. Regardless of the ultimate source of moral truth, or lack thereof, this s how it's done when you are human. The more basic the constituent parts held in common are the more confidently we can assume some kind of truth lurking behind that approbation or disapprobation. People build those constructs in different ways, that's what makes ethics and morality so diverse. One part we are all playing with no matter how we arrange it is a basic sense of the need to live. It's our empathy as humans that turns the need to live, the drive, the frantic demand that we must live, into the desire to see others live and flourish.

That doesn't prove why lynching is wrong, but it does mean we know it is. Regardless of our systems or our constructs or how we put it together, regardless of the meta-ethics (how we know what is right or wrong), this is deeper even then meta-ethics, which is one of the things closest to bedrock, we all have this basic constituent part if we have basic human empathy.That doesn't prove why it's wrong, but it tell us at a gut level that it is.

To then want an explanation of why divorced from that basic understanding of the reverence for live (which is the drive to live turned outward) is doing violence to the whole concept of having a moral code. Anyone, theist, atheist, or pantheist or whatever has to have this basic fact in place in order to act ethically. Without that there is no morel decision because there's no moral commitment.

Whatever one's ethical view point one of the basic things we should be able to agree on just as a human feeling regardless of the ability to prove it's wrong is the evil of injustice and unjustly destroying a life for some trivial prejudice. To try and divorce that from the feelings that go with ethical commitment is to dismantle the process of being moral. That should be the regulator of virtue and action. To say that Rorty is willing to do away with that becuase he has no committement should tell us right there he is not to be trusted in his ethical evaluations. His basis in pragmatism is so pragmatic he gives away the store.

The question also calls for explication without reference to culture. That is a contradiction in terms. That's like saying explain without words. Culture is language, language is culture. What Rorty is doing is accepting culture in place of person insight, feeling, commitment, belief or any sort connection to a universal or transcendent truth. He makes an idol out of the community. Then the questions asks to explain without reference to even the community (culture) which is daft because even Rorty is NOT willing to do that. OF course Fleet put that in because he thought I was saying the culture has nothing to do with it. I am not saying that and I agree you can't talk about right and wrong without reference to culture or community, yet that doesn't mean those things are the origin of right and wrong.

Again, culture is the medium of our thought. It's not the only from of turth, but it is the language of our thinking. Culture is language in it's fuller and more developed sense. Trying to separate them is like trying to separate the wave from the curl. Whatever transcendent truth there is that makes murder wrong above and beyond culture, is going to be communicated in culture and understood culturally. So again the question is nonsense.

Making the immediate community the orbiter of right and wrong makes an idol of the provincial. There are larger cultures, where each community overlaps with others and connections to other people far wider in their bonds until we are talking about districts, nations and finally an international community. To make the provincial the orbiter just becuase there's no imagination and an abhorrence of bleief in God, is just creating an idol out of ignorance. The provincial is the limit on liminal space. It's the liminal that marks the trek as "transcendent." So to limit knowledge to the subliminal is to cut off the transcendent and to make ignorance the limit on learning. We can't traverse anything we don't know. That's means we are enshrining bigotry. That has to be something we oppose at any level or as advocates of any ethical system. That's another constituent part.

I understand why Fleetmouse set up the question in this way. I seemed to be saying the community has noting to do with it, since I castigated Rorty for basing ethics on the community. That's not quite what I'm saying. I am saying there are times when moral judgment transcends the immediate community and there are time when we must stand up against the community and opposes it. Even in that case one must be understanding the moral and ethical decision through the understanding afford by the background culture upon which the community is based or it has no meaning in relation to the community, even to opposes it. Imagine if one says "lynching black people for any reason is murder, it should never be done," the other person says "what's lynching?" For the judgment "do not lynch" to make sense one must know what the words means, that's going to be understood through the culture and nothing else.

Obviously then there's a relationship bewteen the community and the moral. The relationship is not such that the moral depends entirely upon the decision of the community. Culture is primarily a medium, a point of reference, the means by which ideas are understood, a repository of icons and a universe of symbols. That does not preclude a transcendent realm or a transcendent truth. (for an arrangement establishing the basis of a transcendent truth see Olson's article on Tillich's implied ontological argument. See also this blog on my article on same).

As to answering the question, everyone is going to assume that I will say "It's wrong becasue God says so." Not exactly. I have reject that account of Christian morality. Rather than sheer volunteerism I propose that God makes ethical decisions based upon wisdom and his wisdom is indexed by the basis of his charter, which is love. So that love forms the basis of everything, and the back of the moral universe is part of "everything." Morality is the upshot of love, God's love, this is why it's a constituent part universal to humanity. We see ethical thinking showing up in the form of empathy where we are able to focus the drive to live outward upon the desire of others to live. Empathizing is an act of love becuase it's other directed. Love is the will to the good of the other. Thus other directed consciousness is an act of love. This serves as both universal transcendent truth and cultural construct. This means that belief and commitment are not out of bounds for ethical discussion. Morality is decision making. A moral act is one that is decided upon based upon a value system, it is also an act to which one is willing to commit oneself becasue the a value being defended is more important than a taste or a whim but is a value requiring a true commitment. Commitment of this kind must be motivated by love. Even if Tank man didn't know he was acting love, his committment to be crushed while confronting the tanks was still an act of love at some level.


The traditional moral argument (for the existence of God) plays off this sense of the constituent approbation. At least true of my version of it. We know this act is right, or wrong, but we can't say way except in so far as we tie the reason to God. Kant saw that as a reason to believe in God. The atheist see it as a disproof of God and morality because it's not empirical science. That's self defeating it's like the question Fleetmouse asks above. It divorces the concept of the moral from it's reason for being. You can't expect a coherent answer at that rate.