Wednesday, August 18, 2010

The Real Reasons for Belief in God

 Originally I had written a different essay (a better one) but I had problems trying to post and it was lost. So this is a re-hash for the spur of the moment, My apologizes but the original run of this post seemed to interest readers.


Atheists have a new trick--which is actually their original trick but dusted off. They seem to be on a tangent of arguing that "there's no proof for your God." Of course, they have never really stopped saying that. But perhaps a new generation is coming up. I find more of them more often arguing that there is not "one single piece of scientific evidence..." When I put out several posts on the CARM atheist board similar to the previous post here, Kuhn, science is a social construct, they just went ape. One of them was saying "you are making such a fool of yourself to say these things..." Of course it takes real ignorance no to know that no so long ago (mid 90's perhaps) Kuhn was hot stuff. He was a major force, considered a major thinker in the world for about four decades. But I'm making a fool of myself! When I told them we should not expect to find scientific of evdience of God because God is not a scientific question they just sort of blinked their eyes (in writing so to speak) and said "that's why you shouldn't believe in him." Before it was all said and done one of them had made several pronouncements to the effect that "science tells us everything that is worth knowing and if something isn't given in science it's not worth knowing." Moreover, "the only meaningful questions are scientific questions because that's what makes them meaningful." I bet that guy is magic in a relationship.

What can one say? Everyone likes a booster. When confronted with the challenge to prove that science is the only valid form of knowledge--with scientific data only--of course they responded with philosophical arguments and logic. Naturally they never tried to offer one single piece of evidence from science, and when I put up the post defending religious experience with 300 studies they just poo pooed and said it wasn't science. So science is the only valid knowledge, but you can't prove that with science, and when it supports religion it's not science. Of course the real problem is its impossible to really tell people why we believe in God. No one actually comes to believe because of some fact or argument. It's so ultra foolish to expect scientific proof because belief is a world view, it's not based upon any one fact, but upon thousands of fact, upon the way we look at ourselves and the world. It's important to make God arguments, not to prove the existence of God, but because you can't say "I have reasons, they are supported by lots of things and deal and junk and stuff." God arguments help us to focus on detailed reasons that support belief, but they are not meant to prove anything.




The real problem is, on the one hand, the believer really doesn't have a single cogent provable reason for belief, on the other hand, the atheist doesn't understand the nature of world views. Atheists don't understand their own unbelief. They can't get it that they are touting an ideology. They think all the have to do is say "it's the absence of a belief" and that's suppose to make it real simple and clear it of any ideological connotations. But its' not that simple. Belief is a world view.It's foundational, that is is serves as the basis for everything else you think and the ways you view the world. You can't just take out the centerpiece of a world view and not replace it with something. Its' absurd to say "atheism is just the absence of a belief" there is no such thing. The absence of a belief is the presence of unbelief and that is an ideology. This is what Derrida teaches us: absence is presence and presence is absence. It's easy to be a skeptic all you have to do is just keep doubting things and demeaning that no evidence is of any value until it lines up with the ideology. But they have a very clear ideology to fill in the blank left by God and it is based upon reductionism. Nothing short of absolute scientific proof will do becasue the absence of the foudnation requires the presence of a replacement foundation.

atheists can only see the primitive misunderstanding, they can't see the sense of transcendence behind it.



Maslow talks about the psychological necessity of being able to maintain a tranformative symbology. He is not merely saying that we should do this, but that we do it, it is universal and through many different technqiues and psychological schools of thought he shows that this has been gleaned over and over again. What Jung called the Archetypes are universal symbols of transfomration which we understand in the uncoscious, and we must be able to hold them in proper relation to the mundane (the Sacred and the Profane) in order to enjoy healthy growth, or we stagnate and become pathological. It is crucial to human psychology to maintain this balance. Far from merely being stupid and not understanding science, striving to expalin a pre-Newtonian world, the primatives understood this balance and held it better than we do. Religious beleif is crucial to our psychological well being, and this fact far more than social order or the need for examplianation exaplians the origins of religion.

Quote:

"For practically all primitives, these matters that I have spoken about are seen in a more pious, sacred way, as Eliade has stressed, i.e., as rituals, ceremonies, and mysteries. The ceremony of puberty, which we make nothing of, is extremely important for most primitive cultures. When the girl menstruates for the first time and becomes a woman, it is truly a great event and a great ceremony; and it is truly, in the profound and naturalistic and human sense, a great religious moment in the life not only of the girl herself but also of the whole tribe. She steps into the realm of those who can carry on life and those who can produce life; so also for the boy's puberty; so also for the ceremonies of death, of old age, of marriage, of the mysteries of women, the mysteries of men. I think that an examination of primitive or preliterate cultures would show that they often manage the unitive life better than we do, at least as far as relations between the sexes are concerned and also as between adults and children. They combine better than we do the B and the D, as Eliade has pointed out. He defined primitive cultures as different from industrial cultures because they have kept their sense of the sacred about the basic biological things of life.

"We must remember, after all, that all these happenings are in truth mysteries. Even though they happen a million times, they are still mysteries. If we lose our sense of the mysterious, or the numinous, if we lose our sense of awe, of humility, of being struck dumb, if we lose our sense of good fortune, then we have lost a very real and basic human capacity and are diminished thereby."

"Now that may be taken as a frank admission of a naturalistic psychological origin, except that it invovles a universal symbology which is not explicable through merely naturalistic means. How is it that all humans come to hold these same archetypical symbols? (For more on archetypes see Jesus Chrsit and Mythology page II) The "prematives" viewed and understood a sense of transformation which gave them an integration into the universe. This is crucial for human development. They sensed a power in the numenous, that is the origin of religion."


He is saying that the reductionist can only see a flimsy superstition in such primitive doings, but the real knight of faith sees in it the sense of the numinous the way religion really affects people on in daily life. In the words of Thomas Indinopulos:

I think this is a healthy development. When emphasis shifts away from what a Christian believes or does not believe, we can begin to understand the power and meaning of Christianity in a given culture, at a certain time. In other words, I should say that a better way to ascertain Christian belief is to focus on how Christians actually live their lives. I say this on the basis of years spent with Greek villagers who, when asked what they believe, can hardly answer in any precise way. But ask them how they would identify themselves as Greek Orthodox and you will hear a recital of ritual observances and traditional acts of faith that leave no doubt that their faith is not a matter of what is believed or thought about, but rather what is done or felt or imagined. For such villagers the daily life of faith is not reducible to or equatable with a set of formal beliefs. The academic or pedagogical implications here are enormous. When professors teach Christianity as a matter of beliefs, ideas, and institutions, they may be teaching something that is not at all equivalent to the religion practiced by the people who claim the Christian religion as their own. But if they were to teach Christianity as practiced, they would have to pay attention to that which is not so easily categorized as doctrine -- the unspoken, often emotional undertones of faith on the part of ordinary believers.



My point being that real belief is faith, not words on paper. The reasons people relay believe in God have to do with the way they sense their presence in the world and the relation to that sense of God which they also intuit in the world. A good example of this came out in a message board discussion I had on CARM recently:

I don't remember who the other party in the discussion was, I'll just call him "friendly atheist."

Quote:
Originally Posted by Metacrock View Post
the studies show believers are less depressed. you should encourage her faith even if you dont' believe in it. I'm not saying it's your fault but obviously it's very damaging to someone who fervently believes to have that crushed. Please don't think I'm accusing you.




FA:Many of us who are no longer believers have dealt with the transition. I'm not sure that 'damaging' is the correct word. Sometimes growth is hard. Sometimes realizing that what you believed for a long time is false can be hard to deal with. It requires a commitment to intellectual honesty and a desire to know rather than to believe.


Meta: a lot will depend upon why the loss of faith. If one outgrows the Provencal nature of one's faith context, then it's not damaging it's actually a form of growth. Unfortunately due to the fundies and other religious people a lot of people never find the more progressive style of faith so they don't go on with it. But to lose faith due to personal tragedy or just being worn down and not having a chance to cultivate it is deadly. it's killing.





Quote:
FA:My wife and I don't argue about it. I'm not 'anti' about it.


Meta: that's good. what do you hope for? The best you can do is momentary happiness and not really that if you have hard times.


FA:Even in hard times there are things that can be hoped for. I hope for ease, happiness, love, the same as anyone


Meta:Yes but I have someone to trust in hard times. I know from personal experince I can trust God to me through anything. I'm not the least bit worried about the backing collapse. I expect to die in the gutter but I'm looking froward to a lot of republicans learning something!

more than just beyond life. It's the hope that some force of love cares about you.


FA:I prefer to be loved by someone rather than think that I am loved by a 'force'. Perhaps being loved by a force is sufficient for many people but 'love' to me is an active thing.

Meta:I understand why it would be hard for you to think of god as real, but It's not all hard for me. In fact the opposite. it's nearly impossible for the to deny God's reality, becasue the experinces I've had cannot be denied.

even in times when I thought God abandoned me I was still not wiling to give up the concept, I was willing to think of God as impersonal before I was willing to say there wasn't one. Then he came through and I knew I just needed to trust.

I know it's hard for you think of that as a reality since you have not experienced it. but I have and i know it's real. I know it as well as I know I exist myself.


Meta:It's not the hope of getting money because you pray for it anything like that. But meaning in life gives hope.

FA:I agree. I would rather have real meaning than imaginary meaning. But either way, whether one believes that God has a purpose or if one gives credit to something else for their purpose, ultimately it all comes from the self. WE determine our purpose, our meaning.


Meta:meaning that I get from God is a priroi. IT is real and it doesn't depend upon the existence of a God with a mind who knows who I am. Just the attitude to being that undersatnd from studying theology gives me a rock solid meaning that can't be deneied. It is real and I prove it's real (the meaning that is not the being named God who thinks and knows who I am).

Now I believe God is mind and knows who I am but even at a default of an impersonal ;God who si just being itself and nothing ore the meaning that comes from that is undeniable.

but the experinces I've had lead me to have a major hope because I know God is real and is more than just being.

Quote:
Quote:
Atheists can only have localized small letter meaning, meaning that is related to the immediate context. Believers in God can have big capital letter meaning.


FA:Atheists and believers are no different here, the 'meaning' in our lives comes from the same place, ourselves. Some just have the need to put the cause on something else.


Meta:I disagree. I've been both. I was a Sartean atheist so the idea of making youkr own meaning was crucial to my thinking. it was total revolution when I got saved. It was day from night.


repentance is not just saying words. It means "turn from sin" so you are changing your thinking and your behavior. if one really repents one does not want to do the same things again.


FA:Did the thief on the cross do more than just say the words?


Meta:Yes, he sure as hell did. His words were not empty they were backed by the attitude of the heart, which is true repentance. He did more than say words, he repented, he turned his heart toward God!

Monday, August 16, 2010

Answer to Brap Gronk on rational warrant for atheism

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Ancient portrait of Mythras


Our famous visitor form another planet, Brap Gronck, makes I comment that I feel is a great chance to get on my soap box. First here is the full comment:

Since you mentioned rationally warranted belief in your most recent comment, I have a question for you. Let’s assume someone is unaware of the case you present for belief being rationally warranted. Let’s also assume the seven points below are true for this person. Would you agree that non-belief is rationally warranted for that person, given the following seven points, or any subset of these points?

1. I have never seen God.
2. I have never heard God.
3. I don’t know anyone who has ever seen God, or claimed to have seen God.
4. I don’t know anyone who has ever heard God, or claimed to have heard God.
5. I am not aware of any evidence of God’s interaction with our world. Natural laws can explain how things work and why things happen, as far as I know.
6. Humans have wondered about the origins of the earth, the sun, the stars, and themselves for a long time. Many creation myths were developed in ancient times in an attempt to explain these origins, and these creation myths are easily proven to be untrue given the current state of scientific knowledge. The account of creation in the book of Genesis appears to be another easily disproven creation myth.
7. I have read “The Demon-Haunted World” by Carl Sagan, and I can’t think of anything in that book I disagree with.

My initial answer was to say this:

Meta:
Thumbnail answer: Any given argument might be rationally warranted, depending upon how it's argued. Rational warrant is like "logical permission to believe something" not actual proof.

A person is logically justified in not believing something if that person truly has no reason to believe it.

However, there's a point at which one can go beyond the line of credulity. For example the reasons you gave for not believing would only be understandable for someone who never actually read a book and knows nothing about modern thought at all.
Now let's break it down:

Why do I say that "I have never seen God" and the other initial responses are only understandable for someone who  has never read a book and knows nothing about modern thought? The answers he gave that  I put in this category are:

1. I have never seen God.
2. I have never heard God.
3. I don’t know anyone who has ever seen God, or claimed to have seen God.
4. I don’t know anyone who has ever heard God, or claimed to have heard God.

I include these answers because they are fallacious as reasons not to believe in God. Let's consider them for a moment as reasons not to believe something we can reasonably sure is true: I have never seen an atom. I have never heard an atom. I don't know anyone who has ever seen an atom I don't know anyone who has ever heard an atom. If one lives in a Modern industrial country and has a college education that person must know that the absurdly simplistic world view of CARM atheists (atheists who post on the message boards at CARM) is extremely simplistic and overly lauds a reductionist outlook while ignoring all evidence to the contrary of that view. Anyone with a college education should know that modern physics, for example, is largely theoretical and deals with things no readily observable. Even a middle school student would know that now days seeing and hearing something are too surface level to understand as epistemic proof. Any one who has been around since Descartes ought to know that. I'm just assuming a sparse exposure to philosophy. Anyone with any kind of real knowledge of religious belief should understand that 99.9% of religious people in the world do not believe the deity is physically observable.

No 5 is an interesting case:

5. I am not aware of any evidence of God’s interaction with our world. Natural laws can explain how things work and why things happen, as far as I know.

Of course that statement suffers from the same flaws as the first four (I assume "our world" means the life world of 20th century earth not this guy's pretend planet).  In  that sense this is just a multiplication of examples from 1-4. But it also appeals to natural laws in general as an alternative to belief in God. Logically that's a non starter because no religious person I know of has said that physical laws are opposed to God, or God has to make things happen directly without recourse to natural law. Atheists have this odd habit of thinking that just becuase it's "natural" it guaranteed to be separate from God. the reason for that is because LaPlace assumed so ("I have no need of that hypothesis"). He was basically the one who kicked off the secular nature of modernity and offered physical law as an alternative to God. But religious people don't' understand it that way. Nature did not just pop up out of nothing, God created it. Of course we will observe nature seeming to run on its own because God created it to be that way; in fact Newton advanced that notion with his theory of comets. Thus, that is all we would see. We should not expect to see anything but natural laws at work in the world becasue they are made to work autonomously. But such laws are a dead give away that there has to be a mind running the universe at some level, see my 3d God argument, "fire in the equations."

The last two points he makes do present some challenge and are moving in the direction of valid reasons for unbelief. They are not really justifications for unbelief, but the thing is I can hear my old inner atheist saying "unbelief needs no justification." I am not sure that's true I think it depends upon one's level of education. The more one has been exposed to good reason to believe the more accountable one is for unbelief short of valid justifications. Obviously what I said above holds, that "A person is logically justified in not believing something if that person truly has no reason to believe it." In the sense that no reason means one is a priori without reason to believe that state of being requires no justification but is self justifying. On the other hand, how any atheists who post on message boards or read blogs are truly without exposure to any good reason fro belief? I would venture none really. This is where atheist incredulity kicks in. Most atheists are opposed to the concept of belief regardless of evidence so for most atheists there can be no such thing as "good reason" to believe. Moreover, this is the clash of paradigms. For those still live and work in a paradigm based upon natural law as the basis of reality and no God, there can be no such thing as 'reason to believe.' For those who live in a believer's world (by virtue of their paradigm) no justification is needed. It's only where the two agree to meet and trade view points and do mutual learning that a common ground is created upon which a discussion can place. Only on that ground can a "good reason" or a justification matter.

Brap says:

6. Humans have wondered about the origins of the earth, the sun, the stars, and themselves for a long time. Many creation myths were developed in ancient times in an attempt to explain these origins, and these creation myths are easily proven to be untrue given the current state of scientific knowledge. The account of creation in the book of Genesis appears to be another easily disproven creation myth.

This is interesting because he takes at face value the creation myth as the point of departure for justification. This is baggage from the assumptions atheist make in transiting form religious world to secular world, and the kind of thing atheists get stuck on as a quasi justification for their view. It demonstrates an inability to take the religious world at face value and refuses to think of religious thought as modern thought but insists upon rooting it in ancinet outlooks that apply to any modern  believer. It also makes makes several root assumptions of which Brap has probably not even though of (not to sell the guy short, but I doubt that many atheists think about these things).

(1) it assumes that the reason for belief in modern world is the same as the reason for the existence of religion in the ancient world.

(2) it assumes that religion exists in order to explain where we came from,as though that's the only major question that really concenred ancinet man (which if you think about it is based upon an hidden assumption that all of human knowledge and development turns upon some ancient desire to do scinece).

(3) since they assume science is the only form of knowledge they assume that scinece must be the origin of all human thought.

(4) it assumes creation myths are the actual accretion of ancient religious wisdom

Modern religious people are modern people. Many of them may be less educated in certain area, although there is no shortage of religious people in the sciences and in other areas of higher education. A Gallop poll in the 90s found that taking all fields into account the percentages of modern professors in universities and their religious beliefs reflect that of the general population. The study that finds only 5% of NAS people who believe God is based upon a strict fundamentalist definition of God and confined to a self selecting body. Another study found that 45% of all people with scientific degrees bleieve in God. The point is that modern religious people are modern people. Their beliefs are not based upon ancinet creation myths, their belief systems include a harmonization of scinece and faith in a modern sense. I doubt that anyone actually believes in God because of the Genesis creation myth. Science is not the origin of religion. Religion did not evolve because people wanted to explain physical things. Religious evolved out of the human contact with the sense of the numinous.

Mystical experince at the root of all religions


Transpersonal Childhood Experiences of Higher States of Consciousness: Literature Review and Theoretical Integrationm (unpublished paper 1992 by Jayne Gackenback http://www.sawka.com/spiritwatch/cehsc/ipure.htm

Quotes:

"The experience of pure consciousness is typically called "mystical". The essence of the mystical experience has been debated for years (Horne, 1982). It is often held that "mysticism is a manifestation of something which is at the root of all religions (p. 16; Happold, 1963)." The empirical assessment of the mystical experience in psychology has occurred to a limited extent."


a). Core of Organized Religion


The Mystical Core of Organized Religion

David Steindl-Rast http://www.csp.org/experience/docs/steindl-mystical.html

Brother David Steindl-Rast, O.S.B., is a monk of Mount Savior Monastery in the Finger Lake Region of New York State and a member of the board of the Council on Spiritual Practices. He holds a Ph.D. from the Psychological Institute at the University of Vienna and has practiced Zen with Buddhist masters. His most recent book is Gratefulness, The Heart of Prayer (Ramsey, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1984).

"If the religious pursuit is essentially the human quest for meaning, then these most meaningful moments of human existence must certainly be called "religious." They are, in fact, quickly recognized as the very heart of religion, especially by people who have the good fortune of feeling at home in a religious tradition."



b)What all Religions hold in Common.


Cross currents

Thomas A Indianopolus
prof of Religion at of Miami U. of Ohio

http://www.crosscurrents.org/whatisreligion.htm

Quote:


"It is the experience of the transcendent, including the human response to that experience, that creates faith, or more precisely the life of faith. [Huston] Smith seems to regard human beings as having a propensity for faith, so that one speaks of their faith as "innate." In his analysis, faith and transcendence are more accurate descriptions of the lives of religious human beings than conventional uses of the word, religion. The reason for this has to do with the distinction between participant and observer. This is a fundamental distinction for Smith, separating religious people (the participants) from the detached, so-called objective students of religious people (the observers). Smith's argument is that religious persons do not ordinarily have "a religion." The word, religion, comes into usage not as the participant's word but as the observer's word, one that focuses on observable doctrines, institutions, ceremonies, and other practices. By contrast, faith is about the nonobservable, life-shaping vision of transcendence held by a participant..."

Smith considers transcendence to be the one dimension common to all peoples of religious faith: "what they have in common lies not in the tradition that introduces them to transcendence, [not in their faith by which they personally respond, but] in that to which they respond, the transcendent itself..."(11)

Creation myths as we know them are late inventions. The Cosmogony became a form of literature and is based upon thousands of variations and re tellings and old old camp fire fare long before anyone ever wrote them down. Thus they are not reasons fro belief. They are something much different than reasons to believe.  They are not even really explainations. Creation myths as we know them are mythology and mythology is about archetypes, it's a form  of communication that speaks to the psyche it's not a naive simple transition of factual data. A mythology is a symbolic transmission of unconscious understanding. It's about the psyche not about history.


Brap's final statement:

7. I have read “The Demon-Haunted World” by Carl Sagan, and I can’t think of anything in that book I disagree with.

I have not read that book, but I'd be willing to bet that he got it wrong. If what Brap is saying is an accurate reflection I would assume that Sagan makes the same fallacious assumptions that Brap does. I suggest one read Joseph Campbell (The Hero With A Thousand Faces) as an introduction to mythology. That book is too anti-Christian but it will give one a much better understanding of mythology than will Carl Sagan! Ancient studies were not even his field. I'm betting me mad all sort of outmoded assumptions about religion, probalby nineteenth century assumptions, most atheists are stuck in the nineteenth century when it comes to understanding religion.

The French revolution was not far behind and most of what scinece assumed about religion was conditioned by Laplace and the reason for that was becuase the French Philosophes set the tone for ant-clerical thinking due to the enormous influence that the Catholic chruch wielded in relation to the french Monarchy. The Monarchy used priests as enforcers of the educational system and other things that created a lot of enmity with the people. Fighting against the Monarchy in the revolution and opposing the Church became one and the same thing. That set in motion the anti-clerical thinking of Europe which dominated the development of scinece in the nineteenth century. Social scinece were just getting started, sociology developed out of France with August Compt  and thus it took the form of seeking to explain why religious belief began and to set it apart from modern thought, as a means of justifying the existence of the new scinece. Though most social scientists don't make a habit of running down religion as the hallmark of their disciplines in those days they did, because that was the basic origin of sociology.

We need to move beyond the simplistic understanding of the world that seeks to set "scientifically proved" "facts" as the foundation of the world view off against all other forms of knowledge. This is the hall mark of the atheist ideology, to create the pretense that scinece is the only form of knowledge, that atheism is scientific (it's really anti-scientific becuase it refuses to accept any scientific facts that back religion while claiming to be totally scientific in its outlook and the falling back on the ideolgoical slogan "atheism is just the lack of a bleief, nothing else"). Thus we need to shed this  delimiting crutch that only "scientific proof" counts as a valid reason to believe something and move toward a global understanding of knowledge in general.

Thursday, August 12, 2010

Reflections upon Methodology and Science

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I don't think atheists care about evidence. Evidence just means that one has something to reason from. What atheists demand is absolute proof, and at a level that can't be given for anything. I would bet that if for some reason atheists didn't like science, no amount of scientific "proof" wood suffice to prove to them that science works; because they would demand absolute proof, which can't be gotten.

In thinking about the two other threads I initiative over the last few days, and the atheist take on my arguments and their 'dicing' of my thought processes, and their refusal to acknowledge standard resiances that I give all the time, I find the following state of affairs to be a good description of the current state of dialectic between atheists and theists on the boards:

(1) Theists have a vast array of knowledge and argumentation built up over 2000 years, which basically amounts to a ton evidence for the existence of God. It's not absolute proof, because true, sure enough, actual absolute proof is just damn hard to come by on anything--even most scientific things; which is why they invented inductive reasoning. Science accepts correlation's as signs of caudal relationships, it doesn't ever actually observe causality at work. But that kind of indicative relationship is not good for atheists when a God argument is involved. Then it must be absolute demonstration and direct observation.

(2) This double standard always works in favor of the atheist and never in favor of the theist. I suspect that's because Theists are trying to persuade atheists that a certain state of affairs is the case, and at the same time we are apt to be less critical of our own reasons for believing that. Atheists make a habit of denial and pride themselves on it.

Why is it a double standard? Because when it works to establish a unified system of naturalistic observation the atheist is only too happy to appeal to "we never see" "we always see" and "there is a strong correlation." We never see a man raised from the dead. We never see a severed limb restored. The correlation's between naturalistic cause and effect are rock solid and always work, so science gives us truth, and religion doesn't. But when those same kinds of correlation's are used to support a God argument, they are just no darn good. to wit: we never see anything pop out of absolute noting, we never even see absolute nothing, even QM particles seem to emerge from prior conditions such as Vacuum flux, so they are not really proof of something form nothing. But O tisg tosh, that doesn't prove anything and certainly QM proves that the universe could just pop up out of nothing!

(3) "laws of physics" are not real laws, they are only descriptions, aggregates of our observations. So they can't be used to argue for God in any way. But, when it comes to miraculous claims, the observations of such must always be discounted because they violate our standard norm for observation, and we must always assume they are wrong no matter how well documented or how inexplicable. We must always assume that only naturalistic events can happen, even though the whole concept of a naturalism can only be nothing more than an aggregate of our observations about the world; and surely they are anything but exhaustive. Thus one wood think that since our observations are not enough to establish immutable laws of the universe, they would not be enough to establish a metaphysics which says that only material realms exist and only materially caused events can happen! But guess again...!

(4) The Theistic panoply of argumentation is a going concern. Quentin Smith, the top atheist philosopher says that 80% of philosophers today are theists. But when one uses philosophy in a God argument, it's just some left over junk from the middle ages; even though my God arguments are based upon S 5 modal logic which didn't exist even before the 1960s and most of the major God arguers are still living.

(5) They pooh pooh philosophy because it doesn't' produce objective concrete results. But they can't produce any scientific evidence to answer the most basic philosophical questions, and the more adept atheists will admit that it isn't the job of science to answer those questions anyway. Scientific evidence cannot give us answers on the most basic philosophical questions, rather than seeing this as a failing in science (or better yet, evidence of differing magister) they rather just chalice it up to the failing of the question! The question is no good because our methods dot' answer it!

(6) What it appears to me is the case is this; some methods are better tailed for philosophy. Those methods are more likely to yield a God argument and even a rational warrant for belief, because God is a philosophical question and not a scientific one. God is a matter of faint, after all, and in matters of faith a rational warrant is the best one should even hope for. But that's not good enough for atheists, they disparage the whole idea of a philosophical question (at least the scientistic ones do--that's not all of them, but some) yet they want an open ended universe with no hard and fast truth and no hard and fast morality!

(7)So it seems that if one accepts certain methods one can prove God within the nature of that language game. now of course one can reject those language games and choose others that are not quite as cozy with the divine and that's OK too. Neither approach is indicative of one's intelligence or one's morality. But, it does mean that since it may be just as rational given the choice of axioms and methodologies, then what that taps out to is belief in God is rationally warranted--it may not be only rational conclusion but it is one rational conclusion Now I know some of the more intelligent atheists will say "hey I'm fine with that." But then when push comes to shove they will be back again insisting that the lack of absolute proof leaves the method that yields God arguments in doubt, rather than the other way around. I don't see why either should be privileged. Why can't we just say that one method is better suited for one kind of question, the other for the other?

and if one of them says 'why should I ask those questions?' I say 'why shouldn't we leave the choice of questions to the questioner?

Tuesday, August 10, 2010

Plantinga's Possible World's Argument

 





This is based upon and largerly taken from the website of a professor of Philosphy nemed Forest Baird. Unfortunatley his stie is no longer up.

P1 A thing has maximal greatness if and only if it has maximal excellence in every possible world.

P2 Whatever has maximal excellence is omniscient, omnipotent and morally perfect.

P3 There is a possible world in which the property of possessing maximal greatness is exemplified.

P4 The property of possessing maximal greatness is exemplified in every possible world.

P5 If maximal greatness is exemplified in every world, then it is exemplified in this world.




Baird:

Quote:


Plantinga is a leading figure in what is called "analytic philosophy." This type of philosophy represents not so much a particular content as a method of dealing with philosophical problems. The method uses rigorous logical analysis of propositions using a number of rather technical logical concepts.

Like others who use this method, Plantinga's work is difficult to understand without some background in logic. Plantinga uses a system of modal logic that is on the cutting edge and still the topic of much debate. He relies heavily on certain theorems about modal operators that are not universally accepted. Many articles that critique his work are written almost entirely in symbolic logic and so are not accessible to most students.(24) But by first examining some key concepts Plantinga uses, we should be able to make sense of his version of the argument.


A. Concepts


1) Possible Worlds.


Baird

Quote


"Plantinga begins his discussion of the ontological argument by borrowing seventeenth century philosopher Leibniz' idea of "possible worlds." A possible world is a possible state of affairs. So, for example, there is a possible world in which I am able to execute dazzling slam dunks and a possible world in which I am lucky to make a basket at all. The second of these, but certainly not the first, is actual or "obtains." But both of these worlds are possible. While the first does not obtain, there is nothing that is logically impossible about it. On the other hand, a world in which I play basketball with a round square is not possible. Such a world not only does not obtain, it could not obtain."(25)

"Turning to the ontological argument, Plantinga rewrites the argument in terms of possible worlds. Instead of using a premise which says that God's existence is possible, Plantinga says that God exists in a possible world. If God's existence is possible, then there must be a possible world in which God exists. Of course that possible world might not be this world--just as the possible world in which I can slam dunk is not this world. But if God's existence is at least logically possible (i.e., the concept of God's existence is not a concept like "round square"), then there is a possible world in which God exists."




2) Possible Beings.


Baird
"Immediately after stating that there is a possible world in which God exists, Plantinga makes a revision of this statement. To say "There is a possible world in which God exists" is to talk about God as a possible being. Both Malcolm and Hartshorne had assumed that this makes sense: that one can talk about God as a possible being and discuss the qualities of this possible being. Plantinga questioned this assumption."


B. Properties rather than beings.



"But, Plantinga argues, it does not make sense to speak of merely possible beings, beings that don't in fact exist. We can't say that "X does not exist" leads to the statement "there is an X such that X does not exist." This would be like saying "there is a thing that does not exist." If it does not exist we can't say "there is a thing...." Or, we can't say "there is a thing such that this thing does not exist." Plantinga suggests that we should be talking about properties. Rather than talking about wheather a particular being exists, we should talk about the exemplification of certain properties. Is there an instance of this property in a possible world. Baird says:"

"Consider the case of the property of being able to execute dazzling slam dunks. In one possible world (the actual world) that property is exemplified by Michael Jordan (and others). In another possible world (the one of my imagination) that property is exemplified by Forrest Baird. In yet another possible world that property is exemplified by some unidentified being. But in all three cases we are talking about the property of being able to execute dazzling dunk shots. We can ask whether or not that property is exemplified in a particular possible world without talking about the being that exemplifies it."

"By revising the argument in terms of properties, Plantinga makes the argument immune to Kant's criticisms about existence not being a predicate. The argument is no longer talking about a thing that may or may not have certain predicates--including existence. It is now an argument about certain predicates and whether or not there is an instance of them. Plantinga even disagrees with Malcolm and Hartshorne about necessary existence. Plantinga holds that not only is existence not a predicate, neither is necessary existence": As Plantinga Says:"

"...A being has no properties at all and [therefore] no excellent-making properties in a world in which it does not exist. So existence and necessary existence are not themselves perfections, but necessary conditions of perfection."(28) "A being must first exist to have any perfections, so existence, of any type, cannot be one of the perfections a being has."(29)


C. Maximal Greatness.



"Rather than thinking of God in terms of a being, "that which none greater than can be concieved," Plantinga thinks in terms of the property of "maximal greatness" or the property of unsurpassible greatness; none other could possess such a quality for there can only be one such manifestation of this property. If two beings were each "the greatest possible being" wich would be greater than the other?"


But Plantinga doesn't talk about a being with this property. Rather, he asks, is the properly exemplified in any possible world? Maximal greatness, or Maximal excellence would consist of omniscience, omnipotence and moral perfection, so the question is, is this quality exemplified in any possible world? But this still doesn't mean that this quality is exemplified in our world. In some other possible world the maximal greatness might be petty in our world. But Plantinga argues: "...The greatness of a being in world W [any given possible world] depends not merely upon the qualities it has in W; what it is like in other worlds is also relevant." (in Baird) (32) So greatness is relative from one world to another. But to have the property of maximal greatness a being would have to be the greatest in all possible worlds.


D. The Point of the Argument.


1) Plantinga's Modal Version of the Argument.



P1 A thing has maximal greatness if and only if it has maximal excellence in every possible world.
P2 Whatever has maximal excellence is omniscient, omnipotent and morally perfect.
P3 There is a possible world in which the property of possessing maximal greatness is exemplified.
P4 The property of possessing maximal greatness is exemplified in every possible world.
P5 If maximal greatness is exemplified in every world, then it is exemplified in this world.


Barid says:


"This argument is valid in its logical structure, but is it sound and persuasive? As mentioned above, to be sound means that the premises must be true and to be persuasive means that most persons would accept the truth of the premises. P1 and P2 are both given as definitions of terms. Plantinga stipulates them as the definitions of the terms he is using.(34) They are, quite literally, true by definition. P4 follows from P1 and P3. Given P1 and P3 there must be some individual (let's call that individual "x") that exists and has maximal excellence in every possible world. No matter what possible world we choose to examine, x would have to have maximal greatness in that world since x possesses maximal excellence in every world. P5 makes the rather obvious point that since our actual world is also a possible world, whatever is true of all possible worlds must be true of this possible world. So P1, P2, P4, and P5 are all true: P1 and P2 by definition and P4 and P5 by logical inference. That leaves only P3".


Plantinga's conclusion:

"What shall we say of this argument? It is certainly valid; given its premises, the conclusion follows. The only question of interest, it seems to me, is whether its main premise--that maximal greatness is possibly instantiated--is true. I think it is true; hence I think this version of the ontological argument is sound." [In Baird](35)


2. The Possibility of God's Existence.


But can he really prove P3? That might require making a whole other proof for a skeptic.However, God's existence is certainly possible in some possible world. Like Hartshorne he argues that if God is possible than he is necessary, or there is no sense in speaking of a merely possible necessary being. If God exists than God's existence cannot be a contingent fact. To question this would be like questioning whether tables are things to put things on. That is what God is, necessary being, and if God is not actually necessary than he is impossible but cannot be merely possible. God is not like other beings who may or may not exist. If my Parents had met different people and been married to them rather than each other I would not be me, but they might or might not have had any children at all.This might have happened, therefore, I might or might not have come to be. My existence is contingent. But God is not like this, he either must exist or else it is impossible that he could exist, but there is no "might or might not" in the equation.

If God might exist in some possible world he must exist in all possible worlds.

E. Objections.


1) Tooley, revese possible world thinking.


Michael Tooley try's to reverse Plantinga's argument by saying that a statement that is not self contradictory is true in some possible world. So to to say "there is no maximally great being"is true in some possible world. The statement "there may be a unicorn" must be true in some possible world because it could be true. But reversing Plantinga's logic, the talk about a maximally great being must apply to all possible worlds and so there cannot be a maximally great being! [this is in Dr. Baird's notes]


Answer: Mark Stasser comes to the resue in arguing that Plantinga could say that "there is an X" could be true in some possible world unless it is contradictory. If X is the maximally great being. In that case X would have to be true in all possible worlds since a maximally great being could not be merely possible. Both Tooley and Plantinga have concepts that are not self contradictory. Strasser argues that the contradiction test alone is not sufficient to determine the case.

Here is Strasser's test for determining the possible existence in all possible worlds:


1. A is not internally inconsistent, and,
2. A does not entail that A1 exist in all possible worlds, or,
3. if A's existence does entail the necessary existence of A1, then we must establish independently that A1 exists in all possible worlds.(45)

But I suggest that the answer is much simpler than turning some test. The reversal of an ontological argument, which many have attempted, goes back to he work of J.N. Findly in his classic argument with Hartshorne. Hartshorne convened Findlay that the argument of reversal always leads to a ready inversion, so the OA is on again. I suggest that the principle of ontology always works toward reversing its opposite but doesn't work work the other way around. In other words, anytime the OA is reversed it leads back to inversion. But if one reverses Findley or Tooley it does not. This is illustrated as follows:

If we say "There is no maximally great being" in some possible world, this is not ture obviously if it is true that there can be such a being in some possible world, because if there is than there must be one in all possible words, since that is what Maximal greatness is; necessary being. IF it is possible for God to exist than God must exist! In other words, "there is no maximally great being" is never a true statement. Tooley's argument is not sound. It would be correct to say, "we don't' know that God actually exists, perhaps God is impossible." But if God is not impossible (because not self contradictory) than it makes no sense to apply the possible world's theory to God's existence in some possible world since for God to be possible is to be necessary in all worlds. NO one could say then that "there is no maximal being in some possible world" because that would be like trying to confine God's necessary existence to some possible world. Trying to imposes God's non-existence upon all possible world's through the possibility of it on some possible world is like trying to confine God's existence to just one possible world, it does not make sense.



2) Existence is not a predicate.


This is one of the traditional objections that was assumed to have killed off the original OA when Kant siad that existing is not a quality of perfection that can define it's being. So the phrase "that which nothing greater than can be concieved" is not telling us that God actually exists because we do not know that existing is gratness is predicated upon existing. This is discussed on the previous page (unless I decided not to and forogt). But possibility is a predicate of existence. The possible worlds senerio may get around this argument becasue in this case greatness is not predicated upon existence but upon the possibility of existence, and for that it may well be. Why? Because we have added something to the concept. We are being told something different in this case about the situation. We are being told that not only is this quality one of greatness, but it is one of possible greatness, as oppossed to impossible greatness.


Sunday, August 08, 2010

A tragic tale of atheist incredulity:

An atheist on CARM called "Space Monkey" offered to show me a way to restructure on of my arguments and make it logically valid, which of course he pretends it wasn't.

My original argument:

(1) Sense of the Numinous evokes religious devotion

(2) The sense of the numinous is the sense of the special nature of being

(3) Thus being itself, the ground of being, is the object of religious devotion

(4) whatever is the fit object of religious devotion (the thing that evokes it at the core in the first place) is defined as "God."

(5) since we know this special sense of being existing then QED God exists.

Here's the version he restructured:

(1) For many people, the “sense of the numinous” evokes feelings of religious devotion. [Premise 1]

(2) For [some of(?)] those people, this “sense of the numinous” results from a perception of the juxtaposition of the finite nature of ourselves and the infinite nature of the universe, and contemplation of the “special nature of being” which is rationally inferred on the basis of these perceptions. [Premise 2]

(3) This “special nature of being” refers to the necessary existence of a “ground of all being” or “being itself” as the basis of reality. [Premise 3]

(4) These perceptions and the inferred “special nature of being” meet our criteria of epistemic judgment. [Premise 4]

(5) If certain perceptions or inferences meet our criteria of epistemic judgment, then it is rationally warranted to conclude that the perceptions, and that which is inferred on their basis, accurately represents the nature of reality. [Premise 5]

(6) For many people, feelings of religious devotion are evoked by that which results from contemplation of the “ground of all being” or “being itself” as the basis of all reality, which they are rationally warranted in taking to accurately represent the nature of reality. [From 1~5]

(7) For these people, the “ground of being” or “being itself” is itself the object or source of the evoked feelings of religious devotion. [Premise 6]

(8) Whatever is the object or source of feelings of religious devotion can be reasonably defined as “God”. [Premise 7]

(9) There are people who are rationally warranted in concluding that reality contains as its basis that which we can reasonably call "God".
[Conclusion, from 6, 7, & 8]

I agree that his version is closer to being a more formally correct version. I studied Perlman's non formal logic and I don't think it has to be formally correct to be logically valid or to make sense as an idea. Of atheists mock and ridicule it saying that's the 'ravings ofa mad man" and that it's terrible makes no sense. They  have said "you are the only person in the world who thinks the way you do." My ideas are so way out so they so stupid. But if you look at the content mine and his, the only difference is a big of teaking to explain more about why each move is the way it is.

I had explained that myself anyway, I just didn't do it in each line, I did it analysis after each line, what's the difference as long as the ideas are the same the reasons for them are out there? But of course Spacemonkey doesn't seem to understand what I'm saying, even he is very intelligent and I'm not criticizing his abilities. Here is the full presentation I made:

Definitions:

Sense of the numinous: intuitive sense that some special quality or attribute obtains to some aspect of reality such that it points to a larger all embracing truth, some realm of the divine, or some divine aspect of reality. (numinous means "spiritual" form the Greek Penuma).

Ground of being: (aka "being itself") The basic aspect of being that is not contingent are particular to any temporal or temporary or contingent aspect of beings or a being, but is eternal, ontologically necessary, and upon which the individual beings are predicted.

religious: Human tendency to identify the set of problems related to the nature of being human, the way in which humans define the nature of their own existence and that of other humans with respect to meaning or purpose on an ontological level, and the attempt to mediate an ultimate transfomrative experience through ritual or other means such that the sense of problematic is resolved in the transformative power.

Religious Devotion: Personal commitment ot a form of medication (see above).


Basic assumptions: all arguments are based upon assumption, even in scientific studies. This is not an argument it's just the background to the argument based upon things I generally assume about the sources of our knowledge at the most basic level.

(1) The argument assumes that all human understanding of the nature of reality begins with the phenomenological level. That is to say the categories of thought suggested to us by our sense data.

(2) Phenomenological level is predicated upon the five senses in addition to some insinuative senses that humans believe obtain from the nature of being human. (note: this is not necessarily esp or psychic power, just the regular sense of intuition). I include the intuitive because I'm talking about the most basic epistemology. Included with intuition is tacit knowing. It's a psychological function. I'm not saying that our knowledge of the world rests upon this, but it is part of the mix of sources that goes into our understanding of what's real.

(3) Even our basic trust of "official" or "proven" or "empirical" "facts" are based upon, in the final analysis, the extent to which the regular nature of our perceptions have led us to trust such things. For example mathematics is trusted by mathematics because they study it. It may not be trusted by fish mongers or pig iron collectors becuase they have no experiential basis for placing trust in mathematics. They have not studied it.

(4) The extent to which the trust that which we place our confidence in is related to the extent to which such sources meet the criteria:

(a) regular

(b) consistent

(c) shared (inter-subjective)

(d) promotes navigation in the world and in life.

By "navigation in the world and in life" I mean we can use the perceptions to get by, either in physically understanding the world, or emotionally coping with the world. In this way we form trust about perceptions if, and only if, they work, they help us in the process of coping and understanding.

(5) If we can logically place confidence in a proposition, and that confidence is born out in some way (vis the criteria just outlined) then are justified in our confidence and the proposition in which we place confidence is rationally warranted.

Argument:

premise:
(1) Sense of the Numinous evokes religious devotion

Premise:
(2) The sense of the numinous is the sense of the special nature of being



Inferense
(3) Thus: Therefore being itself, the ground of being, is the object of religious devotion

inferense
(4) whatever is the fit object of religious devotion (the thing that evokes it at the core in the first place) is defined as "God."

conclusion
(5) since we have properly basic reason to assume this special sense of being exists as the outcome of our perceptions, since it meets the criteria of epistemic judgment, we are rationally warranted in placing confidence in the hypothesis that "the sense of the numinous" and it's relation to the eternal necessary aspects of being are indications of the divine at the basis of reality.


Now let's go over again and I'll explain why I draw these conclusions:




premise:
(1) Sense of the Numinous evokes religious devotion

this is a statement based upon empirical observations made by anthropologists, historians of religion and other social social scientist. The idea of a sense of numinous is old and is well documented in may areas: the works of Marcea Eliade, Karl karene and studies by Ralph Hood, W.E. Stace, William James and others. All of this body of work from scholars and historians link the sense of the numinous to the orignis of religion.

The old 19th century sociological approach was to assume that religion was about explaining nature. That's becasue they were structural functionalists and they were trying justify their theory that things exist in social structure because they serve a function to the tribe; they did not understand the sense of the numinous as a serving a function, because they didn't have it and they shaped early man in their own images.

Social scientists don't make those assumptions now. Now we look for the real reasons people think things, by listening to them on their own terms.


Premise:
(2) The sense of the numinous is the sense of the special nature of being

There is a link from the concept of sense of the numinous to the concept of eternal necessary being (being itself). That is through the perception of the juxtaposition between infinite and finite. In other words, we sense our limitations as temporal creatures, vs the endless nature of the entire universe, we sense our smallness against the backdrop of the vast universe, in making these perceptions the sense of the numinous is evoked and we connect that psychologically to a sense of the nature of what it means to be (that is demonstrated through the studies on mystical experience--one of the major aspects of mystical experience is that juxtaposition between infinite and finite.

So by contrasting between of being as a whole vs our own limited nature, we link the sense of the numinous to being because its evoked by contemplation of being.

Inferense
(3) Thus: Therefore being itself, the ground of being, is the object of religious devotion.

what that sentence means is what I just said above. We draw certain conclusions psychologically form the experience of this juxtaposition that creates a link between being and the numinous, that link tells us that this special nature of the numinous is based in the eternal necessary nature of being itself. In other words the eternal necessary aspects of being (the vast universe for example) as opposed to any one particular being that is merely temporal and quickly vanishing (my own finite existence) grounds the sense of the numinous in the concepts of eternal necessary being.

In other words we derive from these experiences of nature, such as the starry sky over the night time desert, the sense that the eternal and necessary aspects of being are where the divine aspects of reality are located.


inferense
(4) whatever is the fit object of religious devotion (the thing that evokes it at the core in the first place) is defined as "God."

This sentence is logically derived from the information given previously and it just says that when we think about the nature of religion (apart form hating it) whatever evokes the psychological sense of the numinous is a valid object of worship, why? Because that's what worship is, it's commitment and devotion to the special nature of reality perceived in this thing called "sense of the numinous." Since that's the center and origin of religion anyway it's the final orbiter as to what is sacred.

the sense of the numinous itself is a sense of the sacred. we can put this into a syllogism

*whatever evokes the sacred is a fit object of worship

*the eternal and necessary aspects of being evoke the sacred

*therefore the eternal necessary aspects of being are fit objects of worship.

now we come to the conclusion.

conclusion
(5) since we have properly basic reason to assume this special sense of being exists as the outcome of our perceptions, since it meets the criteria of epistemic judgment, we are rationally warranted in placing confidence in the hypothesis that "the sense of the numinous" and it's relation to the eternal necessary aspects of being are indications of the divine at the basis of reality.

In other words it's just the logical outcome of what's said above. the eternal necessary nature of being (or our perceptions of same) motivate the basis of religious devotion and connect them to these aspects of being which are designated as 'ground of being.' Therefore, we are justified or rationally warranted in assuming that or in placing confidence in the proposition we are actually sensing some divine aspect to reality.

this divine aspect of reality is what the term "God" stands for.


We can make a syllogistic argument:

*whatever evokes the sacred is a fit object of worship

*the eternal and necessary aspects of being evoke the sacred

*therefore the eternal necessary aspects of being are fit objects of worship.


*"God" is the designation for the fit object of worship

*Ground of being is a fit object of worship (from above)


*therefore we are rationally warranted in thinking of ground of being as "God."

Premise
*whatever is the ground of being has an actual existence according to the definition above as "eternal" and "necessary" aspects of being

*We are justified in thinking of the ground of Being as "God" since it evokes the numinous and is a fit object of worship; the term "God" designates a fit object of worship

*therefore, we are rationally warranted in thinking that God has a real an actual existence as the ground of being.

We could go further and argue that in experiencing this realization we find the epistemic criteria are met and thus it works as a means of navigation in the world, and that is the ground for epistemic judgment, in other words for deciding that it's real.

the overall conclusion: we are rationally warranted for concluding that reality contains as it's basis that which we call "God."

I grant that some of the reasons might be better expressed by Spacemonkey and that perhaps doing it his way is better, even though I like mine for its streamlined nature, fewer lines. All he did was put sme of the explanation in further premises but long as the content is there I don't see why it really matters. The atheists are acting this is retarded  to this way. It appears that the can't understand concepts. They can't think logically either. All they can think about is form.

another atheist named Electric Skeptic says:

But SpaceMonkey's version is far better than yours. It is much more exact, with much less question begging, and requires anyone who disagrees to be far more specific in specifying exactly what they disagree with - which would enable the person posting it to be able to better rebut their rebuttal.
I don't see why that would not all be there in the analysis anyway, but be that as it may, I decided to go for the pithy comment rather than argue. So I said "then you better get busy."

ES: Busy doing what?

Meta: debating the argument because now that you admit it's good I'll be using it all the time.

ES says:

Oh, I getcha. I admitted that SpaceMonkey's version is much better framed - I didn't admit that it's a good argument

But I'll certainly tackle his version, if you'd like.

Spacemonkey says:

Notice that there are now many more premises which an opponent might reasonably wish to challenge. But note also that no-one can rationally reject the conclusion now without also specifying exactly which premise or premises they disagree with and why. 

 While disagreement is still open, he has to demonstrate which premise he disagrees with and why. So does he? No! of course not, he never has. In fact 90% of the time when I challenge them to show what's wrong with any of my premises they never do. Once I put all the first premises to all my God arguments in a list to see which they agree withe (not telling them they were premises to God arguments) they did not disagree with a single one,


Friday, August 06, 2010

Plantinga Answers Miller

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 Just for grins I sent part of Miller's argument against the modal argument to Plantinga to see what he would say. Here's the bit I sent:


Some ontological arguments have a cleverer premise to replace the old one.
Old Premise: It is possible that God exists.
New Premise: There is no contradiction in the existence of God.  In other words, God is "consistent."
The old premise logically follows from the new one.  If you're familiar with symbolic logic, I hope you already knew this.  If not, here is a simple proof.

Suppose that the old premise is false; it is not possible that God exists.  The statement "If P, then Q" is always true if P is false.  Likewise, the statement "If God exists, then Q" is always true, because God doesn't exist.  It's true even if Q is a contradictory statement (ie "God is blue and not blue").  Therefore, the new premise is false; the existence of God implies a contradiction.

If the old premise is false, then the new premise is false.  Equivalently, if the new premise is true, then the old premise is true.

But now we will run into another problem of translation.  I will distinguish between two kinds of consistency.
Self-consistency:  The object has no contradicting properties in its definition.
Logical consistency: The object implies no contradictions.
Proponents of the ontological argument often expect me to disprove the self-consistency of God.  Perhaps they expect me to argue that God's omnipotence contradicts its omniscience, or something like that.  But they fail to realize that I don't have to.  The proof requires logical consistency, not self-consistency.

Self-consistency is not sufficient to establish logical consistency.  For an object to be logically consistent, not only must its definition be properly formed, but the world must cooperate.  (More precisely, the set of "possible worlds" must cooperate.)  Suppose that the world does not cooperate, and the object does not exist.  If the object does not exist, then the existence of the object implies a contradiction.  Namely, it implies that the object both exists and does not exist.  I didn't even have to look at the definition of the object.

Of course, I don't know whether the world cooperates with the ontological proof or not.  The proponents have no idea either, but think they do.

Philosophers ought to teach themselves some mathematics. In geometry, there is a famous axiom called the Parallel postulate.  It is famous because many mathematicians thought they could prove it.  Modern mathematicians know that it is impossible to prove, because there is no contradiction in assuming it false.  Likewise, it is impossible to disprove.  The Parallel postulate is self-consistent.  The negation of the Parallel postulate is also self-consistent.  But in any given geometrical system, only one can be true.  Thus, only one can be logically consistent.


 I thought just for grins I'd put up Plantinga's answer. This he sent to me in private email and he sent permission for me to post it.




I'd say that a proposition is *logically consisstent* if it's not possible to deduce a contradiction from it in ordinary *first order) logic.  Obviously the existence of God is logically consistent.  But note everything that is logically consistent is possibles in the broadly logical sense: false arithmetical propositions for example, are logically consistent but impossible in the broadly logical sense.  The question of the ontological argument is whether the existence of God is possible in the broadly logical sense.  If it is, then it is also actual and also necessary.

As for the parallel postulate, it might very well be necessary in the broadly logical sense--which is all you can say for the other axioms on geometry.  When people say it isn't provable, they mean that it isn't deducible from the other axioms--but that (I think) is also true of each of the other axioms.

Tuesday, August 03, 2010

Introducing my new website: The Religious A Priori

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I have a new website that is designed to eventually replace Doxa. I'm just unveiling it so I have still a lot of stuff to up up. It's mostly new material, I have some things form Doxa but I'm trying to update everything and basically just start over.

This site is mostly arguments about God and belief at this point, but I expect to cover all the categories covered by Doxa: God, Jesus, Bible, Science, Theology,  Society.

It also features a lot of articles from this blog on the problems of atheism.

I have included the best arguemnts on my realizing God approach from this blog and other aspects from the blog.

The site is here: The Religious A Priori

Sunday, August 01, 2010

Woman in the Dunes

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Hiroshi Teshigahara's  greatest work, Woman in the Dunes, circa 1964, is a brilliant film. I have seen it only one time, this summer just a few weeks ago was my first time and yet I include it among my very favorite films, maybe no 12 of my all-time list. It's themes are universal and existential, which usually makes for a great film. It's well shot, beautiful cinematography, well acted and though it seems like it would be tedious is compelling and I could not stop watching. It's filmed in Black and White and this one of those times when the b/w make for a powerful image rather than bland lack of color.

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One of the dominate camera angles of the entire film
is the very tiny

Writers:
Kôbô Abe (novel)
Kôbô Abe (screenplay)



Cast

  (Credited cast)
Eiji Okada... Entomologist Niki Jumpei
Kyôko Kishida... Woman
Hiroko Ito... Entomologist's wife (in flashbacks)
Kôji Mitsui

Sen Yano

Ginzô Sekiguchi

rest of cast listed alphabetically:
Kiyohiko Ichiha

Hideo Kanze

Hiroyuki Nishimoto

Tamotsu Tamura

See more »

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Hiroshi Teshigahara (January 28, 1927 – April 14, 2001)


This film is often said to be the product of Toykyo cafe society existentialism as found on the Ginza  of the early 60s. I don't think we can pin it down that directly, but it definitely reflects what was in the air in that decade. By 1964 the Japanese society has srong ties to America and Europe. Even Kurosawa was well versed in Western art and thought before the war. Woman in the Dunes is about a man, despite the title,Entomologist Niki Jumpei, who goes to a desert region to find a rare insect he calls "the tiger beetle." Locals offer him a place to stay for the night as it is getting late. He gratefully accepts they take him to an area which pits and quick sand and its hard to walk. They take down into a pit where a small ramshackle house sits in the pit. The house is owned by a woman who has some mysterious job she doesn't explain that has to do with moving sand out of the pit. She shovels it and other draw it up in buckets on ropes, unseen men who are somewhere beyond outside the pit.

The next morning Niki gets ready to leave, thanks the woman, goes out and sees the rope ladder isn't there. He calls for the ladder but finds they will not lower it or even answer. After some time finally gets the drift, he is to stay there the rest of his life and help the woman shovel sand! Of cousre he's outraged and we go through a spell of his anger and refusal. But he falls back upon his own view of himself; he's a teacher, he's a rational man, he knows more than most people, it's an intellectual challenge but a bunch of rubes such as these can't keep him closed up in a pit! He is actaully arrogant and even to the point of telling the woman her own experiences, which he knows better than she herself. He knows everything and corrects her on everything. He prays out of her the reason why she is shoveling sand. Her logic is convoluted and silly. Her reasoning really is circular and pointless, but it's still the landscape that defines the new reality. She is shoveling sand because if she doesn't shovel it the pit will cave in an bury the house. In fact her husband and child died in that way a year before. Why does she not leave? Because the village is her home, he's part of it, she belongs to it. Why not the whole village leave? No place to go. Most have already gone anyway, the village is dying and in an attempt to keep it going they have kidnapped many people. She tells him of others who have been there ten, fifteen, twenty years. Why not just let it die out, others left why don't they? It's their village, they have to save their village it's their home. The woman also voices her own concerns that in the pit she is the homeowner and she has a valid place, in Tokyo (if she went back with him) she's a homeless stranger with no place to go dependent upon him. It is in this conversation that Niki is prompted to utter a phrase which signifies the film's existential theme: he says "are you shoveling sand t live, or living to shovel sand?" He goes on strike and refuses to shovel and even stop her form it. The pit almost caves in she tells him you have to do it every day or it will bury you. So he does give in and they work hard to catch up and keep shoveling. Thus is winds up shoveling to live and living to shovel.

Teshigahara employ's several cinematic techniques to communicate the profound nature of the subject matter. He begins from the credits with a disorienting establishing shot that shows sand particles on microscopic level so that they actually appear to be a landscape in a desert. Then he pulls away so that we can see they are small particles of sand in a land scape of a desert. He also focuses on the woman face and neck so close that the sand stuck her skin looks like rolling hills. Again the pulling away so that gradually we see where we are. He also focuses upon a drop of water in the same way, and in another shot to emphasize how much water means in such a place he fades from the scene to a splash of water in such a double exposure that it seems as though the drop is wetting the entire world around it. Thus there is this interspersion of the very tiny and the grandiose. We lose perspective. The tiny becomes the world, a world unto itself, the world around becomes a collection of the very tiny. This gives us teh feeling going into ourselves. This sense of the shrinking into the inner world, and the undifferentiated unity of all things, the tiny in the grandiose and the grandiose in the tiny will be very important in the over all film by the end.

Niki makes a successful escape. We see him saving little tools and bits of rope and al manner of things he needs to get out of the pit. But he is not able to calculated or provide for what happens outside. He escapes by making a crude grappling hook. From the roof of the house he pulls himself up the cliff wall having stuck the hook on something outside the pit. He then runs and he stays at large until dark. He accident runs around a corner in the hill side of some area he has never been to before (he has no real sense of there the village lies) he runs right into a woman. He is chased and is getting away but finds himself in quick sand. He's sinking up to his chest and has to call help or die. The peruses run out wearing sand shoes, like snow shoes only made from wooden plans lashed to their feet with rope or whatever. They pull him out and take him back. Over the course of the next few months Niki and the woman (never know her name). The two fall deeply in love. The make love a lot and (no porno scenes). The woman is pregnant but it turns out she has a problem. She is sick and a doctor comes and says that she may die the baby may die they both may die. They take her out.

After they take her off, and Niki just watches, they leave the rope ladder down. He stares at it for some time. They left it down. Do they actually want him to leave? Or were they just focused on the woman and forgot the ladder? He climbs to the top, and looks around. He walks a ways. He could leave. It's his chance, but he watches a bird fly and makes some observation about the bird is free form the ground but trapped in the sky or some such. He has his tiger beetle collection to maintain. He's got ties now and he also doesn't need to leave. He goes back into the pit. The last thing he thinks is "I'll escape some time." The view might think Teshigahara is saying something about giving up or developing ties that bind us into a way of life, but it's not really that. The guy has evolved not only through his love for the woman but also in coming to understand that he's free in himself. His observation about the bird he is in the pit but he's also in watching the bird he's in the sky it's all the same. He can appreciate the world as a whole but he can also appreciate the gran of sand in the pit and little beetle at his feet. It's all the same. Freedom is captivity and captivity is freedom. He's found enlightenment. He doesn't need escape, just being is an escape. That relates to the world of the tiny and it's similarity to the world of the large landscape, the realization that the tiny is a landscape of its' own. The focus from large to tiny brings us into disorientation then the realization that all is unified it's all one thing. It draws us into the inner world, the world of the mind which related to going tiny, going in.

The shoveling of sand  is often compared by reviewers to the Myth of the Sisyphus, the legendary Greek who was condemned by the gods to push a rock up a hill forever, when he gets to the top the rock falls down again. He's trapped in a meaningless endeavor forever. That myth has been expropriated by existentialists as their signature myth (ala Camus). The sand shoveling is likened unto the pushing of the rock, are you shoveling sand to live, or living to shovel sand? But there are differences. Unlike the myth of Sisyphus the sand shoveling relates to real life necessity not to some meaningless drudgery. Even though shoveling he sand is drudgery, it's meaningless relative to leaving, it's necessary if one is to live in the pit. The border implication puts it on a level of a commentary upon society. The useless nature of staying to resuscitate a dying village, kidnapping people to make them save a village it's own people are abandoning, raises a lot of questions about modern society and in that era of the 60s nothing was more cogent and timely. It's still not out of date, it's a universal theme which the individual must re visit again and again.