Jason Thibodeau writes an essay on Secular Outpost in which he makes some interesting comments about the Eutheprho dilemma.I consider Jason to be a friend and I admire his philosophizing,and he really has interesting things to say about the ED that I not following here, but I followup with an argument that the ED does not apply to the Christian God.My original comment:
I have always contended that the ED doesn't apply to the Christian concept of God. There may be other concepts of God to which it does not apply as well such as Vedanta. Essentially the nature of God in post medieval Christian parlance is so radically from any Greek conception of a God that it makes the whole issue non applicable. In Modern Christian theology God is good unambiguously beaus God is love and love is identified with the good.(Augustine, Fletcher) The standard that God uses to determine good is himself not some external standard which would put God in a subordinate position.
My point involves a distinction between things that are good and the property of goodness. So, for example, pleasure is good, but pleasure is not the property of goodness. Pleasure has goodness as a property, but pleasure does not cause goodness. When someone brings about pleasure, that person is bringing about something that is good, but she is not thereby bringing it about that it is good. That is, she is not bringing it about that pleasure is good.
So, the good things that result from loving and being loved are part of what make love valuable. These good things are part of what make love instrumentally good. But these good things that result from love are not the same as the property of being good. Love can have effects and some of these effects are good, but their being good is not an effect of love.JLH: My perspective in answering the ED is a bit different. I understand love as the nature of God's character his framing motivation, Thus love is not merely a side effect of goodness;it is the motive for of God's goodness and as such is at the center of the meaning of what it is to be good,
I resolve the dilemma by saying it is neither that God commands X because X is good,(if by that we mean a good separate and apart from God to which God is compelled to give assent) or that X is good because God commands X and that makes it good. I say X (love) is the standard God works by because it is the essence of his character; God is the origin and fount of all good. The basic notion of good is based upon Gods charter especially moral good. Conversely the moral good reduces to love. For this see Jospeh Fletcher. 
Jason Thibodeau,"The Euthyphro Dilemma, Part 1: The Question and the Options." The Secular outpost blog, commemts (MARCH 6, 2019 BY )
https://www.patheos.com/blogs/secularoutpost/2019/03/06/the-euthyphro-dilemma-part-1-the-question-and-the-options/#disqus_thread (access 3/12/19)
 (1 John 4:8)
 Jospeh Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The new Morality:Louisville, Kentucky Westminster; John Knox Pessr (June 1966),5