Keith Parsons
Over on The Secular Outpost blog philosophy professor Keith Parsons tries to argue for brain/mid reductionism as a confirmation of the naturalistic view point. He levels his argumet against substance dualism: "What sorts of arguments can substance dualists offer? What sorts of arguments would indicate that mind can exist independently of a physical basis? There is overwhelming evidence of the extremely sensitive dependence of every aspect of the mental on a physical basis, the brain in particular."[1] One need not defend substance dualism to argue for the irreducibility of mind to brain (for example Chalmers is a property dualist).. Nor does the dependence of mind upon brain mean either that mind is reducible or that materialism or naturalism is supported. The position that consciousnesses is a basic property and cannot be reduced to chemicals or brain functions is compatible with either property dualism or substance dualism,and either can be a Christian position.
Parsons has set up the discussion in such a way as to focus the issue upon supervenience,[2] or the dependence of mind upon the physical, but that issue is not the most cogent refutation of irreconcilability. Mind could be irredeemable to brain and still supervene upon the physical. Just because one depends upon the other does not mean it reduces to the other. .In fact mind could be the dreaded soul or spirit that one imagines Parsons is really trying to disprove and still supervene upon the physical.[3]
Moreover, Parsons's position is really just the bait-and-switch of which philosopher David Chalmers warns.I an not causing Parsonsof this tactic but it is used by the major reductionists such as Dennett. He protests this allegation in the comment section (when I assaulted him with the charge) but it's clear from the arguments he makes. He doesn't even discuss consciousness but merely opposes one set of brain functions to another, which is the switch brain function for consciousness. Examine his arguments:
He starts with reference to the books of Oliver Sacks which show that "...the most basic experiences of perception and sensation are fundamentally altered when brain function is changed or impaired."[4] Examples include LSD causing perceptual problems and lack of magnesium causing depression or hallucinations. But that's all brain function and in fact he said he's dealing with brain function (above) he's not comparing consciousness or even defining it. While such factors would effect consciousness at a superficial level that doesn't prove that consciousness is brain function. Consciousness might be related to brain function such that light is related to heat or smoke to fire, or some such relation but that does not mean they are identical.
Parsons places even more stock in behavioral arguments; certain behaviors are related to brain function. David Eagleman backs standard deterministic viewpoints with arguments that empathy and bigotry are linked to brain function. As with most deterministic arguments he's just ignoring the exchange between will and bodily functions. Information is transmitted physically to the brain and obviously this has to be linked to behavior but there's no accounting for will and desire as motivating the process. The determinists assume if they can't quantify it it doesn't exist. So behavior is all there is because it's all they can measure. Parsons quotes Eagleman:
Experiments showed that the mPFC regions became less active in volunteers who were shown pictures of homeless people or drug addicts. The consequence is dehumanization, thinking of people as objects rather than persons:
…by shutting down the systems that see the homeless person as another human being, one doesn’t have to experience the unpleasant pressures of feeling bad about not giving money. In other words, the homeless have been dehumanized: the brain is viewing them more like objects and less like people. [5]
The problem is this is like looking away but it doesn't account for the decision to look away or the the moral decision to overcome the numbness and look back. We can see how this process of shutting down empathy would be linked to survival instinct where one might be fighting for one's life and could not afford empathy. That does not prove that we have no free decision making process involved in the choice. That means we are only talking about feelings not decision making or will.
Speaking of the kind of nuerological research he says: "Highly successful research programs tend to justify the heuristic assumptions upon which they are conducted. The regulative assumption of all neuroscience research is that brain function is sufficient for every aspect of the mental." [6] First, that "highly successful research programs," however that is being measured, tending to justify their heuristic assumptions is not the same as proving them true. Secondly, he documents no evidence that allows his extrapolation from Eagleman's research to his assumptions about consciousness as a whole. The regulative assumption of all neuroscience research is that brain function is sufficient for every aspect of the mental is contradicted by some of the major researchers. Raymond Tallis was a professor of Geriatric medicine at University of Manchester, and researcher, who retired in 2006 6o devote himself to philosophy and writing. Tallis denounces what he calls “neurohype,” “the claims made on behalf of neuroscience in areas outside those in which it has any kind of explanatory power….”
Parsons asserts that substance dualists have little more than near death experience (NDE) from which to make empirical argument. He documents nothing and he dismisses all NDE argumet with guilot by association:"The odor of crackpots, cranks, and charlatans cannot be wholly cleansed from the topic of NDE’s, even when they are defended by distinguished academics. For tactical reasons then, if no other, substance dualists usually shy away from NDE’s." He never documents which NDE's are stained with crackpostism. Be that as it may there are several arguments that have nothing to do with NDE that cold be advanced by either substance or property dualism. These arguments demonstrate that mind is not reducible to brain function alone. Since I did a post on these just last month I will just refer the reader to that article, Please see that issue. [8]
He set's up a straw man argument by framing the discussion in terms of the mental working apart from the physical:"What arguments or evidence could indicate that, despite manifold and multifarious appearances, the mental is separable from the physical and capable of operating without it?" It's not important to show that the mental can operate without the physical, not merely in order to be distinct from it. Human mental ability that operates totally apart from the physical is called "death." This makes empirical evidence hard to come by. It is difficult to communicate with the test subject under these conditions.
Parsons allows for property dualism."Even if we conceded that the accepted terms of neuroscience—electrical and chemical happenings in neurons—cannot explain consciousness, could we not adopt a property rather than a substance dualism as a more parsimonious option?" Of course we could but property dualism is Chalmers's position. Under that label Chalmers argues that mind is not replaceable to brain. Parsons does have a point in that since Chalmers is an atheist property dualism is not that damaging to naturalism.
When he says "Surely, it would be evidence for theism, or enhance to prior probability of theism, but it would be only one of numerous considerations (including negative evidence such as the problem of evil) that must be considered in assessing theism..." the real issue is the admissions that property dualism could count as an argument agaisnt naturalism or materialism. Adding that there are still other issues is irrelevant because the problem or evil would have to be addressed even with substance dualism. That does not make a property dualistic approach any weaker as an alternative.
Then he deals with the "hard problem" I will deal with that next time in part 2.
Speaking of the kind of nuerological research he says: "Highly successful research programs tend to justify the heuristic assumptions upon which they are conducted. The regulative assumption of all neuroscience research is that brain function is sufficient for every aspect of the mental." [6] First, that "highly successful research programs," however that is being measured, tending to justify their heuristic assumptions is not the same as proving them true. Secondly, he documents no evidence that allows his extrapolation from Eagleman's research to his assumptions about consciousness as a whole. The regulative assumption of all neuroscience research is that brain function is sufficient for every aspect of the mental is contradicted by some of the major researchers. Raymond Tallis was a professor of Geriatric medicine at University of Manchester, and researcher, who retired in 2006 6o devote himself to philosophy and writing. Tallis denounces what he calls “neurohype,” “the claims made on behalf of neuroscience in areas outside those in which it has any kind of explanatory power….”
The fundamental assumption is that we are our brains and this, I will argue presently, is not true. But this is not the only reason why neuroscience does not tell us what human beings “really” are: it does not even tell us how the brain works, how bits of the brain work, or (even if you accept the dubious assumption that human living could be parcelled up into a number of discrete functions) which bit of the brain is responsible for which function. The rationale for thinking of the kind – “This bit of the brain houses that bit of us...” – is mind-numbingly simplistic.[7]
He set's up a straw man argument by framing the discussion in terms of the mental working apart from the physical:"What arguments or evidence could indicate that, despite manifold and multifarious appearances, the mental is separable from the physical and capable of operating without it?" It's not important to show that the mental can operate without the physical, not merely in order to be distinct from it. Human mental ability that operates totally apart from the physical is called "death." This makes empirical evidence hard to come by. It is difficult to communicate with the test subject under these conditions.
Parsons allows for property dualism."Even if we conceded that the accepted terms of neuroscience—electrical and chemical happenings in neurons—cannot explain consciousness, could we not adopt a property rather than a substance dualism as a more parsimonious option?" Of course we could but property dualism is Chalmers's position. Under that label Chalmers argues that mind is not replaceable to brain. Parsons does have a point in that since Chalmers is an atheist property dualism is not that damaging to naturalism.
That is, rather than take the rather extravagant step of positing supernatural entities, we could argue that some physical things or processes have mental properties as well as physical properties. Further, it seems all too quick to say that the irreducibility of the mental makes theism the best explanation. Surely, it would be evidence for theism, or enhance to prior probability of theism, but it would be only one of numerous considerations (including negative evidence such as the problem of evil) that must be considered in assessing theism. Perhaps a demonstration of the irreducibility of consciousness would be better construed as evidence for animism, the idea that the visible realm is interpenetrated by a spiritual realm containing the spirits of animals, people, and things.
When he says "Surely, it would be evidence for theism, or enhance to prior probability of theism, but it would be only one of numerous considerations (including negative evidence such as the problem of evil) that must be considered in assessing theism..." the real issue is the admissions that property dualism could count as an argument agaisnt naturalism or materialism. Adding that there are still other issues is irrelevant because the problem or evil would have to be addressed even with substance dualism. That does not make a property dualistic approach any weaker as an alternative.
Then he deals with the "hard problem" I will deal with that next time in part 2.
Sources
[1] Keith Parsons, "Can you know what it is like to be a bat? Why not?" The Secular Outpost, blog, (APRIL 16, 2018)
[2]Brian McLaughlin, and Karen Bennett, "Supervenience", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/supervenience/>.
http://www.patheos.com/blogs/secularoutpost/2018/04/16/can-you-know-what-it-is-like-to-be-a-bat-why-not/
(accessed, 5/5/18)
Parsons is professor of Philosophy at Univ Houston,Clearlake.
(accessed, 5/5/18)
Parsons is professor of Philosophy at Univ Houston,Clearlake.
A set of properties A supervenes upon another set B just in case no two things can differ with respect to A-properties without also differing with respect to their B-properties. In slogan form, “there cannot be an A-difference without a B-difference”.
As we shall see, this slogan can be cashed out in many different ways. But to illustrate the basic idea, imagine that there is a perfect forger. Her copies of paintings not only fool the art dealers, but are in fact exact duplicates of the originals down to the precise placement of every molecule of pigment
[3] "Supervenience, philosophy of mind:" Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments
Supervenience, philosophy of mind: supervenience is an expression for a restricted dependency between areas. Elements of a region B are dependent on changes of elements of an area A, but not vice versa. Supervenience is used by some authors to explain the relationship between mental and physical processes. The assumption of a supervenience serves to circumvent more powerful assumptions like, e.g. the identity theory. See also covariance, dependency, identity theory, materialism, reductionism....
33Supervenience/Chalmers: supervenience is in general a relation between two sets of properties:B properties: higher-level propertiesA properties: lower-level properties (for us physical properties). The specific nature of these properties is not relevant to us.Basic pattern:Definition Supervenience/Chalmers: B-properties supervene on A-properties, if two possible situations are not identical with regard to their A-properties and at the same time differ in their B-properties.For example, biological properties supervene on physical ones insofar as two possible physically identical situations are also biologically identical.Local/Global Supervenience/Chalmers: we distinguish global supervenience, depending on how the situations under consideration, refer to individuals or possible worlds.Local Supervenience/Chalmers: B supervenes locally on A when the A properties of an individual determine the B properties of that individual.
[4] Parsons, Op cit
[5] Eagleman,quoted in Parsons, Ibid. (original page155).
[6] Ibid
[7]Raymond Tallis New Haumanist.org.uk Ideas for Godless People (blog—online researche) volume 124 Issue 6 (Nov/Dec 2009) URL: http://newhumanist.org.uk/2172/neurotrash visited 5/9/12
[8] Joseph Hinman,"Mind is Not Reducible to Brain. (part 2),"Metacrock's Blog (March 20, 2018)
http://metacrock.blogspot.com/2018/03/mind-is-not-reducible-to-brain-part-2.html
