Wednesday, May 09, 2018

What's it like to be a Property Dualist? Answering Parsons part 2



Parsons dismisses substance dualism's empirical arguments as small in number and moves on to the philosophical arguments.[1] What he leaves out, however, is the fact that what they lose in quantity they make up for in quality. He mentions Mines to blow off his arguments but doesn't actually quote him:
 The existence of conscious agents with these five mental properties[qualia, intentionality, privileged access, non physicality, and free will] therefore provides evidence that there is a God who created them.
QualiaThe hiss of car tyres on a wet road; the smell of jasmine or the taste of avocado; a flash of sunlight on a stormy lake. All these things have a raw qualitative “feel” that is as immediate and undeniable as it is indescribable. Philosophers call these subjective tinctures of sense perception qualia; and in his influential paper What Is It Like to Be a Bat? [2] the eminent philosopher of mind Thomas Nagel argues that they present an insurmountable conceptual challenge to naturalism.[3] 
This is not quite the way Mines sells the argument but it is the basis of the so called "hard  problem." David Chalmers calls  it that because no one has a clue  how to solve it, The problem is basically that we don't know what consciousness is.We all know we have it   none one seriously tries to argue that we are not conscious, But we can't definite it because can't explain what what causes it, The reductionist want to lose the phenomena and pretend it doesn't existParsons treats this like the weak little old philosophical argument but I think is also empirical. We live empirical evidence that consciousnesses is basic. Parsons asserts that NDE  is the only argument but I don't even make reference to it. 

But Parsons rejects consciousnesses as an argument for God, he asserts that if consciousness is not reducible we could still be property duelists and not believe in God. "This seems a bit hasty[evoking God via irreconcilability of mind] and abrupt to me. Even if we conceded that the accepted terms of neuroscience—electrical and chemical happenings in neurons—cannot explain consciousness, could we not adopt a property rather than a substance dualism as a more parsimonious option?"[4] that is following the example of Chalmers who is an atheist. First my point is not argue for God here, I think we could it makes a good argument, I do use it. I think there is a more important argument to be made: that irreducibility  is important for all people, Theist or other wise,Secondly, while property dualism is compatible with either atheism or belief in God,Neither position is mandated by property dualism. Of course my God arguments are about warrant not proof.  Irreducibility mind could still be a good reason to believe in God without mandating belief.

Mines seems to be misquoting Nagel,however,in saying that "Nagel argues that they present an insurmountable conceptual challenge to naturalism.He is an atheist he does not argue against Naturalism.[5] Yet Parsons rejects Negals's argumemt, he has no real logical. Instead he evokes one of Denett's branding arguments labeling the Bat argument as 'an intuition pump." This is very misleading because it dismisses the argument as something less than it is. He's trying to pretend it's only rhetorical and emotive but in reality it is also logical. If in fact experiential knowledge is closed to us except through experience then it's only logical that we not regard facts as full knowledge without the experiential dimension.  But Dennett is merely losing the phenomena one tactic of a certain kind of reductionism. (For a full take down of Dennett's work Consciousness Explained see Doxa) [6]

Parsons goes on and admits that there is a basis to the idea that first person perspective gives a dimension that "Dorothy when she steps from the sepia of Kansas into the technicolor of Oz. Her experience is different in a way that she could not have explained, even if she were thoroughly versed in the physiology of color vision, to the Dorothy that sees only the gray shades of Kansas." [7] Sort of makes Quoting Denmett unnecessary. 

 Parsons major objection to the hard problem (at  least Nagel's Bat) is the idea that first person experience could be physically or nationalistically caused: 
There is nothing in the qualitative content of my consciousness that informs me that such experience could not have been physically produced. Maybe I cannot intuitively see why brain processes would cause qualia (Chalmers’ “hard” problem), but it does not follow that a brain cannot do it. So, the relevant question is not whether there are some items of knowledge that can only be had via first-person consciousness. The important question is whether first person experience can be physically caused. Why not? Nor is there any reason to think that we could not know, in detail, how it was caused. That is what neuroscience does. If neuroscience can explain how my brain produces first-person experience, then such experience is subsumable under a naturalistic ontology.[8]
Again he has reduced consciousness to brain function. Here he says if neuroscience can explain how the brain produces first person, (that  is brain function). If we understood how first person  experience is produced that would not necessarily  tell us what consciousness is, it would tell part of how consciousness is produced but not necessarily what it is  or what it means. Moreover, there are more God arguments to be derived from consciousnesses than just one stemming from cause and effect.

Parsons wants to defeat consciousnesses as a God argument, but there are more versions of that than just knowing the brain functions that produce consciousness. (see my existential version of the argument,[9] see also my TS argument where mind is a crucial part of the argumemt.[10]


Sources


[1] Keith Parsons, "Can you know what it is like to be a bat? Why not?The Secular Outpost, blog, (APRIL 16, 2018)

[2 Thomas Nagle, "What's it like to Be a Bat?"The Philosophical Review, Vol. 83, No. 4 (Oct., 1974), pp. 435-450

This corresponds to Mine;s fn 3: "Nagel’s fascinating essay is only 16 pages. You can read it hereSee also his book Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False."

[3]Ben Mines "The Argument From Consciousness: Qualia." Thinking Matters, blog  (April 8 2016) http://thinkingmatters.org.nz/2018/04/the-argument-from-consciousness-qualia/
(accessed May 8,2018)

[4]Ibid

[5] Thomas Nagel Mind and Cosmos. Oxford, London:Oxford University press, 2012, 13 

[6] Lantz Miller,  hard sell of  human consciousness, Negations, An Interdisciplinary Journal of Social ail Criticism, issue 3, winder 1998.

scroll down to isssue3winter 98, part I and spriomg 2002 ror part 2



http://www.datawranglers.com/negations/
 scroll to issue 3

[7] Parsoons, Op cit

[8] Ibid

[9] existentiakl arguemt froGod, based upon Gabriel Marcel..
http://www.doxa.ws/experience/Existential.html


[10] Argument from Transcendental Signifies, religious a priori

















42 comments:

Eric Sotnak said...

"Again he has reduced consciousness to brain function."

No, he hasn't. He is claiming that the qualitative aspects of consciousness are CONSISTENT with physicalism. That's all.

Joe Hinman said...

He did not say that Eric. Had he said it that way I would have to think a lot more about how to respond. But anytime he actually makes an argument he uses brain function as the example of what consciousness is.

"...the most basic experiences of perception and sensation are fundamentally altered when brain function is changed or impaired."

see the connection? sensations connected to brain function.

Joe Hinman said...

what he says about the hard problem is pretty telling too:

"There is nothing in the qualitative content of my consciousness that informs me that such experience could not have been physically produced. Maybe I cannot intuitively see why brain processes would cause qualia (Chalmers’ “hard” problem), but it does not follow that a brain cannot do it."

We don't know. He wants to assert that it can without proof then constantly implies
that neuroscience lands the mystique of science and that stands in for real proof anyway. This quote finishes up sort of implying that. Just the fact that it is qualitative and it requires first superwomen experience makes one wonder if that could be produced by physical issues alone. Consciousness is not physical, there is a dimension of reality that is not physical.

Parsons: "So, the relevant question is not whether there are some items of knowledge that can only be had via first-person consciousness."

yes it is



"The important question is whether first person experience can be physically caused. Why not?"

Because that's irrelevant to the ultimate God question .God created the physical world [IFF God Exists] God created physical cause using the physical to produce the mental is not a proof that God is not needed. Or not involved.



"Nor is there any reason to think that we could not know, in detail, how it was caused. That is what neuroscience does. If neuroscience can explain how my brain produces first-person experience, then such experience is subsumable under a naturalistic ontology."

I suspect he argues this to give impression that we already know. We do not know,we are so far from knowing there's no point in trying to secure that idea.

Eric Sotnak said...

But the claim is true: "...the most basic experiences of perception and sensation are fundamentally altered when brain function is changed or impaired." That's why mental states appear to supervene on brain states. This can be true even if mental states are not reducible to brain states.

"it does not follow that a brain cannot do it." is not the same as "it follows that a brain does it."

I really think you are trying to make Parsons hold a much stronger position than he does.

Where I think you will find Parsons making a case for physicalism (and not just for the weaker claim that appeals to the qualitative character of experience is consistent with physicalism) is more in appeals to the way in which understanding mental states does seem to be advanced by improved understanding of brain states.

7th Stooge said...

I think Parsons is holding a pretty modest position when he says that "it does not follow that a brain cannot do it." This position holds open the possibility that an understanding of "brain" could be expanded some day to account for conscious experience.

I differ with him when he says that knowing in detail how the brain causes consciousness is what neuroscience does. That's a much bolder claim. How could neuroscience do this? No matter how fine-grained the correlations that neuroscience can establish between the two things, I don't see how that gets us any closer to an explanation.

Joe Hinman said...

I differ with him when he says that knowing in detail how the brain causes consciousness is what neuroscience does. That's a much bolder claim. How could neuroscience do this? No matter how fine-grained the correlations that neuroscience can establish between the two things, I don't see how that gets us any closer to an explanation.

I agree with you Jim.uh, 7. But there are several things I did not push that maybe I should have. Such as his reliance on Property dualism as a compromise but he ignores the fact Chalmer's position on the hard problem and on consciousness as basic property,,

7th Stooge said...

Good point. It all comes down to the question: "What is the nature of the dependence?" Materialists often say that that will be filled in later. Well, maybe. But notice that the question isn't asking for specifics. It's asking about the nature. How could the dependence conceivably work? Why does access to it seem so different in kind from every other dependence relation we know of?

Joe Hinman said...

It could work with either substance dualism or property. If property, to have a Christian understanding, we have to ask how to can live on after death. That I don't know, except I assume God can save the unique configuration of firing over the synapse.

7th Stooge said...

Well, there is the doctrine of resurrection of the body, the Christian doctrine of the person as a psychosomatic unity. No one knows exactly what that body would be like, whether it would be 'physical' in the same way my body is now. If it's a different substance, then I assume God could preserve my identity through the same functional organization (if property dualism is the case).

7th Stooge said...

This brings up another question: How central is survival after death to being a Christian? At first glance it would seem to be pretty central, since the whole thing hinges on Jesus' resurrection; then there are all the verses in the NT that refer to everlasting life. But aren't there other ways to look at it? (Maybe this is a topic for another thread.)

Joe Hinman said...

Very central. It's the pay off. It;s the fruition, it;s talked about in those terms numerous times.The process of salvation begins in this life with regeneration,redemption,and restoration, But its not called eternal life for nothing.



regeneration: spiritual rebirth; regeneration.


redemption, the consequence of sin begin to be reversed


restoration, empty wasted years restored

7th Stooge said...

I agree. I wonder though if everlasting life can be interpreted differently from infinite temporal duration or extension.

Mike Gerow said...

But it's still problematic, identity-wise. Eternity is a very long time and people are not currently designed for eternal (or even forever) living. To what extent can we be redesigned appropriately without changing our "identity"?

OTOH, we undergo transformations all throughout our earthly lives, and the extent to which "identity" holds across any individual lifetime is debatable anyway. Will that process of transformation continue in an afterlife? What is the "core self", the "identity" part of us that survives all changes? Existing with God is some timeless eternity, or - just as problematically - surviving forever in a earth-like way. We could ask a million questions -- Do we keep the same friends and other relationships? Are we in the same "families?" The narrowness of that seems to raise some issues, even tho many traditional cultures could not and cannot conceive of "the self" as an isolated thing outside of a family and some other specific social connections, Otoh, a case could also be made that what we think of as "self" or "identity" is mostly only a contingent construct based only on the happenstance of some worldly conditions. And all these views seem problematic when if comes to "forever".

Just what exactly is the resurrected body and how will it contain the same "we" as "we" are now, as opposed to how "we" will then have to be different, being 'transformed," as Paul says?

IIRC, Paul's essential answer to these kind of questions was, "well, no-one knows......"

7th Stooge said...

Those are really good questions. And if Paul didn't know...

Another question comes up: awareness of death permeates our lives. It is central to what we are and how we see ourselves. "Death is Dasein's ownmost" Without the prospect of death, without being-towards-death, would we be fundamentally different? IOW, what's essential to our identities and what is accidental?

We touched on this topic on Doxa, the two views of the self, the simple and the complex. If the latter is right, if we are constituted by contingent facts, our genes, social connections, etc, then the self would just disappear when the context that defined it disappears. A religious spin on this cold be something like slipping back into the Godhead or the oversoul, and eternity or eternal life would be understood as a metaphor for spiritual access to God right now, ie somehting like mystical experience, vertical access rather than horizontal extension across time.

Mike Gerow said...

Yeh, and there might even be a place where vertical access and horizontal extension meet? But would it be a static state or a dynamic one? Or maybe a perfectly balanced combination?

I think my essential point is that much or most of "ourselves' -- that which we know of ourselves in any case -- IS, in fact, defined contingently and is relational. So our "identity" (for us) is only what it is within the context of our many relationships. There could perhaps be some "core" of us beyond this, but, aside from that being a rather lonely thought, we'd have to wonder if, outside our contexts, we would have the "identity" we think we have and be the "individuals" we think we are?

Basically, I find this very scary stuff to think about.... :-O

Joe Hinman said...

7th Stooge said...
I agree. I wonder though if everlasting life can be interpreted differently from infinite temporal duration or extension.

good question. what would be the difference?

Joe Hinman said...

Mike Gerow said...
Yeh, and there might even be a place where vertical access and horizontal extension meet? But would it be a static state or a dynamic one? Or maybe a perfectly balanced combination?

see Nicholas of Cuza, coincidence of opposites

I think my essential point is that much or most of "ourselves' -- that which we know of ourselves in any case -- IS, in fact, defined contingently and is relational. So our "identity" (for us) is only what it is within the context of our many relationships. There could perhaps be some "core" of us beyond this, but, aside from that being a rather lonely thought, we'd have to wonder if, outside our contexts, we would have the "identity" we think we have and be the "individuals" we think we are?

Basically, I find this very scary stuff to think about.... :-O

That does not rule out a core substance for self, I studied that stuff or year of doctoral work

Joe Hinman said...

I worked specifically on the postmodern self,

Joe Hinman said...

7th Stooge said...
Those are really good questions. And if Paul didn't know...

Another question comes up: awareness of death permeates our lives. It is central to what we are and how we see ourselves. "Death is Dasein's ownmost" Without the prospect of death, without being-towards-death, would we be fundamentally different? IOW, what's essential to our identities and what is accidental?

We touched on this topic on Doxa, the two views of the self, the simple and the complex. If the latter is right, if we are constituted by contingent facts, our genes, social connections, etc, then the self would just disappear when the context that defined it disappears. A religious spin on this cold be something like slipping back into the Godhead or the oversoul, and eternity or eternal life would be understood as a metaphor for spiritual access to God right now, ie somehting like mystical experience, vertical access rather than horizontal extension across time.


"if we are constituted by contingent facts"


are you kidding? We are continent, our basis for existences contingency we are creatures of God. I have argued that this is the basis of Schleiermeacher;s feeling of utter dependence not an emotion of sense of spending upon thing but being contingent,


that is important because it;s at the core of our realization of God,

7th Stooge said...

good question. what would be the difference?

The difference between the "eternal moment" of mystical experience and simply living forever as an endless succession of moments.

There could be temporal modes we can't imagine, such as an intersection of the vertical and horizontal, or some other dimension(s) entirely. But then again, there could be an intersection of the "relational contingent self" and the "metaphysical self" also.

The relational vs. non-relational self doesn't necessarily cut along the joints of this question of survival after death. There could be a metaphysical basis for the self that ends at death, and there could be no metaphysical basis (only contingent facts) that God preserves by preserving those facts. Just like God preserving our selves by preserving our bodies in the doctrine of the resurrection of the flesh.

7th Stooge said...

are you kidding? We are continent, our basis for existences contingency we are creatures of God. I have argued that this is the basis of Schleiermeacher;s feeling of utter dependence not an emotion of sense of spending upon thing but being contingent,

That's a different issue. Of course we're contingent upon God. The question we're discussing here is whether there could be something like a "soul," something that would underlie my DNA, my social relationships and my life history.

Mike Gerow said...

I think my quesstion was, in what ways is our soul "us" and/or "not-us," even taking the existence of such a thing as given...what is it that survives?

Joe Hinman said...

7th Stooge said...
are you kidding? We are continent, our basis for existences contingency we are creatures of God. I have argued that this is the basis of Schleiermeacher;s feeling of utter dependence not an emotion of sense of spending upon thing but being contingent,

That's a different issue. Of course we're contingent upon God. The question we're discussing here is whether there could be something like a "soul," something that would underlie my DNA, my social relationships and my life history.

1:09 PM
the soul is symbol, it is a symbol for the over all direction of our lives. spirit is the thing lives on (although the terms are not hard and fast). Spirit is essentially mind or consciousness,we know we have that.

Joe Hinman said...

Mike Gerow said...
I think my quesstion was, in what ways is our soul "us" and/or "not-us," even taking the existence of such a thing as given...what is it that survives?

is your life you? soul = life

Mike Gerow said...

Yeah, that's interesting. In some ways, "I" am almost entirely not who "I" was as an infant or a very small child, but in some ways (that are even perhaps more pervasive than just historical continuity) perhaps I am the same?

....largely in the sense that, even then, I had certain, specific, basic potentialities which either have or haven't been realized at this point.

But what about over an infinite timespan? wouldn't we all have the same infinite kind of potentialities?

What then would individuate us?

Is "spirit" then an individuated thing (in the sense we understand that idea now, at least)?

7th Stooge said...

So Joe is using a traditional Christian vocabulary. For me, "soul" is me; it's that without which I am not me. I see it as my consciousness, the thing that if it survives death, then I would survive death, and if it did not survive death, I would not survive. An exact double of me, including my life history, friends, family and so on I would not think of as me if it were a p-zombie or the seat of another consciousness not my own.

That brings up the problem of what differentiates one consciousness from another, if not the psychological history, etc. But isn't this the problem of consciousness all over again? It uniqueness and simplicity as a concept? Materialists would dismiss all of this as "woo" and just assume that my "closest continuer" as Parfit said, would be me. What else could there be to my identity than a set of physical and psychological facts? In a way they're right but I can;t see how it could be the entire story. The same thing is missing from that account that's missing from an account of consciousness as psychology or neuroscience.

Joe Hinman said...

For Kierkegaard we are not surely ourselves until we seek God and find a relationship with Christ and live out the calling we are given. Then we become who we truly are.that's Christian existentialism. That's the counter to Sartre's "being precedes essence"

Reductionist like Parsons (if he would not balk at my calling him that.") only understand substance in terms of a lateral thing like ghost in the machine.We can have an understanding of substance dualism without positing a ghost in the machine type substance, by understanding substances in this sense,ontological meaning.Or to put another way i mpre property dualism would work here as a physiological exploitation because this theological dimension for the soul does not require a ghost in the machine,

Joe Hinman said...

Jim your statement as a whole inspired,me to think of that, But the part about tradition terms especially. The view of the soul as life is not just life itself but in relation to God that si why we ca n be lost souls or saved souls.

7th Stooge said...

You say tomato and I say tomato....

7th Stooge said...

You're talking again about something slightly different. I'm kind of bracketing theology for the moment and just talking about consciousness. Even people who've not sought or found a relationship with God would still be conscious and themselves.

Mike Gerow said...

"That brings up the problem of what differentiates one consciousness from another, if not the psychological history, etc. But isn't this the problem of consciousness all over again? It uniqueness and simplicity as a concept?"

That's insightful..... I know that traditional Eastern thought leans quite a lot in the direction of "sameness" at the core of us, and I also wonder how "self" was conceived in pre-modern Western cultures with less emphasis on the individual and his/her individuated sensibilities, rights, potentials, &tc?

Is our way of thinking about self & consciousness a product of post-Enlightenment thought largely?

(I think Joe may comment here....)

I also think that Joe had an essential insight with his comment about "relation to God" as the primary relation that allows us to be individuated. But, over an "infinite period," (so to speak) would that individuation tend to become less and less as "we" (all the saints, whomever that might be) tend to grow further in that relation?

.... yeh, this stuff does stretch the mind, a little.

Joe Hinman said...

Is our way of thinking about self & consciousness a product of post-Enlightenment thought largely?

(I think Joe may comment here....)

there's no doubt that our way of thinking about the self is the result of cultural evolution and enlightenment is key,I recommend Charles Taylor's Sources of the Self--must read, transformative.

I also think that Joe had an essential insight with his comment about "relation to God" as the primary relation that allows us to be individuated. But, over an "infinite period," (so to speak) would that individuation tend to become less and less as "we" (all the saints, whomever that might be) tend to grow further in that relation?

guess we will fimd ot in heaven

.... yeh, this stuff does stretch the mind, a little.

check

Joe Hinman said...

7th Stooge said...
You're talking again about something slightly different. I'm kind of bracketing theology for the moment and just talking about consciousness. Even people who've not sought or found a relationship with God would still be conscious and themselves.


>>>>I got theology on the brain. either theology, bigfoot, or DC comics

7th Stooge said...

Mike, Absolutely our way of thinking about the self and consciousness is historically conditioned. And I second Joe's recommendation of the Taylor book. I guess this goes back to the old question of whether or to what extent we can think 'beyond' our own historical horizons, or what that could mean, or if it would be something we'd even want to do.

But the way I see it, this situatedness doesn;t mean we're 'trapped' -- it gives us a vantage point, a moral orientation. So we're here now; let's use that, let's think from within it and through it rather than try to abandon or transcend it or whatever.

7th Stooge said...

"Relation to God" is a little ambiguous. There's a basic ground sense in which every partcluar would have a relation to God. Then there's a sense in which it's a relation based on self-awareness that the creature willingly participates in or surrenders to. In the first sense, every person would have a relation to God. In the second, they wouldn't. (I think Joe's talking about the second.) Even atheists would have individuated selves and consciousnesses if anybody does. Their 'finding God' wouldn;t affect that individuation, imo.

Joe Hinman said...

You're talking again about something slightly different. I'm kind of bracketing theology for the moment and just talking about consciousness. Even people who've not sought or found a relationship with God would still be conscious and themselves.

you asked a question about the centrality of salvation to Christianity that is a theological question,


7th Stooge said...
"Relation to God" is a little ambiguous. There's a basic ground sense in which every partcluar would have a relation to God. Then there's a sense in which it's a relation based on self-awareness that the creature willingly participates in or surrenders to. In the first sense, every person would have a relation to God. In the second, they wouldn't. (I think Joe's talking about the second.) Even atheists would have individuated selves and consciousnesses if anybody does. Their 'finding God' wouldn;t affect that individuation, imo.

Due to your question I was talking about a soteriological relation, Baht would include awareness butisnotlimited to it.Everyone has a relation to God even a soteriological one,but there is still an obvious contextual meaning and operational meaning to using the phase of thos ewho are saved and who know God, all people do not know God,

7th Stooge said...

you asked a question about the centrality of salvation to Christianity that is a theological question,

I asked about the centrality of surviving death to Christianity. My question wasn't about salvation.

Not all people know God but all people have a relation to him as the ground of their being, whether they know it or not.

Joe Hinman said...

I asked about the centrality of surviving death to Christianity. My question wasn't about salvation.

the common understanding is that salvation is played out after death,thatit beginsin this life is a radical departure from tradition.

Not all people know God but all people have a relation to him as the ground of their being, whether they know it or not.

11:25 AM
exactly. i don;t know what I can add to that

Mike Gerow said...

"I asked about the centrality of surviving death to Christianity. My question wasn't about salvation."

As I said above, I think the big issue there is around what "surviving death" would mean?

Could we have the same "identity" in an infinite existence?

.... that must be an ancient problematic.

7th Stooge said...

Mike: I would say that if 'my' consciousness survived death, I would survive death. This idea is problematic, I admit. I don't have all the kinks worked out, obviously :)
"Identity" can be understood psychologically, like I have such and such character traits, friends, family, life history and so on. Or it can be understood as something that would or could remain constant even if all of those psychological factors were to be different. This is a hard problem ( not THE hard problem but hard enough). So I agree with you that identity in the psych sense couldn't remain constant for an infinite duration. In the other sense of 'identity' I would say that no one knows enough about consciousness, time or "infinite existence" to have a clear idea...

7th Stooge said...

the common understanding is that salvation is played out after death,thatit beginsin this life is a radical departure from tradition.

But isn't the tradition notoriously vague when it comes to specifics about the afterlife? How do we know how metaphorically to interpret it? It could be that everlasting life involves being absorbed back into God but not surviving as individuals.

Mike Gerow said...

7th, yep, and the hard question is, that "being absorbed back into God" is a non-cessation of "us" in exactly which senses?

Is our finiteness, aka our "separation from God", essentially illusory then - as in Eastern thought and/or some mystical Western writings?

All things are too small to hold me, I am so vast in the infinite I reach for the uncreated. I have touched it, it undoes me, wider than wide. Everything else is too narrow. You know this well, you who are also there… ~Hadewijch II