Sunday, July 09, 2017

First Defense of God Argument 1


I am debatimg Bradley Bowen of teh Secular Outpost on the issue "Resolved: that belief in God is rationally warranted," :Or that is how I conceive of the issue, We have said we are debating the existence of God.My goal is to show belief is rationally warranted not to prove God exists.


Here is the URL to my opponent's attack on my argument or his first attack on Secular Outpost blog.
http://www.patheos.com/blogs/secularoutpost/2017/07/04/hinmans-abean-argument-part-2-objections-11-1/


God: universal mind (not limited to a corporeal form but capable of understanding all minds), the primordial basis for all forms of being, eternal (not limited in duration of time) necessary(cannot cease or fail to exist,must exist in all possible worlds as the ground of all being. God is beyond our understanding, that is standard for Christian theology.  We can experience God's love even when we can;t understand God intellectually.


Transcendental signified: The actual reality refereed to by all marks of signification  the top of the metaphysical hierarchy. In using this term I intend to indicate God's job description as the basis of all meaning and value. The grounding of all moral axioms, the basis of eternal concepts such s truth,justice, the good. The creator, the foundation of all being that bestows existence upon all continent things.


Necessary:  That which cannot cease or fail to exist, reality in all possible words, not dependent upon any higher source for its being.

Contingent: can cease to exist, could have failed to exist,does not exist in all possible worlds, does depend for its existence upon prior conditions.

Eternal: Not limited to the duration of time

Sense of the numinous: That term is carefully and succinctly defined,I pointed out in the Q/A post that it is well defined by doctor Hood in empirical research in chapter 11 of his book, he uses common definition from the scientific field of psychology of religion,[1]
 Its salient feature:  all pervasive presence of love usually identified with God's presence, by those who experience it. 

Ground of Being: the primordial aspect of all that is, the basis of all realty the origin of all thinks, can be construed as first cause. but more organic than Aquinas concept. There is a huge literature on this concept,i did not make it up. It's im Vatican II theologians have been talking about it since the 8th century Paul Tillich made it more popular than it ever was before in the 30s-60s. It's Tillich's notion of the God beyond the God of theism, read Tillich Systematic Theology  vol I. [2]

Problems with Bowen's mania for clarity.
Observation I (1) He never sets a standardard for what kimndo clearity or whyhe needs it

(2) Science often accepts concepts of which we know little merely because they fit well into the theoretical scheme of things, 

Neutrinos
dark matter
string theory

(3) all the concepts I've been using have huge literature behind them he's made no effort to understand them. ,In the Q/A post I linked to laborious explanations of ideas like Being itself,universal mind ,TS did he read them?

Bradley has no excuse for clamming it's unclear, it's well documented there's a huge literature on the subject.

Observation II
God is beyond our understanding, all religious language is analogical for this reason, Thereis a built in problem of clarity. The issue is to understand the possibility of God' reality enough to trust experiences and be open to experiences, because can experience God's presence ven when we can't understand God intellectually; that is a traditional understanding that has a long history of discussion goimgn back to before the time of Christ,

his arguments in blue
(1) veg conclusion in saying "some people are warranted"
I. The Conclusion of the ABEAN Argument is UNCLEAR.(ABEAN is an acronym for: “some Aspect of Being is Eternal And Necessary”, which is premise (4) of Hinman’s argument.)
The first thing that I look at when analyzing an argument is the conclusion of the argument.  Here is the conclusion of Hinman’s ABEAN argument:
11. Therefore, some people are warranted in believing in God.This might not seem to be unclear at first glance, but the meaning of the phrase “believing in God” is indeed unclear.  One might think this means “believing that God exists”, but Hinman apparently does NOT believe that it is literally true that “God exists” (this is only metaphorically true in Hinman’s view), so this otherwise plausible interpretation of (11) is presumably incorrect.

Is that really an argument? Think about the logic of what he's saying: there is no God because "some people are warranted." That makes no sense,so this is not an argument. Now actually Eric Sotnak made comet on my blog right after I posted my argument he offered a version of the argumet  that got around what he thought were flaws in my method of presentation of formal logic. So I used his version. He is  the one who said some people are warranted. I assume what it means is pretty straight forward: those who reason this way are warranted in their conclusion that there must be a God.

(2) Accuses my concept of God as unclear and obscure

the reason is because he is not familiar with the Derridian notion of transcendental signifiers. The problem is his attack on Derrida is nothing more than guilt by association. Because I mention the man's name I lose. But he gives no reason and sure as hell does not deal with the one point I made in referring to Derrida that is to use the TS.

"Logocentrism is described by Derrida as a “metaphysics of presence,” which is motivated by a desire for a “transcendental signified.”[6] A “transcendental signified” is a signified which transcends all signifiers, and is a meaning which transcends all signs"[3]
The things he says above to show how crazy Derrida is make perfect sense to me because I know to what they refer because I studied it. He's just lambasting things he doesn't know about. They are irrelevant because the only thing Derrida has to do with this thing is the one term transcendental signifier and that is easy to understand, (see above).

Signifiers are words, so it's saying TS is a word that connotes transcendent meaning, words such as God for example, Derrida tells us God is the ultimate example. Transcendental Springfied is the thing to which the word points. Bio mas growing out of  the ground is the reality to which the word T-r-e-e points. "Tree" is the signifier and bio mass is the signified. The word "God" is the signifier and the creator of all things is the reality to which the word points. 

I've already spelled out certain other things about God and linked to material. There is no reason to assume those don't hold now. Take this as defining: God is universal mind, the basis of all that is, the ground of being, being itself, the top of the metaphysical hierarchy. In using TS as the definition i was indicating the ultimate and utterly transcendent nature of God. 
The biggest problem here, though, is that Hinman defines the word “God” in a way that makes this concept completely unclear and obscure:
God: The transcendental signified, Universal truth at the top of the metaphysical hierarchy
here's what I said about it in the post answering his questions:

Transcendental signifiers are terms that refer to the top of the metaphysical hierarchy. Concepts that refer to the first principle that sums  and gives meaning to all other principles; the logos, the over soul, the one, God, "object of ultimate concern", the "omega point", the "Atmon." These concepts are hinting at a reality beyond our understanding. The Transcendental signified is that to which these terms refer. In my view that is reality to which the God alludes. It is more than a mere place holder because it can be experienced, (see my book The Trace of God). I conceive of this reality as universal mind, knowing that we don't really understand it well enough to define it and can barely study it. The reality of transcendental signified can be experienced so powerfully that the concept has a reality. But that;s the other argument. (More on the concept of universal mind here). [4]

He then lunches into a  a big anti-Derrida thing:
If you want to make an already unclear concept even more unclear, then there is no better way to make things murky and incomprehensible than to go fishing around in the sewer consisting of the writings of the literary theorist Jacques Derrida.  If you aren’t familiar with Derrida’s notion of the “transcendental signified” don’t worry,  I found this brief and very helpful explanation that is sure to give you a firm grasp of this concept:

Bradley's anti Derrida Harang: 
Upholding the notion of decentering, Derrida asserts that a “fixed” structure is a myth, and that all structures desire “immobility” beyond free play, which is impossible. The assumption of a centre expresses the desire for a “reassuring certitude” which stands beyond the subversive or threatening reach of any play which might disrupt the structure. The centre, that which gives stability, unity and closure to the structure, can be conceived as an “origin”, or a “purpose” — terms which invoke the notion of presence or logos that guarantee such stability and closure.
Now that we are all straight about what Derrida means by the “transcendental signified”, is anyone interested in buying a bottle of my Dr. B’s Amazing Elixir?  It cures baldness, AIDS,  acne, indigestion, and all forms of cancer, and I only charge $50.00 for an eight ounce bottle of it.  What a bargain, right?

That is a cheap high school debate trick, All he does is choose a  passage and assert that because he can't understand that passage then there's no coherence to the concept of the TS. Which was not defined in the passage. The passage he chose is laden with a heavy palimpsest: and requires a background in deconstruction, which obviously he lacks. It's really just an exercise in academic provincialism,
I swear to GOB that I did not make up the above quoted paragraph.  You can read it for yourself on the LITERARY THEORY AND CRITICISM NOTES web page.  WARNING: The bullshit is so deep on that page, that you may want to put on a pair of hip waders before clicking on the link.
It is not his bailiwick so it must be stupid.

the question answering  post that I quote from above ends by reproducing an entire easy I wrote on the meaning of being itself, to continue to maintain the unclear of it after that ks pretty disingenuous, 

read it again:
http://metacrock.blogspot.com/2017/06/preparation-for-my-debate-with-bowen.html


(3) He can't figure out what belief in  God is
In short, I have no clue what Joe Hinman means by  the phrase “believe in God”.  I seriously doubt that Hinman has much of a clue either, and I would rather not immerse my mind into the raw sewage that spews out of the books and articles of many modern literary theorists, especially NOT those by Derrida.  So, the ABEAN argument as it stands is DOA.  It has no clear and intelligible conclusion.
Congratulations Joe!  Your ABEAN argument is a FAILURE even before I examine any premises or any inferences in the argument. An argument cannot possibly FAIL any faster than this one has.
So there's no God because he doesn't know what belief in God means? There's a novel approach. It's stupid to say he has no clue because I told him several times it means God is real. There's no more direct way to put it. No tricky sense implied, God is as real as a solid object although he's not solid. I have made both an intellectual and moral as well as passionate and deep seated commitment to the proposition that God is real. Placing confidence in that proposition is for me more than just accepting a proposition it is a way of life.

Now he's going to get around to actual ideas,
II.  Various Problems with Premise (1) of the ABEAN ArgumentSince I have no clue what the conclusion of ABEAN asserts,  I’m just going to start from the start, and work my way through the argument, step-by-step, noting any problems I discover along the way.
I answered his questions about that if he can't figure out what I say he should tell me'

(4) First premise unclear
The first premise of the argument, like the conclusion, is unclear, at least initially:
1. All naturalistic phenomena are contingent and temporal.In a philosophical argument, when there is a premise of the form “ALL Xs  ARE Ys”, a premise that is a universal generalization, one needs to determine whether this is supposed to be an inductive generalization based on experience, or (alternatively) an a priori claim.  If it is supposed to be an a priori claim, then is it an analytic truth(like “All triangles have three sides”) or  some other sort of a priori claim (like a synthetic a priori claim)?  More on this point later.
All three concepts in this premise are unclear, at least initially: “naturalistic phenomena”, “contingent”, and “temporal”.
No they explicitly are spelled out.I gave three reasons to think naturalistic phenomena are temporal and contingent, two of them were analytical, one was inductive. The analytical are the ancient definition of nature (I said I assume naturalistic means of nature), the nature of big bang theory which puts naturalistic phenomena in space/time that is a prori contingent based upon  the theory of four coordinate system, certainly temporal as the expansion marks the increments beginning of time. Then the third is observation of the world,there are no examples of uncased phenomena. One can lead a philosopher to signification but one can't make him cognatize.

(5) He uses slick trick muddling my language to make bogus argument that I don;t dichotomy necessity and contingency (fake philosophy)_

However, Hinman does provide a fairly clear definition of the characteristic of being “contingent”:
Contingency:  That which can cease or might have failed to exist.The characteristic of being “contingent” contrasts with the characteristic of being “necessary”:
Necessity: That which cannot cease or fail to exist.Here are standard-form definitions of “contingent” and “necessary”, based on what Hinman says about these concepts:
DEFINITION OF “CONTINGENT”:X is contingent IF AND ONLY IF either (a) X can cease to exist, or (b) X can fail to exist.DEFINITION OF “NECESSARY”:X is necessary IF AND ONLY IF either (a) X cannot cease to exist, or (b) X cannot fail to exist.These two concepts are supposed to create a dichotomy, a set of two categories which are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive of all possibilities.  But Hinman’s definitions do NOT create a dichotomy.  That is because something can “fail to exist” that cannot “cease to exist”. (There may be other problems as well.  This is just the problem that I noticed right away.)

my definition of contingency: that which could cease or could have failed to exist,
Necessity : that which could not cease or fail to exist,

Obviously there;s a dichotomy they are mirror opposites. Look at his reasoning:

"That is because something can 'fail to exist' that cannot 'cease to exist'. (There may be other problems as well.  This is just the problem that I noticed right away.) if there are other problems i can't lose a debate because of them if they are not stated,If so I merely need to say there are other answers to his arguments I just can't give them now.

 Something could fail to exist that cannot cease to exist, if it failed to exist it would not be thus can't cease since it doesn't exist, that's why I said either or, necessity is that which could not cease or fail to exist. He's accused Derrida of selling snake oil! In college debate we would call these arguments "greasy."
but of course he;s going to belabor the point!
For example,  a four-sided triangle CAN “fail to exist” (since it is impossible for such a thing to exist), but a four-sided triangle CANNOT “cease to exist” (because it can never exist–not even for a fraction of a second–it can never cease to exist).  Based on Hinman’s definition of “contingent”, a four-sided triangle is “contingent” because it CAN “fail to exist”.  Based on Hinman’s definition of “necessary”, a four-sided triangle is “necessary” because it CANNOT “cease to exist”.  Thus, based on Hinman’s definitions, a four-sided triangle is BOTH “contingent” AND “necessary”.  Therefore, the categories of “necessary” and “contingent” do NOT constitute a dichotomy.  These two categories overlap each other; they are NOT mutually exclusive concepts.

I'm impressed by his analysis of triangle but what I said above takes this out,
The fact that something is contingent, therefore, does NOT imply that it is not necessary.  The fact that something is necessary, does NOT imply that it is not contingent.  Thus, even if I granted, for the sake of argument, that ALL “naturalistic phenomena” were contingent, that does NOT imply that no “naturalistic phenomena” are necessary.  Given Hinman’s definitions, these categories are NOT mutually exclusive, so the fact that something falls into one category does NOT exclude the possibility that it ALSO falls into the other category.

There are several different kinds of necessity and contingency, there's a relative sense of necessity in which all causes are necessary to their effects, All effects are contingent upon their causes. In  stipulating that God is TS that sort of relativity is excluded,I clearly state that God is eternal and necessary, meaning un-caused. If he id goig to use that against the argument he has to how some aspect of nature that is Continent yet necessary. Let's see it?

Hinman’s inference from premise (1) and premise (4) to the sub-conclusion (5) is logically invalid, because this inference ASSUMES that the categories of “contingent” and “necessary” constitute a dichotomy, that they are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive, but this assumption is FALSE, so the the inference to (5) is INVALID.
It's pretty clear that they are valid in the context of this argument.
1.All naturalistic phenomena are contingent and temporal.

4. Some aspect of being is eternal and necessary [=GOB]. (from 2,and 3)
5. Some aspect of being does not consist of naturalistic phenomena. (from 1 and 4)

Pretty straight forward, since all natural phenomena is t/c then some aspect of being must be not natural phenomena, thus N, That follows because no something from nothing and No ICR; excluding those possibilities. If he wants to argue those he has to do more than just hint that they might be true, he has to at least open the door to allow me to argue against them.

(6) Takes issue with my time dichotomy
What does Hinman mean by the term “temporal”?  The category of “temporal” contrasts with the category of “eternal”.  Once again, it appears that Hinman takes these two concepts to be a dichotomy, to be mutually exclusive categories, and to be jointly exhaustive categories.
Yes temporal is of time limited in duration. Eternal is timeless and unlimited in duration.

But Hinman fails to provide a definition of either “temporal” or “eternal”, so we have no reasonable way to determine whether these concepts really do constitute a dichotomy, or if Hinman is just as confused in this case as he was in the case of the false dichotomy between “contingent” and “necessary”. 



 Fool me once, shame on you.  Fool me twice, shame on me.  We should presume that Hinman is just as confused and unclear about this set of categories as we have seen him to be about the previous set of categories.  Unless and until he puts forward clear definitions of “temporal” and “eternal”, we should remain doubtful about the assumption that these concepts constitute a dichotomy, and thus we should remain doubtful about any inferences that Hinman makes based on either of these UNCLEAR concepts.

That is pretty unreasonable. He just said it,He got it right so it's clearly common knowledge.

(7) Takes issue with phrase naturalistic phenomena
What does Hinman mean by the phrase “naturalistic phenomena”?  This phrase is obviously problematic and in need of clarification.  Hinman does discuss this concept, but does NOT provide a clear definition of this term.  What he says is summed up in this one sentence:
Thus I equate naturalistic with nature and nature with S/TC and phyiscal [sic] law. 
I think we are getting a bit Clintonesque here guys, what do we mean by mean? (that would be Bill Clintonequse).

(S/TC  means: Space/Time Continuum)
The term “nature” is hardly much clearer than “naturalistic” and reference to the space/time continuum and physical law might provide a clue about what he means, but this is an inadequate clarification of a key concept in the argument.  Without providing a clear definition of this key term, I don’t see how anyone can rationally evaluate premise (1) as being true or false.

Bull shit! He did not give a reason, why should we not think we know what naturalistic means? He's just reaching to find fault. I've spednt almost 20 years arguing with atheists on message boards every single day, every one of them uses "naturalistic' to mean God did not do it. Believing in God I accept that God created the natural world but he made it to run on its own. So nature is thy process of physical functioning of the world and all the systems that make it up on their own as autonomous workings of the physical world, I think that is obvious and  everyone understood it.

My use of naturalism unless specifically relating to atheist argument is what Keith
Augustine calls "Pluralistic naturalism:"

There are two main kinds of naturalism: materialism and pluralistic naturalism. Materialism, or physicalism, is a "monistic" form of naturalism in that it maintains that only one basic kind of stuff exists--physical stuff. Pluralistic naturalism, by contrast, combines naturalism with ontological pluralism, the idea that there is more than just one basic kind of stuff. Thus while materialists reject the reality of (irreducibly) nonphysical stuff, pluralists affirm the existence of at least one kind of (irreducibly) nonphysical stuff.[5]



(7) dicker with my formal logic in terms of analytical or empirical?
One might assume that because this sounds like other cosmological arguments, that this argument is based on an empirical claim, and that premise (1) is at least one of the empirical claims in this argument.  However, Hinman makes a comment that casts doubt on that reasonable assumption:
The very concept of nature is that of a contingent temporal realm. This comment comes very close to asserting that premise (1) is an analytic truth, and thus NOT an empirical claim.  
So, Hinman needs to be clearer on this crucial point.  Is premise (1) to be interpreted as an inductive generalization based on experience? or is it an a priori claim?  If it is an a priori claim, then is it supposed to be an analytic truth? or some other kind of a priori claim?  This is yet another problem that makes premise (1) an UNCLEAR statement.  We need to know what sort of claim it is, in order to properly evaluate this claim.  But it is less than clear whether this is supposed to be an empirical claim or an a priori claim.

My assumption is that induction and deductions are methods, methods for understanding reality, or truth. Truth and reality are one so it should be the case that some deductive arguments will also find backing from empirical arguments. I have both in terns of this contingency thing. pardon my functionalism.  I two deductive reasons and one empirical.
Premise (1) is hopelessly unclear and confused.  The meaning of the word “contingent” is clear, but is confused, because Hinman mistakenly believes that the categories of “contingent” and “necessary” constitute a dichotomy.  Because of this confusion, the inference from (1) and (4) to (5) is INVALID.  The meaning of the word “temporal” is unclear, because this is a problematic word that is left undefined.  The meaning of the phrase “naturalistic phenomena” is unclear as well.  Hinman makes an effort at clarifying the meaning of this phrase, but his effort falls short; he needs to provide a clear definition of this problematic phrase.  There is also some ambiguity as to the type of claim that Hinman intends to be making.  Is this premise an empiricalclaim or is it an a priori claim?

Thomas Crisp teaches at Biola and studied with Plantinga at Notre Dame says:

"Deductive arguments are, by definition, arguments that purport logical implication of conclusion by premises. The definition of a deductive argument is silent on the question how the premises of the argument are motivated/supported. Premises of a deductive argument can be motivated by intuition, empirical considerations, inductive argument, testimony, further deductive argument…"

III. A Counter Argument from a Skeptical Point of View
Hinman has taken on the burden of proof, which is as things should be.  I made no promise to put forward an argument against the existence of God.  However, in reflecting on the ABEAN argument, I do have some thoughts that constitute an alternative way of thinking about the alleged “contingency” of the universe or of natural phenomena, so I’m going to give Hinman (and the other readers of this post) something to consider (and to criticize) other than my objections to his ABEAN argument:
1. A true explanation of an event requires a true claim of the form “A change in X caused a change in Y”.2. The Big Bang can be thought of as an event, as “a change in Y”.3. There is a true explanation for every event, including the Big Bang.THEREFORE:4. The Big Bang was caused by a “change in X”, by a change in something. (from 1, 2, and 3) 5. God, if God exists, is eternal (meaning “God is outside of time”). 6. Something can undergo change ONLY IF it exists in time.THEREFORE:  7. God, if God exists, cannot undergo change. (from 5 and 6)8. God caused the Big Bang ONLY IF God can undergo change. (from 4)THEREFORE:9. It is NOT the case that God caused the Big Bang. (from 7 and 8)

The essence of this argument is simply that God is eternal and thus outside time thus can't be inside time, he thinks that means that God can't start the Big bang expansion. I have several answers.

(1) That assumes Big bang cosmology, so don't let him argue Hawking's no boundary. He has to assume singularity. At that point I have an argumet for belief in God he can't answer. He can only beat it by abandoning BB cosmology but then he gives up his argument,

..........(a) Atheists have the same problem that Bradley tries to lay on the believer. Nothing can change in a timeless void; beyond event horizon is a timeless void. Time is a function of space/time and is on the the surface o the bubble so to speak. No cause that is not part of the expansion can effect the expansion if Bradley is right. That means nothing should ever change there should be no expansion.

..........(b) There must be something that can change the rules. It makes more  sense to think that it is a mind of some kind, since it has to suspend rules to create a universe then put them back again; of course that also assumes a lot of design type argumet like fine tuning.

The bottom line is without there is no explanation for why there is something. Nothing should come to be, with God to make and break the rules.

(3) Bradley's argumemt doesn't make sense because it says God is outside space/time so he can't create space/time. But you would have to be outside space/time to create it, you can't be in something you haven't created yet.

(4) his argument assumes God is trapped outside of time and there is some impenetrable barrier that he can't get past. That is contrary to one of the most basic Orthodox doctrines of God. The Orthodox church sees God as transcendent in essence but immanent within creation through the extension of divine energies (consult theologians Mithias Joseph
Scheeben and Eugene R. Fairweather)[6][7] ;  the Orthodox, actually understand this in relation to God as being on the order of being itself (Mathew
Ware). [8]

(5) St. Augustine Placed the forms of Plato in the mind of God.  So he makes God the one, the form of the forms so to speak. [9]


Another way of expressing basically the same point is that the mere existence of God is NOT sufficient to explain the coming into existence of the universe.  There must be an EVENT that caused the universe to come into existence.  If God caused the universe to come into existence, then God did this by creating the universe, by willing the universe to come into existence.  But “creating” and “willing” are activities that require God to undergo change.  So, God CANNOT be the cause of the coming into existence of the universe unless God can undergo change.

That is an assertion not in evidence. The kind of change imposed upon God is not physical, you can't drain the power of being itself, it would be infinite. There would be an ontological change in that God is now creator but that is not taxing or impossible to meet.
But Hinman’s concept of God, as with Norman Geisler and Thomas Aquinas, is that God is outside of time and completely unchanging.  Hinman’s God, and the God of Geisler and of Aquinas, does NOT exist, because their concept of God is incoherent, it contains a logical contradiction: “God caused the universe to begin to exist AND God cannot undergo change”.
There's nothing incoherent about it, it does require study and all I can do here is give you a coursery introduction. That should suffice to illustrate that belief in God is warranted. My concept differs from Geisler's in that his is Aquinas based mine is Augustine based. Aquinas followed Aristotle rather than Plato. His notion saw God as the primordial act of being, while Augie saw God as the mind that thinks the forms. Forms of Plato were ideas, the Greek word is idoeos, meaning idea. There are many differences I have a whole piece on  the conflict between those ideas but for this debate we don't need to go into it.

God is creating time and reaching into it through his energies, his energies can change  but not his essence. [10]

In my view all of reality would be centered in this universal mind. That does not make us puppets or determined by the mind because the thought it holds is that of a free will universe, where free moral agents can willingly choose the good. So God is outside time reaching in but nothing is outside God as  mind. In a sense God is all there is. But there is space between creature and creator so God is not the cause of evil. That space is both time and free will. The bottom lime here is God can change in the use of his energies in his title as creator,and in his relation to things without taxing his essence as eternal, and he has to be omnipresent, since all that is being is in the mind of God.











[1] Bernard Spilka, Ralph Hood Jr., Bruce Hunsberger, Richard Gorwuch. The Psychology of Religion: An Empirical Approach. New York, London: the Guildford Press, 2003. 33
[2] Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology volume IChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press, 1957, 
[3] Benjin Knoetze"Derrida The Father of Deconstruction,"  Nov 19, 2007, website (accessed 7/9/17)
https://newderrida.wordpress.com/category/some-key-terms/
[4] Edwin Rolt, "Translator's Introduction" to  Dionysius the Areopagite: on Divine names and the Mystical Theology, trans. Clearance Edwin Rolt , New YorkNew York: Cosmio 2007, from original 1920 publication.  see also online version Christian Classics Ethereal Library, on line version, The Author and his Influence, trans by, 1920  website URL:  by http://www.ccel.org/ccel/rolt/dionysius.iii.i.html
visited May 13,
[5] Keith Augustine, "Pluralistic Naturalism," Secular Web, (accessed 7/6/17) 2003, URL
https://infidels.org/library/modern/nontheism/naturalism/pluralistic.html
Nice name

[6] Matthias Joseph Scheeben, Nature and Grace, Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2009 (paperback) originally unpublished 1856.
[7] Eugene, R. Fairweather, Editor’s introduction to Eugene R. Fairweather, “Christianity and the Supernatural,” in New Theology no.1. New York: Macmillian, Martin E. Marty and Dean G. Peerman ed. 1964. 235-256.
[8] Timothy Ware, The Orthodox Church: An Introduction to Eastern Christianity. New York:Penguin, 1964, 65.
[9] Ronald H. Nash, The Light of the Mind: St. Augustine’s Theory of Knowledge (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1969), 12.
[10] Timothy Ware, The Orthodox Church: op cit.









25 comments:

Ryan M said...

"Is that really an argument? Think about the logic of what he's saying: there is no God because "some people are warranted."

This is a bit confused. Bradley is saying that "Therefore, some people are warranted in believing in God" is unclear. By that Bradley means to say that he is not sure what the conclusion is asserting. As he notes, you deny that you are arguing for warranted belief in the proposition that "God exists", so Bradley cannot see your conclusion being that "Some people are warranted in believing that God exists". The issue then is what you mean by "Believing in God". Since it doesn't mean "God exists", Bradley isn't sure what you mean. You might mean "God is real", but that too is mysterious. What does it mean to say something is real but not exist? Do you mean something different by "existence" than Bradley?

Joe Hinman said...

Rayn I cannot possibly imagine why the thing I;'ve said don't clear that up

(1) I said Tillich agreed we can speak metaphorically

(2)I said is real. Just you are real,you are not a fiction character you area real person,so is God.

abundantly clear, any problem after that point is obfuscation,

Ryan M said...

But "Ryan is real", it seems to me, is the same thing as saying "Ryan exists", so I cannot see how "God is real" is functioning the same way as "Ryan is real" if it's the case that "God is real" does not mean the same thing as "God exists".

Anonymous said...

I find it interesting that Bowen gives a link to your posts, but you do not return the favour, instead giving the web address, and underlining it to look like a link, but not going that last step to actually link.

Is that because you are afraid people might follow the link?

Joe Hinman said...

Ryan M said...
But "Ryan is real", it seems to me, is the same thing as saying "Ryan exists", so I cannot see how "God is real" is functioning the same way as "Ryan is real" if it's the case that "God is real" does not mean the same thing as "God exists".
3:13 AM

that was predicated on Tillich's notion that exist means contingent existence, So if that's wrong then there's no problem. He's not saying God's mode of being is some kind of unphathumable non reality like a fictional character in a book,

Joe Hinman said...

Anonymous said...
I find it interesting that Bowen gives a link to your posts, but you do not return the favour, instead giving the web address, and underlining it to look like a link, but not going that last step to actually link.

Is that because you are afraid people might follow the link?

you are really reading, there;s a link at the top of my post,very first thing

Eric Sotnak said...

The definitions you give here of contingent and necessary appear to confirm what I have said elsewhere: that you are blurring together two different notions of contingency and necessity. One sense has to do with dependence, and the other with the possibility of non-existence. William Rowe is a good example of someone who has taken proper care to make this distinction in his book (and some articles) on the Cosmological Argument.

In any case, my response by now should be predictable: I am unconvinced that it is legitimate to apply any necessity operator to existence.

Joe Hinman said...

you are right that I am linking the two kinds,I said i was the reason I am doing it is Hartshorne did it, I told you this. I said it clearly this is Hartshonrne's move, read him he will beat up Rowe.

Examining the real world the major reason things might cease or fail to exist is because they are dependent upon other things for their existence,so the two are linked.

Eric Sotnak said...

"the major reason things might cease or fail to exist is because they are dependent upon other things for their existence,so the two are linked."

So according to Hartshorne's view, we should accept:
(H) Everything that exists exists either dependently on something else, or it exists as a matter of necessity.
Rowe, in contrast, allows a third possibility:
(R) Everything that exists exists either dependently on something else, or it exists as a matter of necessity, or it exists neither necessarily nor is dependent on something else.

Why should we hold (H) to be preferable to (R)?

But more to the point, if (H) captures Hartshorne's view, then I would know how he would respond to my Quinean objection that necessary existence is a mistake. My principle would be:
(S) Everything that exists exists either dependently on something else, or it does not exist dependently on something else.
To respond to (S), it seems you need an argument that does not assume the truth of (H) that rules out the possibility of there being something that exists that is neither necessary nor dependent, or else you need an argument that shows (S) implies (H). Such an argument cannot simply help itself to the legitimacy of the concept of necessary existence, however. There may be such an argument, but I have yet to see it.

Joe Hinman said...

So according to Hartshorne's view, we should accept:
(H) Everything that exists exists either dependently on something else, or it exists as a matter of necessity.
Rowe, in contrast, allows a third possibility:
(R) Everything that exists exists either dependently on something else, or it exists as a matter of necessity, or it exists neither necessarily nor is dependent on something else.

give me an example. Plantinga once told me the first two are the only possibilities,

Why should we hold (H) to be preferable to (R)?

not a matter of preferable t's a matter of true.

But more to the point, if (H) captures Hartshorne's view, then I would know how he would respond to my Quinean objection that necessary existence is a mistake. My principle would be:
(S) Everything that exists exists either dependently on something else, or it does not exist dependently on something else.

the only alternative to dependence i necessity. go on,give me an example of something that has no cause,show me a thing the world with no cause,

To respond to (S), it seems you need an argument that does not assume the truth of (H) that rules out the possibility of there being something that exists that is neither necessary nor dependent, or else you need an argument that shows (S) implies (H). Such an argument cannot simply help itself to the legitimacy of the concept of necessary existence, however. There may be such an argument, but I have yet to see it.

no. there are only two options, contingent or necessary. show me something that is neither

Ryan M said...

The "Show me one thing without a cause" objection is a failure. It can be used inductively to say "everything has a cause". But by parallel reasoning, we can ask "Show me one thing that is non physical" and use equal inductive reasoning to say "Everything is physical". If we want to play the "Show me" game, then we may as well conclude that there are no immaterial beings, everything is physical, etc. In addition, it simply doesn't address the Quinean objection to predicating something as "Necessary".

If you actually look at your response to Eric, you might realize that you aren't addressing it at all. In responding to his Quinean objection to predicating something as "Necessary", you're saying "Show me something that is neither necessary nor contingent". This response is asking Eric to find a third predicate to a dichotomy that he is denying! As a result, the response not only doesn't address Eric's criticism, but the response presupposes the falsity of the criticism! What you actually need to do to respond to Eric is show that it makes sense to say something has necessary existence.

Joe Hinman said...

Ryan M said...
The "Show me one thing without a cause" objection is a failure. It can be used inductively to say "everything has a cause". But by parallel reasoning, we can ask "Show me one thing that is non physical" and use equal inductive reasoning to say "Everything is physical".

can come a lot closer to showing that than you can to showing the other. Mind is not physical; supervenes upon the physical. Of course there is a problem saying we can "show" a non physical thing but if we use the term to means:make cognizant." Justice, revenge,m the good.



If we want to play the "Show me" game, then we may as well conclude that there are no immaterial beings, everything is physical, etc. In addition, it simply doesn't address the Quinean objection to predicating something as "Necessary".

we re suppose to just accept that things don't need causes at the ontological level merely because you can't bring yourself to assume that mind is not brain?

If you actually look at your response to Eric, you might realize that you aren't addressing it at all. In responding to his Quinean objection to predicating something as "Necessary", you're saying "Show me something that is neither necessary nor contingent". This response is asking Eric to find a third predicate to a dichotomy that he is denying!

he said there is a third one,well he said Rowe calls for it:
"Rowe, in contrast, allows a third possibility:
(R) Everything that exists exists either dependently on something else, or it exists as a matter of necessity, or it exists neither necessarily nor is dependent on something else."



As a result, the response not only doesn't address Eric's criticism, but the response presupposes the falsity of the criticism! What you actually need to do to respond to Eric is show that it makes sense to say something has necessary existence.

I responded to what I just quoted.


1:05 AM Delete

Joe Hinman said...

revisiting Eric's argument:

"The definitions you give here of contingent and necessary appear to confirm what I have said elsewhere: that you are blurring together two different notions of contingency and necessity.'

argumemt there is that I am running together two different notions of N.c. i said yes I am because Hartshorne says you can, that's the real issue,

"One sense has to do with dependence, and the other with the possibility of non-existence. William Rowe is a good example of someone who has taken proper care to make this distinction in his book (and some articles) on the Cosmological Argument."

We are talking about dependence for existence Sophoclean they go together,

In any case, my response by now should be predictable: I am unconvinced that it is legitimate to apply any necessity operator to existence.


that seems illogical, To conclude because I'm running two different versions of the ideas together than neither version is valid? that;s not logical.

Joe Hinman said...

Eric's second response

So according to Hartshorne's view, we should accept:
(H) Everything that exists exists either dependently on something else, or it exists as a matter of necessity.

why does he stick in that additional "something else?" everything exists either dependently or necessarily no other thing,

then he asserts Rowe's third option:



Rowe, in contrast, allows a third possibility:
(R) Everything that exists exists either dependently on something else, or it exists as a matter of necessity, or it exists neither necessarily nor is dependent on something else.


why should I accept Rowe's idea when he can;t give me an example? I can give you examples of non material things,

Ryan M said...

You can give me examples of things you believe are not material, but certainly cannot give examples of things which are known to be non physical. You certainly cannot deduce that such things are not material, nor could you probably give a good argument for such things probably being immaterial (Given that the best philosophers STILL cannot manage to do this).

Joe Hinman said...

You can give me examples of things you believe are not material, but certainly cannot give examples of things which are known to be non physical. You certainly cannot deduce that such things are not material, nor could you probably give a good argument for such things probably being immaterial (Given that the best philosophers STILL cannot manage to do this).

No, we mind is not physical. Don't confuse what produces mind with mind itself. Numbers and shapes are not material,justice is not material,we know that,Even if it is a matter of opinion you can't even give me an example of anything thought be without a cause.

Besides there's a fallacy in your argument, just playing tit of tat does not let you off the hook on being unable to prove anything that doesn't require a cause. It does establish the premise that everything temporal is contingent but proving we can't prove anything imaterial is not analogous because you are not establishing a premise.If you want to argue this unseats all of theism I didn't say my argument disproves atheism I just use it to back up a preise,it's not even my only argument on that.

Eric Sotnak said...

As a matter of logic, the negation of "dependent on something else" is not "necessary" but rather "not dependent on something else."

What you need to motivate (H) is some way of SHOWING that "something is not dependent on something else if and only if it is necessary."

But I have never seen any compelling argument for such an equivalence.

There is no demonstrated contradiction, then, in asserting that something exists that is neither necessary nor dependent on something else.

Ryan M said...

Here are a list of things you have said are not physical:

Minds
Numbers
Shapes
Justice

I will go as far as saying that there are no known sound deductive arguments for the truth of any of those. In addition, there are no non controversial arguments for the plausibility of the immateriality of any of those. In the case of numbers and shapes, I tend to agree with my logic professor, Dr. John Lane Bell, that Platonism is akin to a disease of the mind and ought to be abandoned.

I don't think you understood my criticism of your claim about natural phenomena. Your premise and defence of it is the following:

Premise A - Everything natural is both temporal and contingent.

Defence of A - everything we know of that is natural is both temporal and contingent.

The defence of A does not establish A to be true. That is, you cannot deduce the truth of A from the defence of A. All the defence of A would do is make it the case that you can make a strong inductive argument for the truth of A. But even then, all you could do is make a strong inductive argument that "The types of natural phenomena we know of are both temporal and contingent" which is a weaker hypothesis than your argument requires. In any case, my criticism was that by parallel inductive reasoning we could conclude that anything with a cause has a material cause. E.g.

Premise B - Every dependent being has a material cause.

Defence of B - Everything we know of that is a dependent being is a being with a material cause.

If the defence of A works, then the defence of B works, so you could not establish that an immaterial GOB exists.

Joe Hinman said...

Ryan I appreciate you and Eric actually expending mental energy on my argument unlike some people over there. This offers some interesting points I'm going to put up my answer to this exchange as a main piece on Monday.

Joe Hinman said...

Eric Sotnak said...
As a matter of logic, the negation of "dependent on something else" is not "necessary" but rather "not dependent on something else."

No I can;t prove it because the language has so changed since the advent of the net they don't deal with the issue the way they did, prior to the 80's when people talked about God arguments they spoke of necessity as casual and contingency was it's opposite, I remember it, that's how I learned it,

What you need to motivate (H) is some way of SHOWING that "something is not dependent on something else if and only if it is necessary."

that if self evident of you know the meaning of the term

But I have never seen any compelling argument for such an equivalence.

that is ideological

There is no demonstrated contradiction, then, in asserting that something exists that is neither necessary nor dependent on something else.

if you change the meaning of the tern to erase the thin git meant back when it did meant Thomas Crisp agrees, aplantinga agrees, then of course, because you just crossing out the meaning that contradicts your ideology,

old major steikes agaim, chaning thenessages, atheistfarm

Joe Hinman said...



Eric here is an example of the CA from Stanford Encyc.


4.1 A Deductive Argument from Contingency
As an a posteriori argument, the cosmological argument begins with a fact known by experience, namely, that something contingent exists. We might sketch out a version of the argument as follows.

A contingent being (a being such that if it exists, it could have not-existed or could cease to exist) exists.
This contingent being has a cause of or explanation[1] for its existence.
The cause of or explanation for its existence is something other than the contingent being itself.
What causes or explains the existence of this contingent being must either be solely other contingent beings or include a non-contingent (necessary) being.
Contingent beings alone cannot provide a completely adequate causal account or explanation for the existence of a contingent being.

Therefore, what causes or explains the existence of this contingent being must include a non-contingent (necessary) being.

Therefore, a necessary being (a being such that if it exists, it cannot not-exist) exists.
The universe is contingent.

Therefore, the necessary being is something other than the univers

In the argument, steps 1–7 establish the existence of a necessary or non-contingent being; steps 8–9 attempt in some way to identify it.


in the bold bits it sure seems that necessity is used as the contrast to contingency and that both deal with causes in this argumet,

Eric Sotnak said...

There are several possible responses here. One is to reject the claim that every contingent thing that exists has a cause of its existence. Again, as a matter of logic, the claim here is not a necessary truth (it's denial is not a contradiction).

It is also possible to deny the claim: "Contingent beings alone cannot provide a completely adequate causal account or explanation for the existence of a contingent being." To rule this out one has to show that infinite explanatory chains are incoherent or logically impossible. This has often been claimed, but not successfully shown.

Third, the argument here helps itself to the coherence of necessary beings. Yet, as I have recently been arguing at length, it is not clear that necessity properly applies to existence or to BEINGS (remember this is a point Quine insisted on).

Your accusation that my resistance to arguments like this is "ideological" is really ad hominem, given that you have not offered any positive arguments that for any of the claims I have been disputing.

Eric Sotnak said...

"that if self evident of you know the meaning of the term"

I'm not convinced this doesn't rely on a cheap form of analytic truth.

For example, suppose I can define a raven as a large black bird, from which it follows analytically that all ravens are black. But whether or not all ravens are black (they aren't, by the way) is not a function of what words mean, but of how the world is.

Joe Hinman said...

Eric Sotnak said...
There are several possible responses here. One is to reject the claim that every contingent thing that exists has a cause of its existence. Again, as a matter of logic, the claim here is not a necessary truth (it's denial is not a contradiction).

You are also contradicting the major atheist tenet which they quote constantly that only empirical evidence can be trusted,you are assailimg 100% empirical proof with unbaked theory.

It is also possible to deny the claim: "Contingent beings alone cannot provide a completely adequate causal account or explanation for the existence of a contingent being." To rule this out one has to show that infinite explanatory chains are incoherent or logically impossible. This has often been claimed, but not successfully shown.

that would challenge Ckarkle's CA but not mine. I can take the argument abductive, it;s still the best assumption.

Third, the argument here helps itself to the coherence of necessary beings. Yet, as I have recently been arguing at length, it is not clear that necessity properly applies to existence or to BEINGS (remember this is a point Quine insisted on).

that argumemt OI think deals with necessary beings in individual beings not being itself as in Heidegger.

Your accusation that my resistance to arguments like this is "ideological" is really ad hominem, given that you have not offered any positive arguments that for any of the claims I have been disputing.

I apologize for that.
9:29 AM

Joe Hinman said...

Eric Sotnak said...
"that if self evident of you know the meaning of the term"

I'm not convinced this doesn't rely on a cheap form of analytic truth.

For example, suppose I can define a raven as a large black bird, from which it follows analytically that all ravens are black. But whether or not all ravens are black (they aren't, by the way) is not a function of what words mean, but of how the world is.
3:23 PM
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this is the issue: you said:--What you need to motivate (H) is some way of SHOWING that "something is not dependent on something else if and only if it is necessary." Since being dependent for its existence is part of what I mean when I speak of necessary/continent then all that's needed is to show that there is an aspect of being that has to be necessary that is not dependent,I hove shown that by my argument that something must be eternal because no something from nothing,