tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post6872290005507700320..comments2024-03-18T11:13:57.904-07:00Comments on Metacrock's Blog: First Defense of God Argument 1Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)http://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comBlogger25125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-76876630734453376862017-07-17T22:07:26.114-07:002017-07-17T22:07:26.114-07:00Eric Sotnak said...
"that if self evident of ...Eric Sotnak said...<br />"that if self evident of you know the meaning of the term"<br /><br />I'm not convinced this doesn't rely on a cheap form of analytic truth.<br /><br />For example, suppose I can define a raven as a large black bird, from which it follows analytically that all ravens are black. But whether or not all ravens are black (they aren't, by the way) is not a function of what words mean, but of how the world is.<br />3:23 PM <br />Post a Comment<br /><br /><b>this is the issue: you said:--What you need to motivate (H) is some way of SHOWING that "something is not dependent on something else if and only if it is necessary." Since being dependent for its existence is part of what I mean when I speak of necessary/continent then all that's needed is to show that there is an aspect of being that has to be necessary that is not dependent,I hove shown that by my argument that something must be eternal because no something from nothing, </b>Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-83285634526345258032017-07-17T22:00:22.447-07:002017-07-17T22:00:22.447-07:00Eric Sotnak said...
There are several possible res...Eric Sotnak said...<br />There are several possible responses here. One is to reject the claim that every contingent thing that exists has a cause of its existence. Again, as a matter of logic, the claim here is not a necessary truth (it's denial is not a contradiction).<br /><br /><b>You are also contradicting the major atheist tenet which they quote constantly that only empirical evidence can be trusted,you are assailimg 100% empirical proof with unbaked theory.</b><br /><br />It is also possible to deny the claim: "Contingent beings alone cannot provide a completely adequate causal account or explanation for the existence of a contingent being." To rule this out one has to show that infinite explanatory chains are incoherent or logically impossible. This has often been claimed, but not successfully shown.<br /><br /><b>that would challenge Ckarkle's CA but not mine. I can take the argument abductive, it;s still the best assumption.</b><br /><br />Third, the argument here helps itself to the coherence of necessary beings. Yet, as I have recently been arguing at length, it is not clear that necessity properly applies to existence or to BEINGS (remember this is a point Quine insisted on).<br /><br /><b>that argumemt OI think deals with necessary beings in individual beings not being itself as in Heidegger.</b><br /><br />Your accusation that my resistance to arguments like this is "ideological" is really ad hominem, given that you have not offered any positive arguments that for any of the claims I have been disputing.<br /><br /><b>I apologize for that.</b><br />9:29 AM <br /> Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-40467910336083593122017-07-17T15:23:11.284-07:002017-07-17T15:23:11.284-07:00"that if self evident of you know the meaning..."that if self evident of you know the meaning of the term"<br /><br />I'm not convinced this doesn't rely on a cheap form of analytic truth.<br /><br />For example, suppose I can define a raven as a large black bird, from which it follows analytically that all ravens are black. But whether or not all ravens are black (they aren't, by the way) is not a function of what words mean, but of how the world is.Eric Sotnakhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06162425851889399481noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-90955027993276183942017-07-16T09:29:10.118-07:002017-07-16T09:29:10.118-07:00There are several possible responses here. One is ...There are several possible responses here. One is to reject the claim that every contingent thing that exists has a cause of its existence. Again, as a matter of logic, the claim here is not a necessary truth (it's denial is not a contradiction).<br /><br />It is also possible to deny the claim: "Contingent beings alone cannot provide a completely adequate causal account or explanation for the existence of a contingent being." To rule this out one has to show that infinite explanatory chains are incoherent or logically impossible. This has often been claimed, but not successfully shown.<br /><br />Third, the argument here helps itself to the coherence of necessary beings. Yet, as I have recently been arguing at length, it is not clear that necessity properly applies to existence or to BEINGS (remember this is a point Quine insisted on).<br /><br />Your accusation that my resistance to arguments like this is "ideological" is really ad hominem, given that you have not offered any positive arguments that for any of the claims I have been disputing.Eric Sotnakhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06162425851889399481noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-75886476275090822362017-07-15T09:43:00.573-07:002017-07-15T09:43:00.573-07:00Eric here is an example of the CA from Stanford En...<br /><br />Eric here is an example of the CA from <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmological-argument/#DeduArguCont" rel="nofollow"><b>Stanford Encyc.</b></a><br /><br /><br />4.1 A Deductive Argument from Contingency<br />As an a posteriori argument, the cosmological argument begins with a fact known by experience, namely, that something contingent exists. We might sketch out a version of the argument as follows.<br /><br />A contingent being (a being such that if it exists, it could have not-existed or could cease to exist) exists.<br />This contingent being has a cause of or explanation[1] for its existence.<br />The cause of or explanation for its existence is something other than the contingent being itself.<br />What causes or explains the existence of this contingent being must either be solely other contingent beings or include a non-contingent (necessary) being.<br />Contingent beings alone cannot provide a completely adequate causal account or explanation for the existence of a contingent being.<br /><br /><b>Therefore, what causes or explains the existence of this contingent being must include a non-contingent (necessary) being.</b><br /><br />Therefore, a necessary being (a being such that if it exists, it cannot not-exist) exists.<br />The universe is contingent.<br /><br />Therefore, the necessary being is something other than the univers<br /><br /><b>In the argument, steps 1–7 establish the existence of a necessary or non-contingent being; steps 8–9 attempt in some way to identify it.</b><br /><br /><br />in the bold bits it sure seems that necessity is used as the contrast to contingency and that both deal with causes in this argumet,<br />Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-53765675548485803562017-07-15T09:23:07.750-07:002017-07-15T09:23:07.750-07:00Eric Sotnak said...
As a matter of logic, the nega... Eric Sotnak said...<br />As a matter of logic, the negation of "dependent on something else" is not "necessary" but rather "not dependent on something else." <br /><br /><b>No I can;t prove it because the language has so changed since the advent of the net they don't deal with the issue the way they did, prior to the 80's when people talked about God arguments they spoke of necessity as casual and contingency was it's opposite, I remember it, that's how I learned it,</b><br /><br />What you need to motivate (H) is some way of SHOWING that "something is not dependent on something else if and only if it is necessary."<br /><br /><b>that if self evident of you know the meaning of the term</b><br /><br />But I have never seen any compelling argument for such an equivalence.<br /><br /><b>that is ideological</b><br /><br />There is no demonstrated contradiction, then, in asserting that something exists that is neither necessary nor dependent on something else.<br /><br /><b>if you change the meaning of the tern to erase the thin git meant back when it did meant Thomas Crisp agrees, aplantinga agrees, then of course, because you just crossing out the meaning that contradicts your ideology,<br /><br />old major steikes agaim, chaning thenessages, atheistfarm</b>Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-7704976466720626292017-07-15T09:13:38.993-07:002017-07-15T09:13:38.993-07:00Ryan I appreciate you and Eric actually expending ...Ryan I appreciate you and Eric actually expending mental energy on my argument unlike some people over there. This offers some interesting points I'm going to put up my answer to this exchange as a main piece on Monday.Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-76421786626385211802017-07-14T17:21:47.898-07:002017-07-14T17:21:47.898-07:00Here are a list of things you have said are not ph...Here are a list of things you have said are not physical:<br /><br />Minds<br />Numbers<br />Shapes<br />Justice<br /><br />I will go as far as saying that there are no known sound deductive arguments for the truth of any of those. In addition, there are no non controversial arguments for the plausibility of the immateriality of any of those. In the case of numbers and shapes, I tend to agree with my logic professor, Dr. John Lane Bell, that Platonism is akin to a disease of the mind and ought to be abandoned. <br /><br />I don't think you understood my criticism of your claim about natural phenomena. Your premise and defence of it is the following:<br /><br />Premise A - Everything natural is both temporal and contingent.<br /><br />Defence of A - everything we know of that is natural is both temporal and contingent.<br /><br />The defence of A does not establish A to be true. That is, you cannot deduce the truth of A from the defence of A. All the defence of A would do is make it the case that you can make a strong inductive argument for the truth of A. But even then, all you could do is make a strong inductive argument that "The types of natural phenomena we know of are both temporal and contingent" which is a weaker hypothesis than your argument requires. In any case, my criticism was that by parallel inductive reasoning we could conclude that anything with a cause has a material cause. E.g. <br /><br />Premise B - Every dependent being has a material cause.<br /><br />Defence of B - Everything we know of that is a dependent being is a being with a material cause.<br /><br />If the defence of A works, then the defence of B works, so you could not establish that an immaterial GOB exists. <br /><br />Ryan Mhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15738381414795204410noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-57467944226482126082017-07-14T11:42:38.356-07:002017-07-14T11:42:38.356-07:00As a matter of logic, the negation of "depend...As a matter of logic, the negation of "dependent on something else" is not "necessary" but rather "not dependent on something else." <br /><br />What you need to motivate (H) is some way of SHOWING that "something is not dependent on something else if and only if it is necessary."<br /><br />But I have never seen any compelling argument for such an equivalence.<br /><br />There is no demonstrated contradiction, then, in asserting that something exists that is neither necessary nor dependent on something else.<br />Eric Sotnakhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06162425851889399481noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-88221498507629941982017-07-14T06:49:32.092-07:002017-07-14T06:49:32.092-07:00You can give me examples of things you believe are...You can give me examples of things you believe are not material, but certainly cannot give examples of things which are known to be non physical. You certainly cannot deduce that such things are not material, nor could you probably give a good argument for such things probably being immaterial (Given that the best philosophers STILL cannot manage to do this).<br /><br /><b>No, we mind is not physical. Don't confuse what produces mind with mind itself. Numbers and shapes are not material,justice is not material,we know that,Even if it is a matter of opinion you can't even give me an example of anything thought be without a cause.<br /><br />Besides there's a fallacy in your argument, just playing tit of tat does not let you off the hook on being unable to prove anything that doesn't require a cause. It does establish the premise that everything temporal is contingent but proving we can't prove anything imaterial is not analogous because you are not establishing a premise.If you want to argue this unseats all of theism I didn't say my argument disproves atheism I just use it to back up a preise,it's not even my only argument on that.</b>Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-62425534747969536582017-07-14T01:05:26.015-07:002017-07-14T01:05:26.015-07:00You can give me examples of things you believe are...You can give me examples of things you believe are not material, but certainly cannot give examples of things which are known to be non physical. You certainly cannot deduce that such things are not material, nor could you probably give a good argument for such things probably being immaterial (Given that the best philosophers STILL cannot manage to do this). Ryan Mhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15738381414795204410noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-4224478522521173192017-07-13T07:07:58.124-07:002017-07-13T07:07:58.124-07:00Eric's second response
So according to Hartsh...Eric's second response<br /><br />So according to Hartshorne's view, we should accept:<br />(H) Everything that exists exists either dependently on something else, or it exists as a matter of necessity.<br /><br /><b>why does he stick in that additional "something else?" everything exists either dependently or necessarily no other thing,<br /><br />then he asserts Rowe's third option:</b><br /><br /><br />Rowe, in contrast, allows a third possibility:<br />(R) Everything that exists exists either dependently on something else, or it exists as a matter of necessity, or it exists neither necessarily nor is dependent on something else.<br /><br /><br /><b>why should I accept Rowe's idea when he can;t give me an example? I can give you examples of non material things,</b>Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-61702991752270995972017-07-13T07:01:46.477-07:002017-07-13T07:01:46.477-07:00revisiting Eric's argument:
"The definit...revisiting Eric's argument:<br /><br />"The definitions you give here of contingent and necessary appear to confirm what I have said elsewhere: that you are blurring together two different notions of contingency and necessity.'<br /><br /><b>argumemt there is that I am running together two different notions of N.c. i said yes I am because Hartshorne says you can, that's the real issue, </b><br /><br /> "One sense has to do with dependence, and the other with the possibility of non-existence. William Rowe is a good example of someone who has taken proper care to make this distinction in his book (and some articles) on the Cosmological Argument."<br /><br />We are talking about dependence for existence Sophoclean they go together,<br /><br />In any case, my response by now should be predictable: I am unconvinced that it is legitimate to apply any necessity operator to existence.<br /><br /><br /><b>that seems illogical, To conclude because I'm running two different versions of the ideas together than neither version is valid? that;s not logical.</b>Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-42549389647503431792017-07-13T06:54:37.418-07:002017-07-13T06:54:37.418-07:00Ryan M said...
The "Show me one thing without...Ryan M said...<br />The "Show me one thing without a cause" objection is a failure. It can be used inductively to say "everything has a cause". But by parallel reasoning, we can ask "Show me one thing that is non physical" and use equal inductive reasoning to say "Everything is physical".<br /><br /><b> can come a lot closer to showing that than you can to showing the other. Mind is not physical; supervenes upon the physical. Of course there is a problem saying we can "show" a non physical thing but if we use the term to means:make cognizant." Justice, revenge,m the good. </b><br /><br /><br /><br /> If we want to play the "Show me" game, then we may as well conclude that there are no immaterial beings, everything is physical, etc. In addition, it simply doesn't address the Quinean objection to predicating something as "Necessary". <br /><br /><b>we re suppose to just accept that things don't need causes at the ontological level merely because you can't bring yourself to assume that mind is not brain?</b><br /><br />If you actually look at your response to Eric, you might realize that you aren't addressing it at all. In responding to his Quinean objection to predicating something as "Necessary", you're saying "Show me something that is neither necessary nor contingent". This response is asking Eric to find a third predicate to a dichotomy that he is denying!<br /><br /><b>he said there is a third one,well he said Rowe calls for it:<br />"Rowe, in contrast, allows a third possibility:<br />(R) Everything that exists exists either dependently on something else, or it exists as a matter of necessity, or it exists neither necessarily nor is dependent on something else."</b><br /><br /><br /> As a result, the response not only doesn't address Eric's criticism, but the response presupposes the falsity of the criticism! What you actually need to do to respond to Eric is show that it makes sense to say something has necessary existence. <br /><br /><b>I responded to what I just quoted.</b><br /><br /><br />1:05 AM DeleteJoseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-14683859341279121542017-07-13T01:05:23.337-07:002017-07-13T01:05:23.337-07:00The "Show me one thing without a cause" ...The "Show me one thing without a cause" objection is a failure. It can be used inductively to say "everything has a cause". But by parallel reasoning, we can ask "Show me one thing that is non physical" and use equal inductive reasoning to say "Everything is physical". If we want to play the "Show me" game, then we may as well conclude that there are no immaterial beings, everything is physical, etc. In addition, it simply doesn't address the Quinean objection to predicating something as "Necessary". <br /><br />If you actually look at your response to Eric, you might realize that you aren't addressing it at all. In responding to his Quinean objection to predicating something as "Necessary", you're saying "Show me something that is neither necessary nor contingent". This response is asking Eric to find a third predicate to a dichotomy that he is denying! As a result, the response not only doesn't address Eric's criticism, but the response presupposes the falsity of the criticism! What you actually need to do to respond to Eric is show that it makes sense to say something has necessary existence. <br /><br />Ryan Mhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15738381414795204410noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-58791567064662151372017-07-12T13:53:28.698-07:002017-07-12T13:53:28.698-07:00So according to Hartshorne's view, we should a...So according to Hartshorne's view, we should accept:<br />(H) Everything that exists exists either dependently on something else, or it exists as a matter of necessity.<br />Rowe, in contrast, allows a third possibility:<br />(R) Everything that exists exists either dependently on something else, or it exists as a matter of necessity, or it exists neither necessarily nor is dependent on something else.<br /><br /><b>give me an example. Plantinga once told me the first two are the only possibilities,</b><br /><br />Why should we hold (H) to be preferable to (R)?<br /><br /><b>not a matter of preferable t's a matter of true.</b><br /><br />But more to the point, if (H) captures Hartshorne's view, then I would know how he would respond to my Quinean objection that necessary existence is a mistake. My principle would be:<br />(S) Everything that exists exists either dependently on something else, or it does not exist dependently on something else.<br /><br /><b>the only alternative to dependence i necessity. go on,give me an example of something that has no cause,show me a thing the world with no cause,</b><br /><br />To respond to (S), it seems you need an argument that does not assume the truth of (H) that rules out the possibility of there being something that exists that is neither necessary nor dependent, or else you need an argument that shows (S) implies (H). Such an argument cannot simply help itself to the legitimacy of the concept of necessary existence, however. There may be such an argument, but I have yet to see it.<br /><br /><b>no. there are only two options, contingent or necessary. show me something that is neither</b>Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-6856060971726938182017-07-12T11:04:40.058-07:002017-07-12T11:04:40.058-07:00"the major reason things might cease or fail ..."the major reason things might cease or fail to exist is because they are dependent upon other things for their existence,so the two are linked."<br /><br />So according to Hartshorne's view, we should accept:<br />(H) Everything that exists exists either dependently on something else, or it exists as a matter of necessity.<br />Rowe, in contrast, allows a third possibility:<br />(R) Everything that exists exists either dependently on something else, or it exists as a matter of necessity, or it exists neither necessarily nor is dependent on something else.<br /><br />Why should we hold (H) to be preferable to (R)?<br /><br />But more to the point, if (H) captures Hartshorne's view, then I would know how he would respond to my Quinean objection that necessary existence is a mistake. My principle would be:<br />(S) Everything that exists exists either dependently on something else, or it does not exist dependently on something else.<br />To respond to (S), it seems you need an argument that does not assume the truth of (H) that rules out the possibility of there being something that exists that is neither necessary nor dependent, or else you need an argument that shows (S) implies (H). Such an argument cannot simply help itself to the legitimacy of the concept of necessary existence, however. There may be such an argument, but I have yet to see it.Eric Sotnakhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06162425851889399481noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-46706076306109478202017-07-12T09:22:09.479-07:002017-07-12T09:22:09.479-07:00you are right that I am linking the two kinds,I sa...you are right that I am linking the two kinds,I said i was the reason I am doing it is Hartshorne did it, I told you this. I said it clearly this is Hartshonrne's move, read him he will beat up Rowe.<br /><br />Examining the real world the major reason things might cease or fail to exist is because they are dependent upon other things for their existence,so the two are linked.Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-54514095748236977212017-07-11T07:14:49.004-07:002017-07-11T07:14:49.004-07:00The definitions you give here of contingent and ne...The definitions you give here of contingent and necessary appear to confirm what I have said elsewhere: that you are blurring together two different notions of contingency and necessity. One sense has to do with dependence, and the other with the possibility of non-existence. William Rowe is a good example of someone who has taken proper care to make this distinction in his book (and some articles) on the Cosmological Argument.<br /><br />In any case, my response by now should be predictable: I am unconvinced that it is legitimate to apply any necessity operator to existence.Eric Sotnakhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06162425851889399481noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-61070482910991867822017-07-10T06:22:39.697-07:002017-07-10T06:22:39.697-07:00Anonymous said...
I find it interesting that Bowen...Anonymous said...<br />I find it interesting that Bowen gives a link to your posts, but you do not return the favour, instead giving the web address, and underlining it to look like a link, but not going that last step to actually link.<br /><br />Is that because you are afraid people might follow the link?<br /><br /><b>you are really reading, there;s a link at the top of my post,very first thing</b>Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-61027376346336393012017-07-10T06:21:18.367-07:002017-07-10T06:21:18.367-07:00Ryan M said...
But "Ryan is real", it se...Ryan M said...<br />But "Ryan is real", it seems to me, is the same thing as saying "Ryan exists", so I cannot see how "God is real" is functioning the same way as "Ryan is real" if it's the case that "God is real" does not mean the same thing as "God exists".<br />3:13 AM <br /><br /><b>that was predicated on Tillich's notion that exist means contingent existence, So if that's wrong then there's no problem. He's not saying God's mode of being is some kind of unphathumable non reality like a fictional character in a book,</b>Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-48337970171815869212017-07-10T06:10:52.245-07:002017-07-10T06:10:52.245-07:00I find it interesting that Bowen gives a link to y...I find it interesting that Bowen gives a link to your posts, but you do not return the favour, instead giving the web address, and underlining it to look like a link, but not going that last step to actually link.<br /><br />Is that because you are afraid people might follow the link?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-230329701569944902017-07-10T03:13:01.686-07:002017-07-10T03:13:01.686-07:00But "Ryan is real", it seems to me, is t...But "Ryan is real", it seems to me, is the same thing as saying "Ryan exists", so I cannot see how "God is real" is functioning the same way as "Ryan is real" if it's the case that "God is real" does not mean the same thing as "God exists". Ryan Mhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15738381414795204410noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-503769161658250572017-07-10T01:17:37.552-07:002017-07-10T01:17:37.552-07:00Rayn I cannot possibly imagine why the thing I;...Rayn I cannot possibly imagine why the thing I;'ve said don't clear that up<br /><br />(1) I said Tillich agreed we can speak metaphorically<br /><br />(2)I said is real. Just you are real,you are not a fiction character you area real person,so is God.<br /><br />abundantly clear, any problem after that point is obfuscation,<br />Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-42579430795139905272017-07-09T23:13:43.630-07:002017-07-09T23:13:43.630-07:00"Is that really an argument? Think about the ..."Is that really an argument? Think about the logic of what he's saying: there is no God because "some people are warranted."<br /><br />This is a bit confused. Bradley is saying that "Therefore, some people are warranted in believing in God" is unclear. By that Bradley means to say that he is not sure what the conclusion is asserting. As he notes, you deny that you are arguing for warranted belief in the proposition that "God exists", so Bradley cannot see your conclusion being that "Some people are warranted in believing that God exists". The issue then is what you mean by "Believing in God". Since it doesn't mean "God exists", Bradley isn't sure what you mean. You might mean "God is real", but that too is mysterious. What does it mean to say something is real but not exist? Do you mean something different by "existence" than Bradley?Ryan Mhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15738381414795204410noreply@blogger.com