Best of all Possible Worlds?

Recently I did a post called "Quantum Particles Do Not Prove Universe from Nothing." There were some brilliant comments in the comment section by Eric Sotnak. This is in response to part of that discussion. Growing out of the issues involving the realization that QM particles are not actually coming from real nothing, (Eric has some good counters) we turned to the issue What constitutes "the best" explanation? It is in view of that question my next three pieces will be based. I argued that while it would have to include the best scientific data a philosophical (metaphysical/ontological) answer is to be preferred.

Joe: “God as an explanation may leave a lot of blanks unfilled but it's more satisfying in a couple of ways: in that it's final, where as a naturalistic particle will leave us wondering where the string of endless particles comes from Secondly, it allows a broader understanding. Because it accounts for everything we know from modality to meaning.”

Eric:I question whether it is really more satisfying and whether it really accounts for as much as you suggest. Consider the problem that Leibniz struggled so desperately with: Why did God create the world as he did rather than otherwise or not at all? Unlike Spinoza, whose answer was that all is necessarily as it is, Leibniz wanted to maintain that God could have created things differently. But Leibniz was also committed to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, so it wouldn't do to say, “well, God just plain made things this way – no reason for it.” So, if you want to side with Leibniz in rejecting unexplained first explainers (which is what I suggest the QVS would be), then it seems to me you also share this problem. You seem happy enough to say that God's existence is explained by his being a necessary being. What, then, of God's actions? Do you side with Spinoza and say they are necessary, and thus all is necessary? Or do you say they are contingent, in which case we must now ask what explains them (since you have stated that you think anything that is contingent must be so in the relational sense). [1]

Some aspect of being is eternal and necessary. Meaning not contingent upon a higher source. That I determine by rejecting the logic of infinite causal regression (ICR).[2] If there can't be an eternal regression of causes then there be a final cause where it all stops. That's why the something from nothing issue is crucial. We can't posit a never ending chain of C/e. The issues is which is the best solution, violating reason for pragmatic empirical answer (a never ending string of smaller and smaller particles) or a philosophical concept such as final cause and it's implication: God.

He brings Leibniz into it on the premise that necessary being makes all events in creation necessities. That works on at least two levels: (1) God would have to opt for the best possible world if God is to be perfect and good and loving.[3] Thus the universe we have is the best we could have and thus =call the crap is also mandated as the price we pay for the best. That I base upon his comment about the PSR. If you assert that there must be a reason and you are talking about Maximal greatness (God) then surely his PSR would be a mandate for the perfect answer. (2) Atheists on various message boards asserted that since God is necessary all of ?god's actions must be necessary too I am not associating Erick with this answer. I think he would see through that fallacious reasoning.

In answer to no 1: I don't think Best of all Possible Worlds is the right answer. That raises the absurdity of a world with the holocaust and two world wars being better than a world of peace and happiness because of some long range state of affairs most of us will never see. I think the premise is wrong. Rather than saying God would have to lpt for the best of all possible we can say would have to opt for the most loving alternative given the parameters. The term "possible" is tricky because it implies physical possibility whereas it might be best of all possible in terms of the only alternative given the conditions that must be met for having a world. Put like that a horrible world might still fill the bill because it's necessary to allow for horrors in order to have some overriding good, namely free will. Here we lug in the free will defense. Please read mine, "Soteriologoical Drama."[4]

In other words free will must be inviolable because it is necessary to moral decision making. It is imperative to allow a moral universe because we would otherwise not be able to act in love, and love is the basis of creation [5] Here we have that paradox that God must allow evil or it would not be possible for us to do good. But here God is doing the loving thing. Just because it's not the peaceful or less violent thing doesn't mean it's unloving, The price we would pay for an absence of strife is an absence of thought and an absence of reason, absence of decision making. God is treating us as adults.


As for no 2, that a necessary being has to do only necessary actions is just fallacious because it plays upon equivocation between two different senses of the term "necessary." When we say God is "necessary being" (not "a being") we don't mean we can't explain the physical existence of the world any other way (although we can't) but it refers to the idea that God is not dependent upon anyone or anything else besides "himself" for His/Her actuality. In the assertion that all of God's actions must be necessary because God is necessary they are asserting that God's actions are an extension of the divine mode of being. There is no reason why that should be the case. God must create freely or God is merely an automatic reflex subject to some higher basis for being. Creating freely means creating contingencies that might not have existed.

Do you side with Spinoza and say they are necessary, and thus all is necessary? Or do you say they are contingent, in which case we must now ask what explains them (since you have stated that you think anything that is contingent must be so in the relational sense).

God's will explains them. Because God chooses freely to create they are not necessary they night not have been created. Because God did choose to do so they have their being, yes in God, but conditional upon his will.. They are conditionally necessary, condition upon god's choice to create. So this is not the best of all possible worlds but is the choice of a loving calculus of means and ends in a calculation only God could perform.

[1] Joseph Hinman, "Quantumj Particles Do Not Prove Universe From Nothing," Metacrock's Bog. Tuesday, April 05, 2016, blog, URL:
http://metacrock.blogspot.com/2016/04/quantum-particles-do-not-prove-universe.htmlall accessed 4/12/16

[2] Hinman, "Against Infinite Causal Regression,"  The Religious a priori, on line resource
http://religiousapriori.blogspot.com/2010/08/against-infinite-causal-regress.html

[3] Collin Temple, "Leibnez The Best of All Possible Worlds," Collin Temple ,blog March 1, 2012
http://colintemple.com/2012/03/best-possible-world-leibniz/
Temple is  software guy with a Masters I  philosophy  Western University in London, Ontario, Canada

[4] Joseph Hinman, "Soteriological Drama," Religious A priori, on line
http://religiousapriori.blogspot.com/2011/04/answer-to-theodicy-soteriological-drama.html

[5] _____________, "Love is the Basis of Everything," Metacrock's Blog,Wednesday, November 20, 2013
 http://metacrock.blogspot.com/2013/11/love-is-basis-of-everything.html



 

 

Why Would God Love Us? God's Love and The Depth of Beimg

Poster on Religious forums

Let's say there is a omnipotent creator being who likes to be called God. He is all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-capable. This dude is the single most powerful being in existence and created this whole universe because he got bored one day and decided to brighten up his surroundings. Why the hell would such a powerful infalliable being care about a puny, measly race such as the human race? What makes us so special that we get promises and covenants with this superpower? Why does he give flying **** whether we know he's there or not? Why does he care what I eat on Fridays, or whether I beat my meat, or whether I lied to my mother? It makes absolutely no sense in my mind, this basic principle of a creator being who cares so damn much about the impotent human race in our microscopic section of the universe.[1]

I have seen this view expressed in many ways in many forums. This particular one is average in many ways, maybe a bit more cynical and snide than most. They seem to reflect the idea that God is too  big to care about us. First let's put to rest the misconceptions unique to this expression. God not a dude. God is not "the single most powerful being in existence." Tillich says this explicitly.[2]  God is not a being but being itself. Thus, God is not the most powerful being but the basis of all being.

This guy just reads into the proposition the idea that God created out of boredom. This is very telling because in asserting a trivial or time killing reason for creation he just denigrates his own existence and all the rest of existence., We are just an  after thought God doesn't really care. A sick flawed God reflects this guy's view of himself. This guy is ascribing it all to absurdly cynical reasons. This tells us more about him then it does about God. Joseph Campbell once said "cynicism appears as insight to the cowardly mind.[3] It's actually cowardice that negates us ever looking for the positive, preparing for inevitable failure. Even apart from this extreme version the whole "God is too big care" ideas really self pity anyway. Perhaps it's also fear of failure. If we accept God's love then we feel more is expected of us.

It may be that the basic question "why would God care?" is a valid question at some level. Assuming so cam we give a good answer? Of course we should be prepared to find that we can't fathom it. God's love is beyond our understanding as is everything else about God. Why should we think we could understand this aspect of God? But we may find some valid reasons. Yet we have to remember that weather or  we understand It. Understanding why God loves us is not necessary to the fact that he does. Yet I have huge reasons to believe that he does. These are demonstrable. The overwhelming sense of love that accompanies mystical experience is enough to confirm God's love in a way that can never the doubted. This is well documented aspect of mystical experience.

The question has to be differentiated still further. There is no doubt that great insights and revelations are profoundly felt in mystic or peak-experiences, and certainly some of these are, ipso facto, intrinsically valid as experiences. That is, one can and does learn from such experiences that, e.g., joy, ecstasy, and rapture do in fact exist and that they are in principle available for the experiencer, even if they never have been before. Thus the peaker learns surely and certainly that life can be worthwhile, that it can be beautiful and valuable. There are ends in life, i.e., experiences which are so precious in themselves as to prove that not everything is a means to some end other than itself."[4]

In addition ot the empirical fact of God's love it makes sense that God would love, it is God's nature to love, God is love. We know that God is the ground of being, or being itself. Tillich makes this connection. Tillich says that if We know being has depth we can't be atheists:

"The name of infinite and inexhaustible depth and ground of our being is God. That depth is what the word God means. And if that word has not much meaning for you, translate it, and speak of the depths of your life, of the source of your being, of your ultimate concern, of what you take seriously without any reservation. Perhaps, in order to do so, you must forget everything traditional that you have learned about God, perhaps even that word itself. For if you know that God means depth, you know much about Him. You cannot then call yourself an atheist or unbeliever. For you cannot think or say: Life has no depth! Life itself is shallow. Being itself is surface only. If you could say this in complete seriousness, you would be an atheist; but otherwise you are not."[5]

What this means this depth of being is that there's more to being than just the fact of things existing. Part of that is modes of existing, such as necessity and contingent, part of it is the existential dimension and the phenomenological dimension. One such aspect is transcendent truth. IF we could know there is a transcendent truth we could know there's depth tha would give us a handle on the kind of depth that is a clue toward realization of the divine. Tillich did not make a formal argument stating "here is my ontological argument." Many see implicit in Tillich's work a new approach to the ontological. In other words It is God's nature to love because God is the basis of all being and there is a connection in the nature of love and the nature of being.

I believe that when the Bible says "God is love" it means it literally. In other words, we should put an "itself" there. God is "love itself,": the thing that love is actually the essence of what God is. Now you may ask how can God be both being itself and love itself? Because these two are inextricably bound up together. Love is giving, the idea of seeking the good of the other, according the other full human dignity equal to one's own, these are ideas that entail give over, supplying the other with something. It's a positivity in the sense that it supplies an actual thing to someone. Being also shares these qualifies. Being is giving in the sense that it bettors itself upon the beings and they have their existence. It is positive in the sense that it is something and not taking something away, it's not a void as nothingness is, but moves in the direction of filling a void; nothingness becomes being, the existence of things.

So love and being are really the same impulse and they both unite in the spirit of God. God is the basis of all being, of all reality. God's character is love; that is God seeks the good of the other and bestows upon us the ultimate human dignity of being a child of God. At this point I turn to the other great theologian of Being itself, Hans Urs Von Balthasar.

The common human tendency is to think God created because he needed something. Balthasar is hinting, I think, that God creates because its his nature as being to foment more being, in other words, its creative and God is Creative. It is not for God’s need that he creates but for what will become our need once we are created. In other words, God created us so that we can enjoy being, not because he needed us because once a part of being we would need and would be fulfilled in the need by love.

No Philosophy could give a satisfactory response to that question [why did infinte create finite?] St Paul would say to philosophers that God created man so that he would seek the Divine, try to obtain the Divine. That is why all pre Christian philosophy is theological at its summit. But, in fact, the true response to philosophy could only be given by Being himself, revealing himself from himself. Will man be capable of understanding this revelation? The affirmative response will be given only by the God of the Bible. On the one hand this God, creator of the world and of man, knows his creature. “I who have created the eye do not see? I who have created the ear do not hear?” And we add who who have created language, could not speak and make myself heard?” This posits a counterpart: to be able to hear and understand the auto-revelation of God man must in himself be a search for God, a question posed to him. Thus there is Biblical theology without a religious philosophy. Human reason must be open to the infinite.[6]

Notice how he capitalizes “B” in being and refers to being as “himself.” He personifies being and clearly speaks of it as the creator.

Balthasar sees the understanding of the revelation of “being himself” (my phrase based upon his) to humanity as rooted in the most fundamental human relationship. He says, “the infant is brought to consciousness of himself only by love, by the smile of his mother. In that encounter the horizon of all unlimited opens unto him.”[7] What he means by that is it is only through being por soir, for itself, in other words, consciousness, that we are able to comprehend the infinite and that only in contrast to the finite. Before we can do that, however, we have to become aware of ourselves so we can know we are finite. I think he’s making an implication that love is a link to being itself, and that through our encounter with love, the mother, we encounter the father, so to speak—by way of encountering love. We can see this in four truths that Balthasar finds rooted in this encounter:

(1) realizing that he Is other to the mother, the only way the child realizes he loves the mother; (2) love is good, therefore, being is good; (3) love is true, therefore, being is true; (4) love evokes joy therefore being is beautiful.[8] Notice the link between being and love. He is one of the rare theologians to point out this curial link.

The one, the true, the good, the Beautiful, these are what we call the transcendental attributes of being, because they surpass all the limits of essence, and are coextensive with Being. If there is an insurmountable distance between God and his creature, but if there is also an analogy between them which cannot be resolved in any form of identity, there must also exist an analogy between the transcendentals—between those of the creature and those in God.[9]

In this quotation he as much as equates being and God, since he speaks of the attributes of being then connects the understanding of these to the link between God and the creature. There is more to be said about Balthasar based upon this observation and it will figure importantly in two more chapters, including the last one, and the over all conclusion.

we don't know what God's purpose for us is but if God is too "out there" for us to believe he loves us then we can't second guess his purposes and thus we have not right to doubt his love.

 

Sources


[1]godlikemadman, Religious Forums, feb 26, 2011
http://www.religiousforums.com/threads/why-does-god-care-about-human-beings-so-much.111976/
accessed April 10, 2016


[2] Paul, Tillich, The Courage to Be, Yale University Press; 2 Sub, 2000, 182.

[3]  Joseph Campbell, The Hero with A Thousand Faces.

[4] Abraham H. Maslow, "Appendix D. What is the Validity of Knowledge Gained in Peak-Experiences?" Religions, Values, and Peak-Experiences. New York: Penguin books, 2014.

[5] Paul Tillich, The Shaking of The Foundations

[6] Hans Urs Von Balthasar, “A Resume of my Thought,” in David L. Schindler, Hans Urs Von Balthasar: His Life and Work. San Francisco:Ignatious Press, 1991, on like version p1-2 URL:

http://books.google.com/books?id=LLhBuwGFEugC&pg=PA237&lpg=PA237&dq=Hans+Urs+Von+Balthasar+connection+between+Love+and+Being&source=bl&ots=E6-L_5GF4p&sig=A-MzjMjMmqjBqRmAaUOWGYiOUww&hl=en&ei=xrTSSdLiJdqJnAe4tNTgBQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=7&ct=result#v=onepage&q=Hans%20Urs%20Von%20Balthasar%20connection%20between%20Love%20and%20Being&f=true

[7] Ibid, 1

[8] Ibid., 3

[9] Ibid.

 

 

Quantum Particles Do Not Prove Universe from Nothing

In light of of Naturalist arguments, are predicated: that QM particles prove something can pop up out of nothing with no cause. Quantum theory seems to confirm the notion that it is possible for the universe to begin with no cause. In terms of the TS argument that would mean that no organizing principle is necessary to explain order.

The second contender for a theory of initial conditions is quantum cosmology, the application of quantum theory to the entire Universe. At first this sounds absurd because typically large systems (such as the Universe) obey classical, not quantum, laws. Einstein's theory of general relativity is a classical theory that accurately describes the evolution of the Universe from the first fraction of a second of its existence to now. However it is known that general relativity is inconsistent with the principles of quantum theory and is therefore not an appropriate description of physical processes that occur at very small length scales or over very short times. To describe such processes one requires a theory of quantum gravity. [1]

This statement is more admission than documentation. It admits that quantum theory might not pertain to the universe as a whole. After all the theory has only been validated under normal conditions of space/time, temperature and the like. We have no idea if it still applies at the big bang expansion where the laws of physics seem to be suspended, temperature and time approach infinity. “What we do know is that massive objects do not exhibit quantum behavior. No one can be sure that a new-born universe would obey quantum theory as we know it..”[2]Moreover the statement admits that the theory requires a theory of quantum gravity in order to apply as a theory of origins. Do we have a theory of quantum gravity that has been validated empirically?

Lawrence Krauss in his book, A Universe from Nothing, [3] argues that quantum theory means that the universe came from nothing based upon the assumption that quantum particles do the same. Krauss argues that the eternal laws of Quantum mechanics produce particles out of nothing when the instability of vacuum states causes quantum fields to shift and produce different kinds of particles. [4] This seems like scientific proof but all it really says is that nothing became unstable and turned into something, no thought as to how that could be. There's a deeper trick, however, in that the terms don't really mean what they seem to mean. David Albert (a Philosopher with Ph.D. in physics) exposed the meaning of terms and exploded the whole project.


Albert first points out that tracing the universe back to some physical property or cause is not an explanation as to why there is something rather than nothing.


What if he were in a position to announce, for instance, that the truth of the quantum-mechanical laws can be traced back to the fact that the world has some other, deeper property X? Wouldn’t we still be in a position to ask why X rather than Y? And is there a last such question? Is there some point at which the possibility of asking any further such questions somehow definitively comes to an end? How would that work? What would that be like?[5]

Secondly, he points out that going back to the enlightenment, science has always assumed that at the “bottom of everything” there is “some basic, elementary, eternally persisting, concrete, physical stuff.” [6] Newton had it that this “stuff” consisted of particles. At the end of the nineteenth century it was particles and electro-magnetic fields. Albert argues that since that time all of physics is basically about “how that elementary stuff is arranged.”[7] The laws don’t tell us where the elementary “stuff” came from, not even laws of quantum mechanics. The laws do not tell us where the fields came from, let alone where the “laws” themselves came from. Moreover, contrary to all previous theories, quantum theory particles are understood as arrangements of fields. Some arrangements correspond to certain numbers and kinds of particles, some correspond to no particles.[8] This latter arrangement, Albert tells us, is what they call “vacuum states.” According to Albert, Krauss is arguing that the laws of relativistic quantum field theories “entail that vacuum states are unstable. And that, in a nutshell, is the account he proposes of why there should be something rather than nothing.”[9]


There is no explanation here. No hint as to how nothing could become something. If nothing comes out of some prior condition we don't know. Krauss is just assuming something from nothing. That's important because prior conditions have to be accounted for. There are problems with this account. First, we have just seen, it assumes laws and fields with no explanation as to where othey came from. Secondly, when physicists say “nothing,” they don’t mean real actual nothing, absence of anything, they really mean vacuum flux; that is the pre existing framework of law and field and the arrangement of these things and the sporadic popping in-and-out of prior existing particles. As Albert says, “Relativistic-quantum-field-theoretical vacuum states — no less than giraffes or refrigerators or solar systems — are particular arrangements of elementary physical stuff..” [10] “Nothing” in terms of no particles does not mean “nothing” in terms of no fields, or no laws. Thus “nothing” doesn’t mean “nothing,” it means something for which we still must account.


The particles doing the popping are “virtual particles,” meaning they are made up of combinations of other particles that come together for a short time then break apart again. “Virtual particles are indeed real particles. Quantum theory predicts that every particle spends some time as a combination of other particles in all possible ways. These predictions are very well understood and tested.”[11]

Quantum mechanics allows, and indeed requires, temporary violations of conservation of energy, so one particle can become a pair of heavier particles (the so-called virtual particles), which quickly rejoin into the original particle as if they had never been there. If that were all that occurred we would still be confident that it was a real effect because it is an intrinsic part of quantum mechanics, which is extremely well tested, and is a complete and tightly woven theory--if any part of it were wrong the whole structure would collapse.

But while the virtual particles are briefly part of our world they can interact with other particles, and that leads to a number of tests of the quantum-mechanical predictions about virtual particles.[12]
Thus it's only said that they are coming from nothing because there's a new combination of particles that only exists for a short time. Yet they are actually coming from other particles. Quantum theory is not the best explanation for the age old question, why are we here where did it all come from? God not only provides an ultimate sources but is also a more elegant solution because one simple idea furnishes both the explanation of origins and also ties up morality and everything else into one neat solution.




Sources



1 CTC op. Cit.

 2 Edgar Andres, “Review: the Grand Design,” Challies'.com, Tim Challies, on line reouce, URL:


http://www.challies.com/book-reviews/the-grand-design acessed 10/4/15


Andres is Emeritus professor University of London. Physicist and an expert on large molecules. Born 1932,


3 Lawrence M. Krauss, A Universe from Nothing: Why There is something Rather Than Nothing. New York, NY: Free press, a division of Simon and Schuster, 2012.

 4 Ibid 189.

 5 David Albert, “On the Origin of Everything ‘a Universe form Nothing’ by Lawrence Krauss,” New York Times Sunday Book Review (March 23, 2012). On line version URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/25/books ... rauss.html visited June 20, 2012. David Albert also has a Ph.D. in theoretical phsyics.


Albert is Frederick E. Woodbridge Professor of Philosophy at Columbia, and runs a MA program in philosophy and physics.

 6 ibid.

 7 ibid

 8 ibid

 9 ibid

 10 ibid

11 Gordon Kane, “Are Virtual Particles Really Constantly Popping In and Out of existence? Or Are They Merely a Mathematical Bookkeeping Device For Quantum Mechanics?” Scientific American, (Oct. 9, 2006) on line version URL: http://www.scientific american.com/article/are-virtual-particles-rea/ accessed 10/12/15


Kane is director of the Michigan center for theoretical physics at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor.

12 Ibid.
 

Naturalisms, Method vs Metaphysics: My answer to John Loftus

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

It's been a while since I spared with my old friend John "buy my book" Loftus, yet I found him on the Dangerous Idea Blog spouting stuff about methodological naturalism, so I thought it would be fun.Loftus distinguishes between Methodological naturalism and Metaphysical.

Paul de Vries described the difference between “methodological naturalism,” which is a disciplinary method that says nothing about God’s existence, from “metaphysical naturalism,” which “denies the existence of a transcendent God.” [Paul de Vries, “Naturalism in the Natural Sciences,” Christian Scholar’s Review 15(1986): 388–96]. The method of naturalism assumes that for everything we experience there is a natural explanation, whereas metaphysical naturalism is a worldview that denies the supernatural realm exists. [1]

He writes a piece intended to move the reader from commitment to one to acceptance of the of the other. There is significant commitment among theists to Methodological naturalism because that is nothing more than the approach that says only deal with natural causes in scientific statements. Then we are supposed to see the consistency of metaphysical naturalism and feel cognitive dissonance and go "O well I accept it as a method I guess I should ,make it my metaphysic's." Since it is such a transparent approach the answer should be transparent too, but we will get there in a minute.

He establishes the importance methodological naturalism (MN) in science: "Methodological naturalism is the backbone of science. We cannot have science without it. To see this, just think of the extreme position where every question is settled by saying “only God knows,” or “the Bible says it; We believe it, that settles it.” But this importance only emerges as a methodology, whi9ch assumes it's special use contextually. The context we are talking about is science. As long as we can maintain a distinction between science and metaphysics or science and the rest of reality we can maintain the distinction. That's the real problem because the ideology of atheism seeks to reduce knowledge to one thing, their spin on science.

 

Loftus says:

The question of naturalism only arises when it comes to the gaps in our knowledge. Why does it only apply to the gaps? There are many thousands of scientific experiments taking place every single day. In previous centuries those experiments would’ve been testing something on the cutting edges of the science of that day. But because the science of today is considered normal science (ala Thomas Kuhn) Christian defenders don’t raise the question of methodological naturalism about them. [2]

We don't raise it because we have settled the issue. We understand the distinction between methodology for science and metaphysical/ontological understanding and it's a problem for us. It only entails gaps where atheists fail to understand that if you allow other kinds of knowledge everything is not a struggle with scientist ideology. He's ignoring theology as always so he has no idea of reasons exists for other views. Ironic that he appeals to Kuhn because he somewhat misuses the allusion. It is not that Kun considered science in this age in particular "normal science" as in exemplary form of Science. The science in any age ,however primitive. is "normal science." For Kuhn science is a social construct and works by paradigm shifts so it's not going to supply any kind of metaphysical truth.

.....
Lofuts,,,, ,,,,,,,,,vs,,,, ,,,,,Meta
 

Loftus makes the assertion that early scientists were Christian:b "Most early scientists were Christians and they used this method in order to discover the facts about the world. Ronald L. Numbers tells us:"

"By the late Middle Ages the search for natural causes had come to typify the work of Christian natural philosophers. Although characteristically leaving the door open for the possibility of direct divine intervention, they frequently expressed contempt for soft-minded contemporaries who invoked miracles rather than searching for natural explanations. The University of Paris cleric Jean Buridan (a. 1295-ca. 1358), described as “perhaps the most brilliant arts master of the Middle Ages,” contrasted the philosopher’s search for “appropriate natural causes” with the common folk’s erroneous habit of attributing unusual astronomical phenomena to the supernatural. In the fourteenth century the natural philosopher Nicole Oresme (ca. 1320-82), who went on to become a Roman Catholic bishop, admonished that, in discussing various marvels of nature, “there is no reason to take recourse to the heavens, the last refuge of the weak, or demons, or to our glorious God as if He would produce these effects directly, more so than those effects whose causes we believe are well known to us.

Enthusiasm for the naturalistic study of nature picked up in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as more and more Christians turned their attention to discovering the so-called secondary causes that God employed in operating the world. The Italian Catholic Galileo Galilei (1564-1642), one of the foremost promoters of the new philosophy, insisted that nature “never violates the terms of the laws imposed upon her. [3].

Loftus should stop here and consider this a good reason to think that science and religion are compatible. Why should there be any further discussion? Because the ideology atheist fundamentalism can't rest until it's the only outlook in the world. Orwellian atheism must conquer all. It is this telos that drives John to ask silly questions: "Why would God create a world where scientists must adopt such a method in order for us to discover the facts of science, which would in turn eventually lead them to think the only causes that exist are natural ones, that supernatural explanations are unnecessary?" Because God never meant for science to be the only form of knowledge?" Perhaps because God is not obsessed with science. If God created us with brains to think and curiosity to spur discovery why would he then turn around and make they job too obvious? That would cheat humanity out of the experience of growth as a species. In fact the rational for my theodicy argument would also answer this question. God wants us to make a personal search for truth so we cam internalized the values of the good.[4]

At this point Loftus falls back on the notion that there is no empirical evidence (he says "objective"). "Even with methodological naturalism God could still overcome it with sufficient objective evidence. The problem is that the evidence doesn’t exist. Christian defenders refuse to admit this."[5] That's a deceptive argument. There is no direct scientific evidence that "proves" God or "disproves" God. In fact it's not clear such evidence would be possible. Any evidence that pointed to God would contradict metaphysic naturalism and thus if method supposedly leaded to meta then no such science evidence for God would ever be coherent. That is not the same as saying there is no evidence for God. There is it just requires a different paradigm. I hate to say it but my book (buy my book) offers that approach and data.[6] [7]

He tries to rub a little salt in the wounds saying "Just think of the failed repeated attempts to test prayer." I've never seen an atheist answer the empirical evidence of Lourdes. That's been reinforced over the years by new academic work.[8][9] We knew the double blind approach was wrong for the question because you can't control for outside prayer but the empirical approach has not been answered.

 

Then he tries to turn the alleged problem into an overall paradigm indictment of faith:

This point is extremely important for to see. Just think if there existed sufficient objective evidence to overcome the method of naturalism and it's clear this is what they are doing. Their problem is that this kind of evidence does not exist, and it should. So in order to maintain their faith, Christian defenders have to complain about it even though scientists have amassed a massive amount of knowledge from using it, knowledge that changed our world. [10]

To overcome the method of naturalism. "The Method" like there's only one. See the bait and switch? He starts out talking about two methods and now it's one. Somewhere along the way you are supposed to  do this black is white slide where Methodology becomes metaphysics. But he has not justified collapsing method into metaphysics for the reasons ai spelled out above. In a metaphysical frame work that is not limited to the ideology of science as the only knowledge there other reasons to believe in God and reasons to understand the major questions about God, reality existence, and knowledge as transcending. This is why it is a true black is white slide because Method and Meta have one thing in common ( both about science) but they are really opposite ends of a spectrum.

 

The view from within the ideology looks very different, as Loftus says:

It's knowledge gained about things that were once on the cutting edges of science, about things that, if Christians defenders were alive in a previous era, they would've complained how methodological naturalism doesn't leave room for faith, in those very areas where science rolled over faith-based thinking.[11]

Obviously not true since it did. Methodological naturalism left room for faith in Newton's day and Newton's life. He never made such a complaint. The difference is in John's world there is just one form of knowledge, science viewed through atheist lens. In my world there is a large framework that allows for many forms of knowledge and science is in come compartment and in that compartment Methodological naturalism works fine. But it's limited to that compartment. In that sense it helps provide some evidence that ,while it doesn't  "prove God," does offer rational warrant for belief.

 there were comments on DC I will answer a couple in the comments here.

 

Philosophy Still Owns Science.

Karl Popper

     

Lawrence M. Krauss, atheist and physicist, says:

Philosophy used to be a field that had content, but then "natural philosophy" became physics, and physics has only continued to make inroads. Every time there's a leap in physics, it encroaches on these areas that philosophers have carefully sequestered away to themselves, and so then you have this natural resentment on the part of philosophers. This sense that somehow physicists, because they can't spell the word "philosophy," aren't justified in talking about these things, or haven't thought deeply about them---
(Ross Andersen, “Has Physics Made Philosophy and Religion Obsolete?” The Atlantic (April 23, 2012). Pm et 396. Online URL: http://www.theatlantic.com/technolog...solete/256203/ visited 7/2/12.)

problem is philosophy is still very important to scinece, and in fact any time a scientist pretends to be using scinece to examine something beyond the domain of scinece he is using philosophy More over philosophy directly informs and shapes and guides science in its understanding.

Exhibit A: Popper's Verisimilitude

Karl Popper is almost universally admired by scientists. He's the only philosopher of science who is so admired among scientist that he's almost thought of as one. Popper used philosophy to show that science doesn't' prove things. He did not use science to talk about scinece he used philosophy. His argument about verisimilitude come right out of philosophy.

He argues that one cannot confirm an abstract ideal through empirical observation. This is strictly a matter of philosophy. That forms the basis for his notions on verisimilitude.

Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London, New York:Routledge Classics, original English publication 1959 by Hutchison and co. by Routldege 1992. On line copy URL: http://www.cosmopolitanuniversity.ac...Popper1959.pdf digital copy by Cosmo oedu visited 2/6/2012, p4

Karl Popper (1902-1994) is one of the most renewed and highly respected figures in the philosophy of science. Popper was from Vienna, of Jewish origin, maintained a youthful flirtation with Marxism, and left his native land due to the rise of Nazism in the late thirties. He is considered to be among the ranks of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century. Popper is highly respected by scientists in a way that most philosophers of science are not.[1]

He was also a social and political philosopher of considerable stature, a self-professed ‘critical-rationalist’, a dedicated opponent of all forms of scepticism, conventionalism, and relativism in science and in human affairs generally, a committed advocate and staunch defender of the ‘Open Society’, and an implacable critic of totalitarianism in all of its forms. One of the many remarkable features of Popper's thought is the scope of his intellectual influence. In the modern technological and highly-specialised world scientists are rarely aware of the work of philosophers; it is virtually unprecedented to find them queuing up, as they have done in Popper's case, to testify to the enormously practical beneficial impact which that philosophical work has had upon their own. But notwithstanding the fact that he wrote on even the most technical matters with consummate clarity, the scope of Popper's work is such that it is commonplace by now to find that commentators tend to deal with the epistemological, scientific and social elements of his thought as if they were quite disparate and unconnected, and thus the fundamental unity of his philosophical vision and method has to a large degree been dissipated.[2]

Unfortunately for our purposes we will only be able to skim the surface of Popper’s thoughts on the most crucial aspect of this theory of science, that science is not about proving things but about falsifying them.

Above we see [from larger article] that Dawkins, Stenger and company place their faith in the probability engineered by scientific facts. The problem is probability is not the basis upon which one chooses one theory over another, at least according to Popper. This insight forms the basis of this notion that science can give us verisimilitude not “facts.” Popper never uses the phrase “fortress of facts,” we could add that, science is not a fortress of facts. Science is not giving us “truth,” its’ giving something in place of truth, “verisimilitude.” The term verisimilar means “having the appearance of truth, or probable.” Or it can also mean “depicting realism” as in art or literature.”[3] According to Popper in choosing between two theories one more probable than the other, if one is interested I the informative content of the theory, one should choose the less probable. This is paradoxical but the reason is that probability and informative content very inversely. The higher informative content of a theory is more predictive since the more information contained in a statement the greater the number of ways the statement will turn out to fail or be proved wrong. At that rate mystical experience should be the most scientific view point. If this dictum were applied to a choice between Stenger’s atheism and belief in God mystical God belief would be more predictive and have less likelihood of being wrong because it’s based upon not speaking much about what one experiences as truth. We will see latter that this is actually the case in terms of certain kinds of religious experiences. I am not really suggesting that the two can be compared. They are two different kinds of knowledge. Even though mystical experience per se can be falsified (which will be seen in subsequent chapters) belief in God over all can’t be. The real point is that arguing that God is less probable is not a scientifically valid approach.

Thus the statements which are of special interest to the scientist are those with a high informative content and (consequentially) a low probability, which nevertheless come close to the truth. Informative content, which is in inverse proportion to probability, is in direct proportion to testability. Consequently the severity of the test to which a theory can be subjected, and by means of which it is falsified or corroborated, is all-important.[4]

Scientific criticism of theories must be piecemeal. We can’t question every aspect of a theory at once. For this reason one must accept a certain amount of background knowledge. We can’t have absolute certainty. Science is not about absolute certainty, thus rather than speak of “truth” we speak of “verisimilitude.” No single observation can be taken to falsify a theory. There is always the possibility that the observation is mistaken, or that the assumed background knowledge is faulty.[5] Uneasy with speaking of “true” theories or ideas, or that a corroborated theory is “true,” Popper asserted that a falsified theory is known to be false. He was impressed by Tarski’s 1963 reformulation of the corresponded theory of truth. That is when Popper reformulated his way of speaking to frame the concept of “truth-likeness” or “verisimilitude,” according to Thronton.[6] I wont go into all the ramifications of verisimilitude, but Popper has an extensive theory to cover the notion. Popper’s notions of verisimilitude were critixized by thinkers in the 70’s such as Miller, Tichy’(grave over the y) and Grunbaum (umlaut over the first u) brought out problems with the concept. In an attempt to repair the theory Popper backed off claims to being able to access the numerical levels of verisimilitude between two theories.[7] The resolution of this problem has not diminished the admiration for Popper or his acceptance in the world of philosophy of science. Nor is the solution settled in the direction of acceptance for the fortress of facts. Science is not closer to the fact making business just because there are problems with verisimilitude.

Exhibit B:



Philosophical roots of reductionism


Reductionism is both a philosophy and a tool in science. “Methodological reductionism” is the process of reducing phenomena to its smallest constituent parts to understand what makes it function is a method for dealing with complexities that need to broken down.(8) Then there is “philosophical reductionism” which maintains as it’s goal a philosophical and/or ideological tenet that science can explain everything:

"One form of scientific reductionism follows the belief that every single process in nature can be broken down into its constituent parts and can be described scientifically. The broadest sense of the term upholds the idea that science can be used to explain everything, and that nothing is unknowable. By looking at the individual constituent processes, scientists can gain an understanding of the whole process. For example, a reductionist believes that the complexity of the human brain is a result of complex and interacting physical processes. If scientists research and understand these underlying chemical reactions, then they can explain intelligence, emotion and all of the other human conditions. The only way to comprehend fully the sheer complexity of the human brain is to look at the individual pieces." (9)

Here we can definitely see the ideological aspects of science at work. These advocates of this certain type of reductionism believe that “everything can be explained through science.” Obviously for this to be true science has to be the most valid from of knowledge if not the only form of knowledge. Materialists, who tend to philosophical reductionists, and this includes phyisicalists, go step further and just refuse to accept as knowledge anything that can’t be quantified and pinned down by their methods. God can’t be apprehended by their methods so there must not be a God. This notion of science as the most or only valid form of knowledge is clearly ideological and stems form philosophical concerns. In the issue of reductionism we can see one of the most obvious junctures at which philosophy has clung to scientific development and is still being infused with science. Reductionism is inherently infused with philosophy.

"Reductionism encompasses a set of ontological, epistemological, and methodological claims about the relation of different scientific domains. The basic question of reduction is whether the properties, concepts, explanations, or methods from one scientific domain (typically at higher levels of organization) can be deduced from or explained by the properties, concepts, explanations, or methods from another domain of science (typically one about lower levels of organization). Reduction is germane to a variety of issues in philosophy of science, including the structure of scientific theories, the relations between different scientific disciplines, the nature of explanation, the diversity of methodology, and the very idea of theoretical progress, as well as to numerous topics in metaphysics and philosophy of mind, such as emergence, mereology, and supervenience." (19)


Reductionism goes back to the Greeks and tied to philosophy up to the development of early modern science and beyond. The Greek atomists were reductionists. They wanted to cut up reality in order to get at the basic elements. The idea of positing basic building blocks doesn’t require that one abolish other aspects of reality. Yet certain of the pre-Socratics, such as Leucpp and Democritus, began doing this.(11) The term “reductiosm” is not very old. The modern issues enter science from philosophy. Ontological reductionism was part of the dispute between nominalists and realists in the middles.(12) The major alternative to reductionism is holism. Holism also goes back to the Greeks with Aristotle. The Atomists had atoms in the void as the final explanation and Aristotle had final cause of an unmoved mover as the final cause and explanation of all harmony and unity in the world.(13) Modern science abhors teleology, the idea that everything is directed toward a goal or an end point. The teleological is the hall mark of Aristotle’s’ unmoved mover. Atoms in the void don’t require a goal; they are the end of the process. Thus science has had this atheistic bias literally since the Greeks. Likewise, theistic thinking takes on a holistic bias form the Greeks as well. Science was slow to completely turn over to the atomists and did so in stages. The bias against teleology was not adopted into biology until the middle of the nineteenth century (with Darwin and Wallace). Natural mutation and random selection have come to dominate in biology and replace any idea of purposefulness.(14) The distinction between appearance and reality is a carry over from Democritus’ claim that binary oppositions in experience, such cold and hot, sweet and sour, are really just atoms moving in void. We take this as empirically proved because we dismiss experience as subjective and go with the ‘objective measurement,’ never really considering how we are conditioned by philosophical hold over to think this way.


In both B and C we see philosophy providing the basis for science, not just a way that was useful in the days of the Greeks and is no longer but in the modern world it offers guides and the basis of methodological discussion.

Science is method. It not facts it's not lists of "proven things" it's methodology. no methodology, no scinece.

the minions of this nonsense always get themselves in trouble. look at Exhibit D where Krauss makes a fool of himself trying to take down philosophy.

Exhibit C:hilarious exchange between Krauss and Andersen (interviewer for the Atlantic)(plum my commentary).

A humorous exchange occurs when Andersen points out that philosophy offers a basis for computer science. Krauss says: “Well, you name me the philosophers that did key work for computer science; I think of John Von Neumann and other mathematicians, and---.” Andersen says: “But Bertrand Russell paved the way for Von Neumann..”

Karauss says: “But Bertrand Russell was a mathematician. I mean, he was a philosopher too and he was interested in the philosophical foundations of mathematics, but by the way, when he wrote about the philosophical foundations of mathematics, what did he do? He got it wrong.” So not only can we take him over as one of the science boys since he did math but (which would just as easily mean math is part of philosophy again) but he also got it wrong about math (yet that reflects on his philosophical side not on his math side, not real sure how that works since it would be the math side that got it wrong). Andersen remarks “Einstein got it wrong.” To which Krauss replies:

"Krauss: Sure, but the difference is that scientists are really happy when they get it wrong, because it means that there's more to learn. And look, one can play semantic games, but I think that if you look at the people whose work really pushed the computer revolution from Turing to Von Neumann and, you're right, Bertrand Russell in some general way, I think you'll find it's the mathematicians who had the big impact. And logic can certainly be claimed to be a part of philosophy, but to me the content of logic is mathematical."

Science guys are happy when they are proved wrong? I guess he must be ecstatic since Albert’s article? We’ll have to ask him how happy he’s been since his book was panned. It means there’s more to learn, such as the meaning of life and the value of philosophy. He admits logic is part of philosophy and Russell was into both it just eludes him that this also means philosophy is the foundation of computer science and math together that makes it the foundation of physics. Now that’s the “unthinkable” we should be taught to think. Maybe the fortress of facts is a house of cards and maybe there’s more than one form of knowledge in the universe? Scientists being happen when they get it wrong doesn’t change the original fact being made that there are other views than that one.
(ibid: see above the Andersen interview)

In each case we see that philosophical thinking is still making vital contributions and is both guiding scinece and correcting it.

[1] Steven Thornton, “Karl Popper,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Winter 2011 edition Edward N. Zalta Editor, URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/popper/ vested 2/6/2012

[2] ibid

[3] Miriam-Webster. M-W.com On line version of Webster’s dictionary. URL: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/verisimilar?show=0&t=1328626983 visited 2/7/2012

[4] Thornton, ibid.

[5] ibid

[6] ibid

[7] ibid

(8)“Scientific Recutionsm,” website: Experiment-Resources.com. URL: http://www.experiment-resources.com/...uctionism.html visited 3/13/2012
Experiemnt-reserouces.com is a site ran for educational purposes by a psychologist and other unnamed authors who work in the seicnes.
(9) Ibid.
(10)Brigandt, Ingo and Love, Alan, "Reductionism in Biology", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = .
(11)Richard H. Jones, Reductionism: Analysis and the Fullness of Reality. Danvers, Massachusetts: Associated University Press.2000, 37.online copy, Google books, URL: http://books.google.com/books?id=sUg...epage&q&f=true visited 3/13/2012
(12) ibid.
(13) ibid.