Reflections upon Methodology and Science

I don't think atheists care about evidence. Evidence just means that one has something to reason from. What atheists demand is absolute proof, and at a level that can't be given for anything. I would bet that if for some reason atheists didn't like science, no amount of scientific "proof" wood suffice to prove to them that science works; because they would demand absolute proof, which can't be gotten.

In thinking about the two other threads I initiative over the last few days, and the atheist take on my arguments and their 'dicing' of my thought processes, and their refusal to acknowledge standard resiances that I give all the time, I find the following state of affairs to be a good description of the current state of dialectic between atheists and theists on the boards:

(1) Theists have a vast array of knowledge and argumentation built up over 2000 years, which basically amounts to a ton evidence for the existence of God. It's not absolute proof, because true, sure enough, actual absolute proof is just damn hard to come by on anything--even most scientific things; which is why they invented inductive reasoning. Science accepts correlation's as signs of caudal relationships, it doesn't ever actually observe causality at work. But that kind of indicative relationship is not good for atheists when a God argument is involved. Then it must be absolute demonstration and direct observation.

(2) This double standard always works in favor of the atheist and never in favor of the theist. I suspect that's because Theists are trying to persuade atheists that a certain state of affairs is the case, and at the same time we are apt to be less critical of our own reasons for believing that. Atheists make a habit of denial and pride themselves on it.

Why is it a double standard? Because when it works to establish a unified system of naturalistic observation the atheist is only too happy to appeal to "we never see" "we always see" and "there is a strong correlation." We never see a man raised from the dead. We never see a severed limb restored. The correlation's between naturalistic cause and effect are rock solid and always work, so science gives us truth, and religion doesn't. But when those same kinds of correlation's are used to support a God argument, they are just no darn good. to wit: we never see anything pop out of absolute noting, we never even see absolute nothing, even QM particles seem to emerge from prior conditions such as Vacuum flux, so they are not really proof of something form nothing. But O tisg tosh, that doesn't prove anything and certainly QM proves that the universe could just pop up out of nothing!

(3) "laws of physics" are not real laws, they are only descriptions, aggregates of our observations. So they can't be used to argue for God in any way. But, when it comes to miraculous claims, the observations of such must always be discounted because they violate our standard norm for observation, and we must always assume they are wrong no matter how well documented or how inexplicable. We must always assume that only naturalistic events can happen, even though the whole concept of a naturalism can only be nothing more than an aggregate of our observations about the world; and surely they are anything but exhaustive. Thus one wood think that since our observations are not enough to establish immutable laws of the universe, they would not be enough to establish a metaphysics which says that only material realms exist and only materially caused events can happen! But guess again...!

(4) The Theistic panoply of argumentation is a going concern. Quentin Smith, the top atheist philosopher says that 80% of philosophers today are theists. But when one uses philosophy in a God argument, it's just some left over junk from the middle ages; even though my God arguments are based upon S 5 modal logic which didn't exist even before the 1960s and most of the major God arguers are still living.

(5) They pooh pooh philosophy because it doesn't' produce objective concrete results. But they can't produce any scientific evidence to answer the most basic philosophical questions, and the more adept atheists will admit that it isn't the job of science to answer those questions anyway. Scientific evidence cannot give us answers on the most basic philosophical questions, rather than seeing this as a failing in science (or better yet, evidence of differing magister) they rather just chalice it up to the failing of the question! The question is no good because our methods dot' answer it!

(6) What it appears to me is the case is this; some methods are better tailed for philosophy. Those methods are more likely to yield a God argument and even a rational warrant for belief, because God is a philosophical question and not a scientific one. God is a matter of faint, after all, and in matters of faith a rational warrant is the best one should even hope for. But that's not good enough for atheists, they disparage the whole idea of a philosophical question (at least the scientistic ones do--that's not all of them, but some) yet they want an open ended universe with no hard and fast truth and no hard and fast morality!

(7)So it seems that if one accepts certain methods one can prove God within the nature of that language game. now of course one can reject those language games and choose others that are not quite as cozy with the divine and that's OK too. Neither approach is indicative of one's intelligence or one's morality. But, it does mean that since it may be just as rational given the choice of axioms and methodologies, then what that taps out to is belief in God is rationally warranted--it may not be only rational conclusion but it is one rational conclusion Now I know some of the more intelligent atheists will say "hey I'm fine with that." But then when push comes to shove they will be back again insisting that the lack of absolute proof leaves the method that yields God arguments in doubt, rather than the other way around. I don't see why either should be privileged. Why can't we just say that one method is better suited for one kind of question, the other for the other?

and if one of them says 'why should I ask those questions?' I say 'why shouldn't we leave the choice of questions to the questioner?

Plantinga's Possible World's Argument

 





This is based upon and largerly taken from the website of a professor of Philosphy nemed Forest Baird. Unfortunatley his stie is no longer up.

P1 A thing has maximal greatness if and only if it has maximal excellence in every possible world.

P2 Whatever has maximal excellence is omniscient, omnipotent and morally perfect.

P3 There is a possible world in which the property of possessing maximal greatness is exemplified.

P4 The property of possessing maximal greatness is exemplified in every possible world.

P5 If maximal greatness is exemplified in every world, then it is exemplified in this world.

---

Baird:

Quote:

Plantinga is a leading figure in what is called "analytic philosophy." This type of philosophy represents not so much a particular content as a method of dealing with philosophical problems. The method uses rigorous logical analysis of propositions using a number of rather technical logical concepts.

Like others who use this method, Plantinga's work is difficult to understand without some background in logic. Plantinga uses a system of modal logic that is on the cutting edge and still the topic of much debate. He relies heavily on certain theorems about modal operators that are not universally accepted. Many articles that critique his work are written almost entirely in symbolic logic and so are not accessible to most students.(24) But by first examining some key concepts Plantinga uses, we should be able to make sense of his version of the argument.

A. Concepts

1) Possible Worlds.

Baird

Quote

"Plantinga begins his discussion of the ontological argument by borrowing seventeenth century philosopher Leibniz' idea of "possible worlds." A possible world is a possible state of affairs. So, for example, there is a possible world in which I am able to execute dazzling slam dunks and a possible world in which I am lucky to make a basket at all. The second of these, but certainly not the first, is actual or "obtains." But both of these worlds are possible. While the first does not obtain, there is nothing that is logically impossible about it. On the other hand, a world in which I play basketball with a round square is not possible. Such a world not only does not obtain, it could not obtain."(25)

"Turning to the ontological argument, Plantinga rewrites the argument in terms of possible worlds. Instead of using a premise which says that God's existence is possible, Plantinga says that God exists in a possible world. If God's existence is possible, then there must be a possible world in which God exists. Of course that possible world might not be this world--just as the possible world in which I can slam dunk is not this world. But if God's existence is at least logically possible (i.e., the concept of God's existence is not a concept like "round square"), then there is a possible world in which God exists."

2) Possible Beings.

Baird

"Immediately after stating that there is a possible world in which God exists, Plantinga makes a revision of this statement. To say "There is a possible world in which God exists" is to talk about God as a possible being. Both Malcolm and Hartshorne had assumed that this makes sense: that one can talk about God as a possible being and discuss the qualities of this possible being. Plantinga questioned this assumption."

B. Properties rather than beings.

"But, Plantinga argues, it does not make sense to speak of merely possible beings, beings that don't in fact exist. We can't say that "X does not exist" leads to the statement "there is an X such that X does not exist." This would be like saying "there is a thing that does not exist." If it does not exist we can't say "there is a thing...." Or, we can't say "there is a thing such that this thing does not exist." Plantinga suggests that we should be talking about properties. Rather than talking about wheather a particular being exists, we should talk about the exemplification of certain properties. Is there an instance of this property in a possible world. Baird says:"

"Consider the case of the property of being able to execute dazzling slam dunks. In one possible world (the actual world) that property is exemplified by Michael Jordan (and others). In another possible world (the one of my imagination) that property is exemplified by Forrest Baird. In yet another possible world that property is exemplified by some unidentified being. But in all three cases we are talking about the property of being able to execute dazzling dunk shots. We can ask whether or not that property is exemplified in a particular possible world without talking about the being that exemplifies it."

"By revising the argument in terms of properties, Plantinga makes the argument immune to Kant's criticisms about existence not being a predicate. The argument is no longer talking about a thing that may or may not have certain predicates--including existence. It is now an argument about certain predicates and whether or not there is an instance of them. Plantinga even disagrees with Malcolm and Hartshorne about necessary existence. Plantinga holds that not only is existence not a predicate, neither is necessary existence": As Plantinga Says:"

"...A being has no properties at all and [therefore] no excellent-making properties in a world in which it does not exist. So existence and necessary existence are not themselves perfections, but necessary conditions of perfection."(28) "A being must first exist to have any perfections, so existence, of any type, cannot be one of the perfections a being has."(29)

C. Maximal Greatness.

"Rather than thinking of God in terms of a being, "that which none greater than can be concieved," Plantinga thinks in terms of the property of "maximal greatness" or the property of unsurpassible greatness; none other could possess such a quality for there can only be one such manifestation of this property. If two beings were each "the greatest possible being" wich would be greater than the other?"

But Plantinga doesn't talk about a being with this property. Rather, he asks, is the properly exemplified in any possible world? Maximal greatness, or Maximal excellence would consist of omniscience, omnipotence and moral perfection, so the question is, is this quality exemplified in any possible world? But this still doesn't mean that this quality is exemplified in our world. In some other possible world the maximal greatness might be petty in our world. But Plantinga argues: "...The greatness of a being in world W [any given possible world] depends not merely upon the qualities it has in W; what it is like in other worlds is also relevant." (in Baird) (32) So greatness is relative from one world to another. But to have the property of maximal greatness a being would have to be the greatest in all possible worlds.

D. The Point of the Argument.

1) Plantinga's Modal Version of the Argument.

P1 A thing has maximal greatness if and only if it has maximal excellence in every possible world.
P2 Whatever has maximal excellence is omniscient, omnipotent and morally perfect.
P3 There is a possible world in which the property of possessing maximal greatness is exemplified.
P4 The property of possessing maximal greatness is exemplified in every possible world.
P5 If maximal greatness is exemplified in every world, then it is exemplified in this world.

Barid says:

"This argument is valid in its logical structure, but is it sound and persuasive? As mentioned above, to be sound means that the premises must be true and to be persuasive means that most persons would accept the truth of the premises. P1 and P2 are both given as definitions of terms. Plantinga stipulates them as the definitions of the terms he is using.(34) They are, quite literally, true by definition. P4 follows from P1 and P3. Given P1 and P3 there must be some individual (let's call that individual "x") that exists and has maximal excellence in every possible world. No matter what possible world we choose to examine, x would have to have maximal greatness in that world since x possesses maximal excellence in every world. P5 makes the rather obvious point that since our actual world is also a possible world, whatever is true of all possible worlds must be true of this possible world. So P1, P2, P4, and P5 are all true: P1 and P2 by definition and P4 and P5 by logical inference. That leaves only P3".

Plantinga's conclusion:

"What shall we say of this argument? It is certainly valid; given its premises, the conclusion follows. The only question of interest, it seems to me, is whether its main premise--that maximal greatness is possibly instantiated--is true. I think it is true; hence I think this version of the ontological argument is sound." [In Baird](35)

2. The Possibility of God's Existence.

But can he really prove P3? That might require making a whole other proof for a skeptic.However, God's existence is certainly possible in some possible world. Like Hartshorne he argues that if God is possible than he is necessary, or there is no sense in speaking of a merely possible necessary being. If God exists than God's existence cannot be a contingent fact. To question this would be like questioning whether tables are things to put things on. That is what God is, necessary being, and if God is not actually necessary than he is impossible but cannot be merely possible. God is not like other beings who may or may not exist. If my Parents had met different people and been married to them rather than each other I would not be me, but they might or might not have had any children at all.This might have happened, therefore, I might or might not have come to be. My existence is contingent. But God is not like this, he either must exist or else it is impossible that he could exist, but there is no "might or might not" in the equation.

If God might exist in some possible world he must exist in all possible worlds.

E. Objections.

1) Tooley, revese possible world thinking.

Michael Tooley try's to reverse Plantinga's argument by saying that a statement that is not self contradictory is true in some possible world. So to to say "there is no maximally great being"is true in some possible world. The statement "there may be a unicorn" must be true in some possible world because it could be true. But reversing Plantinga's logic, the talk about a maximally great being must apply to all possible worlds and so there cannot be a maximally great being! [this is in Dr. Baird's notes]


Answer: Mark Stasser comes to the resue in arguing that Plantinga could say that "there is an X" could be true in some possible world unless it is contradictory. If X is the maximally great being. In that case X would have to be true in all possible worlds since a maximally great being could not be merely possible. Both Tooley and Plantinga have concepts that are not self contradictory. Strasser argues that the contradiction test alone is not sufficient to determine the case.

Here is Strasser's test for determining the possible existence in all possible worlds:

1. A is not internally inconsistent, and,
2. A does not entail that A1 exist in all possible worlds, or,
3. if A's existence does entail the necessary existence of A1, then we must establish independently that A1 exists in all possible worlds.(45)

But I suggest that the answer is much simpler than turning some test. The reversal of an ontological argument, which many have attempted, goes back to he work of J.N. Findly in his classic argument with Hartshorne. Hartshorne convened Findlay that the argument of reversal always leads to a ready inversion, so the OA is on again. I suggest that the principle of ontology always works toward reversing its opposite but doesn't work work the other way around. In other words, anytime the OA is reversed it leads back to inversion. But if one reverses Findley or Tooley it does not. This is illustrated as follows:

If we say "There is no maximally great being" in some possible world, this is not ture obviously if it is true that there can be such a being in some possible world, because if there is than there must be one in all possible words, since that is what Maximal greatness is; necessary being. IF it is possible for God to exist than God must exist! In other words, "there is no maximally great being" is never a true statement. Tooley's argument is not sound. It would be correct to say, "we don't' know that God actually exists, perhaps God is impossible." But if God is not impossible (because not self contradictory) than it makes no sense to apply the possible world's theory to God's existence in some possible world since for God to be possible is to be necessary in all worlds. NO one could say then that "there is no maximal being in some possible world" because that would be like trying to confine God's necessary existence to some possible world. Trying to imposes God's non-existence upon all possible world's through the possibility of it on some possible world is like trying to confine God's existence to just one possible world, it does not make sense.

2) Existence is not a predicate.

This is one of the traditional objections that was assumed to have killed off the original OA when Kant siad that existing is not a quality of perfection that can define it's being. So the phrase "that which nothing greater than can be concieved" is not telling us that God actually exists because we do not know that existing is gratness is predicated upon existing. This is discussed on the previous page (unless I decided not to and forogt). But possibility is a predicate of existence. The possible worlds senerio may get around this argument becasue in this case greatness is not predicated upon existence but upon the possibility of existence, and for that it may well be. Why? Because we have added something to the concept. We are being told something different in this case about the situation. We are being told that not only is this quality one of greatness, but it is one of possible greatness, as oppossed to impossible greatness.

A tragic tale of atheist incredulity:

An atheist on CARM called "Space Monkey" offered to show me a way to restructure on of my arguments and make it logically valid, which of course he pretends it wasn't.

My original argument:

(1) Sense of the Numinous evokes religious devotion

(2) The sense of the numinous is the sense of the special nature of being

(3) Thus being itself, the ground of being, is the object of religious devotion

(4) whatever is the fit object of religious devotion (the thing that evokes it at the core in the first place) is defined as "God."

(5) since we know this special sense of being existing then QED God exists.

Here's the version he restructured:

(1) For many people, the “sense of the numinous” evokes feelings of religious devotion. [Premise 1]

(2) For [some of(?)] those people, this “sense of the numinous” results from a perception of the juxtaposition of the finite nature of ourselves and the infinite nature of the universe, and contemplation of the “special nature of being” which is rationally inferred on the basis of these perceptions. [Premise 2]

(3) This “special nature of being” refers to the necessary existence of a “ground of all being” or “being itself” as the basis of reality. [Premise 3]

(4) These perceptions and the inferred “special nature of being” meet our criteria of epistemic judgment. [Premise 4]

(5) If certain perceptions or inferences meet our criteria of epistemic judgment, then it is rationally warranted to conclude that the perceptions, and that which is inferred on their basis, accurately represents the nature of reality. [Premise 5]

(6) For many people, feelings of religious devotion are evoked by that which results from contemplation of the “ground of all being” or “being itself” as the basis of all reality, which they are rationally warranted in taking to accurately represent the nature of reality. [From 1~5]

(7) For these people, the “ground of being” or “being itself” is itself the object or source of the evoked feelings of religious devotion. [Premise 6]

(8) Whatever is the object or source of feelings of religious devotion can be reasonably defined as “God”. [Premise 7]

(9) There are people who are rationally warranted in concluding that reality contains as its basis that which we can reasonably call "God".
[Conclusion, from 6, 7, & 8]

I agree that his version is closer to being a more formally correct version. I studied Perlman's non formal logic and I don't think it has to be formally correct to be logically valid or to make sense as an idea. Of atheists mock and ridicule it saying that's the 'ravings ofa mad man" and that it's terrible makes no sense. They  have said "you are the only person in the world who thinks the way you do." My ideas are so way out so they so stupid. But if you look at the content mine and his, the only difference is a big of teaking to explain more about why each move is the way it is.

I had explained that myself anyway, I just didn't do it in each line, I did it analysis after each line, what's the difference as long as the ideas are the same the reasons for them are out there? But of course Spacemonkey doesn't seem to understand what I'm saying, even he is very intelligent and I'm not criticizing his abilities. Here is the full presentation I made:

Definitions:

Sense of the numinous: intuitive sense that some special quality or attribute obtains to some aspect of reality such that it points to a larger all embracing truth, some realm of the divine, or some divine aspect of reality. (numinous means "spiritual" form the Greek Penuma).

Ground of being: (aka "being itself") The basic aspect of being that is not contingent are particular to any temporal or temporary or contingent aspect of beings or a being, but is eternal, ontologically necessary, and upon which the individual beings are predicted.

religious: Human tendency to identify the set of problems related to the nature of being human, the way in which humans define the nature of their own existence and that of other humans with respect to meaning or purpose on an ontological level, and the attempt to mediate an ultimate transfomrative experience through ritual or other means such that the sense of problematic is resolved in the transformative power.

Religious Devotion: Personal commitment ot a form of medication (see above).


Basic assumptions: all arguments are based upon assumption, even in scientific studies. This is not an argument it's just the background to the argument based upon things I generally assume about the sources of our knowledge at the most basic level.

(1) The argument assumes that all human understanding of the nature of reality begins with the phenomenological level. That is to say the categories of thought suggested to us by our sense data.

(2) Phenomenological level is predicated upon the five senses in addition to some insinuative senses that humans believe obtain from the nature of being human. (note: this is not necessarily esp or psychic power, just the regular sense of intuition). I include the intuitive because I'm talking about the most basic epistemology. Included with intuition is tacit knowing. It's a psychological function. I'm not saying that our knowledge of the world rests upon this, but it is part of the mix of sources that goes into our understanding of what's real.

(3) Even our basic trust of "official" or "proven" or "empirical" "facts" are based upon, in the final analysis, the extent to which the regular nature of our perceptions have led us to trust such things. For example mathematics is trusted by mathematics because they study it. It may not be trusted by fish mongers or pig iron collectors becuase they have no experiential basis for placing trust in mathematics. They have not studied it.

(4) The extent to which the trust that which we place our confidence in is related to the extent to which such sources meet the criteria:

(a) regular

(b) consistent

(c) shared (inter-subjective)

(d) promotes navigation in the world and in life.

By "navigation in the world and in life" I mean we can use the perceptions to get by, either in physically understanding the world, or emotionally coping with the world. In this way we form trust about perceptions if, and only if, they work, they help us in the process of coping and understanding.

(5) If we can logically place confidence in a proposition, and that confidence is born out in some way (vis the criteria just outlined) then are justified in our confidence and the proposition in which we place confidence is rationally warranted.

Argument:

premise:
(1) Sense of the Numinous evokes religious devotion

Premise:
(2) The sense of the numinous is the sense of the special nature of being



Inferense
(3) Thus: Therefore being itself, the ground of being, is the object of religious devotion

inferense
(4) whatever is the fit object of religious devotion (the thing that evokes it at the core in the first place) is defined as "God."

conclusion
(5) since we have properly basic reason to assume this special sense of being exists as the outcome of our perceptions, since it meets the criteria of epistemic judgment, we are rationally warranted in placing confidence in the hypothesis that "the sense of the numinous" and it's relation to the eternal necessary aspects of being are indications of the divine at the basis of reality.


Now let's go over again and I'll explain why I draw these conclusions:




premise:
(1) Sense of the Numinous evokes religious devotion

this is a statement based upon empirical observations made by anthropologists, historians of religion and other social social scientist. The idea of a sense of numinous is old and is well documented in may areas: the works of Marcea Eliade, Karl karene and studies by Ralph Hood, W.E. Stace, William James and others. All of this body of work from scholars and historians link the sense of the numinous to the orignis of religion.

The old 19th century sociological approach was to assume that religion was about explaining nature. That's becasue they were structural functionalists and they were trying justify their theory that things exist in social structure because they serve a function to the tribe; they did not understand the sense of the numinous as a serving a function, because they didn't have it and they shaped early man in their own images.

Social scientists don't make those assumptions now. Now we look for the real reasons people think things, by listening to them on their own terms.


Premise:
(2) The sense of the numinous is the sense of the special nature of being

There is a link from the concept of sense of the numinous to the concept of eternal necessary being (being itself). That is through the perception of the juxtaposition between infinite and finite. In other words, we sense our limitations as temporal creatures, vs the endless nature of the entire universe, we sense our smallness against the backdrop of the vast universe, in making these perceptions the sense of the numinous is evoked and we connect that psychologically to a sense of the nature of what it means to be (that is demonstrated through the studies on mystical experience--one of the major aspects of mystical experience is that juxtaposition between infinite and finite.

So by contrasting between of being as a whole vs our own limited nature, we link the sense of the numinous to being because its evoked by contemplation of being.

Inferense
(3) Thus: Therefore being itself, the ground of being, is the object of religious devotion.

what that sentence means is what I just said above. We draw certain conclusions psychologically form the experience of this juxtaposition that creates a link between being and the numinous, that link tells us that this special nature of the numinous is based in the eternal necessary nature of being itself. In other words the eternal necessary aspects of being (the vast universe for example) as opposed to any one particular being that is merely temporal and quickly vanishing (my own finite existence) grounds the sense of the numinous in the concepts of eternal necessary being.

In other words we derive from these experiences of nature, such as the starry sky over the night time desert, the sense that the eternal and necessary aspects of being are where the divine aspects of reality are located.


inferense
(4) whatever is the fit object of religious devotion (the thing that evokes it at the core in the first place) is defined as "God."

This sentence is logically derived from the information given previously and it just says that when we think about the nature of religion (apart form hating it) whatever evokes the psychological sense of the numinous is a valid object of worship, why? Because that's what worship is, it's commitment and devotion to the special nature of reality perceived in this thing called "sense of the numinous." Since that's the center and origin of religion anyway it's the final orbiter as to what is sacred.

the sense of the numinous itself is a sense of the sacred. we can put this into a syllogism

*whatever evokes the sacred is a fit object of worship

*the eternal and necessary aspects of being evoke the sacred

*therefore the eternal necessary aspects of being are fit objects of worship.

now we come to the conclusion.

conclusion
(5) since we have properly basic reason to assume this special sense of being exists as the outcome of our perceptions, since it meets the criteria of epistemic judgment, we are rationally warranted in placing confidence in the hypothesis that "the sense of the numinous" and it's relation to the eternal necessary aspects of being are indications of the divine at the basis of reality.

In other words it's just the logical outcome of what's said above. the eternal necessary nature of being (or our perceptions of same) motivate the basis of religious devotion and connect them to these aspects of being which are designated as 'ground of being.' Therefore, we are justified or rationally warranted in assuming that or in placing confidence in the proposition we are actually sensing some divine aspect to reality.

this divine aspect of reality is what the term "God" stands for.


We can make a syllogistic argument:

*whatever evokes the sacred is a fit object of worship

*the eternal and necessary aspects of being evoke the sacred

*therefore the eternal necessary aspects of being are fit objects of worship.


*"God" is the designation for the fit object of worship

*Ground of being is a fit object of worship (from above)


*therefore we are rationally warranted in thinking of ground of being as "God."

Premise
*whatever is the ground of being has an actual existence according to the definition above as "eternal" and "necessary" aspects of being

*We are justified in thinking of the ground of Being as "God" since it evokes the numinous and is a fit object of worship; the term "God" designates a fit object of worship

*therefore, we are rationally warranted in thinking that God has a real an actual existence as the ground of being.

We could go further and argue that in experiencing this realization we find the epistemic criteria are met and thus it works as a means of navigation in the world, and that is the ground for epistemic judgment, in other words for deciding that it's real.

the overall conclusion: we are rationally warranted for concluding that reality contains as it's basis that which we call "God."

I grant that some of the reasons might be better expressed by Spacemonkey and that perhaps doing it his way is better, even though I like mine for its streamlined nature, fewer lines. All he did was put sme of the explanation in further premises but long as the content is there I don't see why it really matters. The atheists are acting this is retarded  to this way. It appears that the can't understand concepts. They can't think logically either. All they can think about is form.

another atheist named Electric Skeptic says:

But SpaceMonkey's version is far better than yours. It is much more exact, with much less question begging, and requires anyone who disagrees to be far more specific in specifying exactly what they disagree with - which would enable the person posting it to be able to better rebut their rebuttal.

I don't see why that would not all be there in the analysis anyway, but be that as it may, I decided to go for the pithy comment rather than argue. So I said "then you better get busy."

ES: Busy doing what?

Meta: debating the argument because now that you admit it's good I'll be using it all the time.

ES says:

Oh, I getcha. I admitted that SpaceMonkey's version is much better framed - I didn't admit that it's a good argument

But I'll certainly tackle his version, if you'd like.

Spacemonkey says:

Notice that there are now many more premises which an opponent might reasonably wish to challenge. But note also that no-one can rationally reject the conclusion now without also specifying exactly which premise or premises they disagree with and why. 

 While disagreement is still open, he has to demonstrate which premise he disagrees with and why. So does he? No! of course not, he never has. In fact 90% of the time when I challenge them to show what's wrong with any of my premises they never do. Once I put all the first premises to all my God arguments in a list to see which they agree withe (not telling them they were premises to God arguments) they did not disagree with a single one,

Plantinga Answers Miller

 Just for grins I sent part of Miller's argument against the modal argument to Plantinga to see what he would say. Here's the bit I sent:

Some ontological arguments have a cleverer premise to replace the old one.

Old Premise: It is possible that God exists.
New Premise: There is no contradiction in the existence of God.  In other words, God is "consistent."

The old premise logically follows from the new one.  If you're familiar with symbolic logic, I hope you already knew this.  If not, here is a simple proof.

Suppose that the old premise is false; it is not possible that God exists.  The statement "If P, then Q" is always true if P is false.  Likewise, the statement "If God exists, then Q" is always true, because God doesn't exist.  It's true even if Q is a contradictory statement (ie "God is blue and not blue").  Therefore, the new premise is false; the existence of God implies a contradiction.

If the old premise is false, then the new premise is false.  Equivalently, if the new premise is true, then the old premise is true.

But now we will run into another problem of translation.  I will distinguish between two kinds of consistency.

Self-consistency:  The object has no contradicting properties in its definition.
Logical consistency: The object implies no contradictions.

Proponents of the ontological argument often expect me to disprove the self-consistency of God.  Perhaps they expect me to argue that God's omnipotence contradicts its omniscience, or something like that.  But they fail to realize that I don't have to.  The proof requires logical consistency, not self-consistency.

Self-consistency is not sufficient to establish logical consistency.  For an object to be logically consistent, not only must its definition be properly formed, but the world must cooperate.  (More precisely, the set of "possible worlds" must cooperate.)  Suppose that the world does not cooperate, and the object does not exist.  If the object does not exist, then the existence of the object implies a contradiction.  Namely, it implies that the object both exists and does not exist.  I didn't even have to look at the definition of the object.

Of course, I don't know whether the world cooperates with the ontological proof or not.  The proponents have no idea either, but think they do.

Philosophers ought to teach themselves some mathematics. In geometry, there is a famous axiom called the Parallel postulate.  It is famous because many mathematicians thought they could prove it.  Modern mathematicians know that it is impossible to prove, because there is no contradiction in assuming it false.  Likewise, it is impossible to disprove.  The Parallel postulate is self-consistent.  The negation of the Parallel postulate is also self-consistent.  But in any given geometrical system, only one can be true.  Thus, only one can be logically consistent.

 I thought just for grins I'd put up Plantinga's answer. This he sent to me in private email and he sent permission for me to post it.

I'd say that a proposition is *logically consisstent* if it's not possible to deduce a contradiction from it in ordinary *first order) logic.  Obviously the existence of God is logically consistent.  But note everything that is logically consistent is possibles in the broadly logical sense: false arithmetical propositions for example, are logically consistent but impossible in the broadly logical sense.  The question of the ontological argument is whether the existence of God is possible in the broadly logical sense.  If it is, then it is also actual and also necessary.

As for the parallel postulate, it might very well be necessary in the broadly logical sense--which is all you can say for the other axioms on geometry.  When people say it isn't provable, they mean that it isn't deducible from the other axioms--but that (I think) is also true of each of the other axioms.

Introducing my new website: The Religious A Priori

I have a new website that is designed to eventually replace Doxa. I'm just unveiling it so I have still a lot of stuff to up up. It's mostly new material, I have some things form Doxa but I'm trying to update everything and basically just start over.

This site is mostly arguments about God and belief at this point, but I expect to cover all the categories covered by Doxa: God, Jesus, Bible, Science, Theology,  Society.

It also features a lot of articles from this blog on the problems of atheism.

I have included the best arguemnts on my realizing God approach from this blog and other aspects from the blog.

The site is here: The Religious A Priori

Woman in the Dunes

Hiroshi Teshigahara's  greatest work, Woman in the Dunes, circa 1964, is a brilliant film. I have seen it only one time, this summer just a few weeks ago was my first time and yet I include it among my very favorite films, maybe no 12 of my all-time list. It's themes are universal and existential, which usually makes for a great film. It's well shot, beautiful cinematography, well acted and though it seems like it would be tedious is compelling and I could not stop watching. It's filmed in Black and White and this one of those times when the b/w make for a powerful image rather than bland lack of color.


One of the dominate camera angles of the entire film
is the very tiny

Writers:
Kôbô Abe (novel)
Kôbô Abe (screenplay)

---

Cast

  (Credited cast)

	Eiji Okada	...	Entomologist Niki Jumpei
	Kyôko Kishida	...	Woman
	Hiroko Ito	...	Entomologist's wife (in flashbacks)
	Kôji Mitsui
	Sen Yano
	Ginzô Sekiguchi
rest of cast listed alphabetically:
	Kiyohiko Ichiha
	Hideo Kanze
	Hiroyuki Nishimoto
	Tamotsu Tamura

See more »


Hiroshi Teshigahara (January 28, 1927 – April 14, 2001)


This film is often said to be the product of Toykyo cafe society existentialism as found on the Ginza  of the early 60s. I don't think we can pin it down that directly, but it definitely reflects what was in the air in that decade. By 1964 the Japanese society has srong ties to America and Europe. Even Kurosawa was well versed in Western art and thought before the war. Woman in the Dunes is about a man, despite the title,Entomologist Niki Jumpei, who goes to a desert region to find a rare insect he calls "the tiger beetle." Locals offer him a place to stay for the night as it is getting late. He gratefully accepts they take him to an area which pits and quick sand and its hard to walk. They take down into a pit where a small ramshackle house sits in the pit. The house is owned by a woman who has some mysterious job she doesn't explain that has to do with moving sand out of the pit. She shovels it and other draw it up in buckets on ropes, unseen men who are somewhere beyond outside the pit.

The next morning Niki gets ready to leave, thanks the woman, goes out and sees the rope ladder isn't there. He calls for the ladder but finds they will not lower it or even answer. After some time finally gets the drift, he is to stay there the rest of his life and help the woman shovel sand! Of cousre he's outraged and we go through a spell of his anger and refusal. But he falls back upon his own view of himself; he's a teacher, he's a rational man, he knows more than most people, it's an intellectual challenge but a bunch of rubes such as these can't keep him closed up in a pit! He is actaully arrogant and even to the point of telling the woman her own experiences, which he knows better than she herself. He knows everything and corrects her on everything. He prays out of her the reason why she is shoveling sand. Her logic is convoluted and silly. Her reasoning really is circular and pointless, but it's still the landscape that defines the new reality. She is shoveling sand because if she doesn't shovel it the pit will cave in an bury the house. In fact her husband and child died in that way a year before. Why does she not leave? Because the village is her home, he's part of it, she belongs to it. Why not the whole village leave? No place to go. Most have already gone anyway, the village is dying and in an attempt to keep it going they have kidnapped many people. She tells him of others who have been there ten, fifteen, twenty years. Why not just let it die out, others left why don't they? It's their village, they have to save their village it's their home. The woman also voices her own concerns that in the pit she is the homeowner and she has a valid place, in Tokyo (if she went back with him) she's a homeless stranger with no place to go dependent upon him. It is in this conversation that Niki is prompted to utter a phrase which signifies the film's existential theme: he says "are you shoveling sand t live, or living to shovel sand?" He goes on strike and refuses to shovel and even stop her form it. The pit almost caves in she tells him you have to do it every day or it will bury you. So he does give in and they work hard to catch up and keep shoveling. Thus is winds up shoveling to live and living to shovel.

Teshigahara employ's several cinematic techniques to communicate the profound nature of the subject matter. He begins from the credits with a disorienting establishing shot that shows sand particles on microscopic level so that they actually appear to be a landscape in a desert. Then he pulls away so that we can see they are small particles of sand in a land scape of a desert. He also focuses on the woman face and neck so close that the sand stuck her skin looks like rolling hills. Again the pulling away so that gradually we see where we are. He also focuses upon a drop of water in the same way, and in another shot to emphasize how much water means in such a place he fades from the scene to a splash of water in such a double exposure that it seems as though the drop is wetting the entire world around it. Thus there is this interspersion of the very tiny and the grandiose. We lose perspective. The tiny becomes the world, a world unto itself, the world around becomes a collection of the very tiny. This gives us teh feeling going into ourselves. This sense of the shrinking into the inner world, and the undifferentiated unity of all things, the tiny in the grandiose and the grandiose in the tiny will be very important in the over all film by the end.

Niki makes a successful escape. We see him saving little tools and bits of rope and al manner of things he needs to get out of the pit. But he is not able to calculated or provide for what happens outside. He escapes by making a crude grappling hook. From the roof of the house he pulls himself up the cliff wall having stuck the hook on something outside the pit. He then runs and he stays at large until dark. He accident runs around a corner in the hill side of some area he has never been to before (he has no real sense of there the village lies) he runs right into a woman. He is chased and is getting away but finds himself in quick sand. He's sinking up to his chest and has to call help or die. The peruses run out wearing sand shoes, like snow shoes only made from wooden plans lashed to their feet with rope or whatever. They pull him out and take him back. Over the course of the next few months Niki and the woman (never know her name). The two fall deeply in love. The make love a lot and (no porno scenes). The woman is pregnant but it turns out she has a problem. She is sick and a doctor comes and says that she may die the baby may die they both may die. They take her out.

After they take her off, and Niki just watches, they leave the rope ladder down. He stares at it for some time. They left it down. Do they actually want him to leave? Or were they just focused on the woman and forgot the ladder? He climbs to the top, and looks around. He walks a ways. He could leave. It's his chance, but he watches a bird fly and makes some observation about the bird is free form the ground but trapped in the sky or some such. He has his tiger beetle collection to maintain. He's got ties now and he also doesn't need to leave. He goes back into the pit. The last thing he thinks is "I'll escape some time." The view might think Teshigahara is saying something about giving up or developing ties that bind us into a way of life, but it's not really that. The guy has evolved not only through his love for the woman but also in coming to understand that he's free in himself. His observation about the bird he is in the pit but he's also in watching the bird he's in the sky it's all the same. He can appreciate the world as a whole but he can also appreciate the gran of sand in the pit and little beetle at his feet. It's all the same. Freedom is captivity and captivity is freedom. He's found enlightenment. He doesn't need escape, just being is an escape. That relates to the world of the tiny and it's similarity to the world of the large landscape, the realization that the tiny is a landscape of its' own. The focus from large to tiny brings us into disorientation then the realization that all is unified it's all one thing. It draws us into the inner world, the world of the mind which related to going tiny, going in.

The shoveling of sand  is often compared by reviewers to the Myth of the Sisyphus, the legendary Greek who was condemned by the gods to push a rock up a hill forever, when he gets to the top the rock falls down again. He's trapped in a meaningless endeavor forever. That myth has been expropriated by existentialists as their signature myth (ala Camus). The sand shoveling is likened unto the pushing of the rock, are you shoveling sand to live, or living to shovel sand? But there are differences. Unlike the myth of Sisyphus the sand shoveling relates to real life necessity not to some meaningless drudgery. Even though shoveling he sand is drudgery, it's meaningless relative to leaving, it's necessary if one is to live in the pit. The border implication puts it on a level of a commentary upon society. The useless nature of staying to resuscitate a dying village, kidnapping people to make them save a village it's own people are abandoning, raises a lot of questions about modern society and in that era of the 60s nothing was more cogent and timely. It's still not out of date, it's a universal theme which the individual must re visit again and again.

why doesn't God heal stupidity?

suffering




About three years ago I wrote a post, so long ago I was in my old family home. The post was about he website "why does God hate amputees" and I called it "why does God hate stupidity?" I staled it that not because I think having doubt is stupid, not because I think the problem of pain is not a very serious and very important question that should make us all think but becasue I find this guys approach insulting and obnoxious. Every so often some of his fans still respond to that post and say things about how brilliant he is and how stupid and evil I am for not seeing that is so great. This morning I got a comment form someone who I thin is sincere so I decided to answer it here in the major section.

This post came under the heading of "Anonymous" but it's not by the regular nemesis who posts by that name. Even though I have a rule against publishing comments by anyone using that name, I will make an exception because the poster probably did not know. but I ask him, I would like to hear from him, but please use another name. Even a number will do, but "Anonymous 1" is taken.

It is probably pointless for me to post this, but stupidity calls. I haven't read the site myself, so let me just say that first. But I get the gist of it as it was pointed out to me by a friend. I admit the reasoning is flawed, and it's a classic case of good observation leading to a bad conclusion.

Well no, not really. It's really a matter of the guy is totally insulting, filled with ridicule and refuses to think deeply about any of it because he assume Christians are stupid as shit and he doesn't have to think deeply, all he has to do is make fun.

But in that site, I don't see stupidity, I see pain.

You said you had not looked at the sight. So do you know? I have pain. I have loads of pain. I have so much pain in my life my favorite song is called "Pack your Sorrows" by Richard Farina (Author of the novel Been Down so Long it looks like Up To Me, think about it). The song says:

If somehow could pack up your sorrows
and give them all to me,
you would lose them,
I know how to use them,
give them all to me.

In other words, I know what it is suffer. But, that does not mean that mocking and ridiculing the attempt to have faith in the face of adversity is in anyway intelligent. It is not intelligent, is nothing more than cruel and selfish. If suffering people need God to get them through, who are you take that away from them and crush their hope with cruel mocking?

One of that guy's major attempts at dismissing faith is this, he say "close you eyes real tight and wish real hard for a candy bar or a Milk shake, did you get it? No, why, because there is no God there to give you a milk shake." No that's my paraphrase but he does say exactly that. Now do you really think that is a fair way to look at the problem of pain? God wont give you a candy bar on demand, so there is no God. Now is that really your idea of fair? Do you really think that's an intelligent way to think about the issues? If i said "Ok let's get a magnifying glass now look at your class of water, do you see any bugs? no? that's because science is crap, there are no germs." Would that really be a fair way to think about science?

I am a Jesus person facing the same exact questions as this guy (from what I understand from a cursory knowledge of the site) and if I am to find any silver lining in my trials, is it that I know exactly what it feels like to be an unbeliever.

So do I. I was an atheist, the kind of atheist who loved to argue with Christians and thought they were real stupid and loved to make them feel stupid. But I was never the kind who childishly mocked anything he could at any price.

Before you point the finger at "stupidity," do you consider that someone does not create a site like that without tremendous pain and legitimate disappointment with God.

We still have a responsibility to deal with our pain in ways that does not hurt others. To mock and ridicule religious people becasue they turn to God for support in times of pain is sick and stupid. He's trying to crush the hope of suffering people to make himself feel superior.

How do you then, as a believer, respond to someone who has been hurt in that way by calling them stupid?

Because his words are stupid. he has put no thought of any kind into his mocking and ridicule. The whole site from start to Finnish is simple minded, narrow, hateful, he has nothing of any kind of value to say.

Even if you were right, what does that do for the Kingdom? I hope you don't pass through these trials yourself, so you'll never know this firsthand

too late!

but the truth is, there's a lot of bad teaching in churches that is well meant, but it's based on our American ideas, and not on what God really taught us in the Bible. That kind of bad teaching has caused Christians to make a lot of excuses for God that He doesn't need, and that leaves others rightly skeptical. And it's left a lot of people disillusioned and wounded. So before diagnosing this guys stupidity, consider the possible source. And consider what will expand the Kingdom.

that is a very good statement. I agree with you completely. Good point, bravo. Unfortunately that amputee site does absolutely nothing to foster any kind of serious about the issues. The function of it in atheist circles is to give them an  excuse to disregard any kind of answer or argument that Christians give. I went on that guy's board. I posted tons of material and got no serious thought out of them. The only thing they ever said was "show me an expmle of God healing an amputee. just one come on where is it? you don't have one so God is a lie. nothing you can say you matters becasue God is just a big alie in the sky because you can't show me a heald amputee." Even I laed evidence on them of healed amputees they still continued to harp that "that's a lie, that didnt' happen, you can't prove that."

I had good science to prove the miracles of Lourdes. they just continued to squawk, no healing is a miracle until you have an amputee. even a guy growing a new pair of lungs did not impress them because it's not an amputee. So that sight is not furthering the conversion its' closing down the conversation and all it does is give them a chance to squawk and feel superior. They want to boil all of philosophy and all of religion down this one question, no amputee = no God that's it no thought necessary!

That's why it's stupid. Becasue it's simplistic and shallow and it's only advanced as an excuse to ignore all of Christian thoguht.

Up until The Dawkamentalists came on with their hate group act, a lot of Christian apologists kicked ass all over the net. But since atheists learned that it was much more effective to drop the pretense of real thought just vent their hatred there has been an ever shrinking discourse. I now think there are no messages boards anywhere on the net that are worth looking at. none of them at all reflect any sort of intellectual discussion about religious ideas. It is sights like this that are to blame for this state of affairs.

There are a couple of good sites you should look at. One is God is not imaginary, Marshal Brian is Ignorant These guys have done the body of Christ the service of spending their time answering everything thing the guy says, wow! I can't imagine wasting my line on that polavor, but I thank them for doing it.

The other is my own very serious attempt to answer the theodicty question: I advance my own version of the free will defense, which I think has a unqiue angel if I may so, called Soteriological Drama

Answering Miller's "Right post" on Modal Argument

Before I get started on this I need to make a caveat. Tillich was against the OA because he felt it contradicted the concept of the God as being itself, and instead sought to prove the existence of a greatest being which is contrary to the concept of God as being itself. He also imposed or at least said things taken by some to be imply a version of the OA that could be re-formulated. I have not had a chance to talk about this on my blog yet. I don't think I have time to present the ins and outs of it here. But it is important to understand that in some sense I agree with Miller and with opponents of the modal argument but in other ways I disagree with them.
This is the post Miller linked to that said his more sophisticated understanding of and refutation of the Modal argument.

Wednesday, March 24, 2010
Modal ontological argument, revisited

Let's revisit the modal ontological arguments for God. Though I have covered these arguments and variations at length, and have not changed my opinion about them, I didn't necessarily cover them in the clearest manner possible. It's a tough balance, because for most people, symbolic logic is like math. Math = scary! Other readers understand the symbolic logic, but clearly have difficulties translating between the symbols and their underlying meaning. My goal is to explain it so both groups understand what I'm saying.

I do understand modal logic, in a way, but I don't claim to be an expert. I don't like using the symbols, not because I think they are wrong for I have several problems with it, both intellectual  and personal. The intellectual: I am a phenomenoloist so I don't like that sort hard cast logic, even though I do believe that it's right in matters that can be deduced. I don't like the perspective of trying to make that the major or only form of learning. Personal: I  have dyslexia so the shift about of many symbols is hard for me becuase it tends to wind up in my little fevered brain switching the symbols on me. The same is true of letters in reading of course, but reading English is raiser and I'm more use to it.

Miller:

Modal ontological argument, reviewed

Definition: If God exists, then God necessarily exists.
Premise: It is possible that God exists.
[Insert mess of logical reasoning here]
Conclusion: God exists.

Meta:I think the premise is what you call "definition" and the second line is either a minor premise or corollary.No matter.

Miller:

I omitted the mess of logical reasoning because I don't want to scare away my readers. Unfortunately, this makes it difficult to convey the amount of respect the logical arguments deserve. Richard Dawkins and other atheists often seem to think it's all a bunch of high-sounding gibberish. And perhaps it is. But that particular gibberish is absolutely solid, as solid as 2+2=4.

Meta: I appreciate that.


There are basically two reasonable objections to the argument. Either we must object to the premise, or object to the definition.

Objection to the premise

To explain the problem with the premise, I must distinguish between two kinds of possibility.

Epistemological possibility: For all we know, God exists.
Modal possibility: Among the set of "possible worlds", there exists a world in which God exists.

Meta:Problem: Plantinga's possible worlds argument (for God) asserts that God must exist in all worlds or none. You seem to imply here that the epistemological possibility is "God may exist in some world." While that is an epistemological possibility that possibility is demonstrated false by the argument Plantinga makes. Meanwhile the modal possibility is just as impossible. There cannot be a state of affairs such that God exists in one world only and not in all possible worlds. If it is possible that God exists in one possible world then God must exist in all possible worlds. That is a certainty if we define God as being itself.

Miller:

The conclusion of the proof follows only from modal possibility, not from epistemological possibility. However, the epistemological statement is the one that is intuitively true, while the modal statement could be true or false. Modal possibility is intended to be a translation from epistemological possibility to logic, but the translation is not perfect.

Meta:I think the assumption here is false for reasons stated above.

Miller:

In particular, the translation fails when we talk about the set of possible worlds itself.

Epistemological statement: For all we know, the universe is deterministic (ie there is only one possible world).
Modal translation: Among the set of "possible worlds", there exists a world in which it is true that there is only one possible world.
The epistemological statement is sensible, but if we naively copy it as a modal statement, it's a mess. The first statement only says that the universe may be deterministic, while the second statement can be used to prove that the universe must be deterministic. Clearly, we need to be careful with our translations when discussing determinism.

Meta:If I'm right about what you are trying to do then you are totally wrong. If I understand you correctly, that you are trying to supposes that the argument for God is based upon moving the possibility of God from epistemology to modality, that then you argue the impossibility of the move and that creates the impossible the "no such thing as God merely possible" clause can't be transformed from one to the other. If that's what you are doing you making several mistakes.

(1) Just because "for all we know God might exist" is an epistemolgoical statment that does not mean that the existence of God is only a epistemolgical possibility that is excluded in some way form the modal realm.

(2) the possibility of determinism is not a negation of God; God can create deterministic universes and thus God can exist in deterministic universes.

(3) There is also the possibility that determinism is impossible.

Miller:

Similar to determinism, the existence of God also says something about the set of possible worlds. If God exists, then s/he exists in all possible worlds. If an object does not exist in all possible worlds, then we cannot call it God. So we need to be careful with our translations when discussing God too.

Meta:That would seem to contradict my previous assumption, that I'm wrong about what you are trying to say. But I'm leaving it in anyway just in case.

Miller:

Here is a much better translation to logic:

Epistemological statement: For all I know, God exists
Logical translation: God exists, or God does not exist.

The conclusion of the ontological argument does not follow from this proper translation.

Meta: you lost me on this. You seem to be creating a useless distinction between epistemology and logic where one need not be made. All logical truths are also epistemological problems, everything that exists epistemically also exists logcially.

Miller

Even proponents of the modal ontological argument must accept that there are problems with translation. If we take the statement, "For all I know, God doesn't exist" and naively translate it to modal logic, then we would conclude that God doesn't exist.

Meta: I think the translation bit is a useless gimmick. Belief in God is not confined to one type of thought and has to be "translated" into another. This is super metaphysics, I don't see any reason to make this sort of metaphysical assumption. Its' not as though some questions are intrinsically given to epistemology and barred from logic and vice verse. Its' totally a matter of the way you structure your sentences. Belief in God is as much at home in modal logic as anything. The statement "If God exists then God must exist necessarily" is a statement of modal logic. By calling it "definition" you have screened it off form the actual logic of the argument but it's as much a modal statement as anything.

In Baird's presentation of Hartshorne's argument he did not call it the definition.

Miller:
Alternate premise: Logical consistency

Some ontological arguments have a cleverer premise to replace the old one.

Old Premise: It is possible that God exists.
New Premise: There is no contradiction in the existence of God. In other words, God is "consistent."

The old premise logically follows from the new one. If you're familiar with symbolic logic, I hope you already knew this. If not, here is a simple proof.

Suppose that the old premise is false; it is not possible that God exists. The statement "If P, then Q" is always true if P is false. Likewise, the statement "If God exists, then Q" is always true, because God doesn't exist. It's true even if Q is a contradictory statement (ie "God is blue and not blue"). Therefore, the new premise is false; the existence of God implies a contradiction.

Meta: Truth by stipulation. you can't stipulate the non existence of God.

Miller:

The statement "If P, then Q" is always true if P is false.

this I do not understand. If P is false (and the premise is "if P then Q") then the false nature of P means Q is also false because Q depends upon P. This is true in modus ponens.

If the old premise is false, then the new premise is false. Equivalently, if the new premise is true, then the old premise is true.

not what what said. you said if P is false than if P :. Q would mean Q is true.

Miller:

But now we will run into another problem of translation. I will distinguish between two kinds of consistency.

Self-consistency: The object has no contradicting properties in its definition.
Logical consistency: The object implies no contradictions.

Proponents of the ontological argument often expect me to disprove the self-consistency of God. Perhaps they expect me to argue that God's omnipotence contradicts its omniscience, or something like that. But they fail to realize that I don't have to. The proof requires logical consistency, not self-consistency.

Self-consistency is not sufficient to establish logical consistency. For an object to be logically consistent, not only must its definition be properly formed, but the world must cooperate. (More precisely, the set of "possible worlds" must cooperate.) Suppose that the world does not cooperate, and the object does not exist. If the object does not exist, then the existence of the object implies a contradiction. Namely, it implies that the object both exists and does not exist. I didn't even have to look at the definition of the object.

Meta: There's a huge amount with this.

(1) you  make an arbitrary distinction between "self constancy and logical consistency." that would assume there some disemboweled concept "logic" floating around out there that has nothing to do with objects per se. You are really assuming that things in the world have to fit with the rules of femoral logic and those rules are arbitrary. The only real contradiction that would matter is self consistency. I don't necessarily play that out in terms of omniscience vs omnipotence, it could be any number of ways.

(2) The world "cooperating" is begging the question. you can't argue the world is not reflecting the truth of God because three dozen God arguments show that it does. You can't start by asserting there is no God any more than I can start by asserting that there is.

(3) The OA in and of itself argues that the greatest thought is about the greatest truth. The argument is supposed to reflect the truth of God and is itself a matter of the reality cooperating to show the truth of God.

Miller:

Of course, I don't know whether the world cooperates with the ontological proof or not. The proponents have no idea either, but think they do.

Meta we have a good hint in what I just said, the greatest idea is about the greatest truth.


Miller:

Philosophers ought to teach themselves some mathematics. In geometry, there is a famous axiom called the Parallel postulate. It is famous because many mathematicians thought they could prove it. Modern mathematicians know that it is impossible to prove, because there is no contradiction in assuming it false. Likewise, it is impossible to disprove. The Parallel postulate is self-consistent. The negation of the Parallel postulate is also self-consistent. But in any given geometrical system, only one can be true. Thus, only one can be logically consistent.

Meta: But that's argument from analogy. That proves nothing about the modal argument.


Objection to the Definition of God

Miller

Definition: If God exists, then God necessarily exists.

If we define a fork to be an object with a handle and prongs, then we can give the following statement: "If a fork exists, then it has prongs". If a fork does not exist, we can't even talk about "it", much less ascribe it properties. If an object does not have prongs, then it is not a fork. That is the rationale behind the definition.

Meta: I think I already dealt with this stuff before. First of all you are making a mistake by calling it a defintion.The statement is conditional, definitions are not conditional statements so it can't really be one. It's more like a first premise. But it's based upon the definition of God as necessary and not contingent. That definition is not open to debate. It is not defining God into existence and the assertion that it is is merely clutching at straws. It's a failure to understand this is a given, it's what we believe. It can no more be disputed or disproved  as a valid premise than the statement that I love my mother or that my name is Joe.It's a basic given, the fundamental of a belief system and the assumed construct of the God concept that we talk about. you have to deal with it what we believe on it's own terms of not seek to discuss it. You can't dictate or alter our belief system just becuase you don't like it's fundamental premise.

Now proving that God can't exist necessity would come under the heading of showing a contradiction in the concept of God. That would be valid if you could do it, so good luck with that. You can't just make the premise go away just because you don't like.


Miller:

How can you disagree with a definition? Can't we define any object we like? If the definition makes no sense, can't we just say that the object doesn't exist?

Meta: no because your objective is not founded upon it not making sense or you  would be able to prove a contrdication in God. You passed on that before, you can't show me one. This concept makes sense. Its not a contradition and it's not something something makes no sense I understand it perfectly, it makes sense to me, it makes sense to the believer.

Ah but here's a major major MAJOR sign post: big read sign here saying "THIS IS IMPORTANT>"

Atheist and theist live in two different worlds. The world I live in is totally different from the world tha Miller lives in. It doesn't make sense to him because his ideology has led him to embrace only constructs that eject this notion from reality. But because I have come to see the universe in terms of this construct, and I find it true becuase works and my understanding of the world works perfectly with it, the two fit hand in glove, but they do so only because I can see it. The ground shifted for me and it has not so shifted for Mr. Miller. That is no poor reflection on him, it's just the way it is..

What this means is the way he looks at the world the world doesn't cooperate with the argument and the concept of necessary God does not make sense. I suspect this is in large part because he thinks of God as a big man in the sky and when I say "eternal necessary being" he thinks "a being" rather than being itself. Of course that's problematic because he's not going to see it unless he wants to. IF I try to explain it he will probably say (he has already no doubt) "what the hell is being itself?" We will be back at square one because he doesn't see the world that way either.

So that's what's really stand between us, this view of things that will not allow one to understand the concept and will not allow the other to let go of it.


Miller:

I don't know about philosophy, but in mathematics, you can't just define any object you like. Consider the set of all sets that do not include themselves (like the male barber who shaves all men who do not shave themselves). Call this Russell's Set. In "naive" set theory, you are allowed to define any set you like, including Russell's set. But Russell's set leads to a paradox. Therefore, "naive" set theory is inconsistent.

Meta: Part of the problem here is you are thinking of it as an object. That what I mean when I say atheist are "thing bound." You are wrapped up in the surface level of things and it's a matter of empirical objects vs objects of thought in your head and that's just putting everything on the level of thing hood. Along comes God who is not a "who" and not  "he" and not an "it" but something beyond understanding and you go "wait, If I can't understanding I can't control it, so I can't accept somethign I can't control."

That's really what it's all about. belief vs skepticism is about being willing to let go of control and be controlled by the ultimate, vs trying to control the ultimate and reduce the unconditioned to an "it." This is what I'm talking about above where I sate the caveat.


Miller:

Naturally, mathematicians want a set theory that doesn't have paradoxes. So they formulated Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, which has specific rules dictating what sets you are allowed to define. These rules do not allow us to define Russell's Set, and thus avoid its paradoxes.

Meta: So much the worse for mathematicians. Jesus said "unless you become as an undergraduate, you can't enter the graduate school of heaven."

Miller:

Is modal logic more like "naive" set theory, or like Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory? Can you define anything you like, or do you have to follow specific rules? I suspect it depends on your choice of axioms. It's a difficult question that I don't feel qualified to answer, which is why I prefer objections to the premise.

Meta: Remember I said the problem goes back to thinking of it as an object (God). If you think of God as an object that can be proved, (then of course that also means it can be controlled) you are reducing God from the ground of being to an object in being. Then you are trying to ask if we can define objects anyway but you already doing that. You are doing exactly what you castigate the MA for doing, reducing reality to an object that you can control and then trying to define it yourself.

Of course that's the necessary first step in the battle for control of the object.  If you are doing to seek to ban God from his own reality then you have to first take control of the concept of of God as an object, control is what all reductionists seek. Reduction = control.

At this rate the  MA might be wrong-headed so the argument has been beaten by its own need to be proven. Not beaten by being false but beaten by being something that requires proof, the mere fact that it can be proved makes it worse. That's such an absurdity.

It's far more logical to think about it in its proper terms, not as an object but as a belief, as a apprehension, something religious belief lights upon and grasps as a perception. It's not a definition at all. It shares with definitions that both are merely illumination, not controls. We have to understand God as the unconditioned then we know we  can't jack around definitions at all.

The argument is saved and put back together by the realization that it's proving a ratinoal warrant not a proof that can't be disputed. It 'not proving an object but a concept. What's proved about the concept is the prima facie nature of it as a reason for belief. That's the very aspect that definition argument was designed by atheists to mask.


Miller:

For what it's worth, Immanuel Kant's original objection to the ontological argument might fit in this category. Kant argued that existence is not a property that you can include in the definition of an object.

Meta: that argument is by the modal nature of the nature of the argument. The difference in modality and propositional understanding per se is the addition of the type of being that is discussed (weather contingent or necessary). That status (modal) adds new information and that means in that case existence is a property because the type of existence discussed changes the situation. If necessary I can find a half dozen experts who say this. I don't have the quotes anymore but I have documented this with a huge number of logicians in the past. If you want to take my word for it save us both a lot of time.


Miller:

Alternate definition: The greatest being

Many proponents of ontological arguments like to have it both ways. On the one hand, we are allowed to define God. On the other hand, we are not allowed to define "the unicorn which necessarily exists."

Meta: The greatest begin is not an option. I mean by that not according to a huge portion of Christian thought. Sure the unaware, the uneducated, those not in the know, those who don't read theology, those "not with it" (aka people who disagree with me--I speak tongue in cheek) will say that God is the greatest being; but the Tillichian background from which I am working argues that God is not "a being" at all. God is the ground of being, being itself, not a being. God is the basis upon which all things cohere, not another thing in creation alongside "things." The idea of a supreme being is what I mean when I say atheist are bound up in "thing hood."

Miller:

But to be fair, they're not exactly parallel. In most ontological arguments, God is not defined as "the deity which necessarily exists". Rather, God has a much more specific definition.

Definition: If God exists, then s/he is the greatest being conceivable.
Additional premise: We can conceive of a being as greater by conceiving it as necessarily existing.

Meta: Anselm said "God is that which noting greater than can be conceived." He did not say "the greatest being," although he may have said it somewhere but the famous formation doesn't refer to a being. Tillich's criticism of the OA is that it is aimed at production of proof of "a supreme being." The problem with that is God cannot be "a being" since God is the basis of all being, the ground, being itself. Of course atheists harp upon the "greatest" idea, but that's becuase they don't understand the being itself thing becasue they are too bound up in thing hood to understand the concept. I am not saying atheists are not smart enough to get it or that no atheists do understand it, but by and large they tend not to because it's alien to the way they think.

Miller:

I think that this new definition hurts the ontological argument. 

Meta: So did Paul Tillich, and of course what Tillich thinks I think. ;-)

Miller:

For one thing, we have a whole new premise. I don't have any particular problem with the premise, but it just seems so extraneous and unnecessary. I refuse to argue with the additional premise, because it seems like a tactic to draw attention away from the real flaws of the ontological argument. In my naive optimism, I expected this tactic from conspiracy theorists, not philosophers.

Meta: If I was of a mind to defend the premise of greatest conceivable being you could not get away with just saying that. But since its' antithetical to my theological outlook I am actually in agreement with you to some extent. This this is a good time to point out the importance of reading theology. The Dawkins "theology is stupid I don't have to know about it" is so self defeating. If you know theology you could beat anyone trying to argue this version of the OA but just showing that it's contradicted by some of the major theologians throughout history; in that those who agree that God is being itself disagree that God is "a being" so God can't be "the supreme being" because the "supreme being" is still "a being."

Miller:
And the new definition does not help in the slightest.

Let's say that Russell is the name of "the male barber who shaves all men who do not shave themselves. As I said before, in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, there are rules against defining Russell. If we are not allowed to define Russell, then obviously, we are also not allowed to define Russell's wife! Russell's wife may not have any self-referential paradoxes, but she requires the existence of Russell, who does have self-referential paradoxes.

Let's say we have a rule against defining necessarily existing beings. Obviously, we are also not allowed to define the wives of any of those beings. We are not allowed to make any definition which implies necessary existence. If we accept the additional premise, then the definition of God implies necessary existence. Therefore we are not allowed to construct the definition of God.

Meta: by the same token not arguing the supreme being thing means this argument doesn't apply to my view.