(this was originality posted August 14, 2008)
a poster on Carm said:
Trying to impune my motives, as though I have some cognitive dissonance about going to seminary and to convince myself the money wasn't a waste I have to convince my self God really exists after all. This is quite an uninformed opinion. The case for God's existence has never looked stronger. I wonder why this person would think I have some sort insecurity about belief? But the truth of it is, even if I came believe somehow that God does not exist, that would not mean that my seminary training was a waste. This makes me think the only thing this guy knows about seminaries, if anything at all, is through some of kind of little bible college fundie gig. I can see why a washout from the fundie ranks, who knows nothing about theology anyway would be confused. There are two major reasons why going to Perkins would be good even if one did not believe in God:
(1) It's a fantastic education.
One can always treat the material as sociological artifacts. To graduate with a Masters degree from Perkins, especially in the academic side of it (not a professional degree which is for ministers but like mine, the academic side) one must become well versed in many areas in addition to theology: Philosophy, social sciences, literature, history, world religions. Yes, I studied world religions at a United Methodist seminary. The course was taught by a methodist minister but he lived in Japan and studies Japanese religion for about 30 years. He was a leading expert on what is called "the new religions" of Japan. That course alone made the education itself worth while.
(2) Theology would still be of value without God
AT Perkins I learned about phenomenology, my understanding of existentialism shot up from the level of an undergraduate to almost that of an expert, and I was exposed to a deep understanding of oriental religions: Buddhism, Taoism, Shinto. There is quite a bit of theology to be done without God.
Of course there is no need for that becasue the case for God has never looked better. This guy's statement is quite false. The case for God is almost a certainty. first, before going into that, I will present a brief look at the problems at the heart of atheism. Lack of belief in God is fraught with problems. Essentially it's an illogical ideology.
Limitations of Naturalistic Reductionism
I.Closing off other valid forms of knowledge
and losing the phenomena.
The upshot of this entire argument is that scientific reductionism reduces the full scope of human experience and reduces reality from its full frame to preset conclusions than are already labeled "science" and "objectivity" and which screen out any other possibility. One of those possibilities is the phenomenological apprehension of God's presence through religious experience.
In the conclusion to his famous Gilford lectures, Psychologist William James, whose Varieties of Religious Experience, is still a classic in the filed of psychology of religion, concluded that reductionism shuts off other valid avenues of reality.
II.Philosohpical naturalism based upon
Circular Reasoning and Contradictions
A. Cause and effect.
In fact this way of arguing is wrong on two counts. First, it is based upon circular reasoning. The reasoning behind this notion goes back to the Philosopher David Hume who argued that miracles cannot happen because we do not have enough examples of them happening."A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, form the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can be imagined." (An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Open Court 1958, 126-27) We see this same sort of thinking used over and over again. Scientists sometimes resort to it. Nobel prize winning geneticist A.J. Carlson, "by supernatural we understand...beliefs...claiming origins other than verifiable experiences...or events contrary to known processes in nature...science and miracles are incompatible." (Science Magazine Feb. 27, 1937, 5.)
The great Theologian Rudolf Bultmann, "modern science does not believe that the course of nature can be interrupted or, so to speak, perforated by supernatural powers"(Jesus Christ and Mythology, New York: Schribner and Sons, 1958, 15). The context of Bultmann's comment was in proclaiming the events of the New Testament mythological because they "contradict" scientific principles.B. Hume's Argument against Miracles.The nature of this circular reasoning is pointed out by C.S. Lewis, who wrote: "Now of course we must agree with Hume that if there is absolutely uniform experience, if in other words they have never happened, why then they never have. Unfortunately we know the experience against them to be uniform only if we know that all reports of them have been false. And we can know all the reports of them to be false only if we know already that miracles have never occurred. In fact, we are arguing in a circle." (Miracles: a Preliminary Study. New York: MacMillian, 1947, 105).
The circular nature of the reasoning insists that there can be noting beyond the material realm. Any claims of supernatural effects must be ruled out because they cannot be. And how do we know that they cannot be? Because only that which conforms to the rules of naturalism can be admitted as "fact." Therefore, miracles can never be "fact." While this is understandable as a scientific procedure, to go beyond the confines of explaining natural processes and proclaim that God does not exist and miracles cannot happen far exceeds the boundaries of scientific investigation. Only within a particular situation, the investigation of a particular case can scientists make such claims.C. Philosophical Naturalism based upon Metaphysical assumptionsPhilosophical naturalists go beyond the claims of scientific methodology to take up a metaphysical position. Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy which seeks answers beyond the confines of the physical realm. Philosophical materialists claim to know that there is no God, or at least to be convinced of it. They rule out miracles from a philosophical basis rather than an empirical one. This is in fact a metaphysical position. But philosophical materialists also claim to debunk metaphysics. Since metaphysics holds to knowledge of things beyond the material realm philosophical materialists must count themselves its enemies. But to say that there is no God is to make a metaphysical statement. To claim to know that there is no God is claim to have knowledge of things beyond the material realm. Philosophical materialists are, in fact, taking up a position contradictory to their stated philosophy.What I am saying should not be construed as an argument against scientific investigation of miracle claims. Science should investigate with all the scientific techniques and assumptions fit for the task of valid investigation, but to the extent that such claims are ruled out science should not make blanket assumptions that God does not work miracles, but must pronounce only on those particular cases.
III. Reflections on Method:
Science vs. Philosophy
This post is partly aimed at RG for his instance that atheists demand "evidence." I don't think atheists care about evidence. Evidence just means that one has something to reason from. What atheists demand is absolute proof, and at a level that can't be given for anything. I would bet that if for some reason atheists didn't like science, no amount of scientific "proof" wood suffice to prove to them that science works; because they would demand absolute proof, which can't be gotten.
In thinking about the two other threads I initiative over the last few days, and the atheist take on my arguments and their 'dicing' of my thought processes, and their refusal to acknowledge standard resiances that I give all the time, I find the following state of affairs to be a good description of the current state of dialectic between atheists and theists on the boards:
(1) Theists have a vast array of knowledge and argumentation built up over 2000 years, which basically amounts to a ton evidence for the existence of God. It's not absolute proof, because true, sure enough, actual absolute proof is just damn hard to come by on anything--even most scientific things; which is why they invented inductive reasoning. Science accepts correlation's as signs of caudal relationships, it doesn't ever actually observe causality at work. But that kind of indicative relationship is not good for atheists when a God argument is involved. Then it must be absolute demonstration and direct observation.
(2) This double standard always works in favor of the atheist and never in favor of the theist. I suspect that's because Theists are trying to persuade atheists that a certain state of affairs is the case, and at the same time we are apt to be less critical of our own reasons for believing that. Atheists make a habit of denial and pride themselves on it.
Why is it a double standard? Because when it works to establish a unified system of naturalistic observation the atheist is only too happy to appeal to "we never see" "we always see" and "there is a strong correlation." We never see a man raised from the dead. We never see a severed limb restored. The correlation's between naturalistic cause and effect are rock solid and always work, so science gives us truth, and religion doesn't. But when those same kinds of correlation's are used to support a God argument, they are just no darn good. to wit: we never see anything pop out of absolute noting, we never even see absolute nothing, even QM particles seem to emerge from prior conditions such as Vacuum flux, so they are not really proof of something form nothing. But O tisg tosh, that doesn't prove anything and certainly QM proves that the universe could just pop up out of nothing!
(3) "laws of physics" are not real laws, they are only descriptions, aggregates of our observations. So they can't be used to argue for God in any way. But, when it comes to miraculous claims, the observations of such must always be discounted because they violate our standard norm for observation, and we must always assume they are wrong no matter how well documented or how inexplicable. We must always assume that only naturalistic events can happen, even though the whole concept of a naturalism can only be nothing more than an aggregate of our observations about the world; and surely they are anything but exhaustive. Thus one wood think that since our observations are not enough to establish immutable laws of the universe, they would not be enough to establish a metaphysics which says that only material realms exist and only materially caused events can happen! But guess again...!
(4) The Theistic panoply of argumentation is a going concern. Quentin Smith, the top atheist philosopher says that 80% of philosophers today are theists. But when one uses philosophy in a God argument, it's just some left over junk from the middle ages; even though my God arguments are based upon S 5 modal logic which didn't exist even before the 1960s and most of the major God arguers are still living.
(5) They pooh pooh philosophy because it doesn't' produce objective concrete results. But they can't produce any scientific evidence to answer the most basic philosophical questions, and the more adept atheists will admit that it isn't the job of science to answer those questions anyway. Scientific evidence cannot give us answers on the most basic philosophical questions, rather than seeing this as a failing in science (or better yet, evidence of differing magister) they rather just chalice it up to the failing of the question! The question is no good because our methods dot' answer it!
(6) What it appears to me is the case is this; some methods are better tailed for philosophy. Those methods are more likely to yield a God argument and even a rational warrant for belief, because God is a philosophical question and not a scientific one. God is a matter of faint, after all, and in matters of faith a rational warrant is the best one should even hope for. But that's not good enough for atheists, they disparage the whole idea of a philosophical question (at least the scientistic ones do--that's not all of them, but some) yet they want an open ended universe with no hard and fast truth and no hard and fast morality!
(7)So it seems that if one accepts certain methods one can prove God within the nature of that language game. now of course one can reject those language games and choose others that are not quite as cozy with the divine and that's OK too. Niether approach is indicative of one's intelligence or one's morality. But, it does mean that since it may be just as rational given the choice of axioms and methodologies, then what that taps out to is belief in God is rationally warrented--it may not be only rational conclusion but it is one ratinal conclusion Now i know all these guys like Barron and HRG will say "hey I'm fine with that." But then when push comes to shove they will be back again insisting that the lack of absolute proof leaves the method that yields God arguments in doubt, rather than the other way around. I don't see why either should be privileged. Why can't we just say that one method is better suited for one kind of question, the other for the other?
and if one of them says 'why should I ask those questions?' I say 'why shouldn't we leave the choice of questions to the questioner?
The Case For belief
The standard for which I argue is not absolute proof. What I just said above should indicate why I think absolute proof is nonsense. But the standard I advocate is rational warrant. Belief in God is rationally warranted, and being so, it is rational and not irrational.
See my 42 Arguments for the existence of god.
I can defend each of these arguments just I will just present one here.
Argumnet: Cosmological Necessity
(1) The Universe is contingent upon "prior" conditions (conditions that existed "prior" to our understanding of space/time:
(a) Prior condition being space/time, or gravitational field.
Matter, energy, all physical phenomena stem from 'gravitational field' the prior condition of which is he big bang, the prior condition of which is the singularity, the prior condition of which is...we do not know.
(b)All naturalistic phenomena are empirically derived, thus they are contingent by their very nature.
As Karl Popper said, empirical facts are facts which might not have been. Everything that belongs to space time is a contingent truth because it could have been otherwise, it is dependent upon the existence of something else for its' existence going all the way back to the Big Bang, which is itself contingent upon something.(Antony Flew, Philosophical Dictionary New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979, 242.)
(2) By definition the "ultimate" origin cannot be contingent, since it would reuqire the explaination of still prior conditions (a string of infinite contingencies with no necessity is logical nonsense;the existence of contingent conditions requires the existence of necessary conditions).
(3) Therefore, the universe must have emerged from some prior condition which always existed, is self sufficient, and not dependent upon anything "higher."
(4) Naturalistic assumptions of determinism, and the arbitrary nature of naturalistic cosmology creates an arbitrary necessity; if the UEO has to produce existents automatically and/or deterministically due to naturalistic forces, the congtingencies function as necessities
(5) Therefore, since arbitrary necessities are impossible by nature of their absurdity, thus we should attribute creation to an act of the will; the eternal existent must be possessed of some ability to create at will; and thus must possess will.
Corollary:
(6) An eternal existent which creates all things and chooses to do so is compatible with the definition of "God" found in any major world religion, and therefore, can be regarded as God. Thus God must exist QED!
Analysis:
The state of understanding most Christian apologists use for the cosmological argument is very bad. Most of us are still back in the enlightenment, or even earlier. In fact if one reads the Boyle Lectures (that's 1690's) one sees all the issues of a modern apologetics message board, with very little real advance by the Christian apologists.
The problem revolves around the notion of causality. Causality requires linear direction and time. A causes B, it follows that a precedes B in a sequential effect. No Time means no sequential order, thus no cause. Time begins sequentially simultaneously with the Big Bang. So there is no way to speak of "before" the big bang because there can't be a "before time." Since time is the beginning of sequences there can be no scenic before the beginning of sequences; without sequences there is no begging and no "before." So the problem is that it is meaningless to say things like "everything that begins requires a cause." This is meaningless because we can't really speak of "the beginning" of the universe since the begging of the universe is also the beginning of time, and causality requires time. Thus there is no cause before the beginning of causes. Thus the whole idea of a final cause beginning the sequence that eventually leads to sequences is a lame idea. Yet most Christian Apologists use the Kalam argument (made so poplar by William Lane Craig) which begins "everything that begins requires a cause." The statement itself is self contradictory.
Of course the atheists muck things up even worse with their notions of Quantum theory (AKA "QM"). It seems that everything that begins doesn't require a cause. QM particles pop into exist seemingly out of nothing with no prior casual agent that can be decreed and thus, it seems something could come from nothing. Now it gets tricky at this point, because this not really what's happening, but the best that can come out of this observation is a big muddle.
It seems that we really don't find QM particles "popping" out of "nothing." They emerge from something called "vacuum flux." This is just a fancy name for more QM particles, that doesn't' matter, because it really is not actual nothingness. The problem is that physicists speak of VC as "nothing." So while one finds physicist speaking of QM being something from nothing, they know quite well its not. Now the tricky part is, the Christian apologist suspects, but we cannot prove, that there is a cause in there somewhere. But the skeptic can always elude the obvious implication of a cause since we don't have a direct observational proof of the need for a final cause. Our assumptions about final causes are pinned upon logic and not upon empirical observation (and this is of necessity, since we can't observe final cause since we can't observe "before" the begging of sequential ordering in time).
It seems that the skeptic has a built-in fail-safe to create a stalemate without he CA (cosmological argument) because our thinking as Christian apologists is often rooted in the thinking of the Robert Boil and the 1690's. We still think in terms of cause and effect, things begging, things needing causes and beginnings and logic proving this rather than empirical observation; although a large part of this argument is merely psychological, since in all fairness the skeptic can't prove anything either and we know darn well there has to be a cause back there somewhere.
I have developed an approach which I feel resolves this dilemma and lends a positive presumptive appeal to the CA. I feel that my approach changes the burden of proof in the debate because lends the apologist presumption, by meeting the prima facie burden of proof. This approach works in two phases:
(1) Sets up a "comfort zone" for the argument, or in other words, establishes criteria through which the bar is lowered for the standard of proof and the lower standard can be met; lower standard meaning "rational warrant for belief" rather than "proof."
We are not out to prove the existence of God. We are out to prove only that it is rational to construe the universe as the creation of God.
The outcome of a prima facie argument is that the burden of proof is reversed. Now it becomes the other side's burden to show that the PF case has not been made. What is it in my version of the CA that swings this point over from burden of proof to PF case? It's the way I deal with the notion need for causality.
The standard Christian apologetics approach is usually to say "everything we observe needs a cause, so the universe must need a cause." This leaves the skeptics cold and they just keep harping on their QM stuff. My approach is to move away from the need causes. I no longer call my argument "first cause." I use the term "cosmological" but not "first cause" or "final cause." I don't speak of causes and I never claim "everything that begins to exist recks a cause." Most skeptics will be expecting this, usually they are thrown into a state of total confusion when they learn that I don't bother with this.
My approach is to use the scholastic model of necessity and contingency rather than cause and effect. Now one might think this is so old fashioned and pre modern that it would be untenable. But no, it's the basis of model logic. One can easily argue, what with the return to the impotence of the model aspects from Hartshorne and Platinga, and with Godell's OA being based firmly upon necessity/contingency, that category is alive and well. Now skeptics will remain incredulous of course, but the category can be defended easily with Spinoza's chart of modalities. The categories are there in logic and cannot be denied.
Moreover, move on from that point to speak of "prior conditions," rather than causes. The idea of prior conditions is tricky, since we all there is a cause lurking somewhere behind it. But the skeptic is lambasting us for speaking of causes, and with this approach we need not speak of them. That way the obvious need for one is enthemimatic; that is the skeptic will pick it out himself, but he can't really say anything about it we aren't claiming it as part of the argument. If the skeptic brings it up, well it's a straw man argument, even though it's really there in the background.
Prior conditions is a tricky category and I have the following analogy. In QM theory we face the concept of the VC and the particle emerge from it. We know from observation that this slows way down the closer one gets to the singularity, and we know that we have no observations whatsoever from timeless state (how could we)? Three conditions obtain in which Amp's emerge: (1) the emerge amid physical law. Even though they seem to contradict our previous understanding of law, they are not opposed to it and QM theory is the business of showing how we can assume their harmonious existence with physical law; (2) They emerge in time; since we have no counter observation we must assume so; (3) They emerge from VF. Skeptics have howled and said "that must means more particles." But so what? that's still something. It means they aren't coming form real nothingness. As long as something exits prior to the "first" existent, that existent is not first and what prior to it must be accounted for. IF we don't wish to end up in an infinite causal regress, then we have to assume that there is some prior conditions which is the basic condition of all existence.
Analogy:
It's like fish. Fish are not caused by water. You can't say "water = fish." But, fish are always found in or near bodies of water. You dot' find fish living in the sand in the desert. There are fish which are native to the North American desert, but they live in water deep in caverns and have actually lost eyes because they live in total darkness. But again, the one prior condition we have for fish is water. Now someone will say "but there is causal relationship there." Yes, but my argument doesn't require that there be no causal relation, but I don't have to push the causal relation to win the argument; all I have to do is demonstrate that there must be some eternal prior condition that is necessary for all contingent conditions to be; and of course we construe this "eternally prior condition" as God.
Another important aspect of this argument is to get away form time. We must get over the simplistic idea that BB is the moment of creation and "before" that (which there is no "before") is God in eternity. That treats time like a place that one could go, where God is. Time may be running eternally, it has a "reassert" with the Big Bang but it doesn't' have to be a "place" one could go to visit. Thus it may not be that we can think of the timeless void as a realm beyond the natural realm.
In this argument I set up the contingency of the universe as the predication of an ultimate prior condition. Anything naturalistic is automatically contingent (this can be backed up by Carol Popper and many others). Thus the ontological necessity which predicates these contingencies is a priori some from of prior condition which must be understood as eternal and boundless, otherwise the idea of a contingent universe filled with individual contingencies makes no sense.
From there the argument that this eternal prior condition is equivalent to or can be construed as an object of religious devotion is easy. Of course atheists will fight tooth and nail to keep from accepting the notion that the universe is contingent. They will charge that this is the fallacy of composition. Don't let them! The fallacy of composition only works when the parts are different. In other words, if a brick wall is made up of all bricks then it is not a fallacy of composition to say "this is a wall of bricks." Thus, one case say "this is a universe of contingencies, thus, it is a contingent universe." Moreover, Dr. Kooks (Univ. Texas--our fine main branch in our Glorious UT system) uses mermeology (a funky kind of math stuff) to argue that wholly contingent parts make for a wholly contingent situation. In other words, a universe made up of all contingent parts is a contingent universe. Establishing this point will be the hardest part of the debate, but the skeptic will be scratching his head and asking "what's mermology?"
From there one directs them to Dr. Koons' Website.
I think this approach offers some unique features that get us way from the 1690s and put Christian apologetics in the 21st century.
If god does not exists, then N years of university an M doctorates from prestigious universities on theology are not worth anything, with regards to supernatural statements.
The fact is that the case for the existence of any gods is very weak, and until that has been remedied by the ones claiming such entities exist, musings on the true nature of the gods is just meaningless noise, hence the invisible pink unicorn.
Trying to impune my motives, as though I have some cognitive dissonance about going to seminary and to convince myself the money wasn't a waste I have to convince my self God really exists after all. This is quite an uninformed opinion. The case for God's existence has never looked stronger. I wonder why this person would think I have some sort insecurity about belief? But the truth of it is, even if I came believe somehow that God does not exist, that would not mean that my seminary training was a waste. This makes me think the only thing this guy knows about seminaries, if anything at all, is through some of kind of little bible college fundie gig. I can see why a washout from the fundie ranks, who knows nothing about theology anyway would be confused. There are two major reasons why going to Perkins would be good even if one did not believe in God:
(1) It's a fantastic education.
One can always treat the material as sociological artifacts. To graduate with a Masters degree from Perkins, especially in the academic side of it (not a professional degree which is for ministers but like mine, the academic side) one must become well versed in many areas in addition to theology: Philosophy, social sciences, literature, history, world religions. Yes, I studied world religions at a United Methodist seminary. The course was taught by a methodist minister but he lived in Japan and studies Japanese religion for about 30 years. He was a leading expert on what is called "the new religions" of Japan. That course alone made the education itself worth while.
(2) Theology would still be of value without God
AT Perkins I learned about phenomenology, my understanding of existentialism shot up from the level of an undergraduate to almost that of an expert, and I was exposed to a deep understanding of oriental religions: Buddhism, Taoism, Shinto. There is quite a bit of theology to be done without God.
Of course there is no need for that becasue the case for God has never looked better. This guy's statement is quite false. The case for God is almost a certainty. first, before going into that, I will present a brief look at the problems at the heart of atheism. Lack of belief in God is fraught with problems. Essentially it's an illogical ideology.
Limitations of Naturalistic Reductionism
I.Closing off other valid forms of knowledge
and losing the phenomena.
The upshot of this entire argument is that scientific reductionism reduces the full scope of human experience and reduces reality from its full frame to preset conclusions than are already labeled "science" and "objectivity" and which screen out any other possibility. One of those possibilities is the phenomenological apprehension of God's presence through religious experience.
In the conclusion to his famous Gilford lectures, Psychologist William James, whose Varieties of Religious Experience, is still a classic in the filed of psychology of religion, concluded that reductionism shuts off other valid avenues of reality.
"The world interpreted religiously is not the materialistic world over again, with an altered expression; it must have, over and above the altered expression, a natural constitution different at some point from that which a materialistic world would have. It must be such that different events can be expected in it, different conduct must be required.This thoroughly 'pragmatic' view of religion has usually been taken as a matter of course by common men. They have interpolated divine miracles into the field of nature, they have built a heaven out beyond the grave. It is only transcendentalist metaphysicians who think that, without adding any concrete details to Nature, or subtracting any, but by simply calling it the expression of absolute spirit,you make it more divine just as it stands. I believe the pragmatic way of taking religion to be the deeper way. It gives it body as well as soul, it makes it claim, as everything real must claim, some characteristic realm of fact as its very own. What the more characteristically divine facts are, apart from the actual inflow of energy in the faith-state and the prayer-state, I know not."
"But the over-belief on which I am ready to make my personal venture is that they exist. The whole drift of my education goes to persuade me that the world of our present consciousness is only one out of many worlds of consciousness that exist, and that those other worlds must contain experiences which have a meaning for our life also; and that although in the main their experiences and those of this world keep discrete, yet the two become continuous at certain points, and higher energies filter in. By being faithful in my poor measure to this over-belief, I seem to myself to keep more sane and true. I can, of course, put myself into the sectarian scientist's attitude, and imagine vividly that the world of sensations and of scientific laws and objects may be all. But whenever I do this, I hear that inward monitor of which W. K. Clifford once wrote, whispering the word 'bosh!' Humbug is humbug, even though it bear the scientific name, and the total expression of human experience, as I view it objectively, invincibly urges me beyond the narrow scientific bounds. Assuredly, the real world is of a different temperament,- more intricately built than physical science allows. So my objective and my subjective conscience both hold me to the over-belief which I express. Who knows whether the faithfulness of individuals here below to their own poor over-beliefs may not actually help God in turn to be more effectively faithful to his own greater tasks?"
II.Philosohpical naturalism based upon
Circular Reasoning and Contradictions
A. Cause and effect.
In fact this way of arguing is wrong on two counts. First, it is based upon circular reasoning. The reasoning behind this notion goes back to the Philosopher David Hume who argued that miracles cannot happen because we do not have enough examples of them happening."A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, form the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can be imagined." (An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Open Court 1958, 126-27) We see this same sort of thinking used over and over again. Scientists sometimes resort to it. Nobel prize winning geneticist A.J. Carlson, "by supernatural we understand...beliefs...claiming origins other than verifiable experiences...or events contrary to known processes in nature...science and miracles are incompatible." (Science Magazine Feb. 27, 1937, 5.)
The great Theologian Rudolf Bultmann, "modern science does not believe that the course of nature can be interrupted or, so to speak, perforated by supernatural powers"(Jesus Christ and Mythology, New York: Schribner and Sons, 1958, 15). The context of Bultmann's comment was in proclaiming the events of the New Testament mythological because they "contradict" scientific principles.B. Hume's Argument against Miracles.The nature of this circular reasoning is pointed out by C.S. Lewis, who wrote: "Now of course we must agree with Hume that if there is absolutely uniform experience, if in other words they have never happened, why then they never have. Unfortunately we know the experience against them to be uniform only if we know that all reports of them have been false. And we can know all the reports of them to be false only if we know already that miracles have never occurred. In fact, we are arguing in a circle." (Miracles: a Preliminary Study. New York: MacMillian, 1947, 105).
The circular nature of the reasoning insists that there can be noting beyond the material realm. Any claims of supernatural effects must be ruled out because they cannot be. And how do we know that they cannot be? Because only that which conforms to the rules of naturalism can be admitted as "fact." Therefore, miracles can never be "fact." While this is understandable as a scientific procedure, to go beyond the confines of explaining natural processes and proclaim that God does not exist and miracles cannot happen far exceeds the boundaries of scientific investigation. Only within a particular situation, the investigation of a particular case can scientists make such claims.C. Philosophical Naturalism based upon Metaphysical assumptionsPhilosophical naturalists go beyond the claims of scientific methodology to take up a metaphysical position. Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy which seeks answers beyond the confines of the physical realm. Philosophical materialists claim to know that there is no God, or at least to be convinced of it. They rule out miracles from a philosophical basis rather than an empirical one. This is in fact a metaphysical position. But philosophical materialists also claim to debunk metaphysics. Since metaphysics holds to knowledge of things beyond the material realm philosophical materialists must count themselves its enemies. But to say that there is no God is to make a metaphysical statement. To claim to know that there is no God is claim to have knowledge of things beyond the material realm. Philosophical materialists are, in fact, taking up a position contradictory to their stated philosophy.What I am saying should not be construed as an argument against scientific investigation of miracle claims. Science should investigate with all the scientific techniques and assumptions fit for the task of valid investigation, but to the extent that such claims are ruled out science should not make blanket assumptions that God does not work miracles, but must pronounce only on those particular cases.
III. Reflections on Method:
Science vs. Philosophy
This post is partly aimed at RG for his instance that atheists demand "evidence." I don't think atheists care about evidence. Evidence just means that one has something to reason from. What atheists demand is absolute proof, and at a level that can't be given for anything. I would bet that if for some reason atheists didn't like science, no amount of scientific "proof" wood suffice to prove to them that science works; because they would demand absolute proof, which can't be gotten.
In thinking about the two other threads I initiative over the last few days, and the atheist take on my arguments and their 'dicing' of my thought processes, and their refusal to acknowledge standard resiances that I give all the time, I find the following state of affairs to be a good description of the current state of dialectic between atheists and theists on the boards:
(1) Theists have a vast array of knowledge and argumentation built up over 2000 years, which basically amounts to a ton evidence for the existence of God. It's not absolute proof, because true, sure enough, actual absolute proof is just damn hard to come by on anything--even most scientific things; which is why they invented inductive reasoning. Science accepts correlation's as signs of caudal relationships, it doesn't ever actually observe causality at work. But that kind of indicative relationship is not good for atheists when a God argument is involved. Then it must be absolute demonstration and direct observation.
(2) This double standard always works in favor of the atheist and never in favor of the theist. I suspect that's because Theists are trying to persuade atheists that a certain state of affairs is the case, and at the same time we are apt to be less critical of our own reasons for believing that. Atheists make a habit of denial and pride themselves on it.
Why is it a double standard? Because when it works to establish a unified system of naturalistic observation the atheist is only too happy to appeal to "we never see" "we always see" and "there is a strong correlation." We never see a man raised from the dead. We never see a severed limb restored. The correlation's between naturalistic cause and effect are rock solid and always work, so science gives us truth, and religion doesn't. But when those same kinds of correlation's are used to support a God argument, they are just no darn good. to wit: we never see anything pop out of absolute noting, we never even see absolute nothing, even QM particles seem to emerge from prior conditions such as Vacuum flux, so they are not really proof of something form nothing. But O tisg tosh, that doesn't prove anything and certainly QM proves that the universe could just pop up out of nothing!
(3) "laws of physics" are not real laws, they are only descriptions, aggregates of our observations. So they can't be used to argue for God in any way. But, when it comes to miraculous claims, the observations of such must always be discounted because they violate our standard norm for observation, and we must always assume they are wrong no matter how well documented or how inexplicable. We must always assume that only naturalistic events can happen, even though the whole concept of a naturalism can only be nothing more than an aggregate of our observations about the world; and surely they are anything but exhaustive. Thus one wood think that since our observations are not enough to establish immutable laws of the universe, they would not be enough to establish a metaphysics which says that only material realms exist and only materially caused events can happen! But guess again...!
(4) The Theistic panoply of argumentation is a going concern. Quentin Smith, the top atheist philosopher says that 80% of philosophers today are theists. But when one uses philosophy in a God argument, it's just some left over junk from the middle ages; even though my God arguments are based upon S 5 modal logic which didn't exist even before the 1960s and most of the major God arguers are still living.
(5) They pooh pooh philosophy because it doesn't' produce objective concrete results. But they can't produce any scientific evidence to answer the most basic philosophical questions, and the more adept atheists will admit that it isn't the job of science to answer those questions anyway. Scientific evidence cannot give us answers on the most basic philosophical questions, rather than seeing this as a failing in science (or better yet, evidence of differing magister) they rather just chalice it up to the failing of the question! The question is no good because our methods dot' answer it!
(6) What it appears to me is the case is this; some methods are better tailed for philosophy. Those methods are more likely to yield a God argument and even a rational warrant for belief, because God is a philosophical question and not a scientific one. God is a matter of faint, after all, and in matters of faith a rational warrant is the best one should even hope for. But that's not good enough for atheists, they disparage the whole idea of a philosophical question (at least the scientistic ones do--that's not all of them, but some) yet they want an open ended universe with no hard and fast truth and no hard and fast morality!
(7)So it seems that if one accepts certain methods one can prove God within the nature of that language game. now of course one can reject those language games and choose others that are not quite as cozy with the divine and that's OK too. Niether approach is indicative of one's intelligence or one's morality. But, it does mean that since it may be just as rational given the choice of axioms and methodologies, then what that taps out to is belief in God is rationally warrented--it may not be only rational conclusion but it is one ratinal conclusion Now i know all these guys like Barron and HRG will say "hey I'm fine with that." But then when push comes to shove they will be back again insisting that the lack of absolute proof leaves the method that yields God arguments in doubt, rather than the other way around. I don't see why either should be privileged. Why can't we just say that one method is better suited for one kind of question, the other for the other?
and if one of them says 'why should I ask those questions?' I say 'why shouldn't we leave the choice of questions to the questioner?
The Case For belief
The standard for which I argue is not absolute proof. What I just said above should indicate why I think absolute proof is nonsense. But the standard I advocate is rational warrant. Belief in God is rationally warranted, and being so, it is rational and not irrational.
See my 42 Arguments for the existence of god.
I can defend each of these arguments just I will just present one here.
Argumnet: Cosmological Necessity
(1) The Universe is contingent upon "prior" conditions (conditions that existed "prior" to our understanding of space/time:
(a) Prior condition being space/time, or gravitational field.
Matter, energy, all physical phenomena stem from 'gravitational field' the prior condition of which is he big bang, the prior condition of which is the singularity, the prior condition of which is...we do not know.
(b)All naturalistic phenomena are empirically derived, thus they are contingent by their very nature.
As Karl Popper said, empirical facts are facts which might not have been. Everything that belongs to space time is a contingent truth because it could have been otherwise, it is dependent upon the existence of something else for its' existence going all the way back to the Big Bang, which is itself contingent upon something.(Antony Flew, Philosophical Dictionary New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979, 242.)
(2) By definition the "ultimate" origin cannot be contingent, since it would reuqire the explaination of still prior conditions (a string of infinite contingencies with no necessity is logical nonsense;the existence of contingent conditions requires the existence of necessary conditions).
(3) Therefore, the universe must have emerged from some prior condition which always existed, is self sufficient, and not dependent upon anything "higher."
(4) Naturalistic assumptions of determinism, and the arbitrary nature of naturalistic cosmology creates an arbitrary necessity; if the UEO has to produce existents automatically and/or deterministically due to naturalistic forces, the congtingencies function as necessities
(5) Therefore, since arbitrary necessities are impossible by nature of their absurdity, thus we should attribute creation to an act of the will; the eternal existent must be possessed of some ability to create at will; and thus must possess will.
Corollary:
(6) An eternal existent which creates all things and chooses to do so is compatible with the definition of "God" found in any major world religion, and therefore, can be regarded as God. Thus God must exist QED!
Analysis:
The state of understanding most Christian apologists use for the cosmological argument is very bad. Most of us are still back in the enlightenment, or even earlier. In fact if one reads the Boyle Lectures (that's 1690's) one sees all the issues of a modern apologetics message board, with very little real advance by the Christian apologists.
The problem revolves around the notion of causality. Causality requires linear direction and time. A causes B, it follows that a precedes B in a sequential effect. No Time means no sequential order, thus no cause. Time begins sequentially simultaneously with the Big Bang. So there is no way to speak of "before" the big bang because there can't be a "before time." Since time is the beginning of sequences there can be no scenic before the beginning of sequences; without sequences there is no begging and no "before." So the problem is that it is meaningless to say things like "everything that begins requires a cause." This is meaningless because we can't really speak of "the beginning" of the universe since the begging of the universe is also the beginning of time, and causality requires time. Thus there is no cause before the beginning of causes. Thus the whole idea of a final cause beginning the sequence that eventually leads to sequences is a lame idea. Yet most Christian Apologists use the Kalam argument (made so poplar by William Lane Craig) which begins "everything that begins requires a cause." The statement itself is self contradictory.
Of course the atheists muck things up even worse with their notions of Quantum theory (AKA "QM"). It seems that everything that begins doesn't require a cause. QM particles pop into exist seemingly out of nothing with no prior casual agent that can be decreed and thus, it seems something could come from nothing. Now it gets tricky at this point, because this not really what's happening, but the best that can come out of this observation is a big muddle.
It seems that we really don't find QM particles "popping" out of "nothing." They emerge from something called "vacuum flux." This is just a fancy name for more QM particles, that doesn't' matter, because it really is not actual nothingness. The problem is that physicists speak of VC as "nothing." So while one finds physicist speaking of QM being something from nothing, they know quite well its not. Now the tricky part is, the Christian apologist suspects, but we cannot prove, that there is a cause in there somewhere. But the skeptic can always elude the obvious implication of a cause since we don't have a direct observational proof of the need for a final cause. Our assumptions about final causes are pinned upon logic and not upon empirical observation (and this is of necessity, since we can't observe final cause since we can't observe "before" the begging of sequential ordering in time).
It seems that the skeptic has a built-in fail-safe to create a stalemate without he CA (cosmological argument) because our thinking as Christian apologists is often rooted in the thinking of the Robert Boil and the 1690's. We still think in terms of cause and effect, things begging, things needing causes and beginnings and logic proving this rather than empirical observation; although a large part of this argument is merely psychological, since in all fairness the skeptic can't prove anything either and we know darn well there has to be a cause back there somewhere.
I have developed an approach which I feel resolves this dilemma and lends a positive presumptive appeal to the CA. I feel that my approach changes the burden of proof in the debate because lends the apologist presumption, by meeting the prima facie burden of proof. This approach works in two phases:
(1) Sets up a "comfort zone" for the argument, or in other words, establishes criteria through which the bar is lowered for the standard of proof and the lower standard can be met; lower standard meaning "rational warrant for belief" rather than "proof."
We are not out to prove the existence of God. We are out to prove only that it is rational to construe the universe as the creation of God.
The outcome of a prima facie argument is that the burden of proof is reversed. Now it becomes the other side's burden to show that the PF case has not been made. What is it in my version of the CA that swings this point over from burden of proof to PF case? It's the way I deal with the notion need for causality.
The standard Christian apologetics approach is usually to say "everything we observe needs a cause, so the universe must need a cause." This leaves the skeptics cold and they just keep harping on their QM stuff. My approach is to move away from the need causes. I no longer call my argument "first cause." I use the term "cosmological" but not "first cause" or "final cause." I don't speak of causes and I never claim "everything that begins to exist recks a cause." Most skeptics will be expecting this, usually they are thrown into a state of total confusion when they learn that I don't bother with this.
My approach is to use the scholastic model of necessity and contingency rather than cause and effect. Now one might think this is so old fashioned and pre modern that it would be untenable. But no, it's the basis of model logic. One can easily argue, what with the return to the impotence of the model aspects from Hartshorne and Platinga, and with Godell's OA being based firmly upon necessity/contingency, that category is alive and well. Now skeptics will remain incredulous of course, but the category can be defended easily with Spinoza's chart of modalities. The categories are there in logic and cannot be denied.
Moreover, move on from that point to speak of "prior conditions," rather than causes. The idea of prior conditions is tricky, since we all there is a cause lurking somewhere behind it. But the skeptic is lambasting us for speaking of causes, and with this approach we need not speak of them. That way the obvious need for one is enthemimatic; that is the skeptic will pick it out himself, but he can't really say anything about it we aren't claiming it as part of the argument. If the skeptic brings it up, well it's a straw man argument, even though it's really there in the background.
Prior conditions is a tricky category and I have the following analogy. In QM theory we face the concept of the VC and the particle emerge from it. We know from observation that this slows way down the closer one gets to the singularity, and we know that we have no observations whatsoever from timeless state (how could we)? Three conditions obtain in which Amp's emerge: (1) the emerge amid physical law. Even though they seem to contradict our previous understanding of law, they are not opposed to it and QM theory is the business of showing how we can assume their harmonious existence with physical law; (2) They emerge in time; since we have no counter observation we must assume so; (3) They emerge from VF. Skeptics have howled and said "that must means more particles." But so what? that's still something. It means they aren't coming form real nothingness. As long as something exits prior to the "first" existent, that existent is not first and what prior to it must be accounted for. IF we don't wish to end up in an infinite causal regress, then we have to assume that there is some prior conditions which is the basic condition of all existence.
Analogy:
It's like fish. Fish are not caused by water. You can't say "water = fish." But, fish are always found in or near bodies of water. You dot' find fish living in the sand in the desert. There are fish which are native to the North American desert, but they live in water deep in caverns and have actually lost eyes because they live in total darkness. But again, the one prior condition we have for fish is water. Now someone will say "but there is causal relationship there." Yes, but my argument doesn't require that there be no causal relation, but I don't have to push the causal relation to win the argument; all I have to do is demonstrate that there must be some eternal prior condition that is necessary for all contingent conditions to be; and of course we construe this "eternally prior condition" as God.
Another important aspect of this argument is to get away form time. We must get over the simplistic idea that BB is the moment of creation and "before" that (which there is no "before") is God in eternity. That treats time like a place that one could go, where God is. Time may be running eternally, it has a "reassert" with the Big Bang but it doesn't' have to be a "place" one could go to visit. Thus it may not be that we can think of the timeless void as a realm beyond the natural realm.
In this argument I set up the contingency of the universe as the predication of an ultimate prior condition. Anything naturalistic is automatically contingent (this can be backed up by Carol Popper and many others). Thus the ontological necessity which predicates these contingencies is a priori some from of prior condition which must be understood as eternal and boundless, otherwise the idea of a contingent universe filled with individual contingencies makes no sense.
From there the argument that this eternal prior condition is equivalent to or can be construed as an object of religious devotion is easy. Of course atheists will fight tooth and nail to keep from accepting the notion that the universe is contingent. They will charge that this is the fallacy of composition. Don't let them! The fallacy of composition only works when the parts are different. In other words, if a brick wall is made up of all bricks then it is not a fallacy of composition to say "this is a wall of bricks." Thus, one case say "this is a universe of contingencies, thus, it is a contingent universe." Moreover, Dr. Kooks (Univ. Texas--our fine main branch in our Glorious UT system) uses mermeology (a funky kind of math stuff) to argue that wholly contingent parts make for a wholly contingent situation. In other words, a universe made up of all contingent parts is a contingent universe. Establishing this point will be the hardest part of the debate, but the skeptic will be scratching his head and asking "what's mermology?"
From there one directs them to Dr. Koons' Website.
I think this approach offers some unique features that get us way from the 1690s and put Christian apologetics in the 21st century.
24 comments:
Hi. I'd like to read this article but there's a problem. The way this is formatted is not working. The entire right side of this article is not visible. I have to swipe my screen to the right to get the left side to show up. That would be annoying swiping left and right to read every sentence but I could do it IF I had the ability and the strength, but I don't due to my disability. However, when I swipe to the right the white background moves too and the entire right side of the article shows up on top of a photograph of a road and 85% of that road is black! I can't read the black typeface on the black photo. I can tell that it's there but can't see what it says. The tiny little bit up stop of the ky is partially covered by dark trees so only maybe 5% of the screen is a light color and that's not nearly enough room to read this whole article. I'm sure you were trying an artistic approach to the background, but unfortunately it's not working. I believe what you are writing is the important issue, but if people can't see it then your writing gets lost. Please fix the formatting and I ask that you keep your disabled readers in mind and make it easy to read without swiping, clashing colors, any/or difficult fonts. Thanks very much. Blessings! ❤
Joe: As Karl Popper said, empirical facts are facts which might not have been. Everything that belongs to space time is a contingent truth because it could have been otherwise, it is dependent upon the existence of something else for its' existence going all the way back to the Big Bang, which is itself contingent upon something.(Antony Flew, Philosophical Dictionary New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979, 242.)
I am curious what the proof of this is. Is this just using Popper as an authority? Can you be certain that Popper's generalisation was meant to include the Big Bang? Did he mean it to include conditions prior to the Big Bang?
It is quite possible Popper is using this in a way other than you suggest. This is about knowledge. We do not know what the conditions were before the Big Bang. If we determine that they were X, rather than Y and or Z, then this would be an empirical fact, given that, until we determined it, it could have been Y or Z. However, that would not preclude X being necessary in the sense you are using the word.
This is important, as it seems foundational to your argument.
Joe: So there is no way to speak of "before" the big bang because there can't be a "before time."
Not necessarily:
https://www.sciencealert.com/mind-bending-study-suggests-time-did-actually-exist-before-the-big-bang
Joe: It seems that we really don't find QM particles "popping" out of "nothing." They emerge from something called "vacuum flux." This is just a fancy name for more QM particles, that doesn't' matter, because it really is not actual nothingness.
Okay. So atheists say that originally there was "vacuum flux" rather than true nothingness, and the universe spontaneously appeared in that.
Joe: In QM theory we face the concept of the VC and the particle emerge from it. We know from observation that this slows way down the closer one gets to the singularity...
I guess VC is vacuum flux. Are you claiming particles emerged less frequently from the vacuum flux shortly after the Big Bang? I am curious how anyone could observe that?
Joe: It means they aren't coming form real nothingness. As long as something exits prior to the "first" existent, that existent is not first and what prior to it must be accounted for.
Right, not true nothingness, but vacuum flux. And vacuum flux is necessary. Done.
Joe: As Karl Popper said, empirical facts are facts which might not have been. Everything that belongs to space time is a contingent truth because it could have been otherwise, it is dependent upon the existence of something else for its' existence going all the way back to the Big Bang, which is itself contingent upon something.(Antony Flew, Philosophical Dictionary New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979, 242.)
PxI am curious what the proof of this is. Is this just using Popper as an authority? Can you be certain that Popper's generalisation was meant to include the Big Bang? Did he mean it to include conditions prior to the Big Bang?
to whatever origination point we have for the universe. I think that's logical.
It is quite possible Popper is using this in a way other than you suggest. This is about knowledge. We do not know what the conditions were before the Big Bang. If we determine that they were X, rather than Y and or Z, then this would be an empirical fact, given that, until we determined it, it could have been Y or Z. However, that would not preclude X being necessary in the sense you are using the word.
I think cosmological specifics on origin are not the point he was making.He was talking about contingent facts; why they are continent,what they are contingent upon, the distinction between necessity and contingency.
This is important, as it seems foundational to your argument.
sure
Joe: So there is no way to speak of "before" the big bang because there can't be a "before time."
right. I didn't i said going back to the bb
Not necessarily:
https://www.sciencealert.com/mind-bending-study-suggests-time-did-actually-exist-before-the-big-bang
That flys in the face of so much presumption you are going to need a lot more than one article
Joe: It seems that we really don't find QM particles "popping" out of "nothing." They emerge from something called "vacuum flux." This is just a fancy name for more QM particles, that doesn't' matter, because it really is not actual nothingness.
Okay. So atheists say that originally there was "vacuum flux" rather than true nothingness, and the universe spontaneously appeared in that.
you still have to show where it comes from
Joe: In QM theory we face the concept of the VC and the particle emerge from it. We know from observation that this slows way down the closer one gets to the singularity...
I guess VC is vacuum flux. Are you claiming particles emerged less frequently from the vacuum flux shortly after the Big Bang? I am curious how anyone could observe that?
that's a reference to the singularity
Joe: It means they aren't coming form real nothingness. As long as something exits prior to the "first" existent, that existent is not first and what prior to it must be accounted for.
Right, not true nothingness, but vacuum flux. And vacuum flux is necessary. Done.
Vacum flux is made up of contingent particles so it can't be necessary it has to be caused by something necessary at some point
too long to post here
anon I did nothing different. It was a normal post. Try this link back to the original 2008 posting maybe that will help.
link
Joe: I think cosmological specifics on origin are not the point he was making.He was talking about contingent facts; why they are continent,what they are contingent upon, the distinction between necessity and contingency.
No he was not. He was talking about what we know and do not know. You are twisting Popper's words to mean something else entirely. Quote-mining him effectively (but I assume without realising it). Popper was not interested in cosmology, he was interested in the nature of evidence, and his comment reflects that.
It you get given a present, you do not know what is inside. It could be any number of things. When you open the present, what is inside is an empirical fact [i]because it could have been otherwise before we discovered what it actually is[/i]. Similarly, we do not know what there was before the Big Bang. It could be any number of things. When science delves deeper, we may discover what that is. What was will be an empirical fact [i]because it could have been otherwise before we discovered what it actually is[/i].
Joe: That flys in the face of so much presumption you are going to need a lot more than one article
The point is that we do not know what happened at the Big Bang or before it - it is all speculation - and you are taking it as fact.
Joe: you still have to show where it comes from
No I do not. I can just declare that it is "necessary". That is what theists do for God.
Joe: that's a reference to the singularity
A singularity is where the maths fails. Say you have an equation z = x/y, when y becomes 0, z goes to infinity. The most likely reason that happens is because z = x/y is an approximation, and while it is a good approximation when y is big, when y is small, it is a poor approximation.
The Big Bang is a singularity because the approximate equations we have go to infinity at that point. But the reality is that those approximations are just not that good in those conditions.
Singularity is just a place holder for "we do not know".
Joe: Vacum flux is made up of contingent particles so it can't be necessary it has to be caused by something necessary at some point
Sorry, I meant the space the particles appear in. That is necessary.
Joe: I think cosmological specifics on origin are not the point he was making.He was talking about contingent facts; why they are continent,what they are contingent upon, the distinction between necessity and contingency.
PX:No he was not. He was talking about what we know and do not know. You are twisting Popper's words to mean something else entirely.
Wrong you have not read it you are just assuming. He gives a clear and cogent understanding of contingency and practicality quoted him. Here is the proof He is quoted by Antony Flew sayong this, Here;s the quote about necessity:
"A proposition is said to be necessarily true, or to express a logically necessary truth iff [if and only if] the denial of that proposition would involve a self contradiction."
"A proposition which happens to be contingently true, or which expresses a contingent truth which could nevertheless be denied or asserted without contradiction."[Antony Flew, Philosophical Dictionary, Revised Second Edition. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979, 242]
[Antony Flew, Philosophical Dictionary, Revised Second Edition. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979, 242]
This is me talking about it: quoted on Doxa
In other words a fact which could otherwise not have been. As Karl Popper said, empirical facts are facts which might not have been. Everything that belongs to space time is a contingent truth because it could have been otherwise, it is dependent upon the existence of something else for its' existence going all the way back to the Big Bang, which is itself contingent upon something. [Ibid.]
Quote-mining him effectively (but I assume without realising it). Popper was not interested in cosmology, he was interested in the nature of evidence, and his comment reflects that.
you clearly do not know enough about the issues to distinguish between quot mingling and documentation, Bull shit like this is just bush league crap.
PXIt you get given a present, you do not know what is inside. It could be any number of things. When you open the present, what is inside is an empirical fact [i]because it could have been otherwise before we discovered what it actually is[/i]. Similarly, we do not know what there was before the Big Bang. It could be any number of things. When science delves deeper, we may discover what that is. What was will be an empirical fact [i]because it could have been otherwise before we discovered what it actually is[/i].
Thanks for distilling Shrodinger;s cat for us, that doesn't doesn't prove anything,the cat dies not negate reasonable suppositions or probability,
Joe: That flys in the face of so much presumption you are going to need a lot more than one article
PXThe point is that we do not know what happened at the Big Bang or before it - it is all speculation - and you are taking it as fact.
Speculation can be reasonable or unreasonable or probable or imporobable,
Joe: you still have to show where it comes from
PXNo I do not. I can just declare that it is "necessary". That is what theists do for God.
No that is a childish dodge of the facts, you refuse to reason about reality because you knkow reason takes you to God you don't want that. we are not jest declaring things necessary its logical but you don;t want to follow logic because you fear where it leads,
Joe: that's a reference to the singularity
PXA singularity is where the maths fails. Say you have an equation z = x/y, when y becomes 0, z goes to infinity. The most likely reason that happens is because z = x/y is an approximation, and while it is a good approximation when y is big, when y is small, it is a poor approximation.
that is what we should expect from an infinitesimal point
The Big Bang is a singularity because the approximate equations we have go to infinity at that point. But the reality is that those approximations are just not that good in those conditions.
that's utterly silly,It;s the best one could do mathematically to chart the emergence from god's mind of the reality that was't there before,
Singularity is just a place holder for "we do not know".
It's also a place holder for the appearance of reality out of nothing
Joe: Vacum flux is made up of contingent particles so it can't be necessary it has to be caused by something necessary at some point
Sorry, I meant the space the particles appear in. That is necessary.
no it's not. Space is not nothing, nothing naturalistic is necessary. I quoted Paul Davies saying so
12:42 AM
Joe: Wrong you have not read it you are just assuming. He gives a clear and cogent understanding of contingency and practicality quoted him. Here is the proof He is quoted by Antony Flew sayong this, Here;s the quote about necessity:
When he says "necessarily true", he is talking about the rules of logic. A is true is (not A) is a self contradiction. I.e., if (not A) is false, then it must necessarily follow that A is true.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contingency_(philosophy)
Saying something is necessarily true is quite different to saying God is necessary.
Popper is talking about something different again.
Popper: "Before I can elaborate this view (which might be called ‘deductivism’, in contrast to ‘inductivism’) I must first make clear the distinction between the psychology of knowledge which deals with empirical facts, and the logic of knowledge which is concerned only with logical relations."
http://strangebeautiful.com/other-texts/popper-logic-scientific-discovery.pdf
Flew is clearly talking about logical relations. Popper very clearly stated he is not.
What Popper was concerned about was falsifiability. To be science, a hypothesis must make predictions that can be tested. It is this testing he is talking about. The testing must give "empirical facts", and, to be falsifiable, these facts must potentially support or refute the hypothesis. That is, the test could go either way.
An example. Someone might propose a hypothesis: If aliens exist, they would put a tree outside my window. Look, there is a tree outside my window, so my hypothesis is true.
No, say Popper, because there was no chance of there not being a tree there. You knew the tree was there, and designed the test with that in mind. To be a true test, it has to be something you do not know in advance.
An alternative example: Darwin proposed common descent. If common descent is true, then we would expect intermediates in the fossil record. The fossil of an archaeopteryx was found a few years later supporting the hypothesis. This was an "empirical fact", because it "might not have been".
You have successfully combined your own claims of a necessary being with Flew talking about another thing and Popper talking about a third!
Joe: Thanks for distilling Shrodinger;s cat for us, that doesn't doesn't prove anything,the cat dies not negate reasonable suppositions or probability,
It has nothing to do with quantum mechanics, it is about not cheating when you test a hypothesis.
Joe: No that is a childish dodge of the facts...
Absolutely! The same one theists use.
Joe: that is what we should expect from an infinitesimal point
An infinitesimal point is fine. It is when it gets to zero that the maths falls down, and that is because our approximations fail.
Joe: that's utterly silly,It;s the best one could do mathematically to chart the emergence from god's mind of the reality that was't there before,
Not sure quite what you mean, but "the best one could do mathematically" sounds like an approximation, which is what I am talking about.
Joe: It's also a place holder for the appearance of reality out of nothing
Yes... So?
Joe: no it's not. Space is not nothing, nothing naturalistic is necessary. I quoted Paul Davies saying so
I did not say it was nothing, I said it was necessary. And space may not be the best word; it is not space as in what this universe is mostly.
Joe: Wrong you have not read it you are just assuming. He gives a clear and cogent understanding of contingency and practicality quoted him. Here is the proof He is quoted by Antony Flew saying this, Here;s the quote about necessity:
When he says "necessarily true", he is talking about the rules of logic. A is true is (not A) is a self contradiction. I.e., if (not A) is false, then it must necessarily follow that A is true.
Necessary and continent are rules of logic
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contingency_(philosophy)
Saying something is necessarily true is quite different to saying God is necessary.
Yes there's a distinction but they are both based upon the same perimeter about necessary vs contingent truth,
Popper is talking about something different again.
o it's not very different, it essentially the same thing, A truth that can;t fail to be true s one that is based upon the situation
Popper: "Before I can elaborate this view (which might be called ‘deductivism’, in contrast to ‘inductivism’) I must first make clear the distinction between the psychology of knowledge which deals with empirical facts, and the logic of knowledge which is concerned only with logical relations."
http://strangebeautiful.com/other-texts/popper-logic-scientific-discovery.pdf
that does not change the basis of the quote i used, So in another part of the book he makes this other statement that's not exactly what he says in the quote I used,
Flew is clearly talking about logical relations. Popper very clearly stated he is not.
What Popper was concerned about was falsifiability. To be science, a hypothesis must make predictions that can be tested. It is this testing he is talking about. The testing must give "empirical facts", and, to be falsifiable, these facts must potentially support or refute the hypothesis. That is, the test could go either way.
that doesn't change necessary and continent truth ,you are not going to disprove the quote i used by elaboration of the content,
PX:An example. Someone might propose a hypothesis: If aliens exist, they would put a tree outside my window. Look, there is a tree outside my window, so my hypothesis is true.
No, say Popper, because there was no chance of there not being a tree there. You knew the tree was there, and designed the test with that in mind. To be a true test, it has to be something you do not know in advance.
what you are trying to say here is not clear,I think you need a better example
An alternative example: Darwin proposed common descent. If common descent is true, then we would expect intermediates in the fossil record. The fossil of an archaeopteryx was found a few years later supporting the hypothesis. This was an "empirical fact", because it "might not have been".
Yes. So?
You have successfully combined your own claims of a necessary being with Flew talking about another thing and Popper talking about a third!
No Flew was using Popper to explain necessary and continent, You do not have the original quote your objections are based upon guessing,
7:40 AM
here again is my signal testament using Popper:
'As Karl Popper said, empirical facts are facts which might not have been. Everything that belongs to space time is a contingent truth because it could have been otherwise, it is dependent upon the existence of something else for its' existence going all the way back to the Big Bang, which is itself contingent upon something.(Antony Flew, Philosophical Dictionary New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979, 242.)
The direct quote of Popper here is this:empirical facts are facts which might not have been.
Are you disputing that? that's the basis of my argument are you trying to say that's not true? Do you think Popper didn't say it? tell me out right is that the issue?
do you dispte that empirical facts are facts which might not have been?
The Pixie said...
Joe: Thanks for distilling Shrodinger;s cat for us, that doesn't doesn't prove anything,the cat dies not negate reasonable suppositions or probability,
It has nothing to do with quantum mechanics, it is about not cheating when you test a hypothesis.
Ok we can agree not cheat but where does that come into the assumption that empirical facts are fact that might not have been?
Joe: No that is a childish dodge of the facts...
Absolutely! The same one theists use.
you are going to have to be clear, you want me to let you to make that dodge but still blame theists for using it? Where do they use it?
Joe: that is what we should expect from an infinitesimal point
PX:An infinitesimal point is fine. It is when it gets to zero that the maths falls down, and that is because our approximations fail.
the same made by physicists,
Joe: that's utterly silly,It;s the best one could do mathematically to chart the emergence from god's mind of the reality that was't there before,
PX:Not sure quite what you mean, but "the best one could do mathematically" sounds like an approximation, which is what I am talking about.
so? what's wrong with approximation?
Joe: It's also a place holder for the appearance of reality out of nothing
PX:Yes... So?
Joe: no it's not. Space is not nothing, nothing naturalistic is necessary. I quoted Paul Davies saying so
PX:I did not say it was nothing, I said it was necessary. And space may not be the best word; it is not space as in what this universe is mostly.
space is not necessary it could have failed to be, I don't know what would be in its place but it could have been true nothing,
do you dispute that empirical facts are facts which might not have been?
7:49 AM
Joe: Yes there's a distinction but they are both based upon the same perimeter about necessary vs contingent truth,
A necessary truth is something like all bachelors are unmarried. That is necessarily true because of the definition of bachelor. That is different (if related) nto the idea that God is necessary. That you are obliged to conflate the two indicates how flawed your argument is.
Joe: that does not change the basis of the quote i used, So in another part of the book he makes this other statement that's not exactly what he says in the quote I used,
But then you claim it applies to something Popper was not talking about. You are twisting his words - if only a bit - and then applying them to something else altogether,
Joe: The direct quote of Popper here is this:empirical facts are facts which might not have been.
Are you disputing that? that's the basis of my argument are you trying to say that's not true? Do you think Popper didn't say it? tell me out right is that the issue?
What I dispute is what Popper meant by that. You have ripped it out of context, tried to connect it to your own claims, but that is not what Popper was talking about.
Take a look Popper's book, which I linked to before:
http://strangebeautiful.com/other-texts/popper-logic-scientific-discovery.pdf
Ftom page 95 onwards, there is a section on "DEGREES OF TESTABILITY". He talks there about
"One might then represent the potential falsifiers of various theories by sectors of various widths. And according to the greater and lesser width of the sectors ruled out by them, theories might then be said to have more, or fewer, potential falsifiers."
What he is saying is that there are a whole load of possible outcomes, represented by a circle, and only a subset of those are predicted by the theory, which is represented by a sector of that circle. A more specific theory with have a much smaller sector, and this is the sign of a good theory.
Your quote relates to this circle; "empirical facts are facts which might not have been". Before we do the testing, we have that circle of outcomes. After testing, we have landed on a specific point. We now have an empirical fact, but it might not have been, it could have been any point in the circle.
This has NOTHING to do with God being necessary or with logical necessity. It is about the unknown becoming known.
Joe: the same made by physicists,
Who recognise that they need a better theory, one that combines QM and relativity, for events at the Big Bang. Read this article. It is pretty acessible, but you need to read to the end, as it starts by saying why a singulartity was first proposed and only later why it is now rejected.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/startswithabang/2018/07/27/there-was-no-big-bang-singularity/
Some quotes from it:
"We are absolutely certain there was no singularity associated with the hot Big Bang, and there may not have even been a birth to space and time at all."
"One thing that we can mathematically demonstrate, in fact, is that it's impossible for an inflating state to arise from a singularity."
"Every time you see a diagram, an article, or a story talking about the "big bang singularity" or any sort of big bang/singularity existing before inflation, know that you're dealing with an outdated method of thinking. The idea of a Big Bang singularity went out the window as soon as we realized we had a different state — that of cosmic inflation — preceding and setting up the early, hot-and-dense state of the Big Bang."
Joe: so? what's wrong with approximation?
Most of the time, it is fine, but in extreme conditions they can get very bad.
Newton's laws are great for most things. NASA put a man on the moon using them. But they go awry near large gravity fields. The orbit of Mercury, so close to the sun, cannot be predicted from Newton's laws. You need a better approximation - relativity. But relativity is still just an approximation, and it fails as you get near the Big Bang. You need a better approximation - still to be found.
Joe: space is not necessary it could have failed to be, I don't know what would be in its place but it could have been true nothing,
To be clear, I mean the pre-Big-Bang quantum field space that is nothing but the potential for virtual particles. Alost true nothing. That is necessary.
Joe: Yes there's a distinction but they are both based upon the same perimeter about necessary vs contingent truth,
PX:A necessary truth is something like all bachelors are unmarried. That is necessarily true because of the definition of bachelor. That is different (if related) nto the idea that God is necessary. That you are obliged to conflate the two indicates how flawed your argument is.
Joe: that does not change the basis of the quote i used, So in another part of the book he makes this other statement that's not exactly what he says in the quote I used,
PX:But then you claim it applies to something Popper was not talking about. You are twisting his words - if only a bit - and then applying them to something else altogether,
Joe: The direct quote of Popper here is this:empirical facts are facts which might not have been.
Are you disputing that? that's the basis of my argument are you trying to say that's not true? Do you think Popper didn't say it? tell me out right is that the issue?
PX:What I dispute is what Popper meant by that. You have ripped it out of context, tried to connect it to your own claims, but that is not what Popper was talking about.
beyond this point we have the real problematic issue which is problematic because you don't understand my ideas
PX:Take a look Popper's book, which I linked to before:
http://strangebeautiful.com/other-texts/popper-logic-scientific-discovery.pdf
Ftom page 95 onwards, there is a section on "DEGREES OF TESTABILITY". He talks there about
Being testable does not make the universe necessary. If it was necessary we wouldn't need to test it,
"One might then represent the potential falsifiers of various theories by sectors of various widths. And according to the greater and lesser width of the sectors ruled out by them, theories might then be said to have more, or fewer, potential falsifiers."
What he is saying is that there are a whole load of possible outcomes, represented by a circle, and only a subset of those are predicted by the theory, which is represented by a sector of that circle. A more specific theory with have a much smaller sector, and this is the sign of a good theory.
right that state of affairs can only result from a contingent universe.In a necessary universe the conclusions would all barbecue by logic.
Your quote relates to this circle; "empirical facts are facts which might not have been". Before we do the testing, we have that circle of outcomes. After testing, we have landed on a specific point. We now have an empirical fact, but it might not have been, it could have been any point in the circle.
right and that's what makes it contingent,
This has NOTHING to do with God being necessary or with logical necessity. It is about the unknown becoming known.
Not directly but it does stem form the universe being contingent, Continent universe has to be caused by necessary final cause at some point,
Joe: the same made by physicists,
Who recognize that they need a better theory, one that combines QM and relativity, for events at the Big Bang. Read this article. It is pretty acessible, but you need to read to the end, as it starts by saying why a singulartity was first proposed and only later why it is now rejected.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/startswithabang/2018/07/27/there-was-no-big-bang-singularity/
I've read about that before. The singularity has been disproved or rejected yet it;s still necessary because they don't have an alternative,
Some quotes from it:
"We are absolutely certain there was no singularity associated with the hot Big Bang, and there may not have even been a birth to space and time at all."
that i not proof. None of my God argent depend upon a singularity. Your assertion if singularity God,
no singularity
therefore, no God
is bunk.
"One thing that we can mathematically demonstrate, in fact, is that it's impossible for an inflating state to arise from a singularity."
"Every time you see a diagram, an article, or a story talking about the "big bang singularity" or any sort of big bang/singularity existing before inflation, know that you're dealing with an outdated method of thinking. The idea of a Big Bang singularity went out the window as soon as we realized we had a different state — that of cosmic inflation — preceding and setting up the early, hot-and-dense state of the Big Bang."
Joe: so? what's wrong with approximation?
Most of the time, it is fine, but in extreme conditions they can get very bad.
Newton's laws are great for most things. NASA put a man on the moon using them. But they go awry near large gravity fields. The orbit of Mercury, so close to the sun, cannot be predicted from Newton's laws. You need a better approximation - relativity. But relativity is still just an approximation, and it fails as you get near the Big Bang. You need a better approximation - still to be found.
Joe: space is not necessary it could have failed to be, I don't know what would be in its place but it could have been true nothing,
To be clear, I mean the pre-Big-Bang quantum field space that is nothing but the potential for virtual particles. A lost true nothing. That is necessary.
12:39 AM
do you think my God arguments require a singularity which 0ne's why? I don't think they do but I also don;t think the singularity is as washed up as you think
I really like what you write, provide useful knowledge
Do God exists .
Joe: Being testable does not make the universe necessary. If it was necessary we wouldn't need to test it,
If it was necessary and that was provable and known, then we would not have to test it. That is not the case for anything. Whatever the first thing was, and whether it was necessary, is not known or proven, so there are alternatives. t could be God, it could be the multiverse, it could be nothingness but quantum fields, it could be something else.
Because there are alternatives, it could be something else, so whatever we discover it to be (if that is even possible) will be an empirical fact, whether it is necessary or not, because the "necessary" bit is irrelevant to whether it is an empirical fact.
Joe: right that state of affairs can only result from a contingent universe.In a necessary universe the conclusions would all barbecue by logic.
Why? What difference does the universe being necessary make?
That state of a affairs arises because the origin of the universe is unknown. That means that a hypothesis about the origin of the universe could be wrong. That is the case whether the universe is necessary or not and whether the thing the universe is contingent on is necessary or not.
Joe: right and that's what makes it contingent,
Makes what contingent exactly?
Suppose the hypothesis is God created the universe. Let us suppose the hypothesis makes some predictions about the universe. The circle represents all the possible results of our testing. The sector is just that part of the circle where the results match the predictions from your hypothesis.
We could say that if God created the universe, he could do it however he wanted, so the universe could be anything. In that case the sector is the entire circle. Any and every result is consistent with the hypothesis. But Popper, of course, rejects this, as it is not falsifiable. His point with the circle is that a hypothesis that produces a tiny sector is to be preferred over one with a huge sector.
Given all that, would you say that the hypothesis is contingent?
Joe: Not directly but it does stem form the universe being contingent, Continent universe has to be caused by necessary final cause at some point
So very indirectly in fact.
Joe: I've read about that before. The singularity has been disproved or rejected yet it;s still necessary because they don't have an alternative,
Right. We know it is wrong, but it is currently the best approximation we have. Therefore any hypothesis based on the existence of a singularity is wrong.
Joe: that i not proof. None of my God argent depend upon a singularity. Your assertion if singularity God,
no singularity therefore, no God is bunk.
That is fine. You said in the blog post:
In QM theory we face the concept of the VC and the particle emerge from it. We know from observation that this slows way down the closer one gets to the singularity
When I queried that, you said:
that's a reference to the singularity
There is no singularity except in our bad approximations. So again, how do we "know from observation that this slows way down"?
Yuvraj Singh said...
I really like what you write, provide useful knowledge
thanks
Joe: Being testable does not make the universe necessary. If it was necessary we wouldn't need to test it,
PX:If it was necessary and that was provable and known, then we would not have to test it. That is not the case for anything. Whatever the first thing was, and whether it was necessary, is not known or proven, so there are alternatives. t could be God, it could be the multiverse, it could be nothingness but quantum fields, it could be something else.
If course the universe is not necessary that's because it's creation so it's contingent.Therefore,the thing that created it is necessary, That is proven. It's Logical.
PX:Because there are alternatives, it could be something else, so whatever we discover it to be (if that is even possible) will be an empirical fact, whether it is necessary or not, because the "necessary" bit is irrelevant to whether it is an empirical fact.
whatever the universe is it is contingent,that much is proven. Since it is contingent it could not be necessary,You could portend that things be different but that doesn't make it logical or likely.
Joe: right that state of affairs can only result from a contingent universe.In a necessary universe the conclusions would all barbecue by logic.
PX:Why? What difference does the universe being necessary make?
It it was necessary it could not be otherwise we wound know it because there would be no possibility of it being different,
PX:That state of a affairs arises because the origin of the universe is unknown.
wrong it because it is known that's how we know it's contingent,
PX:That means that a hypothesis about the origin of the universe could be wrong. That is the case whether the universe is necessary or not and whether the thing the universe is contingent on is necessary or not.
the details of cosmology might be different but it's still contingent, If it was necessary it is likely there would be only one cosmological possibility.
Joe: right and that's what makes it contingent,
PX:Makes what contingent exactly?
The universe,I just realized you don't really understand what is being discussed doyou?
PX:Suppose the hypothesis is God created the universe. Let us suppose the hypothesis makes some predictions about the universe. The circle represents all the possible results of our testing. The sector is just that part of the circle where the results match the predictions from your hypothesis.
We could say that if God created the universe, he could do it however he wanted, so the universe could be anything. In that case the sector is the entire circle. Any and every result is consistent with the hypothesis. But Popper, of course, rejects this, as it is not falsifiable. His point with the circle is that a hypothesis that produces a tiny sector is to be preferred over one with a huge sector.
I said popper defines the term continent not that he was right about God. His views on god may be wrong,In fact I don't really now what they were,
PX:Given all that, would you say that the hypothesis is contingent?
Joe: Not directly but it does stem form the universe being contingent, Continent universe has to be caused by necessary final cause at some point
PX:So very indirectly in fact.
not sure what you mean by the hypothesis is contingent? ?
Joe: I've read about that before. The singularity has been disproved or rejected yet it;s still necessary because they don't have an alternative,
Right. We know it is wrong, but it is currently the best approximation we have. Therefore any hypothesis based on the existence of a singularity is wrong.
No more wrong than any other mathematical formula given as symbolic of a reality not fully grasped, so most probability statements? of course the singularity is wrong because it is a place holder for God creating
Joe: that i not proof. None of my God argent depend upon a singularity. Your assertion if singularity God,
no singularity therefore, no God is bunk.
PX:That is fine. You said in the blog post:
In QM theory we face the concept of the VC and the particle emerge from it. We know from observation that this slows way down the closer one get to the singularity
When I queried that, you said:
that's a reference to the singularity
There is no singularity except in our bad approximations. So again, how do we "know from observation that this slows way down"?
That has not been overturned yet, it's one report. It made a big splash it';s a media event but that;snot the same as a scientific revolutionize,
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