The Modal Argument
Charles Hartshorne 1897-2000
Modern Champion of the modal argument
What follows is one of the most challenging subjects you will ever hear about. It is the best way to get a head ache, but I think it proves the existence of God. The problem is it requires a very specialized background to understand it. First you have to understand modal logic.
Modal Logic is so called because it turns upon the use of so called "modal operators." It's called "modal" because it is the logic of modes of being. "modes" as in what type of existence something exits in, weather it is dependent upon other things, weather it can cease or fail to exist and so forth. The modal operators are "necessity," "contingency" "impossibly," "possibility."
Necessity and contingency lie at the base of our modern understanding of cause and effect. They come from scholastic notions of logic, but the distinction between the notion our modern notions of c/e and the scholastic ones in the middle ages is not that great. The scholastic had more levels of cause, efficient cause, final cause and several others. But one could everything we have done in modern science using the scholastic ideas of c/e.
Necessity doesn't mean has to exist. It doesn't mean God is necessary to the existence of the world (except in so far as if God exists then of closure God is necessary to the world as creator--without God there would be no world).The modal argument does not begin with the assumption that God has to exist. It begins with the assumption that there is a valid distinction between necessity and contingency, which there must be.It proceeds along the lines of hypothetical consequence that obtain from different scenarios of God's existence. It concludes that is necessary. But by "necessary" it means not contingent, or not dependent upon something else for its' existence.
This is often misconstrued by atheists and taken to mean the argument proceeds from God's existence as an assumed first premise. This is not the case, the first premise is either/or. Either God's existence is necessary or it is impossible. This allows for the possibility that there is no God. So the argument does not begin by "defining God into existence."
Necessity means either non dependent or cannot cease or fail. By "fail" I mean there could not not be a God. That is the conclusion of the argument, not the premise.
Contingent means the opposite: that a thing is dependent upon a prior thing for existence, or that it could cease or fail to exist.
Impossible means logically impossible, something in the structure of the idea contradictions, such as square circles.
one of the sore spots that atheists get stuck on is the idea that God cannot be contingent. They will always leap to the conclusion that this is defining God into existence, because they don't understand the concept of God. God, by the nature of the concept, carriers certain parameters just as the existence of any human assumes humanity, or the existence of any tree assumes that the tree in question is a plant. To have to define that God is not contingent should not even come into it. The idea of God is that of eternal creator of all things. Thus God cannot cease to exits and cannot be dependent upon anything (or he wouldn't be the creator of all things). Atheists usually assume that all knowledge has to be empirical. they will argue this is defining God into existence. maybe God is contingent.
Argument:
Close to Hartshorne's version
1. God is either necessary or impossible.
2. God can be conceived without contradiction.
3. Whatever can be conceived without contradiction is not impossible.
4. God is not impossible.
5. God's existence is a necessity
6. If God is necessary, then God exists.
7. Belief in God's existence is warranted
About Hartshorne
Hartshorne Lived to be 103, at the time of his death in the Fall of 2000, he was known as "the greatest living Metaphysician." Hartshorne was one of the major forces in the "back to God" movement in Philosophy (a term coined by Christianity Today in a 1979 article. His first and greatest calim to fame is as the second most influential voice in process philosophy, along with Alfred North Whtiehead, but he is also credited as the man who brought the Ontological argument back from ignominious defeat by Kant almost two centuries earlier. Hartshorne was also a recognized authority on birdsong, and an authority on bycicles, having never driven a car a single time in his centogenerian lifespan. Hartshorne devoted the last years of life to waging a letter's to the editor campaign to advocate social issues such as medical care.
Supporting Material
Fun with the nodal argument
The Logic of The Modal Argumemt
64 comments:
I think it's an interesting argument, but I don't think our bias riddled monkey brains are in any position to assess steps 2-4
The problem is Hunter I really doubt that you care about finding God,you are really considered with with proving you are smarter than Christians. I say that after arguing with thousands of atheists and I was an atheist myself at one time.
Should you really care about finding God you are going to have more success just being open to the idea and praying than arguing little arguments. I don't claim to prove the existence of God,I assert that proof is impossible either way. My arguments are for warrant, to provide a reasoned argument that offers a sound and valid reason fro belief,
You are probably right.
Golly willikers, Joe. You must be really smart to use all those 50-cent words like "necessary" and "contingent". Too bad I'm just too dumb to get it.
For example I guess I'm just too dumb to understand why you name four modal operators representing two different dualities necessary/contingent and possible/impossible, but then in the presentation of your argument you don't give them all the same treatment. God is not contingent (by your conception), so he must be either necessary or impossible, according to this argument. But what happened to the "possible"? What is the relationship between necessity and possibility? Is possibility equivalent to contingency? If so, then why are there four modal operators? If not, then why doesn't the argument consider it? In other words, is it possible that this argument is guilty of the fallacy of the excluded middle?
For another thing, you speak of "the concept" of God that includes necessary existence as if it's the only possible concept of God. I understand that this is YOUR concept, but if you don't consider other possibilities, aren't you begging the question? Isn't this in fact defining God into existence?
I'm going to apologize for being educated.
I put up this page so that this Hunter guy from facebook could discuss with me, i hate facebook But apparently he;s not comimg.
For example I guess I'm just too dumb to understand why you name four modal operators representing two different dualities necessary/contingent and possible/impossible, but then in the presentation of your argument you don't give them all the same treatment. God is not contingent (by your conception), so he must be either necessary or impossible, according to this argument. But what happened to the "possible"? What is the relationship between necessity and possibility? Is possibility equivalent to contingency? If so, then why are there four modal operators? If not, then why doesn't the argument consider it? In other words, is it possible that this argument is guilty of the fallacy of the excluded middle?
contingent = possible, this is the problem that came up in squabble with the gadfly Cale. there are two notions of possibility, one meaning not impossible the other meaning might or might not be, God fits the former not the latter. Necessity means can;t cease or fail to be. Something that can;t fail to be can;t be a might or might not be.
I guess I'm just too dumb to understand
I did not say anything like that
Hey, Joe. What did you want to talk about?
I thought you asked me How you could know God is real.,I just have already told you the basis of some things I would say,please study the argument n this page the remarks I've made abut warrant; I am also quite serious when I talk about prayer. You can find satisfying personal verification of God's reality through prayer if you are open to the truth and you don;t harbor preconceived prejudices.
I am also ope to listening if you want to talk about your reasons for rejecting belief in God.
contingent = possible
OK. So why are there four modal operators?
Also, it seems to me that you are leaving something out. If something exists as a brute fact, where does it fit into your calculus? Let's assume for the moment that some kind of world exists eternally (from our perspective), and that it gives rise to our world. Let's postulate that this world is not necessary because it could fail to exist. But at the same time it might not be properly called contingent, because its existence is not dependent on anything else. It simply exists, and it was not caused by anything, but it is the cause of everything we know.
This seems to be the central issue with your modal logic. You don't consider all the possibilities, so your conclusion about God as a necessary being is based on a logical fallacy.
Also, it seems to me that you are leaving something out. If something exists as a brute fact, where does it fit into your calculus? Let's assume for the moment that some kind of world exists eternally (from our perspective), and that it gives rise to our world. Let's postulate that this world is not necessary because it could fail to exist. But at the same time it might not be properly called contingent, because its existence is not dependent on anything else. It simply exists, and it was not caused by anything, but it is the cause of everything we know.
"because its existence is not dependent on anything else." That is not the definition of a brute fact. There is is nothing like that. The only thing you might claim is like that is vacuum flux or subatomic particles but we don't know, we can't say they are not dependent upon something else,
although some use it to mean we don;t have a scientific explication that still doesn't mean no cause. It just means we don;t know the cause,
Contingency Means either dependent (as in caused) or something could cease or fail to exist. the latter is the more accepted under Kripkie but both really go together since most think that fit the latter condition also fit under the former.
So you simply reject any possibility other than your theistic presumption. That's what I figured.
Something that exists outside of time is eternal from our perspective. Something that is eternal has no beginning in time. Something that has no beginning has no cause. But this doesn't imply that it must be necessary - it could still fail to exist. If something exists without necessity and without cause, then it has no explanation. That's what we call a brute fact.
The question is: Why don't you see this as a logical possibility?
So you simply reject any possibility other than your theistic presumption. That's what I figured.
typical atheist ploy; unfair BS. you asked me about how I FIT bf INTO MY BELIEF SYSTEM NOT WHAT i KEEP OPEN AS AN OUTSIDE POSSIBILITY,
Something that exists outside of time is eternal from our perspective. Something that is eternal has no beginning in time. Something that has no beginning has no cause.
We don't know of anything in nature that fits that description, The only things I can think of are God and other dimensions but we don;tif there are any.
But this doesn't imply that it must be necessary - it could still fail to exist. If something exists without necessity and without cause, then it has no explanation. That's what we call a brute fact.
NONONONONO you do not understand the basics, there is no such thing as something that is without necessity and without cause. anything uncased is by definition necessary, and eternal.We don't know if there is many such thing, don't know what it would be.
The question is: Why don't you see this as a logical possibility?
because we it contradicts the concept of modal operators, there can only be necessity and continent, of each only two kinds, you sub divide but those are the major categories. when you propose something not in either category you are speaking nonsense.
two types of necessity: necessary or possible, two types of contingency, existent or fictional. There are subdivisions but there is nothing that neither necessary or contingent.
Well, Joe. You've conveniently defined things such that God must necessarily exist and any natural reality without God is not possible. But you don't think you're begging the question, and anybody who disagrees is accused of not understanding. This is how theistic logic works. Total bullshit.
that is a gimmick you pitied up from atheist websites,it's what they always say. you dom't even understand why. the truth is it shows that the concept of God is that of a fundamental reality that has to exist. that's like saying I think therefore I am is just ranginess ideas in such a way as to assure one's own existence.
the truth is it shows that the concept of God is that of a fundamental reality that has to exist
It has to exist in your mind because you are psychologically invested in it. You wouldn't know what to do if you you didn't have your God-crutch to lean on. The real truth is that your argument excludes possibilities that are perfectly valid from a logical perspective, and make a lot more sense to boot. You are just begging the question.
t has to exist in your mind because you are psychologically invested in it. You wouldn't know what to do if you you didn't have your God-crutch to lean on.
(1) that does not disprove the argument,which has nothing to do with the psychological need to believe, I have a psychological need for a loving father,but I had a loving father for real. I had a psychological need to eat and food really exists.
(2) Since I was an atheist, and a more intellectual one than you are,I know all about your idiotic little assumption of competence and Independence which you don't have. You need the approval of the group.
The real truth is that your argument excludes possibilities that are perfectly valid from a logical perspective, and make a lot more sense to boot. You are just begging the question.
no it does not, you think they are possibilities because you are rebellion against God and see it all a battle of the ills, you can't accept evidence for God how er good it is.
Your so called possibilities are dead ends, all highly unlikely orillogical.
In order to advance those so called possibilities you have to ignore logic like trying to muscle in a category that is neither necessary or continent or possible.
In order to advance those so called possibilities you have to ignore logic like trying to muscle in a category that is neither necessary or continent or possible.
So can you provide a cogent explanation why the possibility I have suggested isn't valid? Why can't something other than God exist as a brute fact?
Let us say we have three possible worlds; W1, W2, W3.
In modal logic, there is something called an "Accessibility relation". If we were talking about physically possible worlds from the actual world, then we would say a physically possible world with different gravitational laws would be inaccessible from the actual world.
In considering the accessibility relation, a proposition at a world is said to be necessary IF it is true at all worlds accessible from that world. So if some P is necessary at W1, and both W2 and W3 are accessible from W1, then P is true in both W2 and W3.
Using W1, W2 and W3, we can define the relevant modal terms like this:
Assumption: W1 is accessible from W1, W2 is accessible from W1, W3 is accessible from W1.
Necessity def - [If P is necessary at W1, then P is true in W1, W2 and W3]
Contingency def - [If P is contingent at W1, then P is true in at least one of W1, W2 or W3, but it is not the case that P is true in all of W1, W2 and W3]
Possibility def - [If P is possible at W1, then P is true in at least one of W1, W2 or W3]
Following the above, if some P is necessarily false at W1, then P is false in W1, W2 and W3.
Following the above, every necessary proposition would be a possible proposition, but it is not the case that every possible proposition is a necessary proposition. A proposition can be necessary AND possible, or a proposition can be contingent AND possible. If a proposition is possible, then it can be either necessary or contingent.
People actually schooled in modal logics probably wouldn't recognize what is going on in this post. The definition of "Necessity" is NOT "Not contingent". In modal logics, if a proposition is said to be "Not contingent" then it is either necessary OR impossible.
1. God is either necessary or impossible.
2. God can be conceived without contradiction.
3. Whatever can be conceived without contradiction is not impossible.
4. God is not impossible.
5. God's existence is a necessity
6. If God is necessary, then God exists.
7. Belief in God's existence is warranted
Premises 2 and 3 have issues. First, we need to know what "Without contradiction" means. A proposition can be contradictory in two ways:
Way 1 - [The proposition is self refuting]
Way 2 - [The proposition + some true proposition forms an inconsistent set]
I assume premise 3 intends to say that "If a proposition can be conceived without being contradictory in either way 1 or way 2, then the proposition is not impossible". But this brings us to the second issue:
How do we know that a proposition we conceive of actually is without a contradiction? If we know a proposition is without contradiction in way 1, then we know the proposition is not self refuting. OK. But what about way 2? To know some P is not contradictory in way 2, we would need to know that there exists no true proposition which is not mutually exclusive to P. This is much stronger than saying "There is no true proposition I know of that is mutually exclusive to P" since it actually requires that there simply is no such proposition whether we know of it or not. This issue brings premise 2 into question begging territory. If there is a sort of identity relation between "P is conceivable" and "P is not impossible" then premise 2 appears to beg the question. If it is not a biconditional matter, then begging the question might not be an issue, but we end up in the same scenario as possibly all other modern modal ontological arguments:
How can we demonstrate that it is not the case that there exists a true proposition which is mutually exclusive to theism? Deducing that there exists no proposition which is mutually exclusive to theism would actually appear to require an sub proof of theism itself! For suppose that atheism is true. If it is, then the proposition "Theism is false" is true, so if there exists no true proposition which is mutually exclusive to theism, then atheism is false. Consequently, if we know there exists no true proposition which is mutually exclusive to theism, then we know atheism is false. But knowing atheism is false requires knowing theism is true, so to know premises 2 and 3 are true we appear to actually require knowledge that theism is true! Consequently, it seems to me, that if my interpretation of premise 3 is correct then we could not know premises 2 and 3 are jointly true unless we already know theism is true, but then the argument would be pointless.
skep said
So can you provide a cogent explanation why the possibility I have suggested isn't valid? Why can't something other than God exist as a brute fact?
In my view brute fact is nit synonymous with being necessary,there are tons of BF's they are all contingent,
Let us say we have three possible worlds; W1, W2, W3.
In modal logic, there is something called an "Accessibility relation". If we were talking about physically possible worlds from the actual world, then we would say a physically possible world with different gravitational laws would be inaccessible from the actual world.
In considering the accessibility relation, a proposition at a world is said to be necessary IF it is true at all worlds accessible from that world. So if some P is necessary at W1, and both W2 and W3 are accessible from W1, then P is true in both W2 and W3.
Using W1, W2 and W3, we can define the relevant modal terms like this:
Assumption: W1 is accessible from W1, W2 is accessible from W1, W3 is accessible from W1.
Necessity def - [If P is necessary at W1, then P is true in W1, W2 and W3]
Contingency def - [If P is contingent at W1, then P is true in at least one of W1, W2 or W3, but it is not the case that P is true in all of W1, W2 and W3]
Possibility def - [If P is possible at W1, then P is true in at least one of W1, W2 or W3]
Following the above, if some P is necessarily false at W1, then P is false in W1, W2 and W3.
Following the above, every necessary proposition would be a possible proposition, but it is not the case that every possible proposition is a necessary proposition.
agree
A proposition can be necessary AND possible, or a proposition can be contingent AND possible. If a proposition is possible, then it can be either necessary or contingent.
the God argument I made attributed to Hatshorne does not un on idea that all possibilities are necessary far fro it,this particular one is because it can't be continent.
I have a palemcest over this argument, too many versions, I think a better one Baird used t illustrate Hartshorne's is this:
(1) If God exists, he must exist necessarily, if God does not exist his existence is impossible.
(2) Therefore, God is either necessary or impossible.
(3) God can be conceived without contradiction
(4) therefore, God is not impossible
(5) Since God is not impossible he must be necessary.
(6) Since god is necessary he must exist.
I assume premise 3 intends to say that "If a proposition can be conceived without being contradictory in either way 1 or way 2, then the proposition is not impossible". But this brings us to the second issue:
How do we know that a proposition we conceive of actually is without a contradiction? If we know a proposition is without contradiction in way 1, then we know the proposition is not self refuting. OK. But what about way 2?
Since I have not claimed to prove the existence of God but am merely arguing belief is warranted I think it;s the other guy's burden there is a contradiction. I am saying I don;t see one and I can;t think of one, but would absurd to suggest that I must find all possible contradictions and disprove them before you have a burden to prove any argument.
To know some P is not contradictory in way 2, we would need to know that there exists no true proposition which is not mutually exclusive to P. This is much stronger than saying "There is no true proposition I know of that is mutually exclusive to P" since it actually requires that there simply is no such proposition whether we know of it or not. This issue brings premise 2 into question begging territory. If there is a sort of identity relation between "P is conceivable" and "P is not impossible" then premise 2 appears to beg the question. If it is not a biconditional matter, then begging the question might not be an issue, but we end up in the same scenario as possibly all other modern modal ontological arguments:
How can we demonstrate that it is not the case that there exists a true proposition which is mutually exclusive to theism? Deducing that there exists no proposition which is mutually exclusive to theism would actually appear to require an sub proof of theism itself! For suppose that atheism is true. If it is, then the proposition "Theism is false" is true, so if there exists no true proposition which is mutually exclusive to theism, then atheism is false. Consequently, if we know there exists no true proposition which is mutually exclusive to theism, then we know atheism is false. But knowing atheism is false requires knowing theism is true, so to know premises 2 and 3 are true we appear to actually require knowledge that theism is true! Consequently, it seems to me, that if my interpretation of premise 3 is correct then we could not know premises 2 and 3 are jointly true unless we already know theism is true, but then the argument would be pointless.
I think is a valid consideration and does require further thought,I may ask Plantinga if he;sup to discussing it. I will ask Tom Crisp, his student,
in the version i think is better:
(3) God can be conceived without contradiction
(4) therefore, God is not impossible
may be the same thing but comes closer to expressing my point that I don't a contradiction,
yan M said...
People actually schooled in modal logics probably wouldn't recognize what is going on in this post. The definition of "Necessity" is NOT "Not contingent". In modal logics, if a proposition is said to be "Not contingent" then it is either necessary OR impossible.
I am sure it violates the contemporary climate- of opinion. I think it is the height of arrogance and ignorance to imagine that Hartshorne was not schooled in modal logic. this is his argument,It's also very close being Godel's,I took stricture from from Forest Baird who a professor,of Philosophy U Colorado I think.also another pro phil named
Ed Stoebenau makes the same argument such the same way. years ago I discussed this argument with Peter Suber who was a highly reputed philosopher and taught modal logic,He did recognize what was going on although he doesn't agree with the argument, he thought it was valid but not sound.
"Since I have not claimed to prove the existence of God but am merely arguing belief is warranted I think it;s the other guy's burden there is a contradiction. I am saying I don;t see one and I can;t think of one, but would absurd to suggest that I must find all possible contradictions and disprove them before you have a burden to prove any argument."
The problem with the weaker thesis that belief in God is warranted rather than "God exists" is that the argument attempts to deduce that God exists in order to show that belief in God is warranted. But if we cannot arrive at "God is necessary", then we cannot arrive at "Belief in God is warranted". As an argument for warrant, it's too strong. I would re-word it to something like this:
1. Either it's the case that God is necessary or God is impossible.
2. If God is necessary, then God exists.
3. Any proposition that is weakly conceivable is warranted and its negation is not.
4. "God is necessary" is weakly conceivable.
5. Therefore, "God is necessary" is warranted and "God is impossible" is not.
6. Any proposition that is a logical implication of a weakly conceivable proposition is warranted.
7. Therefore, "God exists" is warranted.
I wouldn't buy into this argument, but at least it does not attempt to derive a weak thesis, warrant, by using a strong thesis of proving the proposition it attempts to show warrant for.
The problem with the weaker thesis that belief in God is warranted rather than "God exists" is that the argument attempts to deduce that God exists in order to show that belief in God is warranted. But if we cannot arrive at "God is necessary", then we cannot arrive at "Belief in God is warranted". As an argument for warrant, it's too strong. I would re-word it to something like this:
I disagree that it is doing that because having a good reason to believe something is not proving it. Now it may be that I should tweak or disclaim the wording of the argument,I took Hartshorne's argument and used it and he did not do the warrant thing.
"I am sure it violates the contemporary climate- of opinion"
It's not really that. Rather, modal logics define necessity, contingency, possibility, all in ways you aren't using.
Joe says:
there is no such thing as something that is without necessity and without cause. anything uncased is by definition necessary, and eternal.
- Anything that exists eternally has no cause. So by Joe's definition anything that exists eternally is "necessary". But we presume that something caused the beginning of our universe (and with it, the beginning of time). Therefore, that thing (whatever it may be) must be necessary.
But Joe also said:
Whatever can be conceived without contradiction is not impossible
- While he intended this statement to apply to God, I can conceive of a multiverse that spawns our universe, and I can't think of any contradiction entailed by it.
The multiverse is eternal from our perspective, since it spawns the space-time of our universe. So by Joe's logic, it must be necessary. Therefore, Joe has shown that the multiverse exists necessarily.
But wait - I can also conceive without contradiction other possibilities for the beginning of the universe. And by Joe's "logic", each of those possibilities exists necessarily. So much for Joe's "logic".
I forgot I did stick that on about warrant to the version I used this time,the one I put up as my Favorited't have that,I may have to tweak that one.
"The multiverse is eternal from our perspective, since it spawns the space-time of our universe. So by Joe's logic, it must be necessary. Therefore, Joe has shown that the multiverse exists necessarily."
Here would be your parallel argument:
1. A multiverse is either necessary or impossible.
2. A multiverse can be conceived without contradiction.
3. Whatever can be conceived without contradiction is not impossible.
4. Therefore, a multiverse is not impossible.
5. Therefore, a multiverse is necessary.
6. If a multiverse is necessary, then a multiverse exists.
I think Joe would take issue with 1. As you probably know, Joe thinks that only God can be necessary and all models of physical reality must be contingent. Consequently, Joe would deny premise 1. But supposing Joe didn't deny premise 1, that wouldn't defeat his argument. Joe is looking to show that belief in God is warranted, and he is trying to use this ontological argument to bring warrant to theism. Joe could very well say that both theism and atheism are warranted, so a successful parody multiverse argument wouldn't actually cause a problem for his argument so long as his premises are true and the argument is valid. Plantinga thinks similarly in saying that both Christian theists and Muslims theists could both have properly basic beliefs in their specific versions of theism.
Joe can't deny premise 1 without contradicting himself. It follows from his own statement:
"there is no such thing as something that is without necessity and without cause. anything uncased is by definition necessary, and eternal."
and the fact that it is uncaused.
"The multiverse is eternal from our perspective, since it spawns the space-time of our universe. So by Joe's logic, it must be necessary. Therefore, Joe has shown that the multiverse exists necessarily."
(1) You have no Proof there is a Mv that is just fashion to think so no empirical proof,contradicts the defacto canons of atheist rhetoric.
(2) If there is a MV n proof it's eternal that just assumes no God.
(3) Just being beyond space/time doesn't necessarily make it eternal,
(4) we assume God is eternal for several reasons none of them because he;s beyond space/tie sice he was stated to be eternal before we kinew about space/time
Here would be your parallel argument:
1. A multiverse is either necessary or impossible.
2. A multiverse can be conceived without contradiction.
3. Whatever can be conceived without contradiction is not impossible.
4. Therefore, a multiverse is not impossible.
5. Therefore, a multiverse is necessary.
6. If a multiverse is necessary, then a multiverse exists.
that doesn't work, MV is no necessarily N/I. It/s not necessary if Gd created it, Secondly it's not impossible it might or might not be.
I think Joe would take issue with 1. As you probably know, Joe thinks that only God can be necessary and all models of physical reality must be contingent.
I don't know that other things can't be necessary other than God but I think that nature and it's products cannot be.
Consequently, Joe would deny premise 1. But supposing Joe didn't deny premise 1, that wouldn't defeat his argument. Joe is looking to show that belief in God is warranted, and he is trying to use this ontological argument to bring warrant to theism. Joe could very well say that both theism and atheism are warranted, so a successful parody multiverse argument wouldn't actually cause a problem for his argument so long as his premises are true and the argument is valid. Plantinga thinks similarly in saying that both Christian theists and Muslims theists could both have properly basic beliefs in their specific versions of theism.
that's all true buit I do think there are fetishistic and Christian tie breakers,see Metacrock's blog today's edition.
I really thought I had arrived at all that on my own but I had a seven year long correspondence with Plantinga so maybe I just absorbed it from his thought a bit at a time.
"Joe can't deny premise 1 without contradicting himself"
Joe can deny premise 1 by denying that a multiverse could ever be necessary. I already explained this, but Joe thinks that nothing natural can exist necessarily, so Joe would deny the disjunct in premise 1. Joe would probably say "If a multiverse exists, then it has a cause outside itself", and consequently would deny that a multiverse could be uncaused and eternal.
(1) You have no Proof there is a Mv that is just fashion to think so no empirical proof,contradicts the defacto canons of atheist rhetoric.
- You have no proof there's God.
(2) If there is a MV n proof it's eternal that just assumes no God.
- Your proof assumes there's no mv. What's the difference?
(3) Just being beyond space/time doesn't necessarily make it eternal
- I think it does. To me, it means having no beginning in time. What's your definition of eternal.
(4) we assume God is eternal for several reasons none of them because he;s beyond space/tie sice he was stated to be eternal before we kinew about space/time
- You assume God is eternal because that's what your religion dictates. But this argument is supposed to be about logic, not just regurgitating whatever your religion dictates.
Joe can deny premise 1 by denying that a multiverse could ever be necessary.
- then Joe contradicts his own statement: "anything uncased is by definition necessary, and eternal."
By Joe's argument, we start out with three possibilities: impossible, contingent, or necessary. We eliminate contingent, because it has no beginning in time, and therefore it is uncaused. We eliminate impossible, because it can be imagined without contradiction. That leaves necessary. This is Joe's reasoning, not mine. If he wants to deny the possibility of a MV, he needs to explain why we can conceive of it without a contradiction. If he thinks there is a contradiction, he needs to explain what that is. The truth is that he presumes God and he rejects all other possibilities without valid reason.
"then Joe contradicts his own statement"
No. Joe would deny that a multiverse, or anything natural, could be uncaused. As Joe has said in this comment thread:
"I think that nature and it's products cannot be"
You have seen Joe's cosmological arguments before so you ought to know that he defends the following premise:
Premise - [If x is natural, then x is contingent]
I deny that premise, but that is only important for my beliefs being consistent. Since Joe thinks everything natural must be contingent, he would not be contradicting himself by saying "anything uncaused is by definition necessary, and eternal" since Joe would think a multiverse and every other natural thing would be caused to exist.
What you actually need to do is request a proof for why everything natural must be contingent.
I only put in part of Joe's quote:
"I don't know that other things can't be necessary other than God but I think that nature and it's products cannot be."
"The truth is that he presumes God and he rejects all other possibilities without valid reason"
I think this is correct insofar as I believe Joe essentially assumes that all natural things must have a cause. But this is why you challenge the truth of premises.
"The truth is that he presumes God and he rejects all other possibilities without valid reason"
I think this is correct insofar as I believe Joe essentially assumes that all natural things must have a cause. But this is why you challenge the truth of premises.
I have a perfectly valid and sound reason for asserting that all naturalistic thins are caused we have no example of anything natural that is not caused. There is just one thing that might qualify in that regard and that is quantum particles; even those apparently have naturalistic causes. Qm Particles emerge from, Vacuum flux, they seem dependent upon time and physical law. Without resorting to ICR the only logical answer as to the cause of Vacuum flux is something out side the natural process,
God is the most logical in that regard.
Joe Hinman said: "I'm going to apologize for being educated."
I take it your education didn't include any lessons in spelling or grammar?
A couple of picky points ....
"God is either necessary or impossible.”
If you’re going to use an either/or construction, this should read as "God is either necessary or contingent.” After all, you do say yourself that “contingent” is the opposite of “necessary."
"God can be conceived without contradiction.”
You really do need to read some philosophy of religion. The concept of “God” is riddled with contradictions. I recommend Nicholas Everitt’s “The Non Existence of God” for a good overview of these contradictions.
"I have a perfectly valid and sound reason for asserting that all naturalistic thins are caused we have no example of anything natural that is not caused."
That's certainly not a sound reason since we cannot soundly deduce "All natural things have a cause" from "We know of no natural thing without a cause". At best you can say you have a strong inductive argument for the proposition that there exists no uncaused natural things, but an inductive argument is the best you have if your evidence is what we have experienced. In addition, it would be unwise to conclude that we have certainty for exactly what natural things there are. There is so much physicists do not know that we cannot really be confident that we have exhausted all the physical possibilities.
"If you’re going to use an either/or construction, this should read as "God is either necessary or contingent.” After all, you do say yourself that “contingent” is the opposite of “necessary.""
In this instance, Joe's disjunction makes sense. Since Joe says God cannot be contingent, then it must be the case that either God is necessary or there is no God at all. In other words, it would be true to say that if it cannot be that God exists contingently, then it is the case that either God is necessary or God is impossible.
thanks you Ryan. you just saved this guy from a pissing contest.
Klapaucius said...
Joe Hinman said: "I'm going to apologize for being educated."
I take it your education didn't include any lessons in spelling or grammar?
dys·lex·i·a
dəsˈleksēə/Submit
noun
a general term for disorders that involve difficulty in learning to read or interpret words, letters, and other symbols, but that do not affect general intelligence.
read more
"God is either necessary or impossible.”
If you’re going to use an either/or construction, this should read as "God is either necessary or contingent.” After all, you do say yourself that “contingent” is the opposite of “necessary."
Ryan M put you wise on thatone
"God can be conceived without contradiction.”
You really do need to read some philosophy of religion.
I am ABD on Ph.D. in history of ideas and I have a Masters degree in theology.I have been studying God arguments for 40 years
The concept of “God” is riddled with contradictions.
Mine isn't
I recommend Nicholas Everitt’s “The Non Existence of God” for a good overview of these contradictions.
I recommend that you stop emerging yourself in propaganda that just confirms what you already believe and start reading things with which you disagree and with and start thinking about it in an open minded way.
Ryan M said...
"I have a perfectly valid and sound reason for asserting that all naturalistic thins are caused we have no example of anything natural that is not caused."
That's certainly not a sound reason since we cannot soundly deduce "All natural things have a cause" from "We know of no natural thing without a cause".
Maybe not sound in a formal sense but true that there are no counter examples and it is also in line with all theoretical constructs pertaining to physical law or description of universe behavior.
At best you can say you have a strong inductive argument for the proposition that there exists no uncaused natural things, but an inductive argument is the best you have if your evidence is what we have experienced.
That may be all that is needed to established warrant for belief.
In addition, it would be unwise to conclude that we have certainty for exactly what natural things there are. There is so much physicists do not know that we cannot really be confident that we have exhausted all the physical possibilities.
that's a good point.
Klapaucius, I met to say stop immersing yourself. yes I have problems seeing and tying, accept it or get hell off my blog.
I have a perfectly valid and sound reason for asserting that all naturalistic thins are caused we have no example of anything natural that is not caused.
If you want to use induction, that's fine. Why do you limit your statement to "natural things". Why not just say "we have no example of anything that is not caused"? You seem to be carving out an exception or things that are not natural, because you need to assert that there is something that is not caused, and you presume that that thing is God. But induction would tell us "we have no example of anything that is not natural".
Me: I have a perfectly valid and sound reason for asserting that all naturalistic thins are caused we have no example of anything natural that is not caused.
you:: If you want to use induction, that's fine. Why do you limit your statement to "natural things". Why not just say "we have no example of anything that is not caused"?
we have an example of one thing that is not caused, God.I also speak of nature to emphasize cause and effect.
You seem to be carving out an exception or things that are not natural, because you need to assert that there is something that is not caused, and you presume that that thing is God. But induction would tell us "we have no example of anything that is not natural".
No I experience God's Presence lots and that is empirical.
"we have an example of one thing that is not caused, God.I also speak of nature to emphasize cause and effect."
This isn't really true though, is it? If we have such an example, then we have some sort of a proof that God exists. But do we have any such proof? I don't think so. You might want to say it is warranted to think that God exists, so it is warranted to think there is an example of one thing that is not caused. But that won't help me or other non-theists.
@Ryan M
You’re correct, of course. I made the mistake of relying on Croc’s garbled presentation of modal logic rather than looking it up on my own. I’m more familiar with more modern multi-valued logic systems such as fuzzy logic or rough mereology, which involve more precise formulations than the rather subjective qualifiers used in modal logic. So the argument’s opening premise is basically saying that the probability of God existing is either 1 or 0.
However, the whole “argument" still falls over at the second premise, and the rest of the “argument” depends on that.
@Croc
I have some sympathy for your assertion that your writing might be caused by dyslexia, my son had a mild form of it, and, back in the day when I was an elementary teacher, I was dealing with dyslexic children on a regular basis. However, I have little sympathy for your apparent inability to compensate for it using modern technologies - even Microsoft Word has a basic grammar and spelling correction function.
Croc says: "I recommend that you stop emerging yourself in propaganda that just confirms what you already believe and start reading things with which you disagree and with and start thinking about it in an open minded way.”
Good advice, you should follow it yourself. I recommend Nicholas Everitt’s “The Non Existence of God” as a good place to start.
I don't owe you an explanation. You the kind of lame idiot that bullies children over from and has no concept of substance; stay off the blog you are not ready to deal with these issues.
Anonymous said...
@Ryan M
You’re correct, of course. I made the mistake of relying on Croc’s garbled presentation of modal logic rather than looking it up on my own. I’m more familiar with more modern multi-valued logic systems such as fuzzy logic or rough mereology, which involve more precise formulations than the rather subjective qualifiers used in modal logic. So the argument’s opening premise is basically saying that the probability of God existing is either 1 or 0.
However, the whole “argument" still falls over at the second premise, and the rest of the “argument” depends on that.
you don't know shit
Here’s an example of Metacrock’s “intellectual reflection on faith and life”:
"you don't know shit"
Here’s an example of actual philosophical argument:
"What possible actions can the atheist provide which God will be unable to perform? Prima facie, there is a range of things which are possible, because humans actually do them, but which are ruled out for God by God’s other properties. One set of examples concerns actions which humans can do because they are not morally perfect. Humans can behave in a mean, cowardly, cruel, selfish, hypocritical way, etc. But since God is by definition morally perfect, it seems to follow that he cannot act in any of these ways.
A second set of examples concerns actions which humans can do but God cannot, and comes from the fact that humans have bodies and God does not. For instance, it is logically possible for humans to walk, since they have legs. It is not logically possible for legless beings to walk. Since one of God’s defining properties is that he is immaterial, i.e. has no body, it follows that he has no legs, and this in turn implies that he is unable to walk. Clearly, there will be many things which humans can do which logically presuppose that they have a body, and hence which will be logically impossible for a being without a body to do, such as winking, standing up, sitting down, running around, coughing, spluttering, kissing, hugging, scratching one’s nose, and so on.
A third example of a limit on God’s omnipotence is raised by a very traditional though frivolous-sounding question, namely ‘Can God create a stone which is too heavy for him to lift up?’ (let us label this a superheavy stone). The thought here is that the answer must be either ‘yes’ or ‘no’. But either way reveals a limitation on God’s power. If the answer is ‘yes’, then there can be a stone too heavy for God to lift, so he is not omnipotent; if the answer is ‘no’ then there is a superheavy stone which God cannot create, so he is not omnipotent. Since omnipotence is a defining characteristic of God, and we have just shown that the concept is self-contradictory, it follows that no being can be omnipotent, and hence that God does not exist.
A fourth class of actions which promises to create difficulties for the theist concerns humans’ ability to end their own existence: they can commit suicide. But can God commit suicide? It would be natural (even if ultimately indefensible) to say that an omnipotent being must be able to do everything which we (as non-omnipotent beings) can do, and more; so that if we can commit suicide then so too can an omnipotent being. Certainly, if we accept Definition 2, it will follow that an omnipotent being can commit suicide. But many theists would find this conclusion unacceptable. They have wanted to say that if God exists at any time, he exists at all times.
On the face of it, then, there seems to be a range of things which it is logically possible to do (since we do them), and hence which an omnipotent being ought to be able to do; and yet which God cannot do. So, if to be God a being would have to be omnipotent, it would follow that God cannot exist."
(Everitt, “The Non Existence of God”, pp. 258-259).
Of course, quite apart from the problems with the second premise I briefly outlined above*, there is a more basic structural problem with _all_ of the ontological arguments. All of the various forms of the argument put God in as one of the premises and then go on to “prove” his existence. The most blatant example of this is in Anselm’s original formulation of the argument, where he defined God as "that than which nothing greater can be thought,” which is just another way of saying “God.” It is hardly surprising that “God” pops out at the end of the argument. Hartshorne's version is more subtle, with “God” being assigned a characteristic (in this case "without contradiction” in Premise 2), even before God’s existence has been "proved.” This characteristic is essential for the eventual proof. Unfortunately, it nothing more than a magician’s trick, conjuring “God” up out of their sleeve.
* It is worth noting that I have only quoted a fraction of Everitt’s introductory section on the problems with omnipotence. He then goes on to consider, and eventually demolish, theistic responses to these problems. In other chapters, he does the same demolition job on the concepts of omnipresence, omniscience and omnibenevolence, discussing in some detail the logical problems inherent in these concepts.
Klapaucius said...
Here’s an example of Metacrock’s “intellectual reflection on faith and life”:
"you don't know shit"
no that is an example of my disrespect for phonies like you, Your ignorance of this topic does not require much reflection to refute,
Here’s an example of actual philosophical argument:
"What possible actions can the atheist provide which God will be unable to perform? Prima facie, there is a range of things which are possible, because humans actually do them, but which are ruled out for God by God’s other properties. One set of examples concerns actions which humans can do because they are not morally perfect. Humans can behave in a mean, cowardly, cruel, selfish, hypocritical way, etc. But since God is by definition morally perfect, it seems to follow that he cannot act in any of these ways.
o yea tremendously intellectual. that does no make Gd contingent,
A second set of examples concerns actions which humans can do but God cannot, and comes from the fact that humans have bodies and God does not. For instance, it is logically possible for humans to walk, since they have legs. It is not logically possible for legless beings to walk. Since one of God’s defining properties is that he is immaterial, i.e. has no body, it follows that he has no legs, and this in turn implies that he is unable to walk. Clearly, there will be many things which humans can do which logically presuppose that they have a body, and hence which will be logically impossible for a being without a body to do, such as winking, standing up, sitting down, running around, coughing, spluttering, kissing, hugging, scratching one’s nose, and so on.
Good can take the from of a body but that doesn't make contingent, being limited in doing some things does not make God continent,
A third example of a limit on God’s omnipotence is raised by a very traditional though frivolous-sounding question, namely ‘Can God create a stone which is too heavy for him to lift up?’ (let us label this a superheavy stone).
what an idiot,m using that stupid rock thing,I answered taht in third grade.
I am speaking to the reader because the idiot Klaptrapicus will not listen,this argumet is just an elaborate version of God can't make a rock so heavy that he can't lift it, We know the answer to that. They have misconstrued the meaning of the term "omnipotant." It does not mean the ability to do anything,It does not mean all powerful in terms of doing any fool thing one can name.It's only one thing the Biblke Greek term "pantocrator" it means all authority,It refers to jurisdiction not ability.
If that's an example of Everitt's big argument he;s a real light weight.
Klaptrapicus
Of course, quite apart from the problems with the second premise I briefly outlined above*, there is a more basic structural problem with _all_ of the ontological arguments. All of the various forms of the argument put God in as one of the premises and then go on to “prove” his existence.
I am not arguing all OA's. My arguments starts by by admitting Godnight no exist but if he doesn;t it;s becasueit;simpossible fror him to esit,
1. that contradicts his BS that all" OA/s assert God exists in the first premise.; Mine does not. I can show nither does Godel,Plantinga Hartshonre, in fact my argument is Hartshorine's.
2. noting circular about my first premise,
The most blatant example of this is in Anselm’s original formulation of the argument, where he defined God as "that than which nothing greater can be thought,” which is just another way of saying “God.” It is hardly surprising that “God” pops out at the end of the argument.
Hartshorne's version is more subtle, with “God” being assigned a characteristic (in this case "without contradiction” in Premise 2), even before God’s existence has been "proved.” This characteristic is essential for the eventual proof. Unfortunately, it nothing more than a magician’s trick, conjuring “God” up out of their sleeve.
idiot, he talking about the concept, a concept could be contradiction free and not represent a real thing, so that is not an assertion f God;s existence.
* It is worth noting that I have only quoted a fraction of Everitt’s introductory section on the problems with omnipotence. He then goes on to consider,
if that's sample of his work he's not worth reading.That stuff is the same crap I've seen message boards for years when I see those arguments I dimiss the poster as an ignorant beginning who know know anything about the OA.
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