Our skeptical friend, "I am Skeptic," put up a thing n the hard problem. I think in response to comments I made on his blog last week r so. I'll be responding to the whole piece today.
IMS
Philosophers who favor a supernatural or dualistic view of mind have contrived an argument that they think poses a major obstacle to physicalism. It is the so-called hard problem of consciousness, that claims there is an unbridgable gap between physical substance and mental substance. It is basically the claim that the stuff of conscious experience - the qualia, or qualitative component of consciousness - the texture of our perceptions - cannot be explained in terms of physical substances and phenomena. [1]
Joe:
The Hard Problem (THP/HP) has nothing to do with SN. Both David Chalmers and John "Searl are atheists and both major critics of Dennett and the reductionist view. Secondly there is no such thing as 'supernatural view of mind."First the HP doesn't claim anything. It has a point vto it it's not a claim. Secondly, that,s not it. It doesn't say there's a unbridgeable gap between physical and mental substance although I guess probably someone advancing the HP does say that, The real point is that consciousness is of a different quality from brain function. All the study of brain function will never tell us about consciousness, To drive home that point the hard problem illustrates aspects of consciousness that can't apart from exponential means.
IMS:
But this is an unscientific argument. It amounts to an argument from ignorance. It is saying that because we don't yet know how to fully explain consciousness in terms of physical matter and its properties, then there must be something immaterial about it. This fallacy gives courage to those (especially theists) who choose to ignore the track record of naturalistic science, and instead posit the existence of things like the immaterial soul as the answer to the problem.
Joe:
(1) The "scientific" content of a statement is concerned with the correctness of it's methodological procedures not by the adherence to some ideological doctrine such as atheism or scientism. Even though it is true that the HP is more an illustration of a philosophical issue it's hardly opposed to science. Moreover it is scientific in the sense that it points up the methodological and philosophical flaws in a large portion of scientific work.
(2) It is a not argument from ignorance yours. Rather argument against ignorance. AFI is not about your opponent's ignorance, Pointing out the limitation of scientism a d reductionism for understanding min d is not AFI.
(3) The HP is not the entire case by itself but it clearly illustrates a barrier to reduction of mind to brain not just a gap in knowledge. In my article "Mind is not reducible to brain" I spell out six scientific reasons why it can't be done. Not just we don't know how to yet but reasons why it can't be possible.See also the great book by Edward Kelley Irreducible Mind [2]
IMS:
I say this argument is contrived because it hinges largely on a matter of perspective. Our experience of the world by means of sensations is first-person, or subjective. It is necessarily true that we have our own experience of sensations, but we don't share those experiences with another person. The subjective perceptions of qualia occur within our own mind, not someone else's, because they are uniquely our own experiences. Even if we wired another person's sense organs to our brain, we would still have our own subjective experience of his sensations. There's no way we could say that one person's subjective experience of qualia is the same as the other person's. If I see redness, is it the same as the redness another person sees, or could it be that he sees something that I would call blue? We can't describe redness in an objective manner. The best we can do is to compare it to other things that are similar. But we can't give a fundamental description of redness that would be comprehensible to another person, such that he understands it independent of any reference to something in his own experience.
Joe:
that merely proves the validity of the HP. you are reacting in knee jerk fashion with the atheist fear of the subjective Anything subjective must be wrong or invalid. The impenetrable nature of the subjective is exactly why the HP disproves Dennett and his ilk. you can't demonstrate the reduction of mind to brain chemistry with this subjective dimension that can't be shared or mutually understood,. If it was the case that mind is reducible there should be total transparency when we get to a demonstrable level. That we can't give a fundamental description of redness is the point. That means experiencing consciousness is not just a matter of chemicals but also has dimension that can't be reduced to just the physical components It also prevents us from understanding consciousness.
IMS:
This is the basis of Thomas Nagel's argument. His discussion of what it's like to be a bat focuses on subjective experience, and our inability to make an objective description of it. There are facts about the bat's experience that are unknown to the rest of us, he says. And without an objective description, the phenomenon of conscious experience eludes science, he claims. But that is simply the reality of subjective experience. There's no reason to suppose, based on the inability to objectively describe what is inherently subjective, that science could never explain the existence of these experiences as physical phenomena.
Joe
We can explain the existence of them now without science. They exist. What we see here is the atheist reductionism trying jettison from reality anything it can't control through scientnsism, This is what we call "losing the phenomena" (we in the philosophy of science biz). They are going to reduce it out of existence. When they get to a point they can't handle well that is not important because if it was they could handle it, This is one of the tricks of tricks of reduction: redefine, reliable, lose the phenomena, proclaim it minutia. That is a function absorbing the anomaly as Kuhn says.
IMS:
David Chalmers makes an argument for the immaterial aspect of mind based on the conceivability philosophical zombies. A zombie is said to be physically identical to a human, but without the conscious experience of qualia. The zombie can see and hear, and respond to conversation in a way that is indistinguishable from an ordinary person, but without the qualitative feeling of sensations that humans experience as the substance normal consciousness. According to Chalmers, there is no physical difference, but the zombie lacks something else that is supposed to be the immaterial substance of mind.
Joe:
Chalmer's is an atheist. He sees mind as supervened upon brain, he does not believe in any SN ideas. His from of dualism is property dualism which is not SN.Your first statement implied that anyone supporting the hard problem believes in SN that's Bull Shit. Of course I am imbued with SN, and I'll take on all comers. That doesn't mean they all are. The point of philosophical zombies is not to show there's an immaterial part of the mind but to show that there's an explanatory gap between consciousness and brain function, We don't5vknow why we are conscious. From Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
A metaphor of Saul Kripke’s helps to show how the zombie idea threatens physicalism (Kripke 1972/80, 153f.). Imagine God creating the world and deciding to bring into existence the whole of the physical universe. Having created this purely physical universe, did he have to do any more work to provide for consciousness? Answering yes to this question implies there is more to consciousness than the purely physical facts alone can supply. If nothing else, it implies that consciousness depends on nonphysical properties, ones that would not exist in a purely physical world; it would be a zombie world. Physicalists, on the other hand, are committed to answering no. They have to say that by fixing the purely physical facts, God did everything that was needed to fix the mental facts about the organisms thereby created, including their thoughts, feelings, emotions, and experiences. And if fixing the physical facts is alone enough to fix the mental facts, then a zombie world seems impossible.[for those who don't know about Phil Zombies check out this FN][3]IMS:
Chalmers maintains that the experience of qualia is non-functional, and plays no role in physical causation. So the zombie can have sensations and react to them without ever having conscious awareness of their quality. But the zombie that can't experience qualia couldn't possibly behave the way conscious people do, because our behavior is intimately related to the qualitative feel of things. We are attracted to the pleasant taste of sugar, and repulsed by the rotten smell of garbage. We recoil from the unpleasant feeling of pain. If a zombie didn't experience these things, he wouldn't behave the way we do. Imagine a zombie holding his hand in a fire and saying "I can feel the sensation of pain, but there's nothing unpleasant about it."
Joe:
I think IMS has his subject/object dichotomy screwed up. He thinks that Zombies wouldn't;t work because they can't do qualia and qualia is what gives us our feel for living, he puts it: " because our behavior is intimately related to the qualitative feel of things." His example is taste., That's the subjective dimension that he hard problem is about, Why would zombies have to know the sweet taste of sugar to act like we act? That's the subjective side of things and it's unimportant remember?
IMS:
Chalmers' thought experiment postulates something that sounds logically possible, but is actually incoherent. A zombie couldn't possibly behave in a way that is indistinguishable from a conscious person. First, the zombie must be able to sense things the way we do, or he wouldn't know anything about his surroundings. He wouldn't be able to converse, or to see what is in front of him. Second, the zombie must be able to distinguish the difference between different colors, sounds, smells, etc. If you place a red block and a blue block in front of him, and ask him to pick up the red one, he will correctly discern which one is red. But that ability do discern one color from another can only exist if there is something qualitatively different between them. That's precisely what we call qualia.If that's so then how do you explain Trump supporters? His argument is really over doing it. For example there are people who can't see colors, or can't see the same color the rest of us see. They usually are not picked out of a crowd. Not unless someone says raise your hand if you see this red thing and guys doesn't raise it,. I don't know if Other people taste Sweetness the way I do.
IMS
The bottom line is that we have every reason to think that the experience of sensations, that we call qualia, is very much a physical phenomenon, and that it plays a vital role in our ability to survive. The simple fact that we can't make an objective description of subjective experience is no reason to conclude that mind must be immaterial. The "hard problem of consciousness" only provides a weak excuse for dualists to hang on to their belief in the existence of something else for which there is no real evidence.
Joe:
Here he displays a real lack of understanding about the nature of the HP. No one tries to say that sensations are not physical. But the sensation of them registers upon the mind and thus is not physical in that sense, But that's not even the point, the sensation itself is obviously physical. Notice in his piece overall he had not answered the HP, he's merely tried to reduce it., He also loses the phenomena by discording experiences into the realm of the subjective where they don't matter., Then to use them against the reduces them to a totally physical dimension. The mind is kept sealed off from what's going on so he doesn't have to deal with the immaterial., He has failed to come to terms with the HP.
For a long, very well researched ,brilliant disposition on the overall topic of consciousness, see my article "Mind is Not Reducible to Brain." One of the great works of our time. (if we limit the field to my blog): Mind is not Reducible to Brain Part 1
Part 2
Sources
[1] I am Skeptic, "The Hard Problem of Consciousness," The Keptic Zoe,Saturday, (May 7, 2016 ),blog URL:
http://theskepticzone.blogspot.com/2016/05/the-hard-problem-of-consciousness.html accessed 5/8/16
[2] Edward F. Kelley and Emily Williams Kelley, et al, Irreducible Mind: Toward a Psychology for the 21st Century. Boulder, New York, Toronto: Rowman and Littlefield Publishing Inc, 2007/2010, 37.
[3] Kirk, Robert, "Zombies", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
from the article:
Zombies in philosophy are imaginary creatures designed to illuminate problems about consciousness and its relation to the physical world. Unlike those in films or witchcraft, they are exactly like us in all physical respects but without conscious experiences: by definition there is ‘nothing it is like’ to be a zombie. Yet zombies behave just like us, and some even spend a lot of time discussing consciousness.
Few people, if any, think zombies actually exist. But many hold they are at least conceivable, and some that they are possible. It seems that if zombies really are possible, then physicalism is false and some kind of dualism is true. For many philosophers that is the chief importance of the zombie idea. But it is also valuable for the sharp focus it gives to philosophical theorizing about consciousness (for example Howell 2013; Kriegel 2011; Stoljar 2006; Tye 2008). Use of the zombie idea against physicalism also raises more general questions about the relations between imaginability, conceivability, and possibility. Finally, zombies raise epistemological difficulties: they reinstate the ‘other minds’ problem.
72 comments:
It's interesting that you bring up the word zombie, because some fundy atheists like to refer to the Risen Jesus as a zombie. For example, on You Tube, there was a guy named GodlessHayes that did that same very thing several years ago when he was still on there:
You Tube: GodlessHayes PWNS MysticalForest
yes I've seen them use it that way but the idea of "Philosophical zombies" has been used in philosophy for a long time. I think David Chalmers invented it but he sure made it famous.
It is striking (and a little irritating) how often the HP is invoked as a kind of philosophical Boojum -- as though it causes cognitive physicalism to “softly and suddenly vanish away, and never be met with again” (Lewis Carrol, The Hunting of the Snark). I've seen far too many people who either think the HP straightforwardly entails substance dualism (im-skeptical is right to reject that), or “the HP is just a bunch of superstitious claptrap disguised as philosophy” (this is what im-skeptical appears to accept). But as you point out, these are both mistakes. The HP (or standard elements thereof) certainly can figure into arguments for substance dualism (or against physicalism), but this doesn't characterize the problem itself so much as proposed solutions. As I see it, there are three main approaches to the HP: (1) attempt to solve it, (2) attempt to dissolve it, and (3) embrace it as insoluble in principle.
The over-eager substance dualists I allude to above take the first approach, and I have to say that I am underwhelmed by all efforts I have seen along those lines thus far. For the most part, they tend to boil down to “Consciousness is best explained by positing a substance whose inherent nature is to be conscious.” Snore. I'm also underwhelmed by over-eager physicalists who argue along the lines of “we know that all conscious states are produced by the brain, so problem solved!” Yawn.
Speaking for myself, I tend to take the view that before embracing any of the three approaches here, we first have to get clear what would count as a solution, and I think it is differing intuitions about this that ultimately drives choice of approach.
Eric: “the HP is just a bunch of superstitious claptrap disguised as philosophy” (this is what im-skeptical appears to accept).
- No, I say that it is scientifically uninformed philosophy that serves as a substitute for scientific understanding of reality, and enables belief in superstitious claptrap.
Hi, im-skeptical:
Thanks for your reply.
“I say that it is scientifically uninformed philosophy that serves as a substitute for scientific understanding of reality, and enables belief in superstitious claptrap.”
I'm afraid I can't completely agree with this characterization. First, quite a few people who are very scientifically-informed take the HP seriously. Second, I would say it only enables superstitious claptrap in the context of (what I would say are) bad arguments. But I am absolutely onboard with you iif you want to say that there are WAY too many of those.
I don't want to read into your reply here anything you didn't intend, but I would also suggest that there are many who treat “scientific understanding of reality” as though everyone knows and agrees what is being talked about. In fact, though, such a description often hides, rather than dissolves, philosophical presuppositions.
Suppose, for example, someone (like Dan Dennett) claims that consciousness is an illusion. The apparent outrageous ridiculousness of this depends crucially on philosophical presuppositions about what consciousness is and has to be. Making the case for the claim turns out to involve careful philosophical choices about what the term “consciousness” has to mean, so that instead of saying, “consciousness exists, but it isn't what you might think it is” you decide, instead, to say “consciousness doesn't really exist at all.” You can find exactly the same thing going on with free will.
Joe,
I answered much of this in response to your comments on my blog.
The real point is that consciousness is of a different quality from brain function. All the study of brain function will never tell us about consciousness
- You need to do some reading. Scientifically uninformed philosophy doesn't cut it.
the HP is more an illustration of a philosophical issue it's hardly opposed to science.
- The HP is a challenge to science. None of this is a problem for philosophy, which can postulate whatever it likes. But to come up with a scientific answer to the HP is the whole challenge.
Pointing out the limitation of scientism a d reductionism for understanding min d is not AFI.
- It is if you think science can't investigate a question that it does.
I spell out six scientific reasons why it can't be done.
- That is your ignorance of what science can do.
you are reacting in knee jerk fashion with the atheist fear of the subjective Anything subjective must be wrong or invalid.
- No. I have no fear of the subjective. I just don't see why you think it must be something other than physical.
That we can't give a fundamental description of redness is the point. That means experiencing consciousness is not just a matter of chemicals but also has dimension that can't be reduced to just the physical components
- It means no such thing. It means that you aren't able to explain it - not that it can't be explained.
We can explain the existence of them now without science.
- Superstitious claptrap. Better to let science explain things.
Chalmer's is an atheist. He sees mind as supervened upon brain, he does not believe in any SN ideas.
- I don't care if the is an atheist. He is a dualist, and that implies something about it that doesn't reduce to purely physical elements.
Why would zombies have to know the sweet taste of sugar to act like we act? That's the subjective side of things and it's unimportant remember?
- But it is important. Kids like candy because it tastes good. That definitely affects their behavior. The zombie should be just as happy to eat garbage, because he cant tell what it tastes like.
Not unless someone says raise your hand if you see this red thing and guys doesn't raise it
- That's a difference in behavior, isn't it? But the zombie's behavioral differences would be much more extensive than that, because he couldn't discern all kinds of things that the rest of us can.
No one tries to say that sensations are not physical. But the sensation of them registers upon the mind and thus is not physical in that sense
- And it is the conscious perception of sensations that produces much of our behavior. To deny that is to deny what we observe.
Eric,
I read "Consciousness Explained", and I don't recall Dennett saying that it is an illusion. I think that is a straw man.
I may have been mislead by the title for this talk:
https://www.ted.com/talks/dan_dennett_on_our_consciousness?language=en
But in any event,there are certainly others, if not Dennett, who have said that consciousness is an illusion. I admit that in the course of a quick Google search for a representative example, I picked Dennett on the basis of the title.
It's hard to deny that there is a phenomenon that is what we call mind. There are many philosophical theories of mind, but Dennett's is largely in tune with modern science (and with observation). Of course, it is not complete. Nor is any theory of mind. But with science, we are moving in the direction of a realistic understanding of how mind works. Many theories of mind that aren't based on science (including some atheistic ones) are just speculation without basis. I think Panpsychism and naturalistic dualism are in that category.
Speaking for myself, I tend to take the view that before embracing any of the three approaches here, we first have to get clear what would count as a solution, and I think it is differing intuitions about this that ultimately drives choice of approach.
all the more reason not to assume mind reduces to brain
No, I say that it is scientifically uninformed philosophy that serves as a substitute for scientific understanding of reality, and enables belief in superstitious claptrap.
that's nuts to say that Chalmers and Searl are not scientifically well informed you brainwashing from atheist science worship wont allow you to admit that there are still forms of knowledge that are needed to regulate science.
Eric says: don't want to read into your reply here anything you didn't intend, but I would also suggest that there are many who treat “scientific understanding of reality” as though everyone knows and agrees what is being talked about. In fact, though, such a description often hides, rather than dissolves, philosophical presuppositions.
Suppose, for example, someone (like Dan Dennett) claims that consciousness is an illusion. The apparent outrageous ridiculousness of this depends crucially on philosophical presuppositions about what consciousness is and has to be. Making the case for the claim turns out to involve careful philosophical choices about what the term “consciousness” has to mean, so that instead of saying, “consciousness exists, but it isn't what you might think it is” you decide, instead, to say “consciousness doesn't really exist at all.” You can find exactly the same thing going on with free will.
that whole post was very acute man. I find myself agreeing with a lot of your views.
meThe real point is that consciousness is of a different quality from brain function. All the study of brain function will never tell us about consciousness
IMS- You need to do some reading. Scientifically uninformed philosophy doesn't cut it.
I don't see you using any scientific knowledge or data to defend your ideological slogans. you have three maim tricks. you either hide behind the received opinions of Dawkamentalism which you try to pass off as science, you claim superior scientific knowledge but never back up that you have any, or you call it a word salad. that is not scientific.
methe HP is more an illustration of a philosophical issue it's hardly opposed to science.
IMS- The HP is a challenge to science. None of this is a problem for philosophy, which can postulate whatever it likes. But to come up with a scientific answer to the HP is the whole challenge.
you talk about science as though it's a religious cult that has to be assailed or fought for. you have that evangelical hatred of philosophy that scientism leads to, you see it as the rival cult. Calling the HP names is not disproof, that's all you are doing, I see no scientific analysis,
mePointing out the limitation of scientism and reductionism for understanding mind is not AFI.
IMS- It is if you think science can't investigate a question that it does.
you think that's a scientific answer? you are just saying :is to is to..." where's the proof man? I said it's a bait and switch, you are merely using brain function in place of consciousness, That's the main value of the HP it shows the distinction between brain function and consciousness, the reductionists do not study consciousness,
meI spell out six scientific reasons why it can't be done.
IMS- That is your ignorance of what science can do.
that's a scientific answer? it's a statement of faith!, you show scientific ignorance you are using word salad ;-) my arguments were based upon scientific data your are not.
meyou are reacting in knee jerk fashion with the atheist fear of the subjective Anything subjective must be wrong or invalid.
IMS- No. I have no fear of the subjective. I just don't see why you think it must be something other than physical.
because it is. I have an image of New York in my head, New York is not in my head there wouldn't be room. None of the images in my head take up any room, that means they are immaterial..
meThat we can't give a fundamental description of redness is the point. That means experiencing consciousness is not just a matter of chemicals but also has dimension that can't be reduced to just the physical components
IMS- It means no such thing. It means that you aren't able to explain it - not that it can't be explained.
We can explain the existence of them now without science.
IMS- Superstitious claptrap. Better to let science explain things.
Again calling it names is not an option. Do you know you not answered a single point? you haven't, spouting Dawkamentalist slogans and expressing faith in the all knowing nature of science is not an answer to real arguments, I don't think you know science and I don't thing you know arguments.
meChalmer's is an atheist. He sees mind as supervened upon brain, he does not believe in any SN ideas.
IMS- I don't care if the is an atheist. He is a dualist, and that implies something about it that doesn't reduce to purely physical elements.
Property dualism can be held by materialists, it's very different from substance dualists, learning to make these critical distinctions very important you must do it if you want to betaken seriously ikn this kind of discussion, It's not a world salad.
I read Dennett's book 20 years ago. There's a huge amount to read on this stuff Consciousness Explained is now among the classics., what he days is basically the same as saying illusion, he may not use that term but that's what it comes to.
Blogger im-skeptical said...
It's hard to deny that there is a phenomenon that is what we call mind. There are many philosophical theories of mind, but Dennett's is largely in tune with modern science (and with observation). Of course, it is not complete. Nor is any theory of mind.
that is totally Fallacious. I used to publish an academic journal, we had a review of Denmnett and an article disputing his book Consciousness explained when it first came out, I had to find the referees for that article so I got some of the neurology professors where I was doing my Ph.D. work in history of science, the dean of that department who refereed the article told me "Dennett is full of shit." the Dawkies on thye message board may love him because he's the big atheist man, but real scientists don't. He is a philosopher do you know that? you will tolerate philosophy when it supports atheism,
But with science, we are moving in the direction of a realistic understanding of how mind works. Many theories of mind that aren't based on science (including some atheistic ones) are just speculation without basis. I think Panpsychism and naturalistic dualism are in that category.
No we are not. you are getting that from atheists on atheist blogs that's not the consensus in the field, the Brain/mind study is still wipe open and everyone is as expert as anyone else on having a mind,
In other words if consciousness was reducible to brain chemistry there should be an anatomical center in the brain that works to produce the binding effect. Yet the evidence indicates that binding mechanisms must be understood as functions of various areas outside either the brain (nervous system) or in different parts of the brain which means it can’t be reduced to just a physical apparatus but is systemic and that is indicative of top down causation.
* Projective activity in perceptual process
Our brains act as a sort of “word generating virtual reality system.”[21] That is the brain is constantly projecting and updating a model of the perceptual environment and our relation to it. Top down cross modal sensory interactions have been recognized as the rule rather than the exception, in perceptions, as several studies indicate (A.K. Engle et al, 2001; Shimojo and Shams 2001). [22] Evidence indicates that the ultimate source of projective activity may originate outside the brain. A great deal of knowledge is put into action for use in understanding language and in writing. Some researchers have advanced the view that the fundamental form of projective activity is dreaming.[23]
*Semantic or intentional content; word meaning and other form of representation.
This has been dealt with traditionally through reductionism. Representations were said to work by resembling things they represent. This was disproved by Goodman and Heil (1981). [24] In cognitive psychology there is a rule of thumb that meanings are not to be conceived as intrinsic to words, they are defined by the functional role they play in a sentence. The major approach to the problem used now is connectionism, from dynamic systems theory. The meaning of a given response such as settling of a network into one of its attracters or firing of a volley of spikes by a neuron in the visual cortex is identified with the aspect in the environment that produces the response. This account can’t deal with abstract things or non existent things. There’s nothing in the environment to trigger it. Responses do not qualify as representations nor signs as symbols. “That something,” as Searl so effectively argued (in 1992) “is precisely what matters.”[25]
*problem of Intentionality
Intentionality is the ability of representational forms to be about things, to reflect meaning and to be about events and states of affairs in the world. [26] The problem of intentionality has plagued both psychologists and philosophers. Intentionality is inherently three ways, involving the user, symbols, and things symbolized. Searl tells us that intentionality of langue is secondary and derives from the intrinsic intentionality of the mind. “Intentionality can’t be obtained from any kind of physical system including brains.”[27]
*The Humunculus Problem
The Homunculus was a medieval concept about human reproduction. The male was said to have in him little men just like him with all the basic stuff that makes him work that’s how new men get born. In this topic it’s the idea that we need in the mind another mind or brain like structure to make the mind work. The problem is it keeps requiring ever more little structures to make each one before it work; in endless regression of systems. Kelly and Kelly et al site Dennett’s attempt to solve the homunculus problem in the form of less and less smart homunculi until the bottom level corresponding to heard ware level end the recursion so it’s not infinite. (Dennett 1978)[28] Searl (1992) responds that there has to be something outside the bottom level that knows what lower level compositions mean. Cognitive models can’t function without a homunculus because they lack minds, as Kelly tells us.[29]
No homunculus problem, however, is posed by the structure of our conscious experience itself. The efforts of Dennett and others to claim that there is such a problem, and to use that to ridicule any residue of dualism, rely upon the deeply flawed metaphor of the Cartesian theater a place where mental contents get displayed and I pop in separately to view them. Descartes himself, James, Searl and others all have this right: conscious experience comes to us whole and undivided, with the qualitative feels, phenomenological content, unity, and subjective point of view all built in, intrinsic features. I and my experience cannot be separated in this way. [30]
12] Science Research Foundation, “Science at the horizon of life,” independent charitable organization in UK 2007-2012. On-line resource, UFL: http://www.horizonresearch.org/main_page.php?cat_id=200 visisted 5/2/12
[13] ibid
[14] ibid
[15] ibid
[16] Mary Anne Meyers, “Top Down Causation, an Integrating Theme…” Templeton Foundation Symposium, Op cit. (no page number listed).
[17] Edward F. Kelley and Emily Williams Kelley, et al, Irreducible Mind: Toward a Psychology for the 21st Century. Boulder, New York, Toronto: Rowman and Littlefield Publishing Inc, 2007/2010, 37.
[18] Ibid. 38, referring to W.McDougall, Proceedings of scientific physical research 25, 11-29. (1911/1961)..
[19] ibid. 38 refers to Dennette and kinsbourne in Consciousness Explained. (op cit) 183-247
[20] ibid, sites C.Von der Malsburg, “Binding In Models of Perception and Brain Function.” Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 5, 520-526. also sited Crick 94; Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Edelmon and Tononi, 2000; Engle, Fries and Singer 2001; W.J. Freeman 2000, and others.
[21] ibid
[22] ibid, 40, he sites A.K. Engle et al, 2001; Shimojo and Shams 2001;
[23] ibid, 41-42 sites Rodolfo Llina’s and Pare’ 1996 Llina’s and Ribary, 1994.
[24] Ibid, 42 see Heil 1981
[25] ibid, 43 see Searl 1992
[26] ibid
[27] ibid, see also studies, puccetti 1989; Dupuy 2000 discussion of issue form opposing points of view).
[28] Ibid see Dennett 1978 and Searl 1992)
[29] ibid
[30] ibid, 44
Joe,
I would like to respond to your comments, but it becomes somewhat overwhelming, given that you bring in so much material that is only marginally relevant to the topic.
I am intrigued by your bringing Searle into the discussion as someone who supports your position, because my understanding is that he is a physicalist, and completely at odds with Chalmers. The statement you attribute to him: "Intentionality can’t be obtained from any kind of physical system including brains." is actually the thesis of Brentano, and I could find no reference to Searle making a statement like that, but I must admit that I haven't read much of his work. I also see that you have incorrectly quoted your source with regard to the semantic content of mental representations: "that something is precisely what matters".
Joe,
that's nuts to say that Chalmers and Searl are not scientifically well informed you brainwashing from atheist science worship wont allow you to admit that there are still forms of knowledge that are needed to regulate science.
- Any theory of mind that postulates the existence of some kind dualism is scientifically uninformed, because there is ABSOLUTELY NO scientific data to support that. And I think Searle would agree with me.
I don't see you using any scientific knowledge or data to defend your ideological slogans. you have three maim tricks. you either hide behind the received opinions of Dawkamentalism which you try to pass off as science, you claim superior scientific knowledge but never back up that you have any, or you call it a word salad. that is not scientific.
... you talk about science as though it's a religious cult that has to be assailed or fought for. you have that evangelical hatred of philosophy that scientism leads to, you see it as the rival cult. Calling the HP names is not disproof, that's all you are doing, I see no scientific analysis
- Ideological slogans? You mean like "Dawkamentalism", whatever that is? I see no reason to think that you actually understand the material you cite in your own commentary. Yet you take your own position as gospel, as if there's no reasonable alternative to the cult of unscientific mind theories.
you think that's a scientific answer? you are just saying :is to is to..." where's the proof man?
- I asked you to do some reading. Science does indeed investigate the workings of mind, and you seem to be completely unaware of the extent of scientific investigation in this area. The the Google machine. See for yourself.
my arguments were based upon scientific data your are not.
- No. Your arguments are based on philosophical works, and you don't even understand those. I see no citations at all of any scientific material in what you write.
I have an image of New York in my head, New York is not in my head there wouldn't be room. None of the images in my head take up any room, that means they are immaterial.
- Wrong. The images in your head are encoded in physical matter, something like an image on a CD. It doesn't have to occupy much space, but it does take some.
Property dualism can be held by materialists, it's very different from substance dualists, learning to make these critical distinctions very important you must do it if you want to betaken seriously ikn this kind of discussion, It's not a world salad.
- You should learn to understand what I have said before you spout off about it. I never said substance and property dualism are the same ting. And I didn't mention "word salad" in reference to this topic at all. I used that term to describe theistic attempts to rationalize their incoherent ideas about divine simplicity by twisting the common understanding of words and concepts. Now you're accusing me of saying that about everything I disagree with.
we had a review of Denmnett and an article disputing his book Consciousness explained when it first came out, I had to find the referees for that article so I got some of the neurology professors where I was doing my Ph.D. work in history of science, the dean of that department who refereed the article told me "Dennett is full of shit."
- He's full of shit. And so are you, if you think this guy speaks for the scientific community.
No we are not. you are getting that from atheists on atheist blogs that's not the consensus in the field, the Brain/mind study is still wipe open and everyone is as expert as anyone else on having a mind
- I didn't get anything about this topic from blogs. I actually read books written by people who are scientifically informed. You should try it.
I like IMS's comment "Better let science explain things". And he wonders why Joe used the term "Dawkamentalist". Scientism is also another description (for his ideology).
Just like the existence of God, mind can't be disproven or analyzed by using or analyzing physical things (like the brain). Both are non-physical.
Also, you said that you read books? Are you talking about that book called Incomplete Nature (How Mind emerged from matter) that someone on Amazon labeled Scientism?
You should look up Fortress of Facts on this site.
JBsptfn,
Joe used the term "Dawkamentalist" because he doesn't have a good answer for the epistemological power of science as compared to religious faith. You guys need to face the truth. Time and time again, scientific theories have proven to provide a better explanation than religious beliefs. There simply is no contest. "Science works - bitches."
Joe used the term "Dawkamentalist" because he doesn't have a good answer for the epistemological power of science as compared to religious faith.
no I use the term Dawkamentalist because you are one, you are arguing "science says it I believe it that settles it. but actually science doesn't it. Moreover, science has no epistemological power. epistemology is philosophy and it is prior to science. The HP is epistemological a d science is not. science is critiqued by epistemology it doesn't the questions of epistemology
You guys need to face the truth. Time and time again, scientific theories have proven to provide a better explanation than religious beliefs. There simply is no contest. "Science works - bitches."
my good fellow the six points that I made and documented on why mind can't be reduced to brain, biding, top down causation, homunculus and so on are documented by peer reviewed scientific journals.,for you to say this is very ignorant. you are not quoting scientific sources you are quoting atheist bromides.
that rayan guyvtook thik apart at thev seems. L
Again, IMS, you need to search Atheist Fortress of Facts on this site. It describes you to a T.
JBsptfn,
I read it, and there's nothing there but a long rant against a straw-man view of scientism. In fact, his whole thesis is a straw man. One of the things that Joe complained about is not understanding your opponent's argument. Joe is guilty of that in spades.
Moreover, science has no epistemological power. epistemology is philosophy and it is prior to science. The HP is epistemological a d science is not. science is critiqued by epistemology it doesn't the questions of epistemology
- This shows you have absolutely no idea what you are talking about. Epistemology is about knowledge, and how we know it. Science is a way of obtaining knowledge - and it just happens to be the BEST way. But you hate it because it shatters your faith-based beliefs.
Here's an introductory-level paper on it:
http://www2.phy.ilstu.edu/pte/publications/scientific_epistemology.pdf
my good fellow the six points that I made and documented on why mind can't be reduced to brain, biding, top down causation, homunculus and so on are documented by peer reviewed scientific journals
- Once again, you don't know what you're talking about. You cite a blog post by some theist who denies main-stream science, and call that peer-reviewed science? Sorry, but that doesn't cut it. Show me some real scientific data, and then I'll take seriously your claims of having the scientific data on your side.
There you go: When you say that science is the BEST way of obtaining knowledge, you demonstrate the Fortress of Facts mentality in spades.
Also, what do you call "real scientific data"? One that agrees with your ideology?
Real scientific data is objective, repeatable, and verifiable. And I don't care whose ideology it agrees with.
I read it, and there's nothing there but a long rant against a straw-man view of scientism. In fact, his whole thesis is a straw man. One of the things that Joe complained about is not understanding your opponent's argument. Joe is guilty of that in spades.
No not that you made a straw man rant against scientism that are into scientism. your stiff is scientism
Delete
Blogger im-skeptical said...(quoting me before)
Moreover, science has no epistemological power. epistemology is philosophy and it is prior to science. The HP is epistemological a d science is not. science is critiqued by epistemology it doesn't the questions of epistemology
IMS
- This shows you have absolutely no idea what you are talking about. Epistemology is about knowledge, and how we know it. Science is a way of obtaining knowledge - and it just happens to
Epistemology is not just about any kind of knowledge nor is it about how we know ordinary facts or empirical questions, It's a transcendental approach to knowledge it/like philosophy of knowledge
http://www.importanceofphilosophy.com/Epistemology_Main.html
"Epistemology is the study of our method of acquiring knowledge. It answers the question, "How do we know?" It encompasses the nature of concepts, the constructing of concepts, the validity of the senses, logical reasoning, as well as thoughts, ideas, memories, emotions, and all things mental. It is concerned with how our minds are related to reality, and whether these relationships are valid or invalid."
it's a branch of philosophy so it's is more basic than science,. btw the thin I just quoted is the same article he used. that's his link. his evidence supports my argument,
my good fellow the six points that I made and documented on why mind can't be reduced to brain, biding, top down causation, homunculus and so on are documented by peer reviewed scientific journals
- Once again, you don't know what you're talking about. You cite a blog post by some theist who denies main-stream science, and call that peer-reviewed science? Sorry, but that doesn't cut it. Show me some real scientific data, and then I'll take seriously your claims of having the scientific data on your side.
the article is by me Sherlock. not one of they people I quote is a theist, you made that assumption knowing nothing bout them at all nothing, get it straight now I rarely quote theists especially in science for just this reason,so my opponent can't say that.
here are the sources ZI quoted
12] Science Research Foundation, “Science at the horizon of life,” independent charitable organization in UK 2007-2012. On-line resource, UFL: http://www.horizonresearch.org/main_page.php?cat_id=200 visisted 5/2/12
[13] ibid
[14] ibid
[15] ibid
[16] Mary Anne Meyers, “Top Down Causation, an Integrating Theme…” Templeton Foundation Symposium, Op cit. (no page number listed).
[17] Edward F. Kelley and Emily Williams Kelley, et al, Irreducible Mind: Toward a Psychology for the 21st Century. Boulder, New York, Toronto: Rowman and Littlefield Publishing Inc, 2007/2010, 37.
[18] Ibid. 38, referring to W.McDougall, Proceedings of scientific physical research 25, 11-29. (1911/1961)..
[19] ibid. 38 refers to Dennette and kinsbourne in Consciousness Explained. (op cit) 183-247
[20] ibid, sites C.Von der Malsburg, “Binding In Models of Perception and Brain Function.” Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 5, 520-526. also sited Crick 94; Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Edelmon and Tononi, 2000; Engle, Fries and Singer 2001; W.J. Freeman 2000, and others.
[22] ibid, 40, he sites A.K. Engle et al, 2001; Shimojo and Shams 2001;
ibid, 41-42 sites Rodolfo Llina’s and Pare’ 1996 Llina’s and Ribary, 1994.
Ibid, 42 see Heil 1981
see also studies, puccetti 1989; Dupuy 2000 discussion of issue form opposing points of view).
what is theist about those sources you didn't read them did you: notice one I Dennett who you admire.
Joe,
Let's look at these sources.
Horizon Research Foundation - focused mainly on Near Death Experiences. Contains no references to actual scientific research that I could find.
Templeton Foundation Symposium - a theistic organization focused on integrating theism into science.
Irreducible Mind: Toward a Psychology for the 21st Century - a book focused on parapsychology that disputes mainstream science.
You can't really call this stuff representative of the scientific view.
I haven't read Irreducible Mind, but I looked at the comments, and someone made a listing of what each chapter talks about. It looks like they write about more than just parapsychology, and it got a better rating than Incomplete Nature, that book you are so high on:
Amazon: Irreducible Mind
So the book on new-agey pseudoscience gets a better Amazon rating than a more difficult book on serious science, and that's what matters to you. Not surprising.
You call a book on how life could have come from non-life serious science? Man, you are a part of an ideology.
I certainly do. Let the science deniers believe whatever crap they like. THAT's not science.
Let's look at these sources.
Horizon Research Foundation - focused mainly on Near Death Experiences. Contains no references to actual scientific research that I could find.
you didn't read thye study you are not addressing the argument, you are quibbling over who published it,
Templeton Foundation Symposium - a theistic organization focused on integrating theism into science.
TF is highly respected and the size of prize any scientist you admire would love to win it. the gave to to major people such as Davies.
Irreducible Mind: Toward a Psychology for the 21st Century - a book focused on parapsychology that disputes mainstream science.
You can't really call this stuff representative of the scientific view.
2:49 PM
you don't know jack shit about science, you got the hard problem totally wrong, you have not said a single thing about science, all you are talking is who your atheist cult of brainwash accepts.:
again the people you said know nothing include Dennett and Crick. totallt quite about pub med article.
the Horizon thing on fn 12 is not even part of the six points, that's the ameba deal it's not even one of the points.
there's a scientific defense of Templeton in Huffington
as I suspected the major issue against it is from the atheist Junta. totally un-objective sources like Dawkins and Meyers
anotherv defense in American guardian
List of winner ofd Templeton prize. more than half are major names in science.
wise up IMS it's obvious Dawkins an d co are jealous because can never win it, they can't contribute to understanding between science and religion because their bread and butter comes from working up hatred for religion.
One more thing to add: When Joe said that the atheists just accept the people that their brainwashed cult accepts (like Dennett and Dawkins), it reminds me of what someone said on Opposing Views once about Evolution and the Discovery Institute website (the site that Atheists and Evolutionists call The Dishonesty Institute) in the comments section. There was this person who called Daniel Dennett " a national treasure".
you don't know jack shit about science, you got the hard problem totally wrong, you have not said a single thing about science, all you are talking is who your atheist cult of brainwash accepts.:
Joe, when you cite this kind of crap and call it "scientific data", you are only fooling yourself. Sure, lots of people would love to have the Templeton prize. That's why they will support any kind of bullshit position and pretend it's legitimate science. See here. Or here.
I am not a lib or conservative, but it seems that Slate leans to the left (forgive me, Joe, but they are the side that tends to not like what they think is the "supernatural"). They are also owned by a liberal organization (Washington Post), and they had Christopher Hitchens writing for them:
Is Slate Magazine too Liberal or Conservative
Also, your other source is Rational Wiki? Better luck next time.
Liberal scientists: http://www.nature.com/news/2011/110216/full/470323a.html
Liberal teachers: https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/05/21/some-philosophy-scholars-raise-concerns-about-templeton-funding
Liberal NCSE mambers: http://scienceblogs.com/tfk/2011/03/05/how-bad-is-the-templeton-found/
Liberal journalists: https://www.edge.org/conversation/john_horgan-the-templeton-foundation-a-skeptics-take
Joe, when you cite this kind of crap and call it "scientific data", you are only fooling yourself. Sure, lots of people would love to have the Templeton prize. That's why they will support any kind of bullshit position and pretend it's legitimate science. See here. Or here.
That's bull shit., no thinks that about the Templeton foundation except the extremisms in the Dawklamemtalost movement. you are not making critical distinctions. he horizon source was not one of the six points.
Liberal scientists: http://www.nature.com/news/2011/110216/full/470323a.html
Liberal teachers: https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/05/21/some-philosophy-scholars-raise-concerns-about-templeton-funding
Liberal NCSE mambers: http://scienceblogs.com/tfk/2011/03/05/how-bad-is-the-templeton-found/
Liberal journalists: https://www.edge.org/conversation/john_horgan-the-templeton-foundation-a-skeptics-take
those are not scholarly sources, you are not making critical distinctions. you just echoing the atheist bromides.
you need to come to grips with the actual research not the funding ,Iu backed up minding by showing the study is on pub med that is totally legitimately pub med the official source for major medical research.
Templeton was only involved with one source and that was the one backed by pub med.l others are from scientific journals. you haven't een started top look at the six points
Here's an example of how stupidly uncritical IMS is. Templeton appears in connection with one source. a symposium backed by Templeton foundation. Symposium id chaired by marry Anne Myeres. Her expertise is not scientific but im things like chairing symposiums ,but she did not the scientific research, she is also a historian.
she did not do the research she chaired the symposium. she's the sourced list on publication because she edited it. she is qualified there. SHE IS NOT THE RESERCHER. Templeton is proven they pick good science people none of the winners of prise have been less than outstanding in their fields.,
Meyers is there to document top down and it's a point that refer to the paper earlier not the six points, she's not even part of the six points the six points are the crux they disprove reduction of mind to brain none of their research includes Templeton or horizon.
IMS is just hysterically giving a knee jerk reaction to those two names., not even being critical.
the sources on the six points
[17] Edward F. Kelley and Emily Williams Kelley, et al, Irreducible Mind: Toward a Psychology for the 21st Century. Boulder, New York, Toronto: Rowman and Littlefield Publishing Inc, 2007/2010, 37.
[18] Ibid. 38, referring to W.McDougall, Proceedings of scientific physical research 25, 11-29. (1911/1961)..
[19] ibid. 38 refers to Dennette and kinsbourne in Consciousness Explained. (op cit) 183-247
[20] ibid, sites C.Von der Malsburg, “Binding In Models of Perception and Brain Function.” Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 5, 520-526. also sited Crick 94; Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Edelmon and Tononi, 2000; Engle, Fries and Singer 2001; W.J. Freeman 2000, and others.
[21] ibid
[22] ibid, 40, he cites A.K. Engle et al, 2001; Shimojo and Shams 2001;
[23] ibid, 41-42 cites Rodolfo Llina’s and Pare’ 1996 Llina’s and Ribary, 1994.
[24] Ibid, 42 see Heil 1981
[25] ibid, 43 see Searl 1992
[26] ibid
[27] ibid, see also studies, puccetti 1989; Dupuy 2000 discussion of issue form opposing points of view).
[28] Ibid see Dennett 1978 and Searl 1992)
[29] ibid
[30] ibid, 44
the sources on the six points
All these sources are one single book. And that book is about the pseudoscience of parapsychology. Using "ibid" over and over again simply means you read one book and took all your material from that. The book obviously discusses Searle, but your gross misunderstanding of Searle's position (he is a physicalist) indicates that you don't really know what he says. You only know what they said in the pseudoscience book.
All parapsychology isn't pseudoscience. Every time you comment, you show more and more that you are wedded to a materialist ideology.
And every time you comment, you show how far removes from science you are. Sure, there have been some serious investigations of the claims of parapsychology. They have not shown that it is anything more than a lot of unsubstantiated claims. Of course, the story you get from its advocates is different. They try to make it sound like there's some real science behind it. Their books sell pretty well, because there are plenty of gullible people who lap that stuff up. Meanwhile, there appears to be a smaller audience for serious scientific books about mind. To each his own.
Quote"They have not shown that it is anything more than a lot of unsubstantiated claims."Quote
Who's they? People like Richard Dawkins and Sam Harris?
I'm not aware that Dawkins or Harris have done any research in parapsychology.
Here's an example:
http://www.csicop.org/si/show/failure_to_replicate_results_of_bem_parapsychology_experiments_published_by
All these sources are one single book. And that book is about the pseudoscience of parapsychology.
No they are not all one sinlge book. they are listed in one book but they are all published indifferent sources., I didn't record those sources because I got tired of writing; they are documemtd
Using "ibid" over and over again simply means you read one book and took all your material from that. The book obviously discusses
I know what it means that's why I used it. of course some of the original sources are listed, m (read it again) and one I looked up on pub med, but Elliot is good and his documentation is valid.,
Searle, but your gross misunderstanding of Searle's position (he is a physicalist) indicates that you don't really know what he says. You only know what they said in the pseudoscience book.
Ryan already took you to the wood shed on the idiotic assumption that belief in mind always means dualist or belief in SN, Not a contradiction to say physicalist does not accept that mind is reducible to brain. you really know so little about this stuff.,you know so little the science you worship.
And every time you comment, you show how far removes from science you are. Sure, there have been some serious investigations of the claims of parapsychology. They have not shown that it is anything more than a lot of unsubstantiated claims.
Belief in the mind is not parapsychology. but it's so easy for the science worshipers to hide behind the rubric of "true science" without really knowing what it is. fundamentalists of science.
Of course, the story you get from its advocates is different. They try to make it sound like there's some real science behind it. Their books sell pretty well, because there are plenty of gullible people who lap that stuff up. Meanwhile, there appears to be a smaller audience for serious scientific books about mind. To each his own.
you don't know the differenmce in science and atheism,
test for IM research shows there is a connection between mind and immune system thus creating the possibility of mind control wellness, is that parapsychology?
again. souirce quoted by Elliot on binding problem. Engel AK1, Fries P, Singer W.
Author information
•1Cellular Neurobiology Group, Institute for Medicine, Research Centre Jülich, 52425 Jülich, Germany. a.k.engel@fz-juelich.de
I've already shown it on pub med. show what's wrong with that. why is that a a source? you can see it's from a journal.
how do you overcome the binding problem?
still point 1, binding, of the six points that prove reduction of mind to brain is impossible.
2 sources, the second is the one listed imn pub med it's from a journal
from the national review of neuroscience
183-247
[20] ibid, sites C.Von der Malsburg, “Binding In Models of Perception and Brain Function.” Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 5, 520-526.
see
URL: https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=fr&user=omhS3xgAAAAJ&citation_for_view=omhS3xgAAAAJ:hCrLmN-GePgC
Christoph von der Malsburg
[PDF] à partir de cogprints.org
Binding in models of perception and brain function
Auteurs
Christoph Von Der Malsburg
Date de publication
1995/8/31
Revue
Current opinion in neurobiology
Volume
5
Numéro
4
Pages
520-526
Éditeur
Elsevier Current Trends
Description
The development of the concept of feature binding as fundamental to neural dynamics has
made possible recent advances in the modeling of difficult problems of perception and brain
function. Major weaknesses of past neural modeling (most prominently its inability to work
with natural stimuli and its 'learning-time'barrier) have been traced back to improper
treatment of the binding issue. Signal synchrony is now seen as playing a major role in
binding. Inclusion of temporal binding in neural models has led to recent breakthroughs in ...
Nombre total de citations
Cité 439 fois
also sited Crick 94; Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Edelmon and Tononi, 2000;
Engle, Fries and Singer 2001;
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11584308#comments
See comment in PubMed Commons below
Nat Rev Neurosci. 2001 Oct;2(10):704-16.
Dynamic predictions: oscillations and synchrony in top-down processing.
Engel AK1, Fries P, Singer W.
Author information
•1Cellular Neurobiology Group, Institute for Medicine, Research Centre Jülich, 52425 Jülich, Germany. a.k.engel@fz-juelich.de
Abstract
Classical theories of sensory processing view the brain as a passive, stimulus-driven device. By contrast, more recent approaches emphasize the constructive nature of perception, viewing it as an active and highly selective process. Indeed, there is ample evidence that the processing of stimuli is controlled by top-down influences that strongly shape the intrinsic dynamics of thalamocortical networks and constantly create predictions about forthcoming sensory events. We discuss recent experiments indicating that such predictions might be embodied in the temporal structure of both stimulus-evoked and ongoing activity, and that synchronous oscillations are particularly important in this process. Coherence among subthreshold membrane potential fluctuations could be exploited to express selective functional relationships during states of expectancy or attention, and these dynamic patterns could allow the grouping and selection of distributed neuronal responses for further processing.
also in fn 20 cited is an an article by Crick of Wattson and discovered DNA I guess he's a theist and nothing about science,
Joe,
You've been harping about the "binding effect", and claiming that there is a big problem with it - namely: "if consciousness was reducible to brain chemistry there should be an anatomical center in the brain that works to produce the binding effect. Yet the evidence indicates that binding mechanisms must be understood as functions of various areas outside either the brain (nervous system) or in different parts of the brain which means it can’t be reduced to just a physical apparatus but is systemic and that is indicative of top down causation."
Let me ask you this: Do you have any idea at all what this means? Why would it be a problem if binding mechanisms are distributed, rather than located in some specific anatomical center? How would that imply any kind of non-physical causation?
Please don't cite anything. Just explain in your own words.
IMS, here is your link from CSICOP:
CSICOP: Bem parapsychology failure
I had to laugh when I saw it. And now, I want to share some links:
Web Archive: Subversive Thinking-Prometheus Books
Dean Radin's Comments on Alcock's review of Daryl Bem's experiment
Web Archive: Trickster Book-CSICOP Overview
These links show that CSICOP (now CSI), the Center for Inquiry (the group that did the ill-fated Jesus Project that Joe blogged about before), and Prometheus Books (their publishing arm) are all about spreading materialist propaganda.
JBsptfn,
I can't help but notice that you are extremely skeptical of any source that doesn't align with your own superstitions. The attack on Prometheus Books is akin to saying something like this: you have a brother who is married to someone whose cousin is a pervert. Therefore, I should not believe nothing you say. That's essentially the logic you are employing. So now let me say that there are Catholic priests who are sexual perverts. Therefore, I should not listen to or believe anything that comes from the Catholic Church.
I don't have any superstitions. I believe in Jesus Christ, not religion.
Let me ask you this: Do you have any idea at all what this means? Why would it be a problem if binding mechanisms are distributed, rather than located in some specific anatomical center? How would that imply any kind of non-physical causation?
If you would actually bother to read the material it's actually describing top down causation. That's an old argument against reductionism. If you try to reduce the aspects of the system distributed from several system higher up you start going to reduce everything. you can't separate any one aspect that produces that behavior. then goes with the argument that manipulating one part produced a given effect?.
I don't claim to be an expert. zit's been explained to me by people who know the author of the article in my journal. I think I have a rudimentary understanding,
JBsptfn,
You said the entire logical process starts with the gospels. You have not explained how that logical process proceeds.
Joe,
If you can't explain how how your six points lead to the conclusion that mind is not reducible (and you haven't), then why should I or anyone else buy it?
WTF are you talking about? You atheists are so poisoned with the concept of logic it's sickening (the irony is that atheists usually don't use it themselves).
WTF are you talking about?
Sorry. I got my conversations mixed up. Too many going on at once.
If you can't explain how how your six points lead to the conclusion that mind is not reducible (and you haven't), then why should I or anyone else buy it?
If you can't understand my explanation maybe you should read something, I suggest looking up top down causation.
Im-skeptical:
Forgive me if you've answered this before, but what do you mean by the word "physical"?
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