(1) All contingent things have causes
(2) All contingencies require necessities to ground them.
(3) All natural things are contingent
(4) the universe is natural, therefore, the universe is contingent
(5) the universe requires a necessity upon which its existence is grounded, Therefore, the origin of the universe must be necessary.
(6)Since the origin of the universe must be necessary (from 2,4 and 5) and not contingent the origin cannot have a cause.
(7)The origin of universe is necessary and must be eternal and first cause, since this is the definition of God (see Rational Warrant page) then the origin of the universe must be God.
This version understands Necessity and contingency largely in causal terms. The necessity that creates the universe must be understood as eternal and uncaused for two reasons: (1) The impossibility of ICR, there has to be a final cause or nothing would ever come to be, (2) empirically we know the universe is not eternal. See the supporting material. Atheists will often argue that this kind of argument doesn't prove that God is the necessity that causes the universe. but being necessary and creator and primary cause makes it the sources of all thins we can rationally construe that as God.
I do not claim to "prove the existence of God." God is not just another thing in the cosmos. God is being itself, the basis upon which reality coheres. This is beyond our understanding so it is beyond empirical proof. I argue that God arguments prove that belief is rationally warranted, The do not prove that God exists nor do they have to. ultimately belief will not be decided based upon such matters but they may help to clear away the clutter.
Below are links to essays showing the Christian nature of this idea of being itself.
Please join me in the comment section
Being itself source of consciousness
http://religiousapriori.blogspot.com/2009/01/ground-of-being-as-source-of.html
Bible God and the Depth of Being
http://religiousapriori.blogspot.com/2009/01/the-bible-god-depth-of-being.html
22 comments:
I’m not really looking for a “debate,” but here are a few questions.
In premise (1), what counts as a “thing”? If the universe is a “thing,” then the conjunction of (1) and (4) begs the question. Naturalists deny that the universe has a cause and so will reject either (1) or (4).
What does “ground” mean in premise (2)? If “x grounds y” entails that x is a sufficient condition for y, then (2) is plainly false. If some necessary fact x is a sufficient condition for some other fact y, then y is also a necessary fact. If, on the other hand, “x grounds y” entails that x is a necessary condition for y, then (2) is at least puzzling. If I’m not mistaken, on the standard semantics for counterfactuals, all counterfactuals with impossible antecedents are trivially true. So if x is a necessary fact, then it’s true that “were x not to obtain, y would obtain” for any fact y, so x can’t be a necessary condition for any fact y.
Do you have some particular criterion of necessity in mind? That’s an issue you really can’t afford to ignore in making this sort of argument. Suppose we say a state of affairs is necessary if and only if it is coherent to suppose that it obtains but incoherent to suppose that it doesn’t obtain. On that criterion, the conclusion that God exists necessarily is plainly false. So if the premises of your argument together entail that conclusion, one or more of the premises must be false.
Suppose we say instead that a state of affairs is necessary if and only if it obtains but the fact that it obtains does not depend on the obtaining of any other state of affairs that it does not entail. On this criterion, saying that the existence of the universe is contingent, as premise (4) does, amounts to saying that the universe depends on something else for its existence. Which, of course, begs the question.
Suppose we say instead that some state of affairs is necessary if and only if it obtains and at no time (past, present, or future) does there actually exist anything with the power to bring it about that that state of affairs does not obtain. On this criterion, it seems a naturalist will be entitled to reject (4). If there was an initial state of the universe, for example, a naturalist will say that at no time does there exist anything with the power to bring it about that that state never obtained.
Or suppose we say there is no criterion—necessity is just primitive. Then I think you face a challenge in explaining why the theist is entitled say God exists necessarily but the naturalist can’t say that some part of the causal order—say, the initial state of the universe, if there was one, or some infinite past segment of the history of the universe, if the universe is backwardly eternal—could not have failed to obtain, and therefore reject (4).
These are just a few of the questions one could raise about this sort of argument, but perhaps enough to help get a discussion started.
-John
Hi John (John /anonymous. Thank you for your comments I really appreciate it.
Anonymous said...
I’m not really looking for a “debate,” but here are a few questions.
"In premise (1), what counts as a “thing”? If the universe is a “thing,” then the conjunction of (1) and (4) begs the question. Naturalists deny that the universe has a cause and so will reject either (1) or (4)."
I think that's a misconception. Some might do under the guise of QM theory, that's a misconception of QM theory. Most cosmologists I read (most of them one stripe of materialist or another) still look o0fr causes. In my argument a "thing" is any existing object, substance, or physical process.
"What does “ground” mean in premise (2)? If “x grounds y” entails that x is a sufficient condition for y, then (2) is plainly false."
Do you have an actual reason? because it makes no sense. A contingency is something that depends upon something for its being, all natural things do that because they all need causes.
"If some necessary fact x is a sufficient condition for some other fact y, then y is also a necessary fact. If, on the other hand, “x grounds y” entails that x is a necessary condition for y, then (2) is at least puzzling."
If X is necessary for Y then Y is also necessary> that is twaddle. that is the kind o0fg Bull shit atheist have to resort to because they win the CA. No sorry that is predicated up[on a t0ta;;y7 false premise. They have resorted to lie that a necessity has to produce a necessity and that is retorted. Y might not produce anything. Then it would not be necessary at all. X might be necessary to Y but nothing else. If we follow the chain back far enough we come to final cause and that is God. All else is cotangent upon final cause even if it is necessary in relation to the next link in the chain.
"If I’m not mistaken, on the standard semantics for counterfactuals, all counterfactuals with impossible antecedents are trivially true. So if x is a necessary fact, then it’s true that “were x not to obtain, y would obtain” for any fact y, so x can’t be a necessary condition for any fact y."
As far as I am concerned most possible world's theory as it has been applied to God arguments is just bullshit. I am not the only pone/ IO can point to professional big name philosophers who agree.
"Do you have some particular criterion of necessity in mind? That’s an issue you really can’t afford to ignore in making this sort of argument. Suppose we say a state of affairs is necessary if and only if it is coherent to suppose that it obtains but incoherent to suppose that it doesn’t obtain. On that criterion, the conclusion that God exists necessarily is plainly false. So if the premises of your argument together entail that conclusion, one or more of the premises must be false."
I already spelled that out. metaphysical necessity, ontological necessity and physical cause.
"Suppose we say instead that a state of affairs is necessary if and only if it obtains but the fact that it obtains does not depend on the obtaining of any other state of affairs that it does not entail."
If that were true you8 could only deal with final cause, but my argument might still work. That is the upshot of my argument, final cause
"On this criterion, saying that the existence of the universe is contingent, as premise (4) does, amounts to saying that the universe depends on something else for its existence. Which, of course, begs the question."
Atheists (I don't know if you are one) skeptics have come to assume that any argument made by a theist is question begging. ai am not begging the question to posit an argument. No I don't think it's begging the question it's what the previous steps proved Modus Ponins.
"Suppose we say instead that some state of affairs is necessary if and only if it obtains and at no time (past, present, or future) does there actually exist anything with the power to bring it about that that state of affairs does not obtain."
why should we say that? I should that would beg the question because it would be mandating final cause.
"On this criterion, it seems a naturalist will be entitled to reject (4). If there was an initial state of the universe, for example, a naturalist will say that at no time does there exist anything with the power to bring it about that that state never obtained."
That would be an arbitrary move designed to negate the argument because he can't disprove the logic. What possible reason could justify it? If nothing could bring it about then nothing would exist.
do you understand that virtual particles do not come into being for no reason with no prior condition? they are literally the combining of other particles and the only reason they talk about no cause is because the combination comes from no previous combo and it goes into nothing, that does not mean it have no cause or prior conditions.
"Or suppose we say there is no criterion—necessity is just primitive. Then I think you face a challenge in explaining why the theist is entitled say God exists necessarily but the naturalist can’t say that some part of the causal order—say, the initial state of the universe, if there was one, or some infinite past segment of the history of the universe, if the universe is backwardly eternal—could not have failed to obtain, and therefore reject (4)."
follow the steps in the argument it proves the universe is contingent by definition there must be a necessity. Parts of the causal order are contingent. there's also empirical proof because the nature background radiation shows that if there was a series of bangs and crunches they were not eternal. So the universe had to come into existence we have no example of that happening with no pri0or condition.
"These are just a few of the questions one could raise about this sort of argument, but perhaps enough to help get a discussion started.
-John"
Thanks again I appreciate your input
You say: “A contingency is something that depends upon something for its being . . . .”
If that’s what you mean by “contingent”—dependent on something for its existence—then your argument is egregiously question-begging. Naturalists deny that the universe depends on something else for its existence. They think (4) is false, and if they think the universe is a “natural thing,” they will think (3) is false as well.
Suppose an atheist were to offer this argument:
(1) The universe does not depend on anything for its existence. (premise)
(2) If God exists, the universe depends on God for its existence. (premise)
(3) Therefore, God does not exist. (from (1) and (2))
That would be a terrible, question-begging argument because theists deny that (1) is true. Your cosmological argument is just the mirror image of that terrible, question-begging argument.
-John
A few other points of clarification.
Naturalists think the universe has no cause. So if they think the universe is a contingent thing, they will also think there is at least one contingent thing that has no cause. Hence they will think premise (1) is false.
My point about (2) is not “twaddle”; you just didn’t understand it. For the sake of simplicity, I’ll explain it in terms of “possible worlds.” (I know you have it on the highest authority that “possible worlds” talk is bullshit, but the “possible worlds” talk is inessential; you’re welcome to translate the argument into “possible worlds”-free language if you like.) If x is a sufficient condition for y, then in every possible world in which x obtains, y obtains too. Otherwise x wouldn’t be sufficient for y. But if x is necessary, then x obtains in every possible world. So y must also obtain in every possible. Hence y is necessary.
I take it that you don’t think that in every possible world in which God exists, the universe exists too. Hence you don’t think God’s existence is a sufficient condition for the existence of the universe. So you must take “x grounds y” to mean something other than “x is a sufficient condition for y.” I was just wondering what exactly you do take it to mean.
The third criterion of necessity I mentioned is not “an arbitrary move designed to negate the argument.” Alexander Pruss—a theist—proposes a somewhat similar criterion in his chapter of the Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology after an extended argument that other accounts of necessity are inadequate. I’m not sure if the criterion I mentioned is exactly the same as Pruss’s, but it’s not something I made up just to evade the overwhelming force of your argument.
Nothing I said in my original comment has anything whatsoever to do with virtual particles. In particular, nothing I said depends on the claim that virtual particles are uncaused. I have no idea why you brought up virtual particles.
-John
"Anonymous said...
You say: “A contingency is something that depends upon something for its being . . . .”
If that’s what you mean by “contingent”—dependent on something for its existence—then your argument is egregiously question-begging. Naturalists deny that the universe depends on something else for its existence. They think (4) is false, and if they think the universe is a “natural thing,” they will think (3) is false as well."
Begging the question doesn't mean that you say something with which the opponent disagrees...It means that you base your defense of the argument upon the conclusion you are trying to prove., I don't do that. each step step is logically deduced from the prior steps as an argument should be. observe:
(1)all contingent things have causes undeniable
(2) All contingencies require necessities to ground them.undeniable
(3) All natural things are contingentundeniable
(4) the universe is natural, therefore, the universe is contingent--deduced from 1-3. if all natural thingsx are cotingent and the universe natural then it is contingent.
if P then q
p therefore q
if the universe is natural it is contingent
The universe ids natural therefore (since all natural things are cotangent), universe is too. doesn't matter if the other guy doesn't like it.
(5) the universe requires a necessity upon which its existence is grounded, Therefore, the origin of the universe must be necessary.
(6)Since the origin of the universe must be necessary (from 2,4 and 5) and not contingent the origin cannot have a cause.
(7)The origin of universe is necessary and must be eternal and first cause, since this is the definition of God (see Rational Warrant page) then the origin of the universe must be God.
"Suppose an atheist were to offer this argument:
(1) The universe does not depend on anything for its existence. (premise)
(2) If God exists, the universe depends on God for its existence. (premise)
(3) Therefore, God does not exist. (from (1) and (2))
That would be a terrible, question-begging argument because theists deny that (1) is true. Your cosmological argument is just the mirror image of that terrible, question-begging argument."
No. It is a fallacy but not begging the question it's affirming the consequent, question begging is a from circular reasoning nothing about my argument begs the question.
saying that my argument is mirror image means it is the opposite.
there is nothing analogous between my argument and that one. that argument is fallacious because it asserts hat if the universe depends upon God then God must exist and because of this the opposite also hold true, that does not follow. nothing like that is found in my argument. you have failed to show any step that is illogical.
Anonymous Anonymous said...
A few other points of clarification.
Naturalists think the universe has no cause. So if they think the universe is a contingent thing, they will also think there is at least one contingent thing that has no cause. Hence they will think premise (1) is false."
First, naturalists do not think the universe has no cause. Some may think that but not all. I already said that. Secondly, even so is not necessary for the opponent to agree for my argument to be true. That is not how argument works. The opponent generally disagrees and one disproves the arguments, that's what I just did.
"My point about (2) is not “twaddle”; you just didn’t understand it. For the sake of simplicity, I’ll explain it in terms of “possible worlds.” (I know you have it on the highest authority that “possible worlds” talk is bullshit,"
Yes a philosopher named Feiser
"but the “possible worlds” talk is inessential; you’re welcome to translate the argument into “possible worlds”-free language if you like.) If x is a sufficient condition for y, then in every possible world in which x obtains, y obtains too. Otherwise x wouldn’t be sufficient for y. But if x is necessary, then x obtains in every possible world. So y must also obtain in every possible. Hence y is necessary."
no that is totally and absolutely fallacious. the meaning of the term cotangent means that itho9ut X Y would not exit. That does not mean that if X always exists Y must always exist. that's absurd. That's liker saying there is no possible world in which your parents have not gotten married and not had you. Are you trying to claim that you are necessarily in all possible worlds? you may be a fine person but...
"I take it that you don’t think that in every possible world in which God exists, the universe exists too. Hence you don’t think God’s existence is a sufficient condition for the existence of the universe. So you must take “x grounds y” to mean something other than “x is a sufficient condition for y.” I was just wondering what exactly you do take it to mean."
you have a fallacious understanding of the relationship between contingency and necessary. I know the atheists have been fomenting this and it's totally illogical. a contingency is not necessary to the necessity that produces it. Just as your parents, upon whom you are contingent, did not have to have you.
God is necessary in every possible world but the universe is not.
"The third criterion of necessity I mentioned is not “an arbitrary move designed to negate the argument.” Alexander Pruss—a theist—proposes a somewhat similar criterion in his chapter of the Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology after an extended argument that other accounts of necessity are inadequate. I’m not sure if the criterion I mentioned is exactly the same as Pruss’s, but it’s not something I made up just to evade the overwhelming force of your argument."
I disagree with Pruss, I know you did not make it up. I still think it's wrong.
"Nothing I said in my original comment has anything whatsoever to do with virtual particles. In particular, nothing I said depends on the claim that virtual particles are uncaused. I have no idea why you brought up virtual particles."
yes it does. That's the basis upon which those naturalists who deny a cause for the universe do so.
hey John post on my boards. You would like we would love to have you. see the side bar doxa forums.
No naturalist accepts your premise (3) that all natural things are contingent. Not the way you mean “natural things”—as including the universe—and not the way you mean “contingent”—as dependent on something for its existence. Whether all “natural things” (in your sense) depend on something for their existence is a big part of what’s in dispute between theists and naturalists. A cosmological argument is supposed to show that theists are right about that issue and naturalists are wrong. But your premise (3) just assumes that theists are right about that issue and naturalists are wrong. Hence your argument begs the question.
My hypothetical atheistic argument is deductively valid. It’s an instance of modus tollens (if p then q; not-q; therefore, not-p), not affirming the consequent (if p then q; q; therefore, p). The problem with my hypothetical atheistic argument is exactly the same as the problem with your argument: it presupposes a conclusion about a key issue that’s in dispute between the theist and the naturalist—whether the universe depends on something for its existence.
Lots of naturalists don’t rely in any significant way on claims about virtual particles in support of their rejection of, say, the kalam cosmological argument. You’re generalizing a bit too quickly from the “new atheist” types you’ve encountered on message boards.
My point about necessity and contingency and sufficient conditions has to do with notions of necessity and contingency different from the ones you’re relying on in your argument. So my point, though correct, is irrelevant here.
-John
No naturalist accepts your premise
yea they do, most modern people still believe in cause and effect
(3) that all natural things are contingent. Not the way you mean “natural things”—as including the universe—and not the way you mean “contingent”—as dependent on something for its existence.
You really don't get how logic works do you? you can't denie 1-3 without denying cause and effect toally
more latter
Whether all “natural things” (in your sense) depend on something for their existence is a big part of what’s in dispute between theists and naturalists. A cosmological argument is supposed to show that theists are right about that issue and naturalists are wrong. But your premise (3) just assumes that theists are right about that issue and naturalists are wrong. Hence your argument begs the question.
No it's not. There are not things in nature that just comes into being, no rock, no postage stamp, no germ, with no cause. you must give an example of one. let's see it. The issue is the whole. you don't have an argument. Just saying "I disagree" is not an argument.
My hypothetical atheistic argument is deductively valid. It’s an instance of modus tollens (if p then q; not-q; therefore, not-p), not affirming the consequent (if p then q; q; therefore, p).
wrong, your argument would entail the necessity being dependent upon the contingency. that is illogical.v that is not modus tollens
¬q
p→q
∴ ¬p
This form of argument is called modus tollens (the mode that denies).
https://www.cs.ucsb.edu/~pconrad/cs40/lessons/logic/modusPonensModusTollens.html
The problem with my hypothetical atheistic argument is exactly the same as the problem with your argument: it presupposes a conclusion about a key issue that’s in dispute between the theist and the naturalist—whether the universe depends on something for its existence.
I have answered that several times now. The argument only presumes that natural things have causes. now are saying the universe is supernatural?
you have no logical reason why we can't extrapolate from the fact of all natural things have causes to the universe having a cause because it's a natural thing.
that just tell me you don't know what the terms mean. Clearly the argument advances the idea that if x then y therefore not y means not X. that is affirming the consequent. that is not modus tollens.
Lots of naturalists don’t rely in any significant way on claims about virtual particles in support of their rejection of, say, the kalam cosmological argument. You’re generalizing a bit too quickly from the “new atheist” types you’ve encountered on message boards.
My point about necessity and contingency and sufficient conditions has to do with notions of necessity and contingency different from the ones you’re relying on in your argument. So my point, though correct, is irrelevant here.
Lots of naturalists don’t rely in any significant way on claims about virtual particles in support of their rejection of, say, the kalam cosmological argument. You’re generalizing a bit too quickly from the “new atheist” types you’ve encountered on message boards.
you still have no logical reason to deny that the universe must have a cause. That all naturalists don't argue from QM particles doesn't channge that.
My point about necessity and contingency and sufficient conditions has to do with notions of necessity and contingency different from the ones you’re relying on in your argument. So my point, though correct, is irrelevant here.
In any debate it just makes sense that the one making the argument defines the terms. I bring the agument I know what I mean by it.
“You really don't get how logic works do you? you can't denie 1-3 without denying cause and effect toally”
I understand logic pretty well, actually. Well enough to recognize the obvious fact that denying (3) does not entail denying cause and effect totally. It entails only that there is at least one natural thing that isn’t contingent. That’s it. If you think denying (3) entails that no natural things are contingent, then you don’t understand how logic works.
“you don’t have an argument. Just saying ‘I disagree’ is not an argument.”
Come on, Joe. This is a cheap maneuver. You’re the one purporting to offer an argument. Your audience isn’t required to just accept all your premises unless they can affirmatively show them to be false. If you make an argument and your audience doesn’t accept the premises, you either admit that your argument is unsuccessful or give some additional argument for the premises.
“wrong, your argument would entail the necessity being dependent upon the contingency. that is illogical.v that is not modus tollens”
Joe, for the love of God, read my (hypothetical) argument again. It is indeed an instance of modus tollens, and it doesn’t entail any nonsense about necessities being dependent on contingencies.
Let me try to make the structure of the argument as clear as possible. I’ll start with some definitions:
p = God exists
q = The universe depends on something for its existence
Now here’s the argument:
(1) ~q (premise)
(2) p --> q (premise)
(3) ~p (from (1) and (2))
Kinda looks like your definition of modus tollens, doesn’t it? That’s because it is modus tollens, not affirming the consequent.
So the argument is deductively valid. The problem with the argument is that the first premise—(1) ~q—presupposes a conclusion on a key issue that’s in dispute between theists and naturalists. Kind of like your argument, which presupposes q instead of ~q.
“Clearly the argument advances the idea that if x then y therefore not y means not X. that is affirming the consequent. that is not modus tollens.”
Nope. That’s modus tollens again. Inferring the conclusion “not-x” from the premises “if x then y” and “not-y” is modus tollens. Affirming the consequent would be inferring “x” from the premises “if x then y” and “y.” You should really learn the difference.
-John
“you have no logical reason why we can't extrapolate from the fact of all natural things have causes to the universe having a cause because it's a natural thing.”
Okay, are we getting to the argument for premise (3) now? Well, here are a few differences between the particular natural thing at issue—the universe—and, for example, postage stamps.
For any given postage stamp that exists now, there is some time in the past when it didn’t exist. But that isn’t true of the universe. Big Bang cosmology doesn’t say that at some time in the past, there was no universe and then later the universe came into being. It says that the universe has existed at every moment in time, but past time is itself finite. There was no time before the universe existed. And any causal explanations I can think of offhand seem to involve processes that take place in time, and that take place at least partly before the effect exists. That includes not only personal explanations—of which theism would appear to be an example, at least if one holds a particular conception of God—but even purported examples of simultaneous causation, like a bowling ball resting on a pillow causing an indentation in the pillow. (Before the indentation in the pillow appears, someone has to pick up the bowling ball and put it on the pillow.)
So it seems reasonable to doubt that the kinds of causal explanations we usually give to other natural things are available in the case of the universe and, therefore, to have doubts about the generalization from natural things within the universe to the universe itself. Maybe those doubts can be dispelled, but I don’t think pointing out that the universe is “natural” is enough to do the job.
Another difference that comes to mind is that if a postage stamp came into existence completely uncaused, presumably that would violate some conservation law. Where did the mass of the postage stamp come from? Presumably it didn’t exist before if the postage stamp came into existence completely uncaused. But the universe’s having no cause would not seem to violate any conservation laws, since there was no time in the past when, say, the mass-energy in the universe didn’t exist.
Finally, naturalists think the universe is the whole of the causal order, not a part of it. Other natural things are only parts of the causal order. And although it makes sense to ask for causes of parts of the causal order, it doesn’t seem to make sense to ask for the cause of the whole, since any causal explanation for the existence of the causal order itself would inevitably presuppose the existence of some causal order and therefore be circular. Or so it seems to me. Maybe it’s unreasonable for naturalists to think the universe is the whole of the causal order. But I don’t think pointing out that the universe is “natural” is enough to show that.
-John
Anonymous said...
“you have no logical reason why we can't extrapolate from the fact of all natural things have causes to the universe having a cause because it's a natural thing.”
Okay, are we getting to the argument for premise (3) now? Well, here are a few differences between the particular natural thing at issue—the universe—and, for example, postage stamps.
Yes there are, but not to the extent that it allows for something from nothing. Nor can the universe be construed as eternal.
For any given postage stamp that exists now, there is some time in the past when it didn’t exist. But that isn’t true of the universe.
Yes but not the universe existed eternally, only because we have a problem with conceptualizing a "before time." We transpose it to space. there is a beyond time that doesn't mean the universe is eternal. Time and the universe begin together. that's why there's a singularity.
Big Bang cosmology doesn’t say that at some time in the past, there was no universe and then later the universe came into being. It says that the universe has existed at every moment in time, but past time is itself finite. There was no time before the universe existed.
Yes but only as a trick of language. Time and the universe begin together. that is exactly what the theory says.
And any causal explanations I can think of offhand seem to involve processes that take place in time, and that take place at least partly before the effect exists. That includes not only personal explanations—of which theism would appear to be an example, at least if one holds a particular conception of God—but even purported examples of simultaneous causation, like a bowling ball resting on a pillow causing an indentation in the pillow. (Before the indentation in the pillow appears, someone has to pick up the bowling ball and put it on the pillow.)
Or to create time and the universe. Actually time is art of the universe, four coordinate system it's the f0uth dimension. That is a good reason to think the universe should not be here it's reason to thin something external created it.No change in a timeless void. That means nothing could come to bel. they do talk about it as coming to be. U can prove that with all kinds of quotes.
So it seems reasonable to doubt that the kinds of causal explanations we usually give to other natural things are available in the case of the universe and, therefore, to have doubts about the generalization from natural things within the universe to the universe itself. Maybe those doubts can be dispelled, but I don’t think pointing out that the universe is “natural” is enough to do the job.
that doe3s not extend to thinking the universe did not come to be. logically, is time eternal? the whole concept of the big bang is that there's an expansion of space/time from a single point not that space/etkime is eternal.
they sure as hell do think of it as virtual particles come into being from nothing that is why the title of the book is "universe from nothing." But you still have no examples of something crom nothing.
Another difference that comes to mind is that if a postage stamp came into existence completely uncaused, presumably that would violate some conservation law. Where did the mass of the postage stamp come from? Presumably it didn’t exist before if the postage stamp came into existence completely uncaused. But the universe’s having no cause would not seem to violate any conservation laws, since there was no time in the past when, say, the mass-energy in the universe didn’t exist.
there is no way you can argue the universe is eternal. that's not the concept of/cosmology of anyone, that is in fact steady state which was totally discredited.
Finally, naturalists think the universe is the whole of the causal order, not a part of it. Other natural things are only parts of the causal order. And although it makes sense to ask for causes of parts of the causal order, it doesn’t seem to make sense to ask for the cause of the whole, since any causal explanation for the existence of the causal order itself would inevitably presuppose the existence of some causal order and therefore be circular. Or so it seems to me. Maybe it’s unreasonable for naturalists to think the universe is the whole of the causal order. But I don’t think pointing out that the universe is “natural” is enough to show that.
Bull shit. why did the guy call the book "Universe from nothing?" because its expanding from a [point that is nothing, It is not eternal. it is not all order something ordered it.
Even assuming no begining of Time, Susy Gut theory still postulates a "beyond time" as a putative state of affairs. This description confirms my argument since it describes a state in which no change can ever come to be. That leaves the scientific solution still seeking some higher set of coordinates upon which the universe must be contingent:
Sten OdenwaldBeyond the Big Bang.
Copyright (C) 1987, Kalmbach Publishing
"Theories like those of SUSY GUTS (Supersymetry Grand Unified Theory) and Superstrings seem to suggest that just a few moments after Creation, the laws of physics and the content of the world were in a highly symmetric state; one superforce and perhaps one kind of superparticle. The only thing breaking the perfect symmetry of this era was the definite direction and character of the dimension called Time. Before Creation, the primordial symmetry may have been so perfect that, as Vilenkin proposed, the dimensionality of space was itself undefined. To describe this state is a daunting challenge in semantics and mathematics because the mathematical act of specifying its dimensionality would have implied the selection of one possibility from all others and thereby breaking the perfect symmetry of this state. There were, presumably, no particles of matter or even photons of light then, because these particles were born from the vacuum fluctuations in the fabric of spacetime that attended the creation of the universe. In such a world, nothing happens because all 'happenings' take place within the reference frame of time and space. The presence of a single particle in this nothingness would have instantaneously broken the perfect symmetry of this era because there would then have been a favored point in space different from all others; the point occupied by the particle. This nothingness didn't evolve either, because evolution is a time-ordered process. The introduction of time as a favored coordinate would have broken the symmetry too. It would seem that the 'Trans-Creation' state is beyond conventional description because any words we may choose to describe it are inherently laced with the conceptual baggage of time and space. Heinz Pagels reflects on this 'earliest' stage by saying, "The nothingness 'before' the creation of the universe is the most complete void we can imagine. No space, time or matter existed. It is a world without place, without duration or eternity..."
I haven’t claimed that the universe has existed for an infinitely long past time. Nothing I’ve said implies that it’s “eternal” in that sense. And I haven’t endorsed anything like steady-state cosmology.
But even if the universe hasn’t existed for an infinitely long past time, it doesn’t follow that there was some time in the past when the universe didn’t exist. It might be that although the universe has only existed for a finite time, there was no time in the past when the universe didn’t exist, because past time itself is finite. The universe has only existed for about 14 billion years, but there have only been about 14 billion years. And that is in fact what old-fashioned Big Bang cosmology says, at least as this layman understands it.
If that’s right, then there’s no reason for a naturalist to undertake the task of coming up with an example of “something coming from nothing” because there’s no reason for a naturalist to believe the universe “came from nothing.” At no time in the past was there “nothing.” And it doesn’t make sense—not literal sense anyway, even if it might make for a picturesque metaphor—to talk about the universe “coming into being” when the universe has existed at every moment in time, even if every moment in time only adds up to a finite past duration. I came into being. At one time I didn’t exist. Then, through a causal process that took place in time, I came to exist. But the universe isn’t like that.
Besides, even if the naturalist can’t come up with an example of something coming from nothing, what’s your alternative? Some sort of timeless causation? Can you give me an example of that?
I haven’t really gotten into more recent speculations about the universe arising from vacuum fluctuations or whatever because those scenarios seem sort of beside the point in this context. I haven’t read Krauss’s book, for example, but if his preferred scenario involves the universe supposedly “coming into being” from some sort of quantum vacuum state, then it’s just one physical state causing other physical states—just another case of causation within the universe, not a cause of the universe. Talking about a “universe from nothing” is just a way to sell books.
By the way, if you haven’t read it before, you might enjoy David Albert’s harsh review of Krauss’s book: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/25/books/review/a-universe-from-nothing-by-lawrence-m-krauss.html
-John
Anonymous Anonymous said...
I haven’t claimed that the universe has existed for an infinitely long past time. Nothing I’ve said implies that it’s “eternal” in that sense. And I haven’t endorsed anything like steady-state cosmology.
Your argument makes even less since then, because there is no middle ground. If it did not have a cause and did not exist eternally then it popped into existence for no reason that is the least salient option. You have no example of anything doing that.
But even if the universe hasn’t existed for an infinitely long past time, it doesn’t follow that there was some time in the past when the universe didn’t exist.
We've already agreed that that way of speaking about it is semantically problematic. There is no time before time so you can't speak that way. The only alternatives are (1) beginning 3ithvno cause (2) being caused to begin, or (3) existing eternally. No. 1 the one you choose by default is the least logical.
It might be that although the universe has only existed for a finite time, there was no time in the past when the universe didn’t exist, because past time itself is finite. The universe has only existed for about 14 billion years, but there have only been about 14 billion years. And that is in fact what old-fashioned Big Bang cosmology says, at least as this layman understands it.
I've already shown that's just a semantic difficulty.
If that’s right, then there’s no reason for a naturalist to undertake the task of coming up with an example of “something coming from nothing” because there’s no reason for a naturalist to believe the universe “came from nothing.”
Can you give a fourth alternative? You seemed to have nixed the other two so what's left?
At no time in the past was there “nothing.”
I just quoted an expert who says there was. you are playing a semantic game. There s a beyond Time. no time in the past but there is a beyond time where there is no time and co cause. In that state time and the universe begin together.
And it doesn’t make sense—not literal sense anyway, even if it might make for a picturesque metaphor—to talk about the universe “coming into being” when the universe has existed at every moment in time, even if every moment in time only adds up to a finite past duration. I came into being. At one time I didn’t exist. Then, through a causal process that took place in time, I came to exist. But the universe isn’t like that.
you are just contradicting yourself. you say universe is not eternal but at no time was there not a universe that's only a trick of language. There was a timeless void in which there was no universe. I just showed why that means you have to choose the ridiculous answer or accept my conclusion.
Besides, even if the naturalist can’t come up with an example of something coming from nothing, what’s your alternative? Some sort of timeless causation? Can you give me an example of that?
yes, that's why it is a God argument. God is timeless funny how that works hu?
I haven’t really gotten into more recent speculations about the universe arising from vacuum fluctuations or whatever because those scenarios seem sort of beside the point in this context.
that doesn't answer the question because they still have to prove where the Vacuum flux came from.
I haven’t read Krauss’s book, for example, but if his preferred scenario involves the universe supposedly “coming into being” from some sort of quantum vacuum state, then it’s just one physical state causing other physical states—just another case of causation within the universe, not a cause of the universe. Talking about a “universe from nothing” is just a way to sell books.
that is what it says. you are right it doesn't solve the problem.
By the way, if you haven’t read it before, you might enjoy David Albert’s harsh review of Krauss’s book: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/25/books/review/a-universe-from-nothing-by-lawrence-m-krauss.html
Yes that's what IO am basing my answers on.
hey man I am really appreciative that are taking part in comments. Mind telling me how you found my bl9og and when? Might help me raise traffic.
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