Sunday, July 01, 2018

Ethical naturalism and Value Systems: Euthyphro Dilemma (final 3 of 3)

 photo Joseph_Fletcher_zps362f9578.jpg
Joseph Fletcher: Situation 
Ethics,Episcopal priest,
 pioneer in bio ethics.


The Euthyphro Dilemma

            Christian values have been assailed by modernity since the enlightenment. One of the major forms that attack takes is through the “Euthyphro dilemma.” This dilemma is aimed at the assumption that the only form of Christian ethics is divine command theory,[1] that God makes something good just because he says it, and his saying is an arbitrary whim. According to Baggett and Walls account of Louise Antony version is “are morally good actions morally Good simply in virtue of the gods favoring them or does God favor them because they are—independently of his favoring them—morally good?[2] Antony replaces “the gods” with “God” indicating that the God of monotheism is her intended target of rhetorical analysis, as Baggett and Walls point out. Yet the dilemma was orinally cast with Greek gods in mind. Bagget and Walls’s take on the dilemma is very detailed and complex, it’s one of the best in recent years. I won’t be going into it with that kind of complexity. The basic upshot of the dilemma is that either God is subject to an independent standard outside himself, and thus he is not God and secular thought might find that standard so we don’t need religion, or morality is just an arbitrary whim on God’s part. Yet the dilemma is based upon the Greek gods not the Christian, and as noted, Antony shifts form the Greek to the God of the Christian tradition with no justification. The Greek gods were continent beings, they had parents they were not eternal they were not the creators. The dilemma really doesn’t apply to the God of the Christian tradition who is eternal and the basis of all that is. That means there’s a closer relationship between the good God than just God’s commands. That connection  closer than divine command theory would have it; it’s not just a matter of “good is what God says it is,” although it is dependent upon God, but not just on his commands.[3]
            The relationship between God and the good is not merely based upon voluntarism, that God demans X therefore is good. Rather, it is that God is the basis of the good. Goodness is God’s character and without God there would be no concept of the good. Good depends upon God but not just upon his commands. It’s not merely that there would be no big bully on the block to tell us what is good, but that there would be no good itself because God is the good itself. The good is derived form God’s character and God’s character is love, love is the background of the moral universe (Augustine) and thus goodness is derived form love. That brings up several problems. For example, J.L. Mackie argues that once one affirms the existence of unchangeable moral good then God becomes unnecessary and secular thinkers might find those principles without God.[4] The concept of unchangeable moral good that is detachable form God is an impossibly. It might be that thinkers could come to conclusions that coincide with truths implicit upon God’s character and not know it. That’s hardly the same as saying God is “unnecessary.” If there’s any relation between what’s good and what’s true and if good is based upon God’s character there’s no true ontological separation between those two. In discussions with atheists when I say that morality is based upon love and love is God’s character they usually balk at both aspects of that statement: they figure love is a reaction of chemicals in the brain that just produces little sentimental or romantic feelings, and moral good is derived from behavior not from love. Usually they don’t observe the implicit value that would make a behavior good or bad. There’s more to it than just saying good is based upon God’s character. It’s also a matter of God’s judgment. God’s power, knowledge and goodness underwrite his moral authority.[5]God not only creates all that is, including planning its purpose, but also knows the truth and is the only mind that can figure the complexities of all existing relationships between moral concepts and human behavior, and the only truly objective judge who knows the subjects of moral behavior better than they know themselves, and in addition to all that has the forthrightness and loving concern to explicate moral judgments fairly. When I say “love” is behind the good I don’t mean romantic love or sentimentality but the Greek term agape.  The idea that love is the basis of he good may be a problem for some Christians because there is a concept in the Christian tradition that love and moral goodness (justice for example) are two counterpoising forces that have to keep each other in balance. I suggest that is nonsense if we are talking about Gods’ love, the love that is the basis of God’s character. “Whoever does not love does not know God, for God is love.” (1 John 4:8).


What is the good?


            Agape is used of God’s love throughout the New Testament. It is translated as “charity” at times.[6] The word is linked with good will and benevolence. The King James translation renders it “charity” (1 Corinthians 13:1). There’s more to it than that. It’s also linked to “preference” to prefer the other. The word is used for the love of God for man and man for God, the love of humans for each other, and the love of God for Christ.[7] Agape is the basis of the good. What is good evaluated as what is agapic (loving). Other moral precepts and axioms such as justice, fairness and reciprocity would all be meaningful only in relation to agape. In fact one major theological ethicist came to that conclusion back in the 1960s, that was Joseph Fletcher. A lot of Christians were outraged by his view of “situation ethics,” and his book by the same title.[8] It was controversial and it drew lots of fire including the charge of “new morality.” Nevertheless he was a top notch ethicist. Fletcher argues that love and justice are the same. Justice is the distributive aspect of love.[9] He calls upon Augustine and argues that love must be prudent. He argues that this view forces us to pull back from the notion that love is sentimental and “mushy” and non intellectual. This is the intellectual side of love. Literally the argument is how do we manage to supply the beneficiaries of love when there are so many? The answer is by turning the problem into a question of justice. We make sure that justice is done at the same time making sure that love is distributed and doing it in such a way that we exclude one for he sake of the other.[10] Thus we can see how the other aspects of moral axioms indeed stem form love. Love is the background of the moral universe.
            Christian ethics certainly revolve around love. The value system that we use to inform that choice is the one through which Augustine re-valued the values of the Roman Empire. That value system plays out upon the eternal scale of values. We love the eternal we use the temporal. Human beings are eternal, created in the image of God, thus each human being is an end in himself/herself. Temporal things are means to ends. Thus temporal things are to be used and put aside but human beings matter. If science was the basis of ethics, nature never tells us that humans are valuable, there would be no basis for valuing humans except the cultural, and that is relative and can be discarded. Ethical naturalists might kid themselves about the alleged “objective basis” for ethics, they sound like persupositionalist Christian apologists trying to explain what that means. Without the arbitrary assumption already built in regarding the value of human worth, without appeal to a transcendent value system such as Christian agape there is no basis that science could ever give us for not using humans and valuing things. One finds scientistic thinkers such as atheists, especially on the popular level, expressing the sentiments that “humans are not so special.” We don’t have souls, there’s no God, we are just bags of chemicals or jumped up apes so why should we think we are special? Steve Paulson is an example from the popular level. Although he has an advanced science degree and works in science, obliquely. He’s a producer for public radio and an author. He expresses the idea that humans are just “cosmopolitan apes.” Again the idea is not to find fault with evolution. We can accept evolution as scientific fact and accept ethics as philosophical fact and accept The Bible as spiritual fact all at the same time and value humanity. Paulson says:

Most assume that humans are fundamentally different form the rest of the animal world…many people believe that but to biologists we are animals. It’s hard to believe that we are fundamentally different because there is no part of the human brain that is not present in the monkey’s brain. Our brains are bigger and we certainly have more powerful computer than any other animal, but the computer is not fundamentally different. So there’s no fundamental divide between humans and Chimpanzees? no…if you were to ask what the big difference is I would probably say it’s language but like all capacities once you break them down you are going to find some of these part sin other species.[11]

He argues that chimps have morality, “they have a sense of fairness.” Is it really a concept of fairness or just behavior would be fair if they really understood it, but perhaps they don’t? He finds that chimps respond to the needs of others, they seem to share food with those who don’t have enough. Is this really ethical thinking or just a instinctive sense of love that might pervade all creatures? He’s talking about cooperation in hunting. That’s not proof that they value each other. It could just be a practical matter that helps them all. It is evidence of outcome oriented thinking that doesn’t necessarily recognize a moral dimension but a practical survival dimension. Isn’t that what Harris and Churchland and Wilson are reducing ethics to?
            More examination of how this thinking plays out at the popular level, even though this is not scientific, we find bloggers expressed some odd sentiments. The blog “Think Atheist” urges that we should be “ridding ourselves of humanities self centrality: The Importance of Inclusively.”[12]


Humanity thought the universe spun around the Earth as if it were the purpose of the universe. Likewise, the sun.

Another way we think we are special is amongst the rest of the life forms on the planet. We like to believe that there are animals... and there are humans. We seem to have a hard time admitting to ourselves that we are animals. But we are. I'd like to take this idea one step further though. We are all LIFE. We are all BIOLOGY. And the separations between us that seem so important, identifiable and distinctive. Are actually not all that different in the end. All life on this planet evolved IS RELATED. FAMILY. By quantifiable amounts. 99% of our DNA is that of a chimpanzees and 50% of our DNA is that of a banana. ALL LIFE is CLOSELY related. We all come from the same place and we're all going in the same direction. We are procreating and spreading the seed of life, adapting to new environments by all means necessary, even if we must evolve.[13]

If we are animals and we are life and we are no better than any other animals or life would it really matter if we don’t get the quinine to the children dying of malaria? After all there’s lots more life where that life comes from and no one is special. Or that we have to allow dying or even killing off some group so the rest will have more to go around? After all a good outcome is all that matters, we are not special so we can be a means to an end. How are they going to decide this in the clash of such values? Neither the nature from which they take their ethical axioms, nor the science they prize so highly tells us to value humanity or to make humans ends in themselves. How will they resolve such conflicts?            
            These ideas can be put into a positive version. Yet if we assume that we are now coasting on Christian memories and the culture has lots of ideas left over from a time when we valued humanity, what’s going to happen in a couple of generations when those ideas are all gone and we are just seen as “some examples of life among other life,” no better than any other animal and not more than a means to an end; the end being an outcome considered “moral” by those who don’t see a difference in marmoset values and human values. Out come is not totally divorced from deontology. Just because a deontologist doesn’t use outcome as the basis for ethical “ought” doesn’t mean we don’t care about having good outcomes. It seems that if there is no ethical deliberation along the lines of basic value system there is no ethical thought. If there is no ethical thought there is no ethical action. Reducing meta ethical theory (the theory of what makes a thing good or not) to behavior is not the answer. Valuing human individuals as ends in themselves and worthy of preserving rights and ends seems like a good place to start thinking about the sorts of outcomes we desire.




[1] David Baggett and Jerry L. Walls, Good God: The Theistic Foundations of Morality. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011, 32.
[2] Ibid., 32.
[3] Ibid., 84.
[4] Ibid., 85.
[5] Ibid., 123.
[6] Bible Hub website, Thayers Greek Lexicon, Electronic Database. Bible soft, 2002, 2011.  http://biblesuite.com/greek/26.htm  accessed 5/30/13.
[7] Ibid.
[8] James F. Childress, “Introduction,” Joseph Fletcher, Situation Ethics: the New Morality. Louisville Kentucky: Westminster, John Knox Press, originally published 1966. 1.
[9] Ibid., 87. Not only did Fletcher receive a lot of criticism, “situation ethics” was the title of the book and the name of the ethical theory, the subtitle was “the new morality.” Both became dirty words, so the actual title of the book was like a charge leveled against him. I am not supporting situation ethics but I do support Fletcher’s reading of love and justice.
[10] Ibid.,  88.
[11] Steve Paulson, The Cosmopolitan Ape: primatology, empathy, morality, community, culture.” Website: http://nautil.us/issue/1/what-makes-you-so-special/the-cosmopolitan-ape  accessed 6/3/13.
[12] Dragontorn, Think Atheist, “Ridding ourselves of Humanities Self Centrality: the Importance of Inclusively.” Blog: http://www.thinkatheist.com/profiles/blogs/ridding-ourselves-of-humanity-s-self-centrality-the-importance-of  accessed 6/3/13.
[13] Ibid.







27 comments:

Ryan M said...

Not all Christians think that God is the basis of morality, and not all Christians think that literally everything depends on God. Of interest, the very book you're citing says that Swinburne rejects that any moral truth depends on God, so the very book you're citing contradicts you on this point. As I have stressed in the past; don't speak for all theists since not all theists share your views. Some theists would accept Anthony's independence thesis regarding God and morality, and plenty of theists accept Platonism with respect to propositions, sets, possible worlds, relations, etc.

"Antony shifts form the Greek to the God of the Christian tradition with no justification"

Joe, Louise Anthony explicitly says the following:

"Translated into contemporary terms, the question Socrates is asking is this: Are morally good actions morally good simply in virtue of God's favoring them? Or does God favor them because they are - independently of his favoring them - morally good? It's a question I'd like to put directly to Dr.Craig"

Anthony's quote above comes after; 1. Anthony saying she is responding to Bill Craig's moral argument (so she is talking about Bill Craig's variety of monotheism), 2. A brief history of the Euthyphro dilemma as originally found in Plato's story.

The quote comes directly after Anthony explained the Euthyphro story and what all the Greek terms meant. If anyone acted without justification, it is actually you for attacking Anthony without reading her quote in context from the original source.

My advice: Don't search for ways to attack opponents for all you do is look desperate and biased.





Eric Sotnak said...

"This dilemma is aimed at the assumption that the only form of Christian ethics is divine command theory"

Well, no. That's not a fair characterization of the Euthyphro dilemma at all. The Euthyphro dilemma is based on the question of what it is that confers rightness (or perhaps goodness) on actions. It might be possible to read Plato's doctrine of Forms back into the Euthyphro (depending on where you think Socrates ends and Plato begins) and ask whether divine authority can plausibly explain rightness, or whether there is some Form participation in which leads the gods to approve of some actions and not others. Is divine approval or disapproval capricious? That is the core of the Euthyphro dilemma.

I am unpersuaded that contemporary efforts to rehabilitate Divine Command Theory avoid the substance of the Euthyphro dilemma. If we say that God's loving nature constrains his commands, we can still ask whether there is anything on the side of the action that imposes such a constraint, or not. I think it is clear that something must, otherwise the answer is that God approves of (or commands) the actions that he does because he is loving, but we are left with no answer the the question of why a loving God approves of some actions but not others.

For example, a loving-God Divine Command Theorist must answer both "Why does God forbid theft?" and "why did God command the slaughter of the Midianites?" by saying, "Because God is loving." Absent any account of how, exactly, each command conforms to a loving nature, loving-God DCT is no less hollow than traditional DCT.

Eric Sotnak said...
This comment has been removed by a blog administrator.
Joe Hinman said...

Not all Christians think that God is the basis of morality, and not all Christians think that literally everything depends on God.

Anyone who does not believe that everything depends upon God for it's existence and who calls himself a Christian is confused theologically.But i don't believe that God directly "invented" morality or assigned people a code of conduct. Perhaps you missed this discussion the previous post where 7 said:

7th Stooge said...
"God doesn't make things right or wrong. He instantiates right and wrong. I agree with you that God is the reason why things like murder are possible, but I don't think he is the reason why murder is wrong. He cannot create the idea of purpose because purpose is part of his nature. He can create and be the reason for the existence of purposeful creatures."

I said:

"I agree,good is based upon God's character,in love,not because at some point in time he said "I think I'll invent being good" That still takes the thunder out of the
eutheprho thing."

So this argument is about the logical consequences of belief in the kind of God Christianity posits in relation to the ED.God is not contingent. He's eternal, he created everything there are no fates to counterbalance God's will against. So why would there be a question about why God commands what he does? Clearly God commands certain things because they are in line with the good, The good is in concert with God's will because it stems from his character,


Joe Hinman said...

Of interest, the very book you're citing says that Swinburne rejects that any moral truth depends on God, so the very book you're citing contradicts you on this point.

Fool that I am I tend to find myself in disagreement with Swinburne more than I am in agreement,I think that may be because my theological background is more shaped by the Germans. Be that as it may,I am really interested in his reasons. Can you furnish me a quote?


As I have stressed in the past; don't speak for all theists since not all theists share your views. Some theists would accept Anthony's independence thesis regarding God and morality, and plenty of theists accept Platonism with respect to propositions, sets, possible worlds, relations, etc.

I don't understand why you think I've done that But if it's because I say the ED doesn't apply to he Christian God I stand by that. There are basic credal statements that all Christianity must agree to a priori, Christian identity is determined by those doctrines. The Christian God is eternal, necessary (as meaning not continent creator of all things,and the source of love.

"Antony shifts form the Greek to the God of the Christian tradition with no justification"

Joe, Louise Anthony explicitly says the following:

"Translated into contemporary terms, the question Socrates is asking is this: Are morally good actions morally good simply in virtue of God's favoring them? Or does God favor them because they are - independently of his favoring them - morally good? It's a question I'd like to put directly to Dr.Craig"

I contend it's a meaningless question when asked of Christian God. God doesn't favor a pre set collection of actions, God gives us a motive for our acts: love. We try to act on that motive, when we do then we have acted morally,When we violate that motivation we have failed to act morally,

Anthony's quote above comes after; 1. Anthony saying she is responding to Bill Craig's moral argument (so she is talking about Bill Craig's variety of monotheism), 2. A brief history of the Euthyphro dilemma as originally found in Plato's story.

sorry you are doing my argument not Craig's.The Original ED of Socrates was based upon gods that were more superhoere than divine, they were contingent, they were not creators, and they were not necessary being. Moreover they did not love in an agaopic sense.For the record The names to conjure with in my ethical universe are Joseph Fletcher, Reinhold Niebuhr, Dietrich Bonhoeffer,and Fred Schleiermacher, Albert Schweitzer.

The quote comes directly after Anthony explained the Euthyphro story and what all the Greek terms meant. If anyone acted without justification, it is actually you for attacking Anthony without reading her quote in context from the original source.

I fail to see how, you have said nothing that even hints as the concerns I voiced,

My advice: Don't search for ways to attack opponents for all you do is look desperate and biased.

rooting for the home team hu? Remember it's not a war, but it might be a ball game.

Joe Hinman said...

Eric Sotnak said...
"This dilemma is aimed at the assumption that the only form of Christian ethics is divine command theory"

Well, no. That's not a fair characterization of the Euthyphro dilemma at all. The Euthyphro dilemma is based on the question of what it is that confers rightness (or perhaps goodness) on actions. It might be possible to read Plato's doctrine of Forms back into the Euthyphro (depending on where you think Socrates ends and Plato begins) and ask whether divine authority can plausibly explain rightness, or whether there is some Form participation in which leads the gods to approve of some actions and not others. Is divine approval or disapproval capricious? That is the core of the Euthyphro dilemma.

Good point Eric,I wrote this thing about five years ago so I don't remember all that I packed into it. I think what I should have said is that the ED as invented by Soc dealt with a different concept of God.The modern atheists thinkers I;ve seen,which granted not that many academics see, to expect the Christian will defend divine command. Were I writing it today I would say it much differently.

I am unpersuaded that contemporary efforts to rehabilitate Divine Command Theory avoid the substance of the Euthyphro dilemma. If we say that God's loving nature constrains his commands, we can still ask whether there is anything on the side of the action that imposes such a constraint, or not. I think it is clear that something must, otherwise the answer is that God approves of (or commands) the actions that he does because he is loving, but we are left with no answer the the question of why a loving God approves of some actions but not others.

Jesus seemed to imply that the motivation was really important. So if you hate you are a murderer.To me that says think about the motive that leads to murder. I doubt that God gives a body of ethical axioms that focus upon actions. The 10 commandments have an even spread of actions and motives,don't covet,don't steal.

For example, a loving-God Divine Command Theorist must answer both "Why does God forbid theft?" and "why did God command the slaughter of the Midianites?" by saying, "Because God is loving." Absent any account of how, exactly, each command conforms to a loving nature, loving-God DCT is no less hollow than traditional DCT.

Well the first problem there is a discussion abut the nature of the Bible.Remember what is said about Fletcher;s discussion of justice as a form of love, No i don;t slaughter is a form of love,but the Prohibition on theft might be.

8:11 AM Delete

Joe Hinman said...

Eric had a post that was a double of the first one so I zapped it,I guess he was caught out by the moderation.I think I might undo that soon. People don't like it. Blogger doesn;t give you a message saying moderation is on.Design flaw.

7th Stooge said...

Yes, I'm a theist who thinks that not all moral truths depend upon God. God instantiates the good but he's not the basis of it. The good or embodying the good is part of God's nature, but God didn't create his nature. God made and makes it possible for there to be murder but God is not the reason that murder is wrong.

7th Stooge said...

(God's) eternal, he created everything there are no fates to counterbalance God's will against. So why would there be a question about why God commands what he does? Clearly God commands certain things because they are in line with the good, The good is in concert with God's will because it stems from his character.

Did God create the traits of his character, and if so, with what? Did he create numbers?

Joe Hinman said...

(God's) eternal, he created everything there are no fates to counterbalance God's will against. So why would there be a question about why God commands what he does? Clearly God commands certain things because they are in line with the good, The good is in concert with God's will because it stems from his character.

Did God create the traits of his character, and if so, with what? Did he create numbers?

I think we are saying either the same thing or closely related things. when I say God created everything Obviously i mean all continent things not himself, not his nature,God is the reason for morality he is the ultimate grounding of axioms but he is not directly the cause of moral motions or of moral acts.He did not invent morality.

We are created in God's image, with consciousness,mind (aka spirit) and the ability to love, We use the nature God gave us to develop morel motions, axioms and mores.

7th Stooge said...

But if God is not the cause or the reason why actions are right or wrong, I'm not sure what you mean when you say that God is the grounding of (moral) axioms. God would be the reason why there are creatures capable of morality, but I see that as a slightly different matter.

Steve Lovell said...

Haven't read this whole article, or even all the comments, but Swinburne doesn't think that ALL morality is independent of God. He thinks that God is a source of moral obligations, but not the foundation of morality. For example, he thinks that we should honour our benefactors, and that God is one such benefactor, and therefore that we should honour God. So there is a moral obligation which wouldn't exist in the absence of God. But, on this view, there would still be moral obligations if God didn't exist.

Not my own position, but that's my understanding of Swinburne. It may be that his views have changed since the publications my summary here is based upon. I could probably find sources if someone wanted that.

Joe Hinman said...

Thank you Steve,I appreciate that information. I really don't buy that view, it seems there's a prior value underneath gratitude to benefactors. What would make us value keeping obligations at all? I can't see what other God would do it.

Joe Hinman said...

But if God is not the cause or the reason why actions are right or wrong, I'm not sure what you mean when you say that God is the grounding of (moral) axioms. God would be the reason why there are creatures capable of morality, but I see that as a slightly different matter.

BUI thin he is, not by inventing morality but by putting into us the likability to love and standing behind moral obligation

7th Stooge said...

Yes, I agree, but like I said, I think that's a somewhat different issue.

Joe Hinman said...

God does make certain commands, to disobey then is violating an ethical norm..
God's sanction of certain values is grounding those values(axioms) in God's command. But unlike DCT God's command is not arbitrary but is based upon love, in accordance with his character.

7th Stooge said...

But given God's omniscience, couldn't any seemingly capricious command of God be justified as having been motivated out of love? IOW, practically speaking, I don't see the difference between your interpretation and DCT.

Joe Hinman said...

why should we assume that God gives capricious commands just because he might get away with giving them? The real difference is DCT asserts that capricious commands are just as moral. My idea assumes that God is motivated by love not caprice. I assume Capricorns commands would violate God's perfection.

Joe Hinman said...

the real difference is with my view God is worthy of worship with DCT morality is meaningless.

7th Stooge said...

I know. I meant that from our limited human perspective, we cannot know the difference. It has to be an act of faith that rejects DCT and sides with love. And nothing that could ever conceivably happen, even a thousand Holocausts, could ever count against it.

Joe Hinman said...

aside from the perennial oceanic question like why does God allow pain,I think we know when we have hold of a capricious excise for an ethical axiom.

7th Stooge said...

Not with an infinite mind.

Joe Hinman said...

that's just begging the question. you have no reason to think that God could act capriciously if you accept anything b the Christian view of god. Just because
god is beyond our understanding is no reason to assume that he doesn't live up to ordinary standards of the good.

7th Stooge said...

I'm not assuming God would act capriciously. You said that you think we knkow when we have hold of a capricious exercise of an ethical axiom. That has to do with our KNOWLEDGE, not with God himself. There's no reason to think we could understand the moral reasoning of an infinite mind. It has to be an act of faith to affirm that God's acts are always the most loving possible.

Joe Hinman said...

I'm not assuming God would act capriciously. You said that you think we knkow when we have hold of a capricious exercise of an ethical axiom. That has to do with our KNOWLEDGE, not with God himself. There's no reason to think we could understand the moral reasoning of an infinite mind. It has to be an act of faith to affirm that God's acts are always the most loving possible.

True but he can tell us. Jesus modeled God for us.

Ryan M said...

"Not my own position, but that's my understanding of Swinburne. It may be that his views have changed since the publications my summary here is based upon. I could probably find sources if someone wanted that."

That's correct. It's in contrast to Joe though who presumes that the truth of moral propositions depend on God (whereas Swinburne thinks there are possible worlds where there are moral truths but God fails to exist).

Joe Hinman said...

That's correct. It's in contrast to Joe though who presumes that the truth of moral propositions depend on God (whereas Swinburne thinks there are possible worlds where there are moral truths but God fails to exist).

That's the crux of why I don't accept Swinburne, I accept Plantinga, God has to exist in all possible worlds if he exists in one possible world, and if he is God.

Certainty true of Tillich's view as well.God can't be the ground of being in one world and not the ground of being in all worlds