In the last couple of posts I refereed to Dawkis as using the wrong concept of simplicity. complexity in arguing that God has to be complex, Our resident loyal opponent, "Skeptical," took exception, Apparently it's insulting atheists to disagree with them. In the pursuance of this discussion "Skepie" asked a question that suggested a dandy topic, "how do we know God is simple?" The reason this is so great as a topic is because it fits right in with my scheme of illustrating the explanatory power of the God concept. Understanding why God why we should think of God as simple is more than just an answer to Dawkins it also illustrates the justification for my rational warrant idea. I don't prove the existence of God I show that belief is rationally warranted.
Dawkins is working against what he takes to be the most popular pro God arguments (one of the weakest) the monkey’s-writing-Shakespeare-by-accident argument. He couches it in terms of assembling a a 747 from a scrap yard by means of a hurricane. The creationist, whose argument is revises, couches his argument in terms of finding some living creature who is too improbable to be assumable by accident. Improbability means complexity. The more complex something is the less likely it is to be assembled by accident. The creationist equates improbability with design. Dawkins points out that it’s not the Darwinians who are trying to get “something for nothing,” so to speak, in assuming that complexity could come about undersigned, but the creationists are seeking the “free lunch,” simply because they don’t recognize that “however statistically improbable the entity you seek to explain by evoking a designer, the designer himself has got to be at least as improbable. God is the ultimate Boeing 747.” Dawkins takes this assumption through the entire book. The view of God that he’s attacking is obviously that of a big man. It may be couched as “big mind” or even “universal mind” but it’s still an entity, a thing, something that has to consciously calculate or deliberate about what it’s doing. Never does he stop to consider that he might have the wrong idea of God. He spends long pages droning on and on about consciousness raising and implying that creationists are stupid and feminists are smarter, never does it occur to him that he just might be dealing with the wrong concept of God.
Dawkins uses the wrong concept of simplicity because he is assuming that God would be subject to physical law. Of course that is a laughable notion since God created physical law, he would be no more subject to it than we are to our day dreams. But the concept he's using is something like the universe has an immense abundance of detail in it so God has to have a huge amount of dendrites in his brain to keep up with it, This is something like Skeptical thinks about it, because he says "- Complex brains enable complex thinking. God is simple because God doesn't have a brain." That assumes God is a big man, Just because biological organisms must have a brain to have complex mental states doesn't mean God is in the sane boat. God is not a biological organism, The point is the true concept of God's simplicity defeats this notion but it does so by employing a different concept, God is not simple because he has fewer parts or because he doesn't need a brain but because he's qualitative different than any physical object.
According to the classical theism of Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas and their adherents, God is radically unlike creatures in that he is devoid of any complexity or composition, whether physical or metaphysical. Besides lacking spatial and temporal parts, God is free of matter-form composition, potency-act composition, and existence-essence composition. There is also no real distinction between God as subject of his attributes and his attributes. God is thus in a sense requiring clarification identical to each of his attributes, which implies that each attribute is identical to every other one. God is omniscient, then, not in virtue of instantiating or exemplifying omniscience — which would imply a real distinction between God and the property of omniscience — but by being omniscience. And the same holds for each of the divine omni-attributes: God is what he has as Augustine puts it in The City of God, XI, 10. As identical to each of his attributes, God is identical to his nature. And since his nature or essence is identical to his existence, God is identical to his existence. This is the doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS). It is represented not only in classical Christian theology, but also in Jewish, Greek, and Islamic thought. It is to be understood as an affirmation of God's absolute transcendence of creatures. God is not only radically non-anthropomorphic, but radically non-creaturomorphic, not only in respect of the properties he possesses, but in his manner of possessing them. The simple God, we could say, differs in his very ontology from any and all created beings.
God is simple because he does not have constitute parts, he is not a constitute entity and because just the one simple idea packs into it all the qualities and attributes necessary, that is being itself, It's not just a matter of having fewer parts but of being on a completely different level of being such that having parts is not an issue. As it said above, "devoid of any complexity or composition, whether physical or metaphysical. Besides lacking spatial and temporal parts, God is free of matter-form composition, potency-act composition, and existence-essence composition."
One can also arrive at the simplicity doctrine via the divine necessity. As maximally perfect, as that than which no greater can be conceived, God must be a metaphysically necessary being, one that cannot not exist. A necessary being is one whose possibility entails its existence, and whose nonexistence entails its impossibility. But what could be the ground of this necessity of existence if not the identity in God of essence and existence, possibility and actuality? ....A divine being cannot possess contingent modal status: if God exists, then he is necessary, and if he does not exist, then he is impossible. So if God exists, then there is a very tight connection between the divine nature and the divine existence. The simplicity doctrine in its traditional and strongest form assays this ‘tightness’ as identity. The divine simplicity grounds the divine necessity. God is necessary because he is simple. It is easy to see that the divine simplicity also grounds God's possession of essential properties. God has his attributes essentially because he is identical to his attributes. Nothing is more essential to a thing than something to which it is identical.
So how do we know God is simple? Because the kind of simplicity we are talking about is entailed in the concept of the kind of God Christians believe in, If God doesn't have to be complex then why think he is? If Being complex makes him more importable then he must to be complex, Remember Dawkin's argumemt only works if God is a giant biological organism which is ridiculous on it's face. Take for example my discussion of Philipse's God in the Age of Science.
Philipse uses the issue of explanatory power to justify using Bayes to establish the illusion of technique for deciding the matter.Of course his explanatory power is a scientific explanation but he never bothers to justify it. A scientific explanation would have to be limited to the workings of the physical world and modern theology doesn't claim to answer that. Swinburne found the existence of God as the prior to be probable, using simplicity as the criterion to set the prior. Philipse can’t or doesn’t dispute this: he objects to simplicity as the criterion, rather than trying to argue that God is complex, as Dawkins does (see above). He argues against simplicity as the criterion on the basis of lack of empirical evidence. He then takes up the issue of final cause. Theists sometimes use final cause as an “ultimate explanation.” “God forms a more natural stopping place [for theists] than, say, the existence of the universe.  The existence of the universe is what is in question, so of course that in itself can't prove its origin. But Philipse calls into question the satisfying nature of final cause, apparently assuming that infinite causal regress (or “ICR”: a series of effects and causes going back and back, with no beginning) is not unsatisfying. He asserts that defense of God as an explanation can't be “full” and “final,” because it doesn't answer the kinds of questions science answers. He couches this in terms of introducing “questionable metaphysical assumptions.”  I see that answer as ideologically driven.
 Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion , New York: Mariner Books; Reprint edition (January 16, 2008)138
 Metacrock's Blog, Comment Section, WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 01, 2017
 William F. Vallicella, "Divine Simplicity", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/divine-simplicity/> (accessed 11/5/17)
 Tillich beimg itselfosmot pantheitism
 William F. Vallicella, "Divine Simplicity", op. cit.
 Herman Philipse, God In The Age of Science, Oxford, London: Oxford University Press, 2012, 3
 Ibid, 91
 Ibid., 192