Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists Author(s): Paul Draper Source: Noûs, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Jun., 1989), pp. 331-350 Published by: Wiley Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2215486 accessed 12/24/16
http://www.apologeticsinthechurch.com/uploads/7/4/5/6/7456646/pain_and_pleasure.pdf
disclaimer: my views on God's motives are always theoretical, accept for the assumption of God's love
Paul Draper is a major philosopher in this day, he is one of the top two or three atheist philosophers,. He is the real deal, No mere Dawkings but a real thinker and formidable. He's a favorite of the Secular Outpost crowd. His major argument is the evidential argumnet on theodicy,. I know i'll probably fail but i take my turn as trying to whack his argument. My real goal is to hold my own, As Billy Abraham said of his great debate with Schubert Ogden "I attacked his destroyer iwth ny nine sweeper." At least he had a mine sweeper. I attack Draper's destroyer with my dilapidated tug boat.
I will argue in this paper that our knowledge about pain and pleasure creates an epistemic problem for theists. The problem is not that some proposition about pain and pleasure can be shown to be both true and logically inconsistent with theism. Rather, the problem is evidential. A statement reporting the observations and testimony upon which our knowledge about pain and pleasure is based bears a certain significant negative evidential relation to theism.' And because of this, we have a prima facie good epistemic reason to reject theism-that is, a reason that is sufficient for rejecting theism unless overridden by other reasons for not rejecting theism.[1] [2]
In other words we can't prove God has moral reasons for allowing POE and POP. He calls it epistemic and says the problem is evidential. So I assume he's saying we don't have good evidence, This is a catch 22 because to have good evidence we have to have something empirical to study if we had empirical evidence of God there would be no need to prove that God had good reasons,He would be God and that's all he needs, Now I do not way that as a divine command guy, not the kind who thinks God is arbitrarily right all the because as God he can make evil good and so on,I say that because as the creator of all the basis of reality he would have the inside track in knowing good from evil and right from wrong even though it is not arbitrary and has a reasoned rationale.
So the argument is a chatch 22 because if we had the evidence he seeks we wouldn't need it. But God is not given in sense data, and thus is not empirical, We have no ready made undeniable proof of God.,That's why it's called a "belief," That's not to say we don't have good reasons for belief, it is to say that I suspect Draper is playing games with concepts of evidence. Notice his standard is "we have a prima facie good epistemic reason to reject theism..." He's not demanding actual proof but a PF reason. That means we can meet the standard after all. That is to say the PF standard works both ways,If that's the standard he feels can live up to then it's also the standard he has to accept if I meet it,
He goes on to say "a reason that is sufficient for rejecting theism unless overridden by other reasons for not rejecting theism." I can definatley give reasons for not rejecting it. I will ma,e a couple of proviso's: (1) by "theism" I include Panentheism; (2) I don't have to prove X is the case only that i have rational warrant for belief.
I find Draper's challenge to theism to be somewhat narrowly focused, although probably not as narrow as Dawkins.
There exists an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect person who created the Universe. I will use the word "God" as a title rather than as a proper name, and I will stipulate that necessary and sufficient conditions for bearing this title are that one be an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect person who created the Universe. Given this (probably technical) use of the term "God," theism is the statement that God exists. [3]He is ruling out Tillich's view, probably without knowing it, because he stipulates God is "a person." Then he includes the omnis with no discussion as to their modern understanding, That's going to figure into a an understanding of defense for theiodicy since most of the blaming of God for pain and suffering assumes God is totally free to end all such suffering regardless of other goals.
He constricts a view Hypothesis of Indifference, (HI) with which to compare theistic views. He says essentially there or may not be such supernatural intetieds but ifso they are indifferent to human pain or evil. They are not donig evil they are just not conscenred,
Unlike theism, HI does not entail, that supernatural beings exist and so is consistent with naturalism. But HI is also consistent with the existence of supernatural beings. What makes HI inconsistent with theism is that it entails that, if supernatural beings do exist, then no action performed by them is motivated by a direct concern for our well-being. Now let "O" stand for a statement reporting both the observations one has made of humans and animals experiencing pain or pleasure and the testimony one has encountered concerning the observations others have made of sentient beings experiencing pain or pleasure. [4]
The problem here is really two fold. First, it's not really an argument to support atheism because it would allow for a God provided God is not concerned, Said another way he limits his view of what God could be to the fundamentalist view so that any liberal modern view such as process theology or Tilllich's view of God as being itself would go under the category of indifferent even though neither process theologians nor Tillich would understand God as indifferent, Secondly, if there is an indifferent God that's still God and thus atheism is false. This leads me to wonder ab out the ultimate bottom line of his argument, what is the final reasoning rumination? It can't be to support the view that there is no God. It's apparently just to disingender positive feelings for God. He does intimate that his ultimate goal is the rejection of theism,whatever that means, [5] That still leaves us hanging with the problematic situation that there may well be reason to believe in God but God woudl not qualify as theism so it's unclear as to how he would score that in relation to his argument,
Therefore I am going to show that there are good reasons to believe in God, to accept that God is not indifferent but am using the Tillich view of God so Draper's arguments don't apply, First I will show what my alternative is, and then show how Draper's argument fails to disprove my view. This will demonstrate that we have a prima facie good epistemic reason to believe in God weather or not we codifier it theism...
The ultimate issue is an evidently based warrant for belief (which is how I interpret a PF reason to believe. Given what's already been said about this standard I think the defense that I will put up, my twist on FWD, counts as evidence because it not only fits in with the larger evidential scheme that I argue from but it also demonstrates in its own right that God can have rational reasons, I will briefly discuss two other kinds of evidence, but only go into details on the soteriological drama,
Soteriological Drama
My view is called "Soteriologiocal Drama," please read the link to the whole idea.[6] It begins with observations:
I don't think those are unreasonable assumptions, They are pretty standard.
(1) The assumption that God wants a "moral universe" and that this value outweighs all others.
The idea that God wants a moral universe I take from my basic view of God and morality. Following in the footsteps of Joseph Fletcher (Situation Ethics) I assume that love is the background of the moral universe (this is also an Augustinian view). I also assume that there is a deeply ontological connection between love and Being. Axiomatically, in my view point, love is the basic impitus of Being itself. Thus, it seems reasonable to me that, if morality is an upshot of love, or if love motivates moral behavior, then the creation of a moral universe is essential.
(2) that internal "seeking" leads to greater internalization of values than forced compliance or complaisance that would be the result of intimidation.
That's a pretty fair assumption. We all know that people will a lot more to achieve a goal they truly beileve in than one they merely feel forced or obligated to follow but couldn't care less about.
(3)the the drama or the big mystery is the only way to accomplish that end.
The pursuit of the value system becomes a search of the heart for ultimate meaning,that ensures that people continue to seek it until it has been fully internalized.
The argument itself.
(1)God's purpose in creation: to create a Moral Universe, that is one in which free moral agents willingly choose the Good.
(2) Moral choice requires absolutely that choice be free (thus free will is necessitated).
(3) Allowance of free choices requires the risk that the chooser will make evil choices
(4)The possibility of evil choices is a risk God must run, thus the value of free outweighs all other considerations, since without there would be no moral universe and the purpose of creation would be thwarted.One might object that this couldn't outweigh babies dying or the horrors of war or the all the countless injustices and outrages that must be allowed and that permeate human history. It may seem at first glance that free will is petty compared to human suffering. But I am advocating free will for the sake any sort of pleasure or imagined moral victory that accrues from having free will, it's a totally pragmatic issue; that internalizing the value of the good requires that one choose to do so, and free will is essential if choice is required. Thus it is not a capricious or selfish defense of free will, not a matter of choosing our advantage or our pleasure over that of dying babies, but of choosing the key to saving the babies in the long run,and to understanding why we want to save them, and to care about saving them, and to actually choosing their saving over our own good.
This leaves the atheist in the position of demanding to know why God doesn't just tell everyone that he's there, and that he requires moral behavior, and what that entails. Thus there would be no mystery and people would be much less inclined to sin.
This is the point where Soteriological Drama figures into it. Argument on Soteriological Drama:
(5) Life is a "Drama" not for the sake of entertainment, but in the sense that a dramatic tension exists between our ordinary observations of life on a daily basis, and the ultiamte goals, ends and purposes for which we are on this earth.
(6) Clearly God wants us to seek on a level other than the obvious, daily, demonstrative level or he would have made the situation more plain to us
(7) We can assume that the reason for the "big mystery" is the internalization of choices. If God appeared to the world in open objective fashion and laid down the rules, we would probably all try to follow them, but we would not want to follow them. Thus our obedience would be lip service and not from the heart.
(8) therefore, God wants a heart felt response which is internationalized value system that comes through the search for existential answers; that search is phenomenological; introspective, internal, not amenable to ordinary demonstrative evidence.
In other words, we are part of a great drama and our actions and our dilemmas and our choices are all part of the way we respond to the situation as characters in a drama.
This theory also explains why God doesn't often regenerate limbs in healing the sick. That would be a dead giveaway. God creates criteria under which healing takes place, that criteria can't negate the overall plan of a search.
If I understand him correctly I think he's saying we know that biological organisms avoid pain and seek pleasure but we have no proof of any kind that there are moral reasons that excuse allowing pain,[7] Moreover, given the nature of biology it makes more sense to to think any kind of SN being that may have created the universe is indifferent to pain merely cause there is so much pain,
Mystical Experiece Provides both unshakable empirical evidence for the reality of God and for the love (compassion and concern) of God. This is backed by certain empirically based arguments taht I develop in my book The Trace of God.[8] This is more empirically based than anything Draper offers. It may well constitute the evidentail aspect they seek.
From this background ai derive my founding observation:
(1) The assumption that God wants a "moral universe" and that this value outweighs all others.The direct implication both of the transformative experience behind the observation establishes the goodness of Gd and the loving nature of God. Since that gives us a reason to believe in God we can trust that reason despite the seeming evidence to the contrary in Pain and suffering, That is a dimension with which Draper does not deal, we can know God is worthy of trust. Thus being worthy of trust we need not be necessarily certain of God';specific reasons,
Nevvertheless we can go further because we have a valid theoretical rationale,to explain God's preseasons in terms of the soteriological drama. That term means the dramna of salvation is based upon the need to seek for truth in order to internalize the values of the good. That means the search must be inviolable. So God can't clear the world of pain and suffering,If God did that there woudl be no search, None of the three counter thedocieies taht Draper answers include this facet.
this should count as PF evidence because it givs a logical rationale for god's allowance for pain while fitting into the larger framework that shows us god cares. However deep the depths of pain and evil in this would it is not gratuitous and does not outweigh my reasons for belief.,Whatever abstract logical victories Draper wins he does not ofer a final reason for abandoning belief that outweighs my PF reasons for beloief.
Sources
[1] Paul Draper, Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists Author(s): Paul Draper Source: Noûs, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Jun., 1989), pp. 331-350 Published by: Wiley Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2215486 accessed 12/24/16, 331
PDF:http://www.apologeticsinthechurch.com/uploads/7/4/5/6/7456646/pain_and_pleasure.pdf
(accessed 12/20/16)
[2] Jeff Lowder, "Index:Draper's Evidential Argument"Secular OUTPOST ,December 7, 2014,blog
http://www.patheos.com/blogs/secularoutpost/2014/12/07/index-app/
[3] Draper, op cit,331
[4] Ibid 332
[5] Ibid 334
[6] Joseph Hinman, ",Soteriologocal Drama," The Religious a priori, on line resource, URL
http://religiousapriori.blogspot.com/2011/04/answer-to-theodicy-soteriological-drama.html
accessed 1/2/17
[7] Deaper, op ciot336
31 comments:
Nice post, Joe. I have my own theodicy which is from John Polkinghorne and Plantinga. It's close to yours; in fact, it would contain yours but would give a more fundamental and general reason for God allowing pain.
You seem to suggest that one could still believe in God even if God is indiffernt to suffering, and yet I thought that love was central to your understanding of God. How would you square love and indifference?
The most basic idea behind Draper's argument (as with other evidential arguments) is that the magnitude and distribution of pain and pleasure in the world (P) is less surprising on the Hypothesis of Indifference (HI) than on theism (T).
In order to tip the balance the other way (or to even it out, at least) positive considerations need to be adduced that favor T over HI. It is not enough to identify merely possible explanations for P on theism. The considerations have to be such that they are more probable on T than on HI, and it has to be more probable that they are actual than that they are merely probable.
In order to tip the balance the other way (or to even it out, at least) positive considerations need to be adduced that favor T over HI. It is not enough to identify merely possible explanations for P on theism. The considerations have to be such that they are more probable on T than on HI, and it has to be more probable that they are actual than that they are merely probable.
Calling it merely possible is just a matter of rhetorical appeal The issue is it has to look that way to fulfill the soteriological drama. We should actually expect it to look that way. It's just a matter of actually knowing why there has to be a drama. The tie breakers are the inexplicable appoints that tip it to God,sich as the effects f mystical experience or understanding that being means depth.
Nice post, Joe. I have my own theodicy which is from John Polkinghorne and Plantinga. It's close to yours; in fact, it would contain yours but would give a more fundamental and general reason for God allowing pain.
Jim, I would would like to know more aboiut that. Do you have a link?
Eric it has to look like indifference because that's neutrality, Only if the empirical evidence is neutral can the decision be made in the heart. I would not expect a analytical philosopher to understand but your background in martial arts should tell you there other kinds of knowledge than just one type.
In order to tip the balance the other way (or to even it out, at least) positive considerations need to be adduced that favor T over HI. It is not enough to identify merely possible explanations for P on theism. The considerations have to be such that they are more probable on T than on HI, and it has to be more probable that they are actual than that they are merely probable.
How is that done without appeal to things we already assume to be true? In other words, the theist would appeal to reasons they have for thinking theism is more likely than not and atheists would do the opposite. We'd have to assess the probability of those prior beliefs and so on.
Polkinghorne regards the problem of evil as the most serious intellectual objection to the existence of God. He believes that "The well-known free will defence in relation to moral evil asserts that a world with a possibility of sinful people is better than one with perfectly programmed machines. The tale of human evil is such that one cannot make that assertion without a quiver, but I believe that it is true nevertheless. I have added to it the free-process defence, that a world allowed to make itself is better than a puppet theatre with a Cosmic Tyrant. I think that these two defences are opposite sides of the same coin, that our nature is inextricably linked with that of the physical world which has given us birth."[27](Wikipedia)
Polkinghorne thinks that God's kenotic withdrawal was neccesary to "make room" for a more or less autonomous creation. So the need for a soteriological drama would be incorporated into this defense but this defense wouldn't be limited to it. Freedom is an intrinsic as well as an instrumental good.
Joe, to me, "soteriological drama" sounds like a "big guy in the sky" kind of figure who's watching the show and judging the performers. How does this relate to a Tillichian panentheistic "ground" sort of theology?
Does the sort of "God" who wants a heartfelt response also have to HAVE (or share in) heartfelt responses?
“I discovered later, and I'm still discovering right up to this moment, that is it only by living completely in this world that one learns to have faith. By this-worldliness I mean living unreservedly in life's duties, problems, successes and failures. In so doing we throw ourselves completely into the arms of God, taking seriously, not our own sufferings, but those of God in the world. That, I think, is faith.”
― Bonhoeffer, LPP
"Calling it merely possible is just a matter of rhetorical appeal"
Well, no. It isn't. There is a difference between saying that maybe God permits pain for susch-and-such reasons and saying that he does, in fact, do so (and here is the evidence that supports that this is more than a mere possibility). By analogy, in a criminal trial, it isn't enough to say that the defendant may have had a twin brother who committed the crime - positive evidence needs to be produced that the defendant does, in fact, have a twin brother, who (also) had means, motive, and opportunity to commit the crime.
Furthermore, the idea that soteriological drama is "just what we would expect" on the hypothesis that God exists seems disingenuous. When you consider the millions of people who have died of cancer, malaria, etc., no one in their right mind says, "right. just what we would expect if an all-powerful and supremely benevolent God exists. It's all soteriological drama, you see."
I'm not saying the concept of soteriological drama doesn't work as a defense against a logical version of the POE, but I don't think it is enough to offset the higher prior probability of HI over T in Draper's evidential version.
I dunno... The argument may show HI Is more likely than certain perspectives on a 3-Omni God that, as Joe said, he codifies as "theism"....but, as Joe also said, that seems quite narrowly focused on very particular conceptions of "God" that 20th century theology has already moved away from.
I already said in a earlier post that I don't care for the term "soteriological drama", and I also think it's loaded with implications of compensatory afterlife rewards (for choosing the Good) that Joe doesn't seem to state explicitly. But those might not really be necessary. I think Joe's central point may be - something more like, kinda - that "depth experiences" (eg the experience of being loved or a mystical experience) may tend to overshadow more facile concerns about (less profound) pains and pleasures, or even our finiteness itself with all its frustrations and griefs, and that such "depth of being" is more likely in a "theistic" (even if not necessarily 3-Omni theistic) universe.
.... iow,"God" gives ground for our discovery of such experiences and for them to be really "real."
Mike Gerow said...
Joe, to me, "soteriological drama" sounds like a "big guy in the sky" kind of figure who's watching the show and judging the performers. How does this relate to a Tillichian panentheistic "ground" sort of theology?
do you really think drama is only another for stage play? second definition of the owrd:"an exciting, emotional, or unexpected series of events or set of circumstances.
synonyms: incident, scene, spectacle, crisis; More
Does the sort of "God" who wants a heartfelt response also have to HAVE (or share in) heartfelt responses?
how could God love and not feel? there is a idiomatic between consicioesness and man ih the sky, all forms of consciousness are mot anthropomorphic,
“I discovered later, and I'm still discovering right up to this moment, that is it only by living completely in this world that one learns to have faith. By this-worldliness I mean living unreservedly in life's duties, problems, successes and failures. In so doing we throw ourselves completely into the arms of God, taking seriously, not our own sufferings, but those of God in the world. That, I think, is faith.”
I think that quote is takn out of context, Bonehoffer sure thought God was cousiouns
Jim thans for turning me on to that, do you have source for Plantinfga?
Eric Sotnak said...
"Calling it merely possible is just a matter of rhetorical appeal"
Well, no. It isn't. There is a difference between saying that maybe God permits pain for susch-and-such reasons and saying that he does,
what I meant was I don't want to seem arrogant claiming to know the mind of God but I'm pretty sure I'm in the ball park.
in fact, do so (and here is the evidence that supports that this is more than a mere possibility). By analogy, in a criminal trial, it isn't enough to say that the defendant may have had a twin brother who committed the crime - positive evidence needs to be produced that the defendant does, in fact, have a twin brother, who (also) had means, motive, and opportunity to commit the crime.
We are not trying God, God is tying us. your analogy is telling but mot appropriate you clearly blame God and want to prosecute. The more fitting analogy is we have done wrong we broke the law,perhaps we ran away from home because we mistook the fahter's motives,and a less wayward sibling says you don't understand father he has a good reason don't know what it is but I know father so I know he is not mean or bad or hurtful, we just need to understand,.there's an element of trust there you are not wiling to accept. I can understand that,in fact that's why I wanted to appear humble,
I am having major problems now,I can't see or sit up to type so I can;t givemy best answers,
oe Hinman said...
(Eric) Furthermore, the idea that soteriological drama is "just what we would expect" on the hypothesis that God exists seems disingenuous.
Not on the hypothesizes that he exists but knowing the concept of the gospel and why it matters that we internalize the valuables of the good.
When you consider the millions of people who have died of cancer, malaria, etc., no one in their right mind says, "right. just what we would expect if an all-powerful and supremely benevolent God exists. It's all soteriological drama, you see."
that's jut multiplying examples,if the principle of the reason is valid for one person it's valid for a million. Besides we have to distinguish between natural disaster and moral evil.They will have somewhat different reasons. malaria doesn't involve free will. that is necessary as a consequence of a real world. But you seem to be evoke emotions at this point to motivate one against God as the bad guy but would you balk at using emotion to sway one in favor of trusting God?
I'm not saying the concept of soteriological drama doesn't work as a defense against a logical version of the POE, but I don't think it is enough to offset the higher prior probability of HI over T in Draper's evoidemtioal version.
I am not commenced that it is essentially
any different; that is based upon a skewed analysis, designed to lay up anger and make God the bad guy but then fallback On the false neutrality of pure reason as though curtailing our emotions will give us light even though the real issue here is our reasons to trust God, this is fundamentally about trusty and I have reason to trust,
5:00 PM Delete
2:48 AM Delete
"We are not trying God, God is tying us. your analogy is telling but mot appropriate you clearly blame God and want to prosecute"
What?
What is at issue is the standard of evidence by which we distinguish between raising a possibility and asserting it as fact.
Since the central claim at issue in Draper's argument is exactly whether we have enough reasons to prefer T to HI, you can't legitimately respond by shifting the burden of proof to Draper through the implicit assumption that God exists and is therefore blameworthy for permitting evil.
To take the criminal trial example, again, the shift you are trying to make is analogous to shifting from the question of the defendant's guilt to the question of whether the defendant is deserving of punishment.
"Not on the hypothesizes that he exists..."
But in Draper's argument, you can't begin by assuming T and then explaining the distribution of pain and pleasure (P). That isn't how the argument goes. Rather, you begin with P and then ask whether P is more surprising on T or on HI.
Joe, It's in Plantinga's God, Freedom, and Evil. Note that his is a defense against the logical problem, not the evidential problem which I admit I don't fully understand.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alvin_Plantinga%27s_free_will_defense
How do you go about assigning probabilities according to evidential arguments such as Draper's?
7th Stooge said...
Joe, It's in Plantinga's God, Freedom, and Evil. Note that his is a defense against the logical problem, not the evidential problem which I admit I don't fully understand.
<<thanks Jim
"We are not trying God, God is tying us. your analogy is telling but mot appropriate you clearly blame God and want to prosecute"
What?
there is no trial we are talking about trust, I'm just using another way of looking at it,
What is at issue is the standard of evidence by which we distinguish between raising a possibility and asserting it as fact.
we are assimilate God exists or we don't need to discuss evil If no God there is no need to ask why God aLLOWS EVIL,
Since the central claim at issue in Draper's argument is exactly whether we have enough reasons to prefer T to HI, you can't legitimately respond by shifting the burden of proof to Draper through the implicit assumption that God exists and is therefore blameworthy for permitting evil.
I am not siting the burden of proof on God;s existence Im demanding that Draper prove arguments he makes,he does not give me a reason to abandon the belie I already have,
To take the criminal trial example, again, the shift you are trying to make is analogous to shifting from the question of the defendant's guilt to the question of whether the defendant is deserving of punishment.
No I am sheeting to the question why are we talking about a trial? That is not analogousness situation,
Draper
"A statement reporting the observations and testimony upon which our knowledge about pain and pleasure is based bears a certain significant negative evidential relation to theism.' And because of this, we have a prima facie good epistemic reason to reject theism-that is, a reason that is sufficient for rejecting theism unless overridden by other reasons for not rejecting theism."
significant negative evident relation,means no evidence right? but evidence of What? the issue is the world doesn't look as it would if a loving God created it, But that's only true if we don't know the extenuation circumstances of creation.
but then he says "unless overridden by other reasons for not rejecting theism." well I give the other reasons, I sense God's presence, God works in m,y life,I know I can trust God.
"But in Draper's argument, you can't begin by assuming T and then explaining the distribution of pain and pleasure (P). That isn't how the argument goes. Rather, you begin with P and then ask whether P is more surprising on T or on HI."
that is a shell game, the basic issue or the same any theodocy question,the answers are the same,there is a reason why God does not put an end to evil, knowing there;s a reason means the existence of evil does not count against belief,
three observations i make
(1) The assumption that God wants a "moral universe" and that this value outweighs all others.
The idea that God wants a moral universe I take from my basic view of God and morality. Following in the footsteps of Joseph Fletcher (Situation Ethics) I assume that love is the background of the moral universe (this is also an Augustinian view). I also assume that there is a deeply ontological connection between love and Being. Axiomatically, in my view point, love is the basic impitus of Being itself. Thus, it seems reasonable to me that, if morality is an upshot of love, or if love motivates moral behavior, then the creation of a moral universe is essential.
(2) that internal "seeking" leads to greater internalization of values than forced compliance or complaisance that would be the result of intimidation.
That's a pretty fair assumption. We all know that people will a lot more to achieve a goal they truly beileve in than one they merely feel forced or obligated to follow but couldn't care less about.
(3)the the drama or the big mystery is the only way to accomplish that end.
The pursuit of the value system becomes a search of the heart for ultimate meaning,that ensures that people continue to seek it until it has been fully internalized.
"why are we talking about a trial?"
Because trials are situations where a positive evidential case needs to be made for a particular claim (that the defendant is guilty). By analogy, if the evidence we have are the amounts of pain and pleasure found in the world, the question is which of the two competing hypotheses, HI and T is more plausible on the basis of that evidence.
"well I give the other reasons, I sense God's presence, God works in m,y life,I know I can trust God."
For the sake of argument I am willing to allow that you have experiential reasons to believe that God exists. That is, it may be that you possess evidence that FOR YOU defeats the evidential arguments against the existence of God. But these are of no help to anyone who has not had such experiences. Whether or not an evidential argument is defeated for you depends on the evidence available to you.
By analogy, the objective evidence against alien abductions may be very strong, but if I sincerely believe to have had an experience of having been abducted by aliens, then I have personal evidence that defeats the evidential argument against alien abductions.
Draper would agree that evidential arguments are defeasible, in principle. The question, though, is whether anyone has adequate grounds to claim that they are all actually defeated. And I also think Draper would agree (and this is a point made by Rowe, quite clearly) that a theist and an atheist might reasonably disagree on this latter question.
Eric Sotnak said...
"why are we talking about a trial?"
Because trials are situations where a positive evidential case needs to be made for a particular claim (that the defendant is guilty). By analogy, if the evidence we have are the amounts of pain and pleasure found in the world, the question is which of the two competing hypotheses, HI and T is more plausible on the basis of that evidence.
4:56 PM Delete
"if the evidence we have are the amounts of pain and pleasure found in the world,..."--but they are not,I already refitted that, pain not maltreated to moral issues, is inherent in being a physic world, bracket that. Deal with evil, evil is a choice, evil depends upon humans making choices,thus we can't know who much is indicative because the variables are too complex, and also because the will is free. so the amount can't be indicative of the issue,we can't predoct alll the choices.
Eric Sotnak said...
"well I give the other reasons, I sense God's presence, God works in m,y life,I know I can trust God."
For the sake of argument I am willing to allow that you have experiential reasons to believe that God exists. That is, it may be that you possess evidence that FOR YOU defeats the evidential arguments against the existence of God. But these are of no help to anyone who has not had such experiences. Whether or not an evidential argument is defeated for you depends on the evidence available to you.
they could be if one takes the studies on religious experience seriously and if you read my book. More importantly I/m am not arrogant enough to think I've proven it all but I think there is enough there to clear away clutter so as to make personal search valid, then it's up to you to seek in your heart. The heart is the true battle found. Intellectuals like to think education is the solution to all but reality is some of the most educated people have been war criminals and oblivious to the obvious. Robert Macnamaera was highly educated and an expert in analytical thinking, Systems man,
By analogy, the objective evidence against alien abductions may be very strong, but if I sincerely believe to have had an experience of having been abducted by aliens, then I have personal evidence that defeats the evidential argument against alien abductions.
argument from analogy. that is a weak analogy. I doubt thee are 200 peer reviewed studies on alien abdication that say it's great stuff,
Draper would agree that evidential arguments are defeasible, in principle. The question, though, is whether anyone has adequate grounds to claim that they are all actually defeated. And I also think Draper would agree (and this is a point made by Rowe, quite clearly) that a theist and an atheist might reasonably disagree on this latter question.
I dare say.the proof is in the specific aliments
5:08 PM Delete
I think that quote is takn out of context, Bonehoffer sure thought God was cousious
Well, that wasn't what I meant anyway, but, just as an aside to,this, I don't think you should underestimate how radical B's vision of the post-WWII transformation of Xianity to "religionlessness" really was based on what he himself had personally believed. He wasn't trying to expose his own views in LPP but go beyond them, and I think he saw a radically different future for Xianity.
"argument from analogy. that is a weak analogy."
On the contrary, I think it is a very good analogy. The difference is one you, yourself, point out: which is that (if your interpretation of the research is right) there appears to be better objective evidence for experience of God than for experience of aliens.
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