Sunday, July 16, 2017

My defense of the contingent nature of the universe: Answer to Ryan M,

Image result for metacrock's blog





In my debate with Bradley Bowen I argued that naturalistic phenomena are contingent and temporal. To back up that premise i argued three things, but the third answer is the one that usually catches fire, I said we have no examples of anything in nature that lacks a cause and is not temporally bound, As a counter point Ryan M, in the comments of this blog argues that we have no examples of anything that is not physical. I countered this by arguing that we do actually. I gave four examples, mind, numbers,shapes,and justice. After some exchange Ryan made the following statement upon which I will expound:




Ryan M said...
Here are a list of things you have said are not physical:
Minds
Numbers
Shapes
Justice
I will go as far as saying that there are no known sound deductive arguments for the truth of any of those. In addition, there are no non controversial arguments for the plausibility of the immateriality of any of those. In the case of numbers and shapes, I tend to agree with my logic professor, Dr. John Lane Bell, that Platonism is akin to a disease of the mind and ought to be abandoned.
I don't think you understood my criticism of your claim about natural phenomena. Your premise and defence of it is the following:
Premise A - Everything natural is both temporal and contingent.
Defence of A - everything we know of that is natural is both temporal and contingent.
The defence of A does not establish A to be true. That is, you cannot deduce the truth of A from the defence of A.
All the defence of A would do is make it the case that you can make a strong inductive argument for the truth of A. But even then, all you could do is make a strong inductive argument that "The types of natural phenomena we know of are both temporal and contingent" which is a weaker hypothesis than your argument requires. In any case, my criticism was that by parallel inductive reasoning we could conclude that anything with a cause has a material cause. E.g. 
Premise B - Every dependent being has a material cause.
Defence of B - Everything we know of that is a dependent being is a being with a material cause.
If the defence of A works, then the defence of B works, so you could not establish that an immaterial GOB exists. 

Let's break it down: "I will go as far as saying that there are no known sound deductive arguments for the truth of any of those." I bet I can come up with one, but what if I dom't Where is the law of logic that says empirical arguments as good as deductive ones? Moreover, I think it's self evident that mind is not physical, It's obvious that justice is not physical. I wont bother to defend numbers or shapes because I think they were ill-considered; they are different kids of things from mind or justice. they are abstractions I don;'t think an abstraction created the universe. Mind is really all I need to make my point.

"In addition, there are no non controversial arguments for the plausibility of the immateriality of any of those." Yes but I don't mind being controversial. I think Mind is self-evidently not physical; confusing mind with brain creates the sense that mind is physical but there is a distinction. Even though mind requires physical brain chemistry to be accessed that does not make it physical. Moreover the physicality is in more trouble than is physical recognized, He can;t really tell us what exactly it means to be physical. Physical thins are made of matter but matter is known to be energy in another from, So what is energy? The physicalist usually strikes out to answer this by dutifully giving the names of all subatomic particles it's quacks and bozons ect. ect, but when asked to explain it goes something like this,"they are charges," what are charges 
made of? "more charges," Turns out no one really knows. When dealing with the level of existence beyond space/time we know nothing, it's not so cut and drained.[1]

"In the case of numbers and shapes, I tend to agree with my logic professor, Dr. John Lane Bell, that Platonism is akin to a disease of the mind and ought to be abandoned. " I am not a Platonist, I've already discussed numbers and shapes.
"I don't think you understood my criticism of your claim about natural phenomena. Your premise and defence of it is the following:Premise A - Everything natural is both temporal and contingent.Defence of A - everything we know of that is natural is both temporal and contingent.The defence of A does not establish A to be true. That is, you cannot deduce the truth of A from the defence of A." 
You have no disproof, you have only the gap left by my lack of  proving. But we do not have to remain at an impasse, I am not attenuating prove to that God exists,I am merely aging that belief is warranted. The reality that there are no uncased phenomena in the physical world is a good reason to assume that nature is contingent and temporal (besides my two other arguments backing the premise). That the physical world is contingent still the best assumption to make, there is no counter example.

"All the defence of A would do is make it the case that you can make a strong inductive argument for the truth of A. But even then, all you could do is make a strong inductive argument that "The types of natural phenomena we know of are both temporal and contingent" which is a weaker hypothesis than your argument requires. " First I am assuming that you mean by that "than your argument requiters" you are thinking of a proof for the existence of God not an argument to warrant belief. I don't see why a warrant for belief would
require  a stronger backing. Moreover it's still the best assumption  see as how you have no counter examples 
or evince. You have nothing more than casting doubt on my assumption which is backed and yours is not. Secondly, I argued in my opening speech the concept of nature is clearly in the empirical world of flesh and blood thus confining it to space/time. Thirdly I argued Big Bang cosmology which would understand physical law as limited to time.Neither of these arguments have been touched.

"In any case, my criticism was that by parallel inductive reasoning we could conclude that anything with a cause has a material cause. E.g. " Except you might not pull it off since I think it;s self evident hat mind is not physical that ruins your argument, at least I have more with which to counter your argument than you have to counter mine. Btw we could also argue that if an aspect of being transcends space/time it;s more likely that we should think of it as non physical since it transcends physical law. See my third argument on the premise one.

In terms of my argument that physical existence is not as clear cut as we think see my that's a major reason to assume the assumption I make in defense of my premise is more defensible than your parallel,


[1] Joseph Hinman, "Can Science really prove the basis of Modern Physics." Metacrock's blog  (accessed /17/17) URL
http://metacrock.blogspot.com/2017/04/can-science-really-prove-basis-of.html

2 comments:

Eric Sotnak said...

"Where is the law of logic that says empirical arguments as good as deductive ones? "

By "empirical" did you mean inductive/statistical?

Because it is possible to have a deductive argument with empirically-supported premises. Example:

1. All protons have mass.
2. x is a proton.
3. Therefore, x has mass.

Joe Hinman said...

Eric Sotnak said...
"Where is the law of logic that says empirical arguments as good as deductive ones? "

By "empirical" did you mean inductive/statistical?

Because it is possible to have a deductive argument with empirically-supported premises. Example:

1. All protons have mass.
2. x is a proton.
3. Therefore, x has mass.

well the problem is I've developed this problem in tying in last few years,I leave stuff out of sentences.I don't know why,I should have said "Where is the law of logic that says empirical arguments are NOt as good as deductive ones?" He did imply that.
I agree that they are as good and you can mix them.