Recently I did a post called "Quantum Particles Do Not Prove Universe from Nothing." There were some brilliant comments in the comment section by Eric Sotnak. This is in response to part of that discussion. Growing out of the issues involving the realization that QM particles are not actually coming from real nothing, (Eric has some good counters) we turned to the issue What constitutes "the best" explanation? It is in view of that question my next three pieces will be based. I argued that while it would have to include the best scientific data a philosophical (metaphysical/ontological) answer is to be preferred.
Joe: “God as an explanation may leave a lot of blanks unfilled but it's more satisfying in a couple of ways: in that it's final, where as a naturalistic particle will leave us wondering where the string of endless particles comes from Secondly, it allows a broader understanding. Because it accounts for everything we know from modality to meaning.”
Eric:I question whether it is really more satisfying and whether it really accounts for as much as you suggest. Consider the problem that Leibniz struggled so desperately with: Why did God create the world as he did rather than otherwise or not at all? Unlike Spinoza, whose answer was that all is necessarily as it is, Leibniz wanted to maintain that God could have created things differently. But Leibniz was also committed to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, so it wouldn't do to say, “well, God just plain made things this way – no reason for it.” So, if you want to side with Leibniz in rejecting unexplained first explainers (which is what I suggest the QVS would be), then it seems to me you also share this problem. You seem happy enough to say that God's existence is explained by his being a necessary being. What, then, of God's actions? Do you side with Spinoza and say they are necessary, and thus all is necessary? Or do you say they are contingent, in which case we must now ask what explains them (since you have stated that you think anything that is contingent must be so in the relational sense). 
Some aspect of being is eternal and necessary. Meaning not contingent upon a higher source. That I determine by rejecting the logic of infinite causal regression (ICR). If there can't be an eternal regression of causes then there be a final cause where it all stops. That's why the something from nothing issue is crucial. We can't posit a never ending chain of C/e. The issues is which is the best solution, violating reason for pragmatic empirical answer (a never ending string of smaller and smaller particles) or a philosophical concept such as final cause and it's implication: God.
He brings Leibniz into it on the premise that necessary being makes all events in creation necessities. That works on at least two levels: (1) God would have to opt for the best possible world if God is to be perfect and good and loving. Thus the universe we have is the best we could have and thus =call the crap is also mandated as the price we pay for the best. That I base upon his comment about the PSR. If you assert that there must be a reason and you are talking about Maximal greatness (God) then surely his PSR would be a mandate for the perfect answer. (2) Atheists on various message boards asserted that since God is necessary all of ?god's actions must be necessary too I am not associating Erick with this answer. I think he would see through that fallacious reasoning.
In answer to no 1: I don't think Best of all Possible Worlds is the right answer. That raises the absurdity of a world with the holocaust and two world wars being better than a world of peace and happiness because of some long range state of affairs most of us will never see. I think the premise is wrong. Rather than saying God would have to lpt for the best of all possible we can say would have to opt for the most loving alternative given the parameters. The term "possible" is tricky because it implies physical possibility whereas it might be best of all possible in terms of the only alternative given the conditions that must be met for having a world. Put like that a horrible world might still fill the bill because it's necessary to allow for horrors in order to have some overriding good, namely free will. Here we lug in the free will defense. Please read mine, "Soteriologoical Drama."
In other words free will must be inviolable because it is necessary to moral decision making. It is imperative to allow a moral universe because we would otherwise not be able to act in love, and love is the basis of creation  Here we have that paradox that God must allow evil or it would not be possible for us to do good. But here God is doing the loving thing. Just because it's not the peaceful or less violent thing doesn't mean it's unloving, The price we would pay for an absence of strife is an absence of thought and an absence of reason, absence of decision making. God is treating us as adults.
As for no 2, that a necessary being has to do only necessary actions is just fallacious because it plays upon equivocation between two different senses of the term "necessary." When we say God is "necessary being" (not "a being") we don't mean we can't explain the physical existence of the world any other way (although we can't) but it refers to the idea that God is not dependent upon anyone or anything else besides "himself" for His/Her actuality. In the assertion that all of God's actions must be necessary because God is necessary they are asserting that God's actions are an extension of the divine mode of being. There is no reason why that should be the case. God must create freely or God is merely an automatic reflex subject to some higher basis for being. Creating freely means creating contingencies that might not have existed.
Do you side with Spinoza and say they are necessary, and thus all is necessary? Or do you say they are contingent, in which case we must now ask what explains them (since you have stated that you think anything that is contingent must be so in the relational sense).
God's will explains them. Because God chooses freely to create they are not necessary they night not have been created. Because God did choose to do so they have their being, yes in God, but conditional upon his will.. They are conditionally necessary, condition upon god's choice to create. So this is not the best of all possible worlds but is the choice of a loving calculus of means and ends in a calculation only God could perform.