The Is/Ought Dichotomy
The “is-ought”
problem tells us that we can’t derive what should be just from a description of
what is. If we look at what Harris is saying, he’s really not deriving a view
of what ought to be by understanding what is, although he wants us to think he
is. He thinks it’s possible to do this just by being real accurate with the
“is.” But he’s already reduced reality so it wont include transcendent ought.
So he’s already hedged his bets against the argument. In reality there is no
reason why we should accept that the “ought” is already in place and that it’s
already a given that pleasant physical circumstances as outcome are the only
valid good available. This has not been established by anything. It’s just an
assertion that is put in the position to be a default given that alternatives
are ruled out ideologically. There’s nothing about biological facts that
establish an “ought.” We might show that religious belief has harmed more
people than Polio (perhaps) but if true that still would not tell us why it’s
wrong to do so. Harris’s basic answer to this argument is that people who make
such criticisms have too narrow a concept of science. “Science simply
represents our best effort to understand what’s going on in the universe, and
the boundary between it and the rest of rational thought cannot always be drawn.”[1] That is his answer to the issue of is-ought,
basically no answer at all. What difference does it make if it is our best
efforts (which I doubt)? Best efforts don’t change is to ought.
What difference does it make if we broaden our scope of understanding for
science? What he’s really saying is that science is the only true ethics. In
saying that, he’s clearing the way to replace real ethical thinking with the
reductionist ideology that makes up his understanding of science. All the
scientific precision there is can’t turn “is” into “ought”—there is simply no
reason why facts by themselves represent what should be. As Philosopher Robert
Nozick tells us:
Ethical truths find no place within the
contemporary scientific picture of the world. No such truths are established in
any scientific theory or tested by any scientific procedure—microscopes and
telescopes reveal no ethical facts. In the guise of a complete picture of the
world, science seems to leave no room for any ethical facts. What kind of facts
are these, what makes them hold true?[2]
Brain Earp, again tells us:
Example: It’s a fact that rape occurs in nature — among chimpanzees, for
instance; and there are some evolutionary arguments to explain its existence in
humans and non-humans alike. But this fact tells us exactly nothing about
whether it’s OK to rape people. This is because “natural” doesn’t entail “right”
(just as “unnatural” doesn’t necessarily mean “wrong”) — indeed, the correct
answer is that it’s not OK, and this is a judgment we make at the
interface of moral philosophy and common sense: it’s not an output of science.
The domain of science is to describe nature, and then to explain its
descriptions in terms of deeper patterns or laws. Science cannot tell us how to
live. It cannot tell us right and wrong. If a system of thought claims to be
doing those things, it cannot be science. If a scientist tells you she has some
statements about how you ought to behave, they cannot be
scientific statements, and the lab-coat is no longer speaking as a scientist.
Questions about “How should we live?” — for better or worse — fall outside the
purview of “objective” science. We have to sort them out, messily, by
ourselves.[3]
If the current state of affairs (what is) is the basis of
what should be than political repression and backward understanding of the
environment and focus on short term needs only, as well as greed and even
cruelty must be what should be. That certainly sums up what is as far as life
on earth goes.
Rachels
defends ethical naturalism against the “is-ought” argument and his defense is a
bit more involved than Harris’s. He argues that evaluative conclusions can
sometimes be drawn from factual premises. His example is if the only difference
between doing A and not doing A is a
child will suffer intense prolonged pain, then it’s better not to do A.[4] Wait,
this in principle is no different than Harris’s answer and it’s based upon the
same “trick.” I use the term advisedly because they may not intend to trick,
but they are tricking themselves because there is clearly a value that’s being
inserted into the process that is kept unspoken and asserted as though the it’s
the only valid conclusion that comes form the nature of the case but it’s
clearly loaded at the front before the example is made. The idea that doing is
wrong because all other things being equal it would result in the pain of a
child assumes form the outset that our values are such that paining children is
wrong. This is fraught with a host of assumptions: that there is a right and
wrong, that children are more innocent than adults, that it’s wrong to harm the
innocent, that’s more wrong to harm the innocent than the not so innocent, and
so on. Yes, these are values with which we all agree. There is, however, no
evidence that they are arrived at logically as a result of some magic
transmutation of “is” into “ought.” Rather the “ought” is assumed form the
beginning, it is loaded into the example, otherwise why use a child? The basis
of those values is proved by this example to be logically derived from the
nature of the case but could well be derived from fine feelings or a sense of
right intuited from the Spirit or any number of things. Its use as an emotional
ploy suggests the flaw in using it, because it suggests a value already built
in. He also argues that beliefs are tied to motivations, those stem from
behavior and that is based upon “is,” upon the factual nature of the human
psyche and other situations that are derived from the nature of the case.[5]
Yes it is undeniable that an evocation of ethical duty or obligation must
revolve around actual facts rather than mere abstractions or there is no actual
ethical concern. That in no way means that the “ought” is derived form the mere
facts of the nature of the case apart form the value systems employed to
evaluate them.
Value systems
Value
systems make up the basis of ethical thinking. Intrinsic value is what supplies
the reason for action in ethics.[6]
Ethics is about what we do, how we live, as a result of examining our actions
in relation to our values. We all agree that pleasant outcome; absence of pain
is a good thing.[7] Yet we believe for different
reasons. The reductionists try to justify it as an outgrowth of survival
instinct, the Christian as an expression of God’s love. It matters which way we
do it because the decision is ultimately the expression of a value system, that
decision will determine how we decide our actions. If we write off human values
as merely the opinions of a different set of mammals, if we say “o well
marmoset actions are marmoset ethics,” that’s all it is just the way a
different set of organisms spins the survival mode, then we might wind up
justifying a whole set of dehumanizing actions. If we are led down the garden
path by the priests of knowledge and taught to think of these dehumanizing
actions as merely a means to an end, we may lose the human values that would
enable us to regret such actions. Behind what might seem like split hairs lurk
the justifications and rationalizations for destructive and dehumanizing
decisions. One could see, for example, rationalizing loss of freedom by an
appeal to concrete nature of the outcome and there fleeting transitory nature
of the “merely human” value of freedom. The space between is and “ought” must
be kept in order not to sanctify what “is.” The danger is too great that
deriving “ought” from “is” will produce a way of thinking about “is” that
forever links it with “ought.”
One of the
things that make ethical philosophy and moral philosophy seem so aloof,
transitory and “unscientific” is the relative nature of their value systems.
Value systems are relative and arbitrary to the extent that we either hold them
or we don’t. We can’t prove what values we should hold. In order to be able to
prove what value system we should hold to we would have to have a prior value
system to put in place to say it with, if we could have that it would solve the
issue there be no need to say it. That’s what the scientific ethics
reductionists think they are doing; they think they are giving us a stable
grounding in “is.” It’s really an appeal to the fortress of facts idea. The
problem with that is that it begs the question about which value system we
should assume. We can’t be confused by the humanitarian nature of the outcome
oriented ethics. Just because it values things we deem “good” doesn’t mean it’s
the only access to the good. Deontologists value happiness, peace, absence of
carnage, too. The problem is, values come into conflict. Take Harris’s example,
do we use our billion to cure malaria or help feed people? I assume he would
base that upon which is killing the most. The problem there’s more to consider
in the equation. What do we have to do to provide those particular goods? If we
have to take food out of the mouths of people being sustained by that funding
in order to save other lives with malaria have we produced a net good? We only
shift around evils if we create starving masses to cure disease. By the same
token a deontological approach could see feeding the hungry and curing disease
both as values that must be met. This leads to the argument about replacing all
other forms of ethics with consequentialist ethics. This is clearly something
that Harris seeks to do. He defines ethics in such a way that ethics is about
producing certain kinds of consequences, as we have seen.
I stated
above that intrinsic values are what motivate action in ethics. There are other
kinds of values;[8] there are values that
derived from the things they accrue, for example in consequentialist ethics
various states or attitudes are moral values because the outcome of holding
them is the desired outcome. For example the outcome of holding non racist
attitudes is seen as clearing the way for freedom and human potential that
leads to more happiness and less pain for people of color and even for those
who would hold the prejudiced attitudes. Yet there’s also an intrinsic value
there. The intrinsic value is one that is the object of the outcome; we might
term it “pleasure,” more like “fulfillment,” “human potential.” What is the
point of keeping people alive? Why should we care if more people die of Malaria
or are harmed by religion, why care about either? We care because we value
human life both in the sense of protecting it, and enhancing the quality of it.
That is an end in itself. We can’t say why we value human life, except in terms
of either expressing feelings or expressing ideas about the nature of the
universe. We have no scientific data that tells us why we should value it. We
can’t prove logically that we should. The fact that we do feel that we should
may well be grounds of notion of the “self evident” nature of moral motions,
but is not a scientifically provable or even logically provable proposition.
The whole of ethical theory is about figuring out what to do with and how best
to make use of these values we hold. We organize our thinking into schools of
thought and design ethical systems for this purpose.
The Strength
of moral philosophy is it’s diversity of value systems. Diversity is strength
and not a weakness. The assertion all three make, Harris, Churchland and Wilson
is that consequntialist ethics is the only real basis for ethics. That’s
clearly not the case if we go by the field of ethics itself. There’s no
scientific proof for the assertion that teleological ethics is the only true
basis for ethics without dragging a surreptitious value system into the
equation, and thus if we look at moral philosophy and ethics as an academic
field its loaded with other view points, with other values systems and other
ways of implanting values. Consequence is only one of many. For example
deontolgocal ethics asserts that there is intrinsic value in the acts
themselves. For example there may be value in truth telling even though the
result of telling the truth may be harmful.[9] Lying
may be wrong even if no harm results. There are two main types of deontological
theories, intuitionism which holds that moral principles are self
evident upon reflection, and the second types is rationalism, which uses
a second order principle is used to generate a set of first order principles.”[10]
They both seem to ground ethics in duty.[11]
This is just scratching the surface; there are many other views of ethics,
including Virtue ethics where one focuses upon the kind of person one should be
rather than means to act ethically,[12]
and even aesthetic ethics which does not seek the good but the beautiful or the
aesthetically fulfilling. Dorothy Emmett shows that aesthetic ethics can be as
consistent and logical as any other kind.[13]
To just assert that ethics is about one thing, pleasure over pain, stopping
pain, outcomes that result in fewer deaths, is absurd. If we impose a hidden
value system while pretending to ground values in a scientific fact we ignore the
basis of all ethical thinking, not to mention the diversity of the field.
Trying to shift from deontological or other form of decision making to outcome
oriented ethics on the grounds that “this is obviously what ethics is about” is
absurd.
Values
motivate ethical thinking and actions; we choose the ethical system that best
serves our values. The flexibility to change form one system to another is
strength because it allows for new approaches. It would be stifling to assert
one system over the others and to close off alternatives by terming it “fact.”
There are good arguments against consequentialism as an ethical theory. It’s
been hinted at already that consequentialism ignores the basis of intrinsic
value and thus can at times force the individual to violate intrinsic values in
order to meet the demands of gaining certain out come. Various life boat scenarios
often depict this kind of thinking. The life boat analogy was first proposed by
Garrett Hardin (in 1974) its application was closely related to environmental
ethics. The life boat idea imaged 50 people in a life boat with room for 10
more, but they are surrounded by 100 swimmers. Who will be let on to row?
Garrett’s intention was to criticize the spaceship earth idea.[14]
Life boat examples are often used in high school and perhaps middle school to
introduce students to ethical thinking. Teachers are advised that students
often go for the outcome oriented solution, so they have to be advised to think
about other options: “Discussions about the lifeboat are influenced strongly by
how the question is posed. Be sure to allow room for solutions that maximize
fairness (i.e. drawing straws) by asking students to focus on how they are
making their decision. Students often default to solutions that are
outcome-based. It is useful to be able to show that there are other approaches
that can be applied. ”[15]
One might be led to let the old woman drawn because she can’t row and well as
the middle aged man swimming more strongly
than she, unless of course one realizes that a higher value might be
protecting the weak and taking care of those who can’t take care of themselves.
Certainly the life boat idea does cast a spot light on the tendency of values
to collide. It points up the potential for outcome oriented thinking to force
upon the individual acts considered immoral by conscience. It’s then that we
realize we need a system that recognizes the intrinsic nature of values and a
flexibility that allows us to re-consider our options. We have no factual basis
in science that would tell us, “yes it’s better to save this one and let the
other drawn.” Now it’s true we don’t have a clear cut means of understanding
the right choice in any other system either, but that’s not a reason to close
off the option with the pretense that science give us the factual basis form
which to act.
Why should
we laud one set of values over others? To use an example already given, we can
choose human values over Marmoset values because we are human. We have no
actual reason to suspect that marmoset’s think ethically, science might
actually help us there. I’m not arguing that science is of no use. Yet since we
are human and we know that we can think ethically, that in itself is reason
enough to accept human values. We can also identify the intrinsic values.
Values intrinsic to other species probably would not always be intrinsic to us,
it makes no since therefore that we don’t use human values.
[1] Harris, Ibid., 29.
[2] Robert Nozick, Philosophical
Explanations. Cambridge, Mass.:
Bellknap Press, Harvard University
Press, 1981, 399.
[3] Earp, Ibid.
[4] Rachels, Ibid., 4.
[5] Ibid., 6.
[6] Robin Attfield, Value,
Obligation and Meta-Ethics, Amsterdam,
Atlanta, Georgia:
Editions Rodopi B.V. Value Inquiry Book
Series,1995, 29
MA (Oxon), PhD (Wales)
has been Professor of Philosophy at Cardiff
University since 1992. Robin
Attfield read Greats (Literae Humaniores) at Christ
Church and theology at Regent's Park
College, Oxford.
[7] Nozick, Ibid., 399.
[8] Attfield, Ibid. 29-30.
[9] Lois P. Pojman, (editor),
Moral Philosophy: A Reader. Indianapolis,
In.: Hackett Publishing Company inc., Third edition. 2003, Originally 1993, 193.
[10] Ibid., 193
[11] Ibid., 193.
[12] Find, virtue ethics
[13] Find moral Prisim
[14] Garrett Hardin, “Life
Boat Ethics, The Case Against Helping the Poor,” Psychology Today,
September (1974) 38-40, continued
123-124.
[15] Teaching Background, “The
Life Boat,” Teacher Instructions, hosted by Northwest Association for
Biomedical Research. online resource: http://nwabr.org/sites/default/files/Lifeboat.pdf accessed 5/24/13.
No comments:
Post a Comment