Sunday, September 11, 2016

How Scholarly are Evangelical Academics? (1 of 2)


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The other day on facebook a reader of this blog ask me to comment on his post about evangelical academics. Specifically he asked is this is  an oxi-moron? How academic are they? In course of investigation I found tons of sites that list accomplished evangelicals, many of these figures we all known. There is no doubt that there are many accomplished intelligent evangelicals in the academy. The problem is most of them tend not to innovate and they don't really raise the level of thinking in the evangelical church, although, there are notable exceptions!

The major problem with this topic is the ambiguity of the term "evangelical." They come in all stripes from moderates who just believe in the atonement and resurrection to  far right wing legalistic and literalistic. One standard measure might be the classical definition defined by the Chicago statnent [1] includes those who accept inerrantcy of scripture. Others site five points such as  Evangelicals are defined by belief in inerrancy, literal interpretation of scripture atonement, resurrection, conversion experience, and the like. [2] Some tend to equate evangelical with fundamentalist, I tend to think of fundamentalists as evangelicals on steroids. For this article I'll be using evangelical in a broad sense. Another aspect that must be understood is that the "lite" version tends to be foreign, evangelicals in UK and Netherlands tend to be more "rational," more "liberal." more on that in part 2.

I am going to begin with evangelicals who I would think are great and excellent in their fields, who clearly exemplify the best of the academic tradition. Then I'll move to show a middle group who are accomplished but who have not really contributed to scholarship in a significant sense. Then I will discuss those who I feel are only pretenders to the title of academic.

There are a couple of great theologians I would label as evangelical but not many. A great theologian advances the understanding of the field in some ground breaking way. It's hard to do that if your major messages is "stay the same." There is actually a site called Super Scholar and their list of great theologians includes only liberals: lists Crosson, Hick, Kung, Pannenberg, Ruther (counting theology proper not Bible scholars).[3] There are some evangelical theologians who I count as great. The Best Is William Abraham (aka "Billy"). He was my professor at Perkins and we were coffee buddies. He's very conservative although Methodist. He's brilliant, studied positivism with Rawls at Oxford. His work Canon and Criterion [4]I think is brilliant and ground breaking. I have a singed galley copy he gave me years ago. One I suspect is evangelical is Herman Dooyeweerd, the most prominent Philosopher of the Netherlands,. Dutch evangelicals are very rational and moderate.(see more)[5] In the crazy fanatic column I would place Rushdooney the Christian Reconstructionist, it is not ground breaking theology it's just insane.[6]

There are more philosophers than theologians who are evangelical, or that I count as such. The first I will name is really a social scientists, the only great Christian social scientist I know of (living at least) Peter Berger.He's brilliant, ground breaking, and is regarded as the Noam Chomsky of sociology of Knowledge.[7] He writes a lot about secularization, saying society is secularizing but that does not mean decline of religion. He doesn't claim to be evangelical but says, "I am evangelisch [emphasis his] "I'm...Luthern, but I'm very comfortable with evangelicals," I call that "evangelical lite." [8] see more [9] Of course we would have to include William Lane Craig. He get's a lot of  hate and criticism from atheists and even Christians especially us liberals, but even though Secular Outpost guys are always harping on him one of their top thinkers, Jeff Lowder, proclaims his brilliance and his competence as a philosopher. Lowder admires his sophistication, Crai is definitely evangelical. There is also Alvin Paltinga, I'm pretty sure we can call him evangelical. He is head and shoulders above Craig as far as I am concerned. Plantinga is probably the greatest living metaphysision of our times,(see more)[10] There is William, Alston (see more) [11] and others. The evangelicals are strongest in philosophy, all of these thinkers have contributed to the field of philosophy in ways that even atheist philosophers acknowledge. The one exception might be Craig, I don't think he;s acknowledge as ground breaking in philosophy (although they know he's competent) yet from an apologetic view point he is, having saved the Cosmological argument and he dig up the Kalam argument from obscurity in the iddle ages. Together with Palantinga and Alson they have made reformed philosophy a force to recon with. I would tend to think of these ground breakers as evangelical lite. Another philosopher whose main contribution is in apologetic is Victor Repeert with his work C.S. Lewis's Dangerous Idea, the best treatment of the arument from reason.

There are evangelicals who tried to tap into the world of though through philosophy and social sciences but one must wonder if they knew what they were doing, In the Case of Tim LaHaye (April 27, 1926 – July 25, 2016) it's pretty obvious not. LaHaye was mimicking Francis Shaeffer. Shaeffer did not know philosophy, Anyone who does know that field and reads The God who is There will see that immediately, He thought Kierkegaard was trying to destroy christianity. One could only think trait by not having read any references works and not having read anything than the Attack on Christendom and that not having read carefully. [12] The Reagan supporters looked to Shaeffer as vindication of their own world view and raised him to a position as "missionary to the intellectuals" he had no chance of filling that role. LaHaye was mimicking him and had no Philosophical learning,LaHaye says: "Kant was a thought bomb." Yes, whatever. Shaeffer and LaHaye are more from the fundamentalist end of the spectrum.

Finally there is Biblical scholarship. Unfortunately the evangelicals don't do well here either. They have a lot of component people, some great ground breakers, mostly from the past. By competent I mean they have the degrees the work they do is good but they are not ground breaking. It's unfortunate because Biblical scholarship is where they should excel, but I find most evangelical bible scholars I come across do not impress me. From the past Sir William Ramsey,Albright, Kenyon,are legends in the field of Biblical scholarship. Lightfoot, Wescot and Hoart I would count as legends and as evangelicals but they've been disowned by modern evangelicals due to the propaganda of the KJV only crowd.

In contemporaneity era among living Biblical  scholars who are excellent and evangelical scholars include Mark Goodacre and N.T, Wright."Mark Goodacre is a New Testament scholar and Professor at Duke University's Department of Religion. He has written extensively on the Synoptic Problem; that is, the origins of the gospels of Matthew." [13] I am impressed by Goodacre. He has made strides in dealing with issuers of synoptic problem while defending the faith. I think N.T. Wright is overrated. I woud not put him on apar with the greats of the past but he's certainly light years ahead of me.(more on him)[14] He;s more than just component he;s probably the best to hold up against Koester or Crosson. Alistar McGrath I give high marks does good work ,he may be ground breaking I have to read more of his work. I give him a gold star foro stadning up to the atheist whiz kid Ricahrd Carrier. I give another gold star for making Carrier so angry he threw a temper tantrum just because McGrath argumed against Bayes.

In the middle ground I spoke of above,where they are comportment and accomplished and do good work but not ground breaking I put Carl Henry, F.F.Bruce, James I Packer. They had the degrees they did the work but they did not push the field forward. I use Bruce's work in apostolic. he did good stuff, His New Testament Documents are They Reliable? is good as  apologetics but not on par with Koester or Crosson. In terms of the "pretender" category I put Grudem and John Piper whose "scholarship" is only done to support their doctrines (facsimileing women). Most Bible scholars don't impress me, I don't demand that one issue silly way out ideas to be "ground breaking." Most evangelical Bible scholars I find are repeating the Orthodoxy of their camp and passing that of a learning, There are numerous exceptions as I've named but the typical thing I find is mediocrity, I will give examples in part 2


 Baukhaum (Jesus and the Eye Witnesses) is considered evangelical. As a matter of standards I use him as an example of ground breaking for a believing scholar. He does not propose some way out idea that reduces Jesus to less than divine or reduces  the Bible to unless scribbling. He actually defends the faith and he does it in a way that moves forward our understanding of Gospels and the eyewitness to Jesus. His idea about the names is brilliant work. He figures out a pattern for when names of people are used or when they just identified namelessly and shows that at certain junctures the names must have been eyewitness who were important to the community that produced the Gospel,, It is possible to put the field forward while defending the faith but most of them don't hit that mark,

Peter Enns quotes Kenton L. Sparks in saying that the evangelicals have tried to give their sons credentials to make them able to counter liberal scholarship but their attempts are not successful, 

[I]t was impossible for bright, young fundamentalist students to avoid noticing that the biblical and historical evidence created, or at least seemed to create, substantial difficulties for their conservative doctrine of Scripture.  As a result, while their fundamentalist forefathers tended to reject biblical criticism with anti-intellectual fideistic responses, this new generation of fundamentalists from the 1950s and 1960s–now called evangelicals–intended to use their intellectual and critical skills to prove that fundamentalism’s view of the Bible was correct all along.
Consequently, a common characteristic of conservative, evangelical scholarship during the 20th century, and now at the dawn of a new century, is that it attempts to use accepted critical methodologies to demonstrate that certain conservative theological positions–such as the Bible’s inerrancy and historical accuracy–fit the biblical evidence and are intellectually satisfying.


[15] Unfortunatley Enns says Sparks argues they were unsuccessful but Enns does not include that information.
As a conclusion I call attention to a book by NT Wright Written with Stephen Neil, The Interpretation of the New Testament 1864-1986 (see more)[16] This is a perfect metaphor for the way I feel about Biblical Scholarship and all of theology. This books is reprint of a book wreitten in 1964 by Stephen Neill (I have it) it went 1864-1964 then N.T. Wright added to it and published it again under that title. Turns out Wright was student of Neill and was working with is guidance before he died,Neill is one of my favorites.That may have been necessary because a lot come down the pike in those years, such as Ray Brown and the importance of non canonical Gospels that wasn't even thought of in 1964. Yet Wright is still hitchhiking on a the shoulders of a giant. There was a whole generation kn the 20th centiry of sincere believing liberals and moderates who were great scholars: Goodspeed, Canon Streeter, Neil, A.D. Knock, D.E.H.Whiteley. That's all gone, The next thing today is Koester who does't believe in the resurrection. There are believers trying to build on their work. They are pretty unknown to the evangelicals.

next time part 2:specific issues that I feel mark the weakness of most evangelical Biblical Scholarship




Sources
all sources acessed 9/9/16
[1] "Chicago Statement o Biblical Inerrancy With Exposition." Bble Research, Onlime URL:
http://www.bible-researcher.com/chicago1.html 


[2] Traci Schemaker "Five Beliefs That set Evangelicals Apart From Other Christians." News Max online resource, 2 April, 2015 URL:
http://www.newsmax.com/FastFeatures/evangelical-christians-beliefs/2015/04/02/id/636050/


[3] "0 Most Influential Christian Scholars," Super Scholar: best ideas im the world on line URL:
http://superscholar.org/features/20-most-influential-christian-scholars/

[4] William Abraham,  Canon and Criterion in Christian Theology,: From the Fathers to Feminism.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.

[5] , On Dooyeweerd: a bibliography 10 page pdf All of Life Redeemed,Christian Philosophy or Al.l of /Life. On line Url: http://www.freewebs.com/reformational/dooyeweerd.htm


He has been described as one of the foremost philosophers of the Netherlands.  Dr. P.B. Cliteur, [1] wrote in 1994: ‘Herman Dooyeweerd is undoubtedly the most formidable Dutch philosopher of the 20th century. ... As a humanist I have always looked at “my own tradition” in search for similar examples. They simply don't exist. Of course, humanists too wrote important books, but in the case of Herman Dooyeweerd we are justified in speaking about a philosopher of international repute.’... Giorgio Delvecchio, an Italian neo-Kantian philosopher, viewed Dooyeweerd as ‘the most profound, innovative, and penetrating philosopher since Kant’...Dooyeweerd’s father was greatly influenced by Abraham Kuyper and Dooyeweerd, who became a Christian at a young age, was immersed in kuyperian thought and neo-calvinism.  He would have heard Kuyper’s newspaper articles read aloud at home and he attended a Christian school whose headmaster Dr J. Woltjer was an associate of Kuyper.
He was a modern Christian Humanist and Evangelical. 



[6] from Wikepedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rousas_Rushdoony
Rousas John Rushdoony (April 25, 1916 – February 8, 2001)was a Calvinistphilosopher, historian, and theologian and is widely credited as the father of Christian Reconstructionism[3] and an inspiration for the modern Christian homeschoolmovement.[4][5] His followers and critics have argued that his thought exerts considerable influence on the evangelical Christian right.[6] [North, Gary (Feb 10, 2001). "R. J. Rushdoony, R.I.P.".LewRockwell.com.]

[7] Gregor thuswaldner, "A Conversation with Peter L. Berger, How My Views Have Changed," The Cresset,: A Review f Life,Art, Publkic Affaiors. (Vol LXXVII, No. 3,2014 pp 16-21) on line Resource, URL:
http://thecresset.org/2014/Lent/Thuswaldner_L14.html

[8] Ibid


[9] Berger in Super Scholar Op. cit.

Peter L. Berger (b. 1929) is a sociologist, who, starting in 1985, was director of the Institute for the Study of Economic Culture based at Boston University. He is best known for his sympathetic treatment of traditional religious beliefs that have guided humanity for thousands of years. Accounting for a worldwide resurgence of religion, he noted that there is an intractable conflict between the certainties by which people have lived for thousands of years and the secularity of an elite culture advancing rapidly to power in the Western world. His best known work is in social constructionism, a school of thought that focuses on uncovering the ways in which individuals and groups participate in the creation of their perceived reality

[10] Alvin Plamntinga, Super Scholar Op Cit

Alvin Plantinga (b. 1932), professor of philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, has led the way in the rational defense of Christian belief, turning Christian philosophy into a recognized area of academic scholarship. An expert in epistemology, metaphysics, and the philosophy of religion, he has authored many influential books, including God and Other Minds, The Nature of Necessity, and a trilogy on epistemology—Warrant: The Current Debate, Warrant and Proper Function, and Warranted Christian Belief. Coming from a Dutch reformed background, he is a proponent of Reformed epistemology. His evolutionary argument against naturalism has placed him at odds with atheistic Darwinists.
[11] "William Alston" The Information Philosopher: solving philosophical problems with new infomratiomnm philosophy on line resource, URL:
http://www.informationphilosopher.com/knowledge/philosophers/alston/ 



William Alston
(1921-2009)
William P. Alston was an analytic philosopher and epistemologist. With Alvin Plantinga, he founded the Society of Christian Philosophers and the journal Faith and Philosophy.
He argued for a blend of internalism and externalism. The fulfillment of one's epistemic duty (deontological justification) strengthenedfoundationalist justification on the internalist side. He argued for levelsof justification, first order, second order, etc. One need not be justified in holding a second-order belief in p, but still may be directly justified in believing p.
Alston tried to show the reliability of perception, despite circular reasoning, and thereby defended justified beliefs in God.
On the externalist side, he followed Thomas Reid in seeing justification as a certain kind of social practice.
Alston was a leader in the effort to create a "reformed epistemology" that could justify belief in God as a "basic belief" and defend faith as rational. Basic beliefs do not require explicit justification. They are self-justifying, according to some epistemologists. Alston did not care for the adjective "Reformed," as it refers back to John Calvin's Reformed theology, and the doctrine that God placed a sensus divinatus in the minds of men.
[12] Francis Shaeffer, The God who is There. Downer's Grove Il.: IVP 1968

[13] "Mark Goodacre" Wikipedioa
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_Goodacre

[14] N.T. Wright, Super Scholar,. Op cit


Nicholas Thomas Wright (b. 1948), widely known as “Tom” or “N.T.,” is the former Anglican bishop of Durham and presently a research professor at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland. He is a preeminent New Testament scholar, best known for his works defending orthodox Christian belief. His book The Resurrection of the Son of God was so influential that even Antony Flew, the late atheist scholar turned deist, praised it in his own book There IS a God (2007). Wright has defended his practice of writing “god” with a small “g” explaining that “in the first century, as well as the twenty-first, the question is not whether we believe in god … but which out of many available candidates we might be talking about.”

[15] Peter Enns, "Diagnosing Conservatove Evangelocal Biblical Scholarship,"  Peter Enns:Re Thinking Biblical Christianity. October 14, 2014 blog URL
http://www.patheos.com/blogs/peterenns/2014/10/diagnosing-conservative-evangelical-biblical-scholarship/

[16] Stephen Neill and Tom Wright. The Interpretation of the New Testament 1861–1986. 2d ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.  http://andynaselli.com/review-of-neills-and-wrights-the-interpretation-of-the-new-testament-1861-1986



Stephen Neill (1900–1984) was a missionary, Anglican Bishop, professor, and linguist, andN. T. Wright (b. 1948), who earned his Ph.D. from Oxford in 1980, is now the famous and influential Bishop of Durham. The Interpretation of the New Testament 1861–1986(henceforth, INT) attempts to summarize the major people and events in the vast field of NT interpretation over a 125-year period. Neill’s first edition, which was the outgrowth of his Firth Lectures at the University of Nottingham in 1962 (p. ix), was published in 1966 and covered one hundred years of NT interpretation (1861–1961). Neill began updatingINT for its second edition, but he died before completing it. He did, however, discuss the second edition with Wright, who edited Neill’s work (chapters 1–8, pp. 1–359) and replaced Neill’s previous conclusions with a final chapter that accounts for twenty-five more years of NT interpretation (pp. 360–449). The subject matter is almost exclusively British with some discussions of significant advances elsewhere (e.g., Germany), so the volume could be appropriately titled The Interpretation of the New Testament in Britain from 1861 to 1986.

Friday, September 09, 2016

Is there Rationality in The universe?

I just listened to Trump's campaign manager denied that he was ever for the war in Iraq. They played Trump on Howard Stern saying "Yea I guess so" meaning we should invade iraq, the fool actually said(CBS this morning) the fool said 'it's not a contradiction because he was n the Radio."
Man her logic is putrid,l how can someone like this win an election? every answer she's given is circular, She says Hillary went agaisnt the genraks views, Then we say Trump says Generals are no God she say yea Trump will put good generals in, doesn't that means he's going against the generals too?
Every answer she gave was based upon the idea that it must be wrong because she's Hilary,She is Hilary and we know she's wrong because of who she is,how do we know that? because she's her,
If Trump wins I will k now there is not rational mind in the universe,

Wednesday, September 07, 2016

Reducationism: Scientific Methodology, Atheist Philosohy, Rhetorical Ploy



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            Reductionism is a major methodological aspect of science; it also lends itself to atheist thought as a major world view, and to atheist apologetics as a rhetorical ploy. Reduction is a valid scientific methodology, but like all science it is also infused with notions of an ideological nature. When atheists use reductionism as a tool of ideology it has the fervor of scientific dedication and is cast with the aura of the sacred. It is both a valid methodological tool and an ideological propaganda device at the same time.

DEFINITION OF REDUCTIONISM

1
: explanation of complex life-science processes and phenomena in terms of the laws of physics and chemistry; also : a theory or doctrine that complete reductionism is possible
2
: a procedure or theory that reduces complex data and phenomena to simple terms [1]

Philosophical roots of reductionism


             “Methodological reductionism” is the process of reducing phenomena to its smallest constituent parts to understand what makes it function as a method for dealing with complexities that need to broken down.[2] Then there is “philosophical reductionism” which maintains as its goal a philosophical and/or ideological tenet that science can explain everything:
One form of scientific reductionism follows the belief that every single process in nature can be broken down into its constituent parts and can be described scientifically. The broadest sense of the term upholds the idea that science can be used to explain everything, and that nothing is unknowable. By looking at the individual constituent processes, scientists can gain an understanding of the whole process. For example, a reductionist believes that the complexity of the human brain is a result of complex and interacting physical processes. If scientists research and understand these underlying chemical reactions, then they can explain intelligence, emotion and all of the other human conditions. The only way to comprehend fully the sheer complexity of the human brain is to look at the individual pieces.[3]

 Here we can definitely see the ideological aspects of science at work. These advocates of this certain type of reductionism believe that “everything can be explained through science.” Obviously for this to be true science has to be the most valid from of knowledge if not the only form of knowledge. Materialists, who tend to philosophical reductionists, and this includes phyisicalists, go step further and just refuse to accept as knowledge anything that can’t be quantified and pinned down by their methods. God can’t be apprehended by their methods so there must not be a God. This notion of science as the most or only valid form of knowledge is clearly ideological and stems form philosophical concerns. In the issue of reductionism we can see one of the most obvious junctures at which philosophy has clung to scientific development and is still being infused with science. Reductionism is inherently infused with philosophy.

Reductionism encompasses a set of ontological, epistemological, and methodological claims about the relation of different scientific domains. The basic question of reduction is whether the properties, concepts, explanations, or methods from one scientific domain (typically at higher levels of organization) can be deduced from or explained by the properties, concepts, explanations, or methods from another domain of science (typically one about lower levels of organization). Reduction is germane to a variety of issues in philosophy of science, including the structure of scientific theories, the relations between different scientific disciplines, the nature of explanation, the diversity of methodology, and the very idea of theoretical progress, as well as to numerous topics in metaphysics and philosophy of mind, such as emergence, mereology, and supervenience.[4]


            Reductionism goes back to the Greeks and tied to philosophy up to the development of early modern science and beyond. The Greek atomists were reductionists. They wanted to cut up reality in order to get at the basic elements. The idea of positing basic building blocks doesn’t require that one abolish other aspects of reality. Yet certain of the pre-Socratics, such as Leucpp and Democritus, began doing this.[5] The term “reductiosm” is not very old. The modern issues enter science from philosophy. Ontological reductionism was part of the dispute between nominalists and realists in the middles.[6]  The major alternative to reductionism is holism. Holism also goes back to the Greeks with Aristotle. The Atomists had atoms in the void as the final explanation and Aristotle had final cause of an unmoved mover as the final cause and explanation of all harmony and unity in the world.[7] Modern science abhors teleology, the idea that everything is directed toward a goal or an end point. The teleological is the hall mark of Aristotle’s’ unmoved mover. Atoms in the void don’t require a goal; they are the end of the process. Thus science has had this atheistic bias literally since the Greeks. Likewise, theistic thinking takes on a holistic bias form the Greeks as well. Science was slow to completely turn over to the atomists and did so in stages. The bias against teleology was not adopted into biology until the middle of the nineteenth century (with Darwin and Wallace). Natural mutation and random selection have come to dominate in biology and replace any idea of purposefulness.[8]  The distinction between appearance and reality is a carry over from Democritus’ claim that binary oppositions in experience, such cold and hot, sweet and sour, are really just atoms moving in void.[9] We take this as empirically proved because we dismiss experience as subjective and go with the ‘objective measurement,’ never really considering how we are conditioned by philosophical hold over to think this way.

In this way, a conception of the world and our place in it evolved in the scientific revolution and the latter Enlightenment in Europe that was conducive to the development of the idea of reducing reality to only what scientists analyze out of the “buzzing, blooming confusion” we experience. Reductionist tendencies remained central to the epistemologies and metaphysics that developed in light of reflections on the modern natural scientific search for simplicity and unity. Such philosophies set the stage for explicit reductionist disputes in twentieth-century philosophy. But, contrary to many scholars’ perspective, the scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment were not the only sources of modern reductionist thinking. Another source can also be traced back to ancient thought—the quest for a viable monism.[10]

It may seem that monism is the child of mystical concerns, a refugee from a religious past, something more akin to Hinduism or Buddhism than modern science. In fact materialism/phyiscalism is heir to Greek monism.
           In terms of ontology three major approaches. Pluralists, of which Leibniz is an example) accept either plurality of fundamentally irreducible realities or plurality of real material objects. Dualists typified by Descartes two basic realities that can’t be reduced to one. Monists reduce it all to one fundamental type of reality or apparent multiplicity as a manifestation of one fundamental type of reality. Positing one reality in place of apparent multiplicity is reductive. Jones thus argues that the first type of monist is a weaker version of the second.[11] He sees Thales and the pre-Socratics and their attempt to understand the world in terms of one basic element as the orign of the reductive impulse in Western thought..[12] One might wonder, however, if that’s not just an appearance that results from following the atomists. There is a link to modern through that’s a lot more direct than a secret winding path through 2000 years of history. The skeptics and dissenters of the English enlightenment were influenced by the Greek atomists. In the restoration period the English churchmen, the Latitudinarians began arguing against a philosophical bugbear. At that time Greek thinking, especially that of the atomists, was being rediscovered. The Latitudinarians put up an apologetical front against the Greeks even though skepticism was virtually invisible to the public. Dissenters, Socinians (Latter to become Unitarians) and skeptics picked up these ideas.



            Jones understands materialism as the only form of monism produced in modern times. He does discuss Berkeley’s form of idealism known as  “immaterialism”
 which postulates that that “all reality is reduced to a collection of mental substances…merely perceptions in the mind of God.”[13] We tend to think of monism as either eastern or atheist but not Christian. Yet Berkeley was a Christian Bishop. The Bible never pronounces upon the truth of philosophical schools. That wasn’t part of the conceptual universe of the people who write the bible. It’s left up to theologians to argue for one version or another. Hume argued for a monism that was neither mental nor physical.[14] Modern materialists are not strong monists as they allow for plurality of material objects.


Types of Reductionism.

            It seems that there is no set list of types. Each author has his/her own version of the different types. John Polkinghorne, formerly professor of mathematical physics as University of Cambridge, lists constituent, conceptual (or epistemological) and causal. “Constituent” means that when a complex system is reduced or taken apart what remains is a set of fragments that correspond to the expected constituents and nothing more. The example he gives is that of a living organism, when decomposed, doesn’t leave behind any part pertaining to a “spark of life” as was once claimed by the philosophy of “vitalism.” [15] Of course that seems self defeating because the organism is dead so one would not expect to find a spark of life. Nevertheless, Polkinghorne denies that this form of reductionism implies that living beings are nothing but collections of molecules. “This kind is closely related to methodological reductionism, the widely practiced scientific strategy of studying wholes through breaking them up into their constituent parts. Again, the success of the strategy does not imply that everything relevant to the whole can be studied in this way.”[16] “Conceptual” refers to means that concepts applying to the whole can be totally expressed in terms of concepts applying to the parts. “An example of a successful reduction of this kind is afforded by the use of the kinetic theory of gases to reduce the concept of temperature (originating in the thermodynamics of bulk matter) to exact equivalence to the average kinetic energy of the molecules of the gas.”[17] Polkinghorne also sites counter examples to this second kind of reduction. Individual water molecules are not wet, for example. The third type, “causal” will probably be more important for our purposes.
            Causal reductionism:


…implies that the causes acting on the whole are simply the sum of the effects of the individual causalities of the parts. In the case of wetness such a reduction appears successful, on the reasonable supposition that surface tension is generated entirely by the action of inter-molecular forces. Since at both levels one is concerned with purely energetic properties, a translation between the two seems plausible. On the other hand, it is not at all clear that sums of firings of neural synapses can add up to produce mental qualia (feels), as there appears to be a clear qualitative difference between the two ( MIND-BODY RELATIONSHIP). Causal reductionism is closely allied to ontological reductionism, the assertion that the whole is the sum of its parts. It is quite possible to hold to constituent reductionism and to deny causal reductionism as, in fact, many do. One strategy for this is to embracecontextualism, the belief that the behaviour of constituents depends upon the nature of the whole that they constitute.[18]

This type of reduction seems to correspond to what was said above about philosophical reductionism, where the concept is not so much used as only a method in science but the basis of a philosophy.
            As we saw above there is a kind of reductionist who believes that science can explain everything, and nothing is “unknowable.”




Reductionism in Action


            Reductionism is a tool of atheist apologetics. It’s used as a major tactic because it support the materialist assumption of the world as only matter, or the physicalist assumption as the world as only physical objects. Thus any alternative to these ideologies can be ignored, and the mystique of a scientific procedure can be applied. The Reductionist is merely ignoring the possibility of spirit or of some alternative but doing it under the assumption that there can only be physical things anyway. Certain “tricks’ are employed to pull off this connection, spreading the aura of science over a purely ideological move.  Before look at those moves, however it’s important to note some of the major issues where these moves are used. Although reductionism is a standard procedure for atheist thinking so almost any issue is vulnerable, yet there are certain issues that draw more fire in the reductionist camp. The major issue on which the ploys of reductionism are used is the brain/mind issue. The idea that consciousness is not reducible to brain chemistry is a major challenge for materialists. The counter position is that of the reductionists who believe that the qualities of consciousness must be reduced to the basic physical complement that they feel produce brain function. Of course they are almost certainly arbitrarily refusing to accept a possibly of something more than brain function as the nature of consciousness. To hold their position at all is to do some form of reductionism as a founding assumption. Any issue involving free will, which includes the problem of pain and attempts to disprove god based upon Theodicy, employs a reductions approach to ignore the basis of free will as rooted in something other than brain chemistry. Thus reductionism sort of mandates determinism.
            I will look at three issues, as stated; almost any issue can include a reductionst approach. These issues are: (1) Religious experience (2) Brain/mind, (3) Free will/determinism. By “religious experience” I mean primarily of the “mystical kind.” This includes both exterrvertive and interovertive, as well as esoteric and exoteric. In other words, this includes both mystics as well as charismatics. This includes the sense of the numinous, which the feeling of prescience or meaning of overwhelming love that mystics try describe. It is not about visions and voices it is about a form of consciousness where one seems to see through he world illusion and recognizes the undifferentiated unity of all things. It can also be experienced in terms of the sense of the numinous, love and presence of divine. On a popular level atheist apologists have learned some tricks form reductionism. They meet claims of empirical studies demonstrating the transfoarmtive power of religious experience by reducing transformation to “getting happy.” They reduce the effects to brain chemistry and ideologically ignore the possibly of any form of consciousness not a side effect of brain chemistry.

Long-Term Effects

Wuthnow study:
*Say their lives are more meaningful,
*think about meaning and purpose
*Know what purpose of life is
Meditate more
*Score higher on self-rated personal talents and capabilities
*Less likely to value material possessions, high pay, job security, fame, and having lots of friends
*Greater value on work for social change, solving social problems, helping needy
*Reflective, inner-directed, self-aware, self-confident life style

Noble study: 

*Experience more productive of psychological health than illness
*Less authoritarian and dogmatic
*More assertive, imaginative, self-sufficient
*intelligent, relaxed
*High ego strength,
*relationships, symbolization, values,
*integration, allocentrism,
*psychological maturity,
*self-acceptance, self-worth,
*autonomy, authenticity, need for solitude,
*increased love and compassion


These are long term characteristics that the mystical experiencing subject exhibited.[19]So then to say that all just amounts to “getting happy” is losing the actual aspects that make the experience what it is and totally changes the outcome. The standard tricks of the reductionist can be understood as follows:

Lose the Phenomena

All the complexity of relationships to self and others, self image, autonomy, social responsibility and so on are reduced to one simplistic undefined feeling of “happy.” It’s counted in such a country cornpone way that it’s clear derogatory.


Re-label

The as aspect of changing “self actualization” to “happy” not only loses a lot in translation but it is also changing the label from one that connotes a complex psychological theory of personality to one that connotes little thought and simplistic motives (“gett’n happy”).

Re-Describe

This will be illustrated in forthcoming material. It involves a way of losing phenomena by leaving out curcial aspect in re-describing what is to be recued.


Bait and Switch

This is seen in a major way on the brain/mind issue. One of the major proponents of mind (David Chalmers) argues that the reductionsits are pulling a bait and switch. They are not examining consciousness but bran function put over as consciousness. Bait “we are going to examine consciousness,” the switch, it’s really brain function they examine. This biat and switch tactic is one of the chief ways that reductionists lose the phenomena, by diverting our attention to other phenomena.


            These same tricks are used by professionals. One of the major practitioners is philosopher Wayne Proudfoot who teaches at Columbia University. Proudfoot’sReligious Experience, is a practically a blue print to the use of use of reductionism as a rhetorical device to blunt the effects of empirical research.[20] The issue comes in where skeptics try to offer counter causal explanations for the experience. Mainly the materialist/physicalist tries to explain it in term of brain chemistry since this is the order of the day, all consciousness must be reduced to brain chemistry. William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (The Gilford Lectures):

Medical materialism seems indeed a good appellation for the too simple-minded system of thought which we are considering. Medical materialism finishes up Saint Paul by calling his vision on the road to Damascus a discharging lesion of the occipital cortex, he being an epileptic. It snuffs out Saint Teresa as an hysteric, Saint Francis of Assisi as an hereditary degenerate. George Fox's discontent with the shams of his age, and his pining for spiritual veracity, it treats as a symptom of a disordered colon. Carlyle's organ-tones of misery it accounts for by a gastro-duodenal catarrh. All such mental over-tensions, it says, are, when you come to the bottom of the matter, mere affairs of diathesis (auto-intoxications most probably), due to the perverted action of various glands which physiology will yet discover. And medical materialism then thinks that the spiritual authority of all such personages is successfully undermined.[21]


[1 Merriam-Webser’s  Dicitonary online version URL: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reductionism  visited 3/16/2012
[2] “Scientific Recutionsm,” website: Experiment-Resources.com. URL:http://www.experiment-resources.com/scientific-reductionism.html  visited 3/13/2012
Experiemnt-reserouces.com is a site ran for educational purposes by a psychologist and other unnamed authors who work in the seicnes.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Brigandt, Ingo and Love, Alan, "Reductionism in Biology", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = .
[5] Richard H. Jones, Reductionism: Analysis and the Fullness of Reality. Danvers, Massachusetts: Associated University Press.2000, 37.online copy, Google books, URL:http://books.google.com/books?id=sUgnio874NUC&pg=PA39&lpg=PA39&dq=revolution+against+reductionism&source=bl&ots=RfQNUal7yQ&sig=Wputdv-lWVTdRJ0lJem2hrXHKZI&hl=en&ei=rWusTp3zG4risQLZzKXdDg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CCQQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q&f=true  visited 3/13/2012
[6] ibid.
[7] ibid.
[8] ibid, 38
[9] ibid.
[10] ibid.
[11] ibid, 40
[12] ibid
[13] ibid
[14] ibid
[15] John Polkinghorne, “Reductionism.” Inters Interdisciplinary Encyclopedia of Religion and Science.  p.zza sant'Apollinare, 49 - 00186 Rome: Centro di Documentazione Interdisciplinare di Scienza e Fede operating at the Pontifical University of the Holy Cross. Edited by Giuseppe Tanzella-Nitti, Philip Larrey andAlberto Strumìa  On line resource, URL http://www.disf.org/en/voci/104.asp  visited 3/16/2012
[16] ibid
[17] ibid
[18] ibid
[19] Council on Spiritual Practices listsBoth of these lists are distilled by another writer from the two different studies by Wuthnow and Nobel. This list is found on a webstie hosted by the Council on Spiritual Pracices. “State of Unitive Consciousness Research Summary.” URL: http://csp.org/experience/docs/unitive_consciousness.html visitied 4/5/2012.
About Council on Spiritual Pracitices: (from the site) “The Council on Spiritual Practices is a collaboration among spiritual guides, experts in the behavioral and biomedical sciences, and scholars of religion, dedicated to making direct experience of the sacred more available to more people. There is evidence that such encounters can have profound benefits for those who experience them, for their neighbors, and for the world.”http://csp.org/about.html
[20] Wayne Proudfoot, Religious Experince. Berkeley: University of California Press,
[21] William James, Varieties of Religious Experience. New York: Modern Library, 1994, 16.

Tuesday, September 06, 2016

Obama's Econmy: Helll in a Hand Basket? with 5.1%


7 econ0jioc lies Trump brainwashes us into

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mM5Ep9fS7Z0



Unemployment? 5.1%!

 photo prez_jobs_june2015_zps8n6wk4ez.png
from Daily Kos Site [1]


Trump has made the statement "The country is going to hell in a hand basket." Let's look at the figures? See those little red stumps on the upper graph? That's Bush's Job growth. One is negative. Obama's much better. It's not as good as Clinton's or even Reagan's (see the graph, Clinton blue) but Obama had a much worse economic crisis that he inherited.



From Fact Check.org 

Summary

Since President Barack Obama first took office:
  • The economy has added nearly 8.4 million jobs — more than six times the number gained under George W. Bush.
  • The number of job openings doubled, to a record 5.7 million.
  • Nearly 15 million fewer people lack health insurance coverage.
  • Corporate profits are at record levels; stock prices have more than doubled.
  • However, median household income was down 3 percent as of 2014, and the official poverty rate was 1.6 percentage points higher.
  • The rate of home ownership has dropped to the lowest point in nearly half a century.
  • The federal debt owed to the public has more than doubled — up 107 percent.[2]
The site lists unemployment ratevatv5.1%,  Job openings up 180%,  Business start ups +19%, business failimgs downm 27%

Even a conservative publication such as the Economist says that "the president's record is a lot better than the woes of America's economy suggests." The article points out that Obama faced the most grim economic conditions since 1933, After detailing failure in comic growth and housing market for most of Obama's two terms only picking up late in second term the articles finds all economic recoveries are slow. This a far cry from hell in a hand basket. Since the article is not lauding him as stupendous or berating him for causing every sill since the great depression, it's probably a fairly objective appraisal. [3]







Sources

all sources accessed 2/26/16
[1] Jon Perr, "Obama Has Created Six Times As Many Jobs As Bush," Daily Kos Blog, July 6, 2015,
URL: http://www.dailykos.com/story/2015/6/7/1391360/-Obama-has-created-six-times-as-many-jobs-as-Bush

[2] , "Obama's Numbers (October, 2015)," Fact check .org, Posted on October 6, 2015 , blog URL http://www.factcheck.org/2015/10/obamas-numbers-october-2015-update/
Trump's statement was that same month.

[3]  Editor, "End of Term Report,"  The Economist, Sep 2012, online URL:
http://www.economist.com/node/21561909

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Sunday, September 04, 2016

Proudfoot's Reductionism: Losing the Phenomena of Religious Experience


 photo Proudfoot_zpsufmgdgrq.jpg

Wayne Proudfoot
Columbia University





I recently found a sight an Encyclopedia of Religion and Society, [1] with an article about mystical experience. The article quoted Wayne Proudfoot, a philosopher, as an expert o the subject. I devoted two chapters in my book to debuckimg Proudfoot's doctrinaire denunciation of religious experience. Here is the theory of Proudfoot that the source quotes:


This existence of culturally specific "triggers" for mystical experience coincides with attribution theory. Proudfoot (1985) argues that an apologetic strategy underlies the attempts of many scholars to differentiate religious experience from the normal structures associated with culture and language. He bases his position on the research of Schachter and Singer (1962), who argued that nervous system arousal without apparent reason leads to the attribution of a causal explanation dependent on the environmental factors prevalent at the time. This orientation allows Proudfoot to apply sociological orientations to the understanding of religious perceptions.
What this actually means is he doesn't believe there  are religious experiences, He thinks those who have such experiences are are just convinced that they want them so they mislabel other feelings as religious experience. It is this view that I tear apart over two chapters. The encyclopedia itself lists some criticisms:
Although Proudfoot's work is frequently cited, his formulations have been subject to criticism (Garnard 1992). The basis for many of his arguments, the work of Schachter and Singer (1962), has received only limited support by later researchers. Studies indicate that different physiological sensations are associated with different emotions. Although Proudfoot's orientation does not explain the incidence of some forms of mystical experience (noted by Hay and Morisy 1978, for example), attribution theory continues to provide a valuable means for explaining many of the characteristics of religious experience (Spilka and McIntosh 1995). Environmental and cultural factors shape experiential perception and affect the degree that experiences are interpreted as "religious."
 Here I will focus upon another aspect of Proudfoot's ideological treatment of RE. That is his reductionist. Reductionism is valid scientific methodology but too often it crosses the line into philosophy and even ideology. 

One of the major practitioners is philosopher Wayne Proudfoot, who teaches at Columbia University. Proudfoot’s Religious Experience is practically a blueprint for the use of reductionism as a rhetorical device to blunt the effects of empirical research.[2] The issue comes in where skeptics try to offer counter-causal explanations for conscious experiences. Mainly, the materialist/physicalist tries to explain them in term of brain chemistry, since this is the order of the day: all consciousness must be reduced to brain chemistry. William James, dealt with the same problem over a hundred years ago in The Varieties of Religious Experience (The Gilford Lectures):
Medical materialism seems indeed a good appellation for the too simple-minded system of thought which we are considering. Medical materialism finishes up Saint Paul by calling his vision on the road to Damascus a discharging lesion of the occipital cortex, he being an epileptic. It snuffs out Saint Teresa as an hysteric, Saint Francis of Assisi as an hereditary degenerate. George Fox's discontent with the shams of his age, and his pining for spiritual veracity, it treats as a symptom of a disordered colon. Carlyle's organ-tones of misery it accounts for by a gastro-duodenal catarrh. All such mental over-tensions, it says, are, when you come to the bottom of the matter, mere affairs of diathesis (auto-intoxications most probably), due to the perverted action of various glands which physiology will yet discover. And medical materialism then thinks that the spiritual authority of all such personages is successfully undermined. [3]

Reducing religious experience

Some of Proudfoot’s critiques of mystical/religious experience are valid, so I won’t go into everything he says. I want to focus on those aspects where he uses re-labeling, re-describing and losing the phenomena. A simple version of this is described above, where some reduce a long list of transformative characteristics to “getting happy.” Proudfoot does a much more complex version of the same thing. He goes beyond methodological reductionism to ideological reductionism. He begins by correcting Schleiermacher’s language regarding religious experience. This is also an example of re-labeling. One of the aspects of mystical experience is that it is said to be beyond word, thought or image. It is said to be a pure moment of experience, precluding any attempt to describe it. Of course, this must be understood in a particular sense and is probably still a misstatement, because to even to say that one has a sense of the numinous or an all-pervasive sense of love, a sense of the divine, etc., one must use words, thoughts and images. Obviously, then, the experience is not so entirely beyond our understanding that we cannot label it in certain ways. But Proudfoot exploits that seeming contradiction, using the inadequacy of the original experiencer’s labels, to pull off a bait and switch. He essentially argues that what we believe about an experience determines the nature of the experience. We can see this in his statement, “The belief that a particular moment of consciousness is immediate and prior to all concepts and beliefs may well be constitutive of the experience..”[4] “Constitutive” would mean that it is made up of more simple concepts that are used to build the construct like an edifice, which then in turn becomes another building block in a more complex edifice. In other words, it’s not just a pure moment of experience, but what is being experienced is actually conditioned upon prior understanding.

There is probably some extent to which this is true, but Proudfoot doesn’t say, “If the moment is immediate”— he says, “If we believe the moment is immediate.” He has changed the actuality of a pure moment that has really been experienced, to an idea about an experience that we might hold. Perhaps we can’t have a pure moment that is not conditioned in some way by our prior understanding, but that doesn’t mean that the experience itself can contain no aspects that are not expected or that in some way exceed understanding. Proudfoot is not concerned with the actual experience, but with losing the phenomena and re-labeling, so that we believe about an experience determines the experience. As I said, this is valid to a point. If we believe going to the dentist is no big deal, we may not amplify the pain in our minds and thus we may find it less painful than if we dread it and worry and anticipate it to be a very painful experience. The problem is that this gives the impression (and excuse) that any time we experience something of the divine, it must come from our expectations. But this ignores experiences when they are new or when they are totally unexpected. It also removes reflection upon the past. If all ideas about experience are read back into the memory, then there is ultimately no memory that is unconditioned by belief.
By Proudfoot’s logic, we have no real experiences. We never did love; we never did enjoy; we don’t really miss our parents: this is all back-reading our expectations into our physiological sensations. The tactic becomes a means of knocking down the experience of being human and replacing it with an ideology about someone else’s ideas of what being human means. Proudfoot uses this bait and switch to wipe out the concept of religious experience completely. In fact, his ideas actually wipe out all experience.
Proudfoot re-labels Schleiermacher’s views on emotions and feelings: instead of an honest appraisal, they are “apologetics.” By re-labeling the appraisal in this way, he moves it out of the category of an empirical approach, to something of which we must be suspicious. He observes that religious experience has come to be associated with a set of experiences that transcend the verbal, according to “some quarters.” He finds that there are two reasons why this is so. One is descriptive, the other apologetic. The descriptive is the need to find commonality among “different experiences we call religious.” The apologetic is the need to distinguish “religious” experience from other kinds of experience. Schleiermacher believed that religion is more deeply entrenched in the lives and communities of people than are doctrines. Feelings are more basic and more entrenched in life than words on paper. This probably seems pretty reasonable to most


people, but to Proudfoot it is an apologetic ploy. In calling one reason “descriptive” and the other “apologetic,” he is trying to cast a pall on the whole process of attempting to make a distinction between religious experiences and other kinds of experiences. This is important for his strategy, because it will enable the switch from religious experience feelings to all feelings.[5] If we can describe commonalities between religious experiences, does that not automatically imply that we can distinguish between religious and non-religious feelings? If not, then how can we find commonalities? If so, then why is this “apologetic”? It seems that both are equally necessary to one another. Of course, even if there is an apologetic going on, that does not mean there are no religious experiences. But describing this differentiation as apologetic is part of Proudfoot’s hermeneutic of suspicion and a way to lose the phenomena. After page 78 he slides into a critique of all feelings in general.
Proudfoot uses the example of Stephen Bradley’s dramatic religious experience found in William James’ Verities of Religious Experience.ii [6]The example as Proudfoot describes it appears to be that of a man (Bradley) who has a heart attack and takes it for a religious conversion experience. He is in fact converted by it. The experience was brought on while at a revival meeting. Proudfoot centers on the physical phenomenon, the man’s heart speeding up very fast and beating like a trip hammer, but says nothing about any other aspects, such as any special feelings or anything that might have put Bradley in a mood to repent. The assessment is entirely in terms of physiological phenomena, which are then analyzed in terms of the recipient labeling them so that he would know what meaning to give them. That is then taken as proof that internal states are nothing more than the labeling of physiological phenomena. But all Proudfoot has done is to mine the data for what he wants. He ignores other aspects that do not support his idea. The subject in question does speak of being filled with “the joy and grace of the Lord.” This aspect of the experience is ignored— Proudfoot doesn’t take it into account at all. To him, it is obviously these physiological sensations which produced in the subject the idea that he was being saved. But in fact, most mystical experiences do not contain such overt physical phenomena. So it’s clear that Proudfoot ignores what does not support his view. He only pays attention to those aspects that confirm his labeling theory.

Proudfoot says of this instance: “Bradley, like so many prospective devotees before and since, could not understand his feelings in naturalistic terms. Religious symbols offered him an explanation that was compatible both with his experience and with his antecedent beliefs.”[7] [6]One problem with this is that Bradley’s antecedent beliefs were not religious. Bradley even says, “Had any person told me prior to this that I could have experienced the power of the Holy Spirit in the manner in which I did, I could not have believed it.”[8] This actually disproves the labeling hypothesis. Moreover, since this was a conversion experience, it is important because it disputes the “placebo” argument. Religious experience is said to be a placebo effect— but placebos require expectations in order to work, and Bradley had none. Many such religious experiences are conversion experiences with no prior expectations.

We see reductionism at work here in a major way. The reductionist reads the situation in terms favorable to his theory, even at the expense of losing sight of the situation itself by ignoring those aspects of it that don’t fit the theory. The classic sense of the phrase “losing the phenomena” means that when the reductive process is finished, the experience has been explained away to the point where what remains cannot adequately describe or account for the total experience. But there is another sense in which a great deal of reductionism is about helping along the process of losing a phenomenon by simply ignoring parts of it.





Sources

[1]William H. Swatos (ed), Encyclopedia of Religion and Society, Hartord CT: Hartford Institute of Religius Research, Hartford Seminary. online resource URL:
[2]Wayne Proudfoot, Religious Experience. Berkeley: University of California Press, [need date and page number here]
[3] William James, Varieties of Religious Experience. New York: Modern Library, 1994, 16.
[4] Proudfoot , 13.
[5] Ibid 75,76
[6] Proudfoot, Ibid, 103, quoting from William James, the Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature, being the Gifford Lectures Delivered at Edinburgh, 1901-1902. New York and Bombay, Longmans Green and Company 1905. 190-193.
[7] Ibid, 104
[8] Ibid