Paul Tillich.....................Duane Olson
What
follows are examples of my own attempts and the attempts of others at
making God arguments based upon Tillich’s ideas and implicit arguments.
The first one is based upon Duane Olson’s idea of Tillich’s implied
ontological argument. The second and third arguments are based upon my
own first understanding of what Tillich was saying about God and being
itself. This is the crude understanding I had leavening seminary. These
are supposed to be examples of “talking points” not “proofs” of God’s
existence. They are demonstrations of aspects of the depth of being,
indications that being has depth. We can use this concept, indications that being has depth,
as the orientation for God arguments, rather than “proofs” of “God’s
existence.” Tillich never put these ideas together in this way to call
them “arguments” but these are ideas I take from Tillich, although
without being put over as “arguments.” In fact here they are not so much
arguments as “points of embarkation” to move into the realization process. That is the process that leads to “realizing God.”
Several authors have tired to demonstrate that Tillich’s understanding implies a ready made ontological argument:
Paul
Tillich’s name is not ordinarily included in a list of thinkers who
have made a significant contribution to the ontological argument. Those
who find affinity with Tillich’s thought have tended to overlook what
he says about the arguments for God’s existence, influenced perhaps by
Tillich’s sometime statements about the improper nature of such
arguments.[1]
Those who work with the arguments for God’s existence have tended to
avoid Tillich’s ideas, perhaps for the same reason, or perhaps because
his critique of the “existence of God” seems to belie a connection with
arguments attempting to prove God’s existence. Despite this overlooking,
I contend that Tillich made a significant contribution to the
ontological argument and that it is important to examine this
contribution for several reasons. 1) Tillich sought to reconceive the
argument from its traditional interpretation in which the argument is
understood as attempting to prove the existence of a theistic deity on
the basis of an idea of this deity. [2]
In addition to Olson’s version there Is also John M. Russell at Methodist Theological School in Ohio.[3]
I am only able to obtain the Olson article so that’s the one I’ll deal
with. Olson argues that Tillich works with the classical correspondence
theory of epistemology. Truth is correspondence between subject and
object. “The
focus of Tillich’s main argument is not on concrete judgments, or any
truths in any field of knowledge, but on the fact that the subject has
the capacity to make judgments about reality. This capacity involves
applying a correspondence-norm, or a norm of truth, to a concrete
subject-object interaction.”[4]
The
indubitability of the norm of truth is shown by a reductio argument
regarding the process of knowing. In different places and in different
ways Tillich points out that denial and doubt in knowing presuppose the
norm of truth.[17 in the article]
I want to systematize Tillich’s reductio argument at this point to
show that all major theoretical postures presuppose this norm.We
can imagine four major postures taken by a subject to any theoretical
judgment. One could affirm the judgment, claiming it corresponds with
reality; one could deny the judgment, claiming it does not correspond;
one could doubt, question, and debate the judgment; or one could claim a
decision cannot be made about the judgment. All of the options
presuppose the subject’s ability to apply a correspondence-norm, or norm
of truth. Certainly one must apply a norm to affirm a judgment. One
must also apply a norm, however, to deny a judgment. Any negative
judgment presupposes and lives from the positive bearing of a norm of
truth by the subject. One cannot deny that a judgment corresponds to
reality without presupposing the subject’s ability to make judgments
about reality. Doubting, questioning, or debating a judgment presuppose
a norm of truth as well. One could not debate the veracity of a
judgment without presupposing the capacity in the debaters to determine
that veracity. Doubting or questioning a judgment is only meaningful
under the presupposition of a norm that gives validity to that
questioning and doubting. Finally, the claim that one cannot know
whether a judgment is true presupposes the bearing of a norm to
determine how or why a decision cannot be made.
It
is important to note that the argument for a correspondence-norm, or
norm of truth, is on a different level than arguments about the specific
nature of the correspondence between subject and object. The
correspondence itself may be conceived in terms of naïve realism,
idealism, or a multitude of positions in between. Every theory about
the nature of the correspondence, however, relies on the presupposition
of a correspondence-norm that would make it possible to formulate, and
affirm, deny, debate, or declare uncertain that theory. Put
differently, the theory of the specific nature of the correspondence
between subject and object is another field of knowledge that is subject
to the ultimate criterion of knowledge, which is what is disclosed in
the idea of a correspondence-norm.
To
claim that the capacity to apply a norm is indubitable is the same
thing as saying the subject bears an indubitable awareness of truth. In
other words, when one analyzes the major postures toward judgments and
shows how a norm of truth is presupposed as something borne by the
subject in every posture, one is pointing out an awareness of truth the
subject has, though it is something the subject may overlook, especially
in doubting or denying particular truths. Through the reductio
argument, one focuses attention on the fact that the subject bears a
norm of truth, thus raising it to conscious awareness. I speak more
below about the character of this awareness, but for now I simply affirm
something Tillich presupposes, which is the identity between the
affirmation that the subject bears a norm of truth and the subject’s
awareness of this norm.[5]
The
awareness of the norm of truth is the awareness of something
transcendent and unconditioned, beyond the dichotomy of subject/object.
This transcendent unconditioned is beyond both subjectivity and
objectivity. But subject and object participate in the unconditioned,
and it is a transcendent unity that makes possible all concrete
affirmation, denial, down and uncertainty in the process of knowing. It
is being itself appearing in the theoretical function as that which
transcends subject and object. The norm of truth is not limited to
subjectivity because it is used to judge the correspondence with
objects. Since the subject bears it, it is not merely objective. It is
not an object at all in the sense of being anything with which the
subject can have a synthesis.
The
subject cannot condition the norm of truth, but is conditioned by it.
The subject can deny or debate or doubt any particular truth but cannot
deny either her own capacity to apply a norm of truth itself. Nor can
the subject down the concept of truth. The certainty about the norm of
truth is different from any other contents of knowledge. The norm is
grounded in necessary truth. One could not challenge the concept of
truth except in terms of the untruth of truth, which implies a truth;
the notion of truth, to be meaningful, but also contain the assumption
that it’s opposite is untrue, and vice versa.[6]
As
supplementary arguments Tillich asserts that the quest to know drives
the seeker on toward an end goal of total knowing. The unconditioned
nature of the norm of truth is implicit in all knowing and in the desire
to know.
Let’s
try to summarize what this argument is really saying by isolating and
enumerating it’s most basic and necessary points. This is not an attempt
at a formal presentation of logic, but merely a way of summarizing, a
thumbnail sketch.
Remember
from chapter 4 that Tillich identified God with truth based upon God’s
eternally necessary nature and the eternal and transcendent nature of
the Platonic forms and God’s self revelation in Exodus 3:
(1) Tillich understand’s God to be the unconditioned, eternal, transcendent, ground of all being;
(2) Truth is an unconditioned norm based upon the correspondence theory; truth is correspondence between subject and object.
(3)
The norm of truth is self verifying sense; truth as a concept cannot be
untrue unless the concept of truth is affirmed in contrast to the
possibility of untruth. Any particular truth can be doubted but not the
concept of truth itself.
(4)
Due to this unconditioned, necessary, and indubitable nature the norm
of truth is understood to be transcendent of subject and object, and
transcendent of any particulars of nature.
(5)
The transcendent unconditioned is equated with God in Tilich’s
understanding of being itself (from 1); the existence of such a norm is
demonstrated in the nature of the norm of truth.
(6)
Therefore, we have a rational warrant for understanding the ground of
being as synonymous with Tillich’s understanding of “the divine.”
Tillich basically makes the argument himself, in Theology of Culture where he talks about God construed as truth (see chapter 4, Augustine on Being itself). Then he says:
Augustine,
after he had experienced all the implications of ancient skepticism,
gave a classical answer to the problem of the two absolutes: they
coincide in the nature of truth. Veritas is presupposed in ever philosophical argument; and veritas
is God. You cannot deny truth as such because you could do it only in
the name of truth, thus establishing truth. And if you establish truth
you affirm God. “Where I have found the truth there I have found my God,
the truth itself,” Augustine says. The question of the two Ultimates is
solved in such a way that the religious Ultimate is presupposed in
every philosophical question, including the question of God. God is the presupposition of the question of God. This is the ontological solution of the problem of the philosophy of religion. God can never be reached if he is the object of a question and not its basis.[7]
This is the part not quoted in previous chapter:
The
Truth which is presupposed in every question and in every doubt
precedes the cleavage into subject and object. Neither of them Is an
ultimate power, but they participate in the ultimate power above them,
in Being itself, in primum esse. “Being is what first appears in
the intellect…” this being (which is not a being) is pure actuality and
therefore Divine. We always see it but we do not always notice it; as we
see everything in the light without always noticing the light as such.
According to Augustine and his followers the verum ipsum is also the bonum ipsum because nothing which is less than the ultimate power of being can be the ultimate power of good.[8]
Tillich
never calls this “my ontological argument.” He may or may not hint that
it is somewhere but I have not seen that. He does not, to my knowledge,
put this over as a version of the OA. Yet I feel that it is and it’s
essentially what Olson is talking about.
[1] footnoe in the Olson article by Olsen where he states:
In one of the more significant recent monographs on Tillich’s thought, Langdon Gilkey flatly states “[Tillich] denied that an argument for the transcendent power and ground of being was possible” (Gilkey on Tillich (Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2000), 105). Gilkey never discusses Tillich’s use of the traditional arguments.
In one of the more significant recent monographs on Tillich’s thought, Langdon Gilkey flatly states “[Tillich] denied that an argument for the transcendent power and ground of being was possible” (Gilkey on Tillich (Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2000), 105). Gilkey never discusses Tillich’s use of the traditional arguments.
[2] Duane Olson, “Paul Tillich and the Ontological Argument,” Quodlibet Journal vol. 6, no 3, July-sep 2004, online journal, URL: http://www.quodlibet.net/articles/olson-tillich.shtml visited 8/4/10
Unfortunately this URL is no longer valid and the article cannot be found online.
Olson's wevb page: http://www.mckendree.edu/directory/duane-olson.php
lists this article as " reprinted in International Yearbook for Tillich Research, Band 1/2006"
Olson has two foot notes in this quotation which are important to examine:
Olson's wevb page: http://www.mckendree.edu/directory/duane-olson.php
lists this article as " reprinted in International Yearbook for Tillich Research, Band 1/2006"
Olson has two foot notes in this quotation which are important to examine:
1) “In
one of the more significant recent monographs on Tillich’s thought,
Langdon Gilkey flatly states “[Tillich] denied that an argument for the
transcendent power and ground of being was possible” (Gilkey on Tillich (Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2000), 105). Gilkey never discusses Tillich’s use of the traditional arguments.” (2) “In
his detailed and extensive volume on the ontological argument, Graham
Oppy mentions Tillich’s name only once in the literature review, and he
never analyzes any of Tillich’s statements (Ontological Arguments and Belief in God (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 275). To Oppy’s credit, he
discusses a type of argument to which Tillich’s is related. I comment
on Oppy’s analysis of this argument in the final section of this paper.”
[3]
John M. Russell, “Tillich’s Implicit Ontological Argument” Sophia,
Netherlands: Springer. Vol.2 No. July 1993, 1-16. Online: URL http://www.springerlink.com/content/q5324702874k2257/
visited 8/4/10
[4] Olson, Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid, Olsen foot notes two sources at this point, in thinking of the indubitable nature of the norm. He sites Tillich’s Theology of Culture, 23, and the same source page 13, for the latter: This explains Tillich’s somewhat obscure statements that “God is the presupposition of the question of God,” and “God can never be reached if he is the object of a question and not its basis (Theology of Culture, 13).”
[7] Paul Tillich, Theology of Culture, 12-13
[8] Paul Tillich, Theology of Culture, op cit, 14
Olson's fn 17:
He [Tillich] credits the insight that the norm of truth cannot be denied to Augustine (Theology of Culture, 12), and the insight that it cannot be doubted to Matthew of Aquasparta (Theology of Culture, 13).
He [Tillich] credits the insight that the norm of truth cannot be denied to Augustine (Theology of Culture, 12), and the insight that it cannot be doubted to Matthew of Aquasparta (Theology of Culture, 13).
