Monday, May 23, 2022

Atheist Fortress of Facts is Cultural Construct

I speak of the atheist fortress of facts in dealimg with their attitudes that we have this pile of fact and religion has none. No facts disprove God. This whole tenedency is the upshot of an ideology.

Not Facts but Verisimilitude:

Karl Popper (1902-1994) is one of the most renewed and highly respected figures in the philosophy of science. Popper was from Vienna, of Jewish origin, maintained a youthful flirtation with Marxism, and left his native land due to the rise of Nazism in the late thirties. He is considered to be among the ranks of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century. Popper is highly respected by scientists in a way that most philosophers of science are not.[1]

He was also a social and political philosopher of considerable stature, a self-professed ‘critical-rationalist’, a dedicated opponent of all forms of scepticism, conventionalism, and relativism in science and in human affairs generally, a committed advocate and staunch defender of the ‘Open Society’, and an implacable critic of totalitarianism in all of its forms. One of the many remarkable features of Popper's thought is the scope of his intellectual influence. In the modern technological and highly-specialised world scientists are rarely aware of the work of philosophers; it is virtually unprecedented to find them queuing up, as they have done in Popper's case, to testify to the enormously practical beneficial impact which that philosophical work has had upon their own. But notwithstanding the fact that he wrote on even the most technical matters with consummate clarity, the scope of Popper's work is such that it is commonplace by now to find that commentators tend to deal with the epistemological, scientific and social elements of his thought as if they were quite disparate and unconnected, and thus the fundamental unity of his philosophical vision and method has to a large degree been dissipated.[2]

Unfortunately for our purposes we will only be able to skim the surface of Popper’s thoughts on the most crucial aspect of this theory of science, that science is not about proving things but about falsifying them.

Above we see that Dawkins, Stenger and company place their faith in the probability engineered by scientific facts. The problem is probability is not the basis upon which one chooses one theory over another, at least according to Popper. This insight forms the basis of this notion that science can give us verisimilitude not “facts.” Popper never uses the phrase “fortress of facts,” we could add that, science is not a fortress of facts. Science is not giving us “truth,” its’ giving something in place of truth, “verisimilitude.” The term verisimilar means “having the appearance of truth, or probable.” Or it can also mean “depicting realism” as in art or literature.”[3] According to Popper in choosing between two theories one more probable than the other, if one is interested I the informative content of the theory, one should choose the less probable. This is paradoxical but the reason is that probability and informative content very inversely. The higher informative content of a theory is more predictive since the more information contained in a statement the greater the number of ways the statement will turn out to fail or be proved wrong. At that rate mystical experience should be the most scientific view point. If this dictum were applied to a choice between Stenger’s atheism and belief in God mystical God belief would be more predictive and have less likelihood of being wrong because it’s based upon not speaking much about what one experiences as truth. We will see latter that this is actually the case in terms of certain kinds of religious experiences. I am not really suggesting that the two can be compared. They are two different kinds of knowledge. Even though mystical experience per se can be falsified (which will be seen in subsequent chapters) belief in God over all can’t be. The real point is that arguing that God is less probable is not a scientifically valid approach.

Thus the statements which are of special interest to the scientist are those with a high informative content and (consequentially) a low probability, which nevertheless come close to the truth. Informative content, which is in inverse proportion to probability, is in direct proportion to testability. Consequently the severity of the test to which a theory can be subjected, and by means of which it is falsified or corroborated, is all-important.[4]

Scientific criticism of theories must be piecemeal. We can’t question every aspect of a theory at once. For this reason one must accept a certain amount of background knowledge. We can’t have absolute certainty. Science is not about absolute certainty, thus rather than speak of “truth” we speak of “verisimilitude.” No single observation can be taken to falsify a theory. There is always the possibility that the observation is mistaken, or that the assumed background knowledge is faulty.[5] Uneasy with speaking of “true” theories or ideas, or that a corroborated theory is “true,” Popper asserted that a falsified theory is known to be false. He was impressed by Tarski’s 1963 reformulation of the corresponded theory of truth. That is when Popper reformulated his way of speaking to frame the concept of “truth-likeness” or “verisimilitude,” according to Thronton.[6] I wont go into all the ramifications of verisimilitude, but Popper has an extensive theory to cover the notion. Popper’s notions of verisimilitude were critixized by thinkers in the 70’s such as Miller, Tichy’(grave over the y) and Grunbaum (umlaut over the first u) brought out problems with the concept. In an attempt to repair the theory Popper backed off claims to being able to access the numerical levels of verisimilitude between two theories.[7] The resolution of this problem has not diminished the admiration for Popper or his acceptance in the world of philosophy of science. Nor is the solution settled in the direction of acceptance for the fortress of facts. Science is not closer to the fact making business just because there are problems with verisimilitude.

Science doesn’t prove but Falsifies

The aspect of Popper’s theory for which he is best known is probably the idea of falsification. In 1959 He published the Logic of Scientific Discovery in which he rigorously and painstakingly demonstrated why science can’t prove but can only disprove, or falsify. Popper begins by observing that science uses inductive methods and thus is thought to be marked and defined by this approach. By the use of the inductive approach science moves from “particular statements,” such as the result of an experiment, to universal statements such as an hypothesis or theories. Yet, Popper observes, the fallacy of this kind of reasoning has always been known. Regardless of how many times we observe white swans “this does not justify the conclusion that all swans are white.”[8] He points out this is the problem of universal statements, which can’t be grounded in experience because experience is not universal, at least not human experience. One might observe this is also a problem of empirical observation. Some argue that we can know universal statements to be true by experience; this is only true if the experiences are universal as well. Such experience can only be a singular statement. This puts it in the same category with the original problem so it can’t do any better.[9] The only way to resolve the problem of induction, Popper argues, is to establish a principle of induction. Such a principle would be a statement by which we could put inductive inferences into logically acceptable form. He tells us that upholders of the need for such a principle would say that without science can’t provide truth or falsehood of its theories.[10]

The principle can’t be a purely logical statement such as tautology or a prori reasoning, if it could there would be no problem of induction. This means it must be a synthetic statement, empirically derived. Then he asked “how can we justify statement on rational grounds?” [11] After all he’s just demonstrated that an empirical statement can’t be the basis of a universal principle. Then to conclude that there must be a universal principle of logic that justifies induction knowing that it ahs to be an empirical statement, just opens up the problem again. He points out that Reichenbach[12] would point that such the principle of induction is accepted by all of science.[13] Against Reinchenback he sties Hume.[14] Popper glosses over Kant’s attempt at a prori justification of syetnic a priori statements.[15] In the end Popper disparages finding a solution and determines that induction is not the hallmark of science. Popper argues that truth alludes science since it’s only real ability is to produce probability. Probability and not truth is what science can produce. “…but scientific statements can only attain continuous degrees of probability whose unattainable upper and lower limits are truth and falsity’.”[16] He goes on to argue against probability as a measure of inductive logic.[17] Then he’s going to argue for an approach he calls “deductive method of testing.. In this case he argues that an hypothesis can only be empirically tested and only after it has been advanced. [18]

What has been established so far is enough to destroy the fortress of facts of idea. The defeat of a principle of induction as a means of understanding truth is primary defeat for the idea that science is going about establishing a big pile of facts. What all of this is driving at of course is the idea that science is not so much the process of fact discovery as it is the process of elimination of bad idea taken as fact. Science doesn’t prove facts it disproves hypotheses.. Falsifying theories is the real business of science. It’s the comparison to theory in terms of what is left after falsification has been done that makes for a seeming ‘truth-likeness,’ or verisimilitude. Falsification is a branch of what Popper calls “Demarcation.” This issue refers to the domain or the territory of the scientists work. Induction does not mark out the proper demarcation. The criticism he is answering in discussing demarcation is that removing induction removes for science it’s most important distinction from metaphysical speculation. He states that this is precisely his reason for rejecting induction because “it does not provide a suitable distinguishing mark of the empirical non metaphysical character of a theoretical system,”[19] this is what he calls “demarcation.”

Popper writes with reference to positivistic philosophers as the sort of umpires of scientific mythology. He was a philosopher and the project of the positivists was to “clear away the clutter” (in the words of A.J. Ayer) for science so it could get on with it’s work. Positivistic philosophers were the janitors of science. Positivists had developed the credo that “meaningful statements” (statements of empirical science) must be statements that are “fully decided.” That is to say, they had to be both falsifiable and verifiable. The requirement for verifiable is really a requirement similar to the notion of proving facts, or truth. Verifiability is not the same thing as facticiy or proof it’s easy to see how psychologically it reinforces th sense that science is about proving things. He quotes several positivists in reinforcing this idea: Thus Schlick says: “. . . a genuine statement must be capable of conclusive verification” Waismann says, “If there is no possible way to determine whether a statement is true then that statement has no meaning whatsoever. For the meaning of a statement is the method of its verification.”[20] Yet Popper disagrees with them. He writes that there is no such thing as induction. He discusses particular statements which are verified by experience just opens up the same issues he launched in the beginning one cannot derive universal statements from experience. “Therefore, theories are never theories are never empirically verifiable. He argues that the only way to deal with the demarcation problem is to admit statements that are not empirically verified.[21]

But I shall certainly admit a system as empirical or scientific only if it is capable of being tested by experience. These considerations suggest that not the verifiability but the falsifiability of a system is to be taken as a criterion of demarcation. In other words: I shall not require of a Scientific system that it shall be capable of being singled out, once and for all, in a positive sense; but I shall require that its logical form shall be such that it can be singled out, by means of empirical tests, in a negative sense: it must be possible for an empirical scientific system to be refuted by experience.[22]

What this means in relation to the “fortress of facts” idea is that it transgresses upon the domain of science. Compiling a fortress of facts is beyond the scope of science and also denudes science of it’s domain.

He deals with the objection that science is supposed to give us positive knowledge and to reduce it to a system of falsification only negates its major purpose. He deals with this by saying this criticism carries little weight since the amount of positive information is greater the more likely it is to clash. The reason being laws of nature get more done the more they act as a limit on possibility, in other words, he puts it, “not for nothing do we call the laws of nature laws. They more they prohibit the more they say.”[22]



sources

[1] Steven Thornton, “Karl Popper,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Winter 2011 edition Edward N. Zalta Editor, URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/popper/ vested 2/6/2012

[2] ibid

[3] Miriam-Webster. M-W.com On line version of Webster’s dictionary. URL: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/verisimilar?show=0&t=1328626983 visited 2/7/2012

[4] Thornton, ibid.

[5] ibid

[6] ibid

[7] ibid

[8] Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London, New York:Routledge Classics, original English publication 1959 by Hutchison and co. by Routldege 1992. On line copy URL: http://www.cosmopolitanuniversity.ac/library/LogicofScientificDiscoveryPopper1959.pdf digital copy by Cosmo oedu visited 2/6/2012, p4

[9] ibid

[10] ibid

[11] ibid, 5

[12] Hans Reinchenbach (1891-1953) German philosopher, attended Einstein’s lectures and contributed to work on Quantum Mechanics. He fled Germany to escape Hitler wound up teaching at UCLA.

[13] Popper, ibid, referece to , H. Reichenbach, Erkenntnis 1, 1930, p. 186 (cf. also pp. 64 f.). Cf. the penultimate paragraph of Russell’s chapter xii, on Hume, in his History of Western Philosophy, 1946,

p. 699.

[14] ibid, Popper, 5

[15] ibid, 6

[16] ibid 6

[17] ibid, 7

[18] ibid

[19] ibid 11

[20] ibid, 17, references to Schlick, Naturwissenschaften 19, 1931, p. 150. and Waismann, Erkenntnis 1, 1903, p. 229.

[21] Ibid 18

[22] ibid

[23] ibid, 19 the quotation about laws is found on p 19 but the over all argument is developed over sections 31-46 spanning pages 95-133.



19 comments:

JAB128 said...

Good article. Six years ago, Bernardo Kastrup had an article about how Militant Atheists stole your sense of meaning to enhance theirs:

BK: How Militant Atheists Stole Your Sense of Meaning to Enhance Theirs

The Fortress of Facts (or Scientism) is probably one way they try to do that.

Joseph Hinman (Metacrock) said...

good point, thanks for the link/

Anonymous said...

Above we see that Dawkins, Stenger and company place their faith in the probability engineered by scientific facts. The problem is probability is not the basis upon which one chooses one theory over another, at least according to Popper. This insight forms the basis of this notion that science can give us verisimilitude not “facts.” Popper never uses the phrase “fortress of facts,” we could add that, science is not a fortress of facts.

You, Joe, are the one using the phrase "fortress of facts". I am not aware of Dawkins, Stenger and company using the phrase, and certainly you do not quote them using it.

Science is not giving us “truth,” its’ giving something in place of truth, “verisimilitude.” The term verisimilar means “having the appearance of truth, or probable.” Or it can also mean “depicting realism” as in art or literature.”[3]

I think that that is fair comment. Science is in the business of modeling reality.

It has to be noted that we have nothing better whenit comes to the big questions. Religion claims certainty, but lacks the support to be any more than personal opinion.

According to Popper in choosing between two theories one more probable than the other, if one is interested I the informative content of the theory, one should choose the less probable. This is paradoxical but the reason is that probability and informative content very inversely. The higher informative content of a theory is more predictive since the more information contained in a statement the greater the number of ways the statement will turn out to fail or be proved wrong.

This is pretty unclear. How are you judging the probability and information content? Given the relationshi, the probability has to be judged without a consideration of the real world.

I would guess this means that if we compare Newtonian mechanics to relativity, the former has less information content - it is a much simpler system - and is more probable in the sense that its predictions are less specific.

Of course, Newtonian mechanics is known to be a poorer model than relativity.

I guess we could also conside "God did it" as a contender. The information content is zero. It predicts that anything could happen, so the probability of that being right is 1.

This highlights why we go with the less probable. The theory that makes more specific predictions is - absent knowledge of the real world - less likely to get them right.

At that rate mystical experience should be the most scientific view point.

How is this predictive, how does it have "the greater the number of ways the statement will turn out to fail or be proved wrong"?

If this dictum were applied to a choice between Stenger’s atheism and belief in God mystical God belief would be more predictive and have less likelihood of being wrong because it’s based upon not speaking much about what one experiences as truth. We will see latter that this is actually the case in terms of certain kinds of religious experiences. I am not really suggesting that the two can be compared. They are two different kinds of knowledge. Even though mystical experience per se can be falsified (which will be seen in subsequent chapters) belief in God over all can’t be. The real point is that arguing that God is less probable is not a scientifically valid approach.

As you concede, belief in God cannot be falisified. That is to say, the probability of its predictions being true is 1. And this is why it should be rejected.

Thus the statements which are of special interest to the scientist are those with a high informative content and (consequentially) a low probability, which nevertheless come close to the truth. Informative content, which is in inverse proportion to probability, is in direct proportion to testability. Consequently the severity of the test to which a theory can be subjected, and by means of which it is falsified or corroborated, is all-important.

Agreed. Belief in Godis high probability, low informatin content and low tesrability.

Pix

Joseph Hinman (Metacrock) said...

Anonymous said...

Quoting me:
Above we see that Dawkins, Stenger and company place their faith in the probability engineered by scientific facts. The problem is probability is not the basis upon which one chooses one theory over another, at least according to Popper. This insight forms the basis of this notion that science can give us verisimilitude not “facts.” Popper never uses the phrase “fortress of facts,” we could add that, science is not a fortress of facts.

You, Joe, are the one using the phrase "fortress of facts". I am not aware of Dawkins, Stenger and company using the phrase, and certainly you do not quote them using it.

Yes they don't use my label but the label names a behavior which they do exhibit.

Science is not giving us “truth,” its’ giving something in place of truth, “verisimilitude.” The term verisimilar means “having the appearance of truth, or probable.” Or it can also mean “depicting realism” as in art or literature.”[3]

I just alluded to that above. That's why atheist's assumption of the FF is a contradiction.

I think that that is fair comment. Science is in the business of modeling reality.


O no it's not! science tells us nothing about reality. it is about hypothesis testing but those hypotheses are about the way the physicals worlds works. Regality potentially encompasses more.

It has to be noted that we have nothing better when it comes to the big questions. Religion claims certainty, but lacks the support to be any more than personal opinion.

Religion claims personal, existential or phenomenological kinds of certainty.. That is not the same as this blanket idea that you think science offers.

According to Popper in choosing between two theories one more probable than the other, if one is interested I the informative content of the theory, one should choose the less probable. This is paradoxical but the reason is that probability and informative content very inversely. The higher informative content of a theory is more predictive since the more information contained in a statement the greater the number of ways the statement will turn out to fail or be proved wrong.


That doesn't apply to religious beliefs that are the result of revelation. If it is n fact revealed knowledge then it has to be true a priori, regardless of parlor tricks of probability. If it's not true then it lack of truth content merely reflects it's lack of being revealed by God. --that has nothing to do with the issue of FF/ Neither does your argumemt.

This is pretty unclear. How are you judging the probability and information content? Given the relationshi, the probability has to be judged without a consideration of the real world.

Obviously wrong. That is like saying facts don't matter. No one will agree to that.

Joseph Hinman (Metacrock) said...


I would guess this means that if we compare Newtonian mechanics to relativity, the former has less information content - it is a much simpler system - and is more probable in the sense that its predictions are less specific.

this is a true red herring.

Of course, Newtonian mechanics is known to be a poorer model than relativity.

That's irrelevant. what does this have to do with my argumemt?

I guess we could also conside "God did it" as a contender. The information content is zero. It predicts that anything could happen, so the probability of that being right is 1.

Hilarious! He's using one atheist red herring to support another atheist red Herring,s Like most atheist's he thinks "God did it" is a real theistic idea when its nothing more than a straw man argument. He turns the straw man into a red Herring and uses it to through us off the track of another atheist red Herring.

This highlights why we go with the less probable. The theory that makes more specific predictions is - absent knowledge of the real world - less likely to get them right.


simply does not apply to revealed truth

At that rate mystical experience should be the most scientific view point.

Experiences, all experiences transcend science.

How is this predictive, how does it have "the greater the number of ways the statement will turn out to fail or be proved wrong"?


first of all I don't need a scientific theory to give myself permission to have experiences' already had them. Nothing in science can tell me I did not. Secondly you are misusing that concept of Popper's. He says science does not offer proof but verisimilitude. That does not mean any time an idra has complexity it's wrong.

If this dictum were applied to a choice between Stenger’s atheism and belief in God mystical God belief would be more predictive and have less likelihood of being wrong because it’s based upon not speaking much about what one experiences as truth. We will see latter that this is actually the case in terms of certain kinds of religious experiences. I am not really suggesting that the two can be compared. They are two different kinds of knowledge. Even though mystical experience per se can be falsified (which will be seen in subsequent chapters) belief in God over all can’t be. The real point is that arguing that God is less probable is not a scientifically valid approach.



As you concede, belief in God cannot be falisified. That is to say, the probability of its predictions being true is 1. And this is why it should be rejected.


That is simplistic. One can neither prove nor disprove the exitance of God. You can have personal assurance on an existential level bt you can't prove it. So it's not subject to any kind of evaluation.

im-skeptical said...

Not Facts but Verisimilitude:
- Science doesn't give us facts. It gives us models of reality. Those models are based on observed facts.

Unfortunately for our purposes we will only be able to skim the surface of Popper’s thoughts on the most crucial aspect of this theory of science, that science is not about proving things but about falsifying them.
- Who ever told you that science was supposed to provide proof? You didn't get that from Popper or Dawkins, or anyone who understands science. It's a misunderstanding on the part of people who expect certainty. Could that be religionists?

Dawkins, Stenger and company place their faith in the probability engineered by scientific facts
- Where do you get this from? I don't even know what it's supposed to mean. In real science, theories are developed on the basis of observed facts, and then tested. Theories whose predictions are not consistent with the facts are then rejected in favor of a better model. I'm not sure how you turn this into a probability calculation. Perhaps you could explain with more clarity.

Thus the statements which are of special interest to the scientist are those with a high informative content and (consequentially) a low probability, which nevertheless come close to the truth.
- I think that's a poor description. I'd say the theories favored by scientists are those that come closest to truth, as determined by observation and testing.

Science doesn’t prove but Falsifies
- Science doesn't purport to give us proof. It's not like religion. Any scientist (including Dawkins) will tell you that theories are tentative, and always subject to falsification. Again, this appears to be another misunderstanding on the part of people who don't understand science.

What this means in relation to the “fortress of facts” idea is that it transgresses upon the domain of science. Compiling a fortress of facts is beyond the scope of science and also denudes science of it’s domain.
- Your "fortress of facts" is a fantasy. It certainly doesn't reflect the thinking of actual scientists. You seem to be under the illusion that Popper and scientists have opposing views. There may be points of disagreement some scientists have with Popper, but in general, most of them are pretty well aligned with Popper's philosophy. I think the illusions you have about science are a product of your own misunderstanding.

It is also worth pointing out that philosophy of science generally follows scientific practice. Popper didn't invent the idea of falsification. He observed the way science works, noting and describing the best practices. You might also be interested to know that philosophy of science has continued to develop (after Popper) along with the latest developments in science. Metaphysical views, in particular, have changed substantially in response to scientific advancements that make older metaphysical systems obsolete.

Joseph Hinman (Metacrock) said...

Not Facts but Verisimilitude:

- Science doesn't give us facts. It gives us models of reality. Those models are based on observed facts.

Karl Popper said science doesn't give us truth but it gives us verisimilitude. What you call models if reality could fit into that category,

Unfortunately for our purposes we will only be able to skim the surface of Popper’s thoughts on the most crucial aspect of this theory of science, that science is not about proving things but about falsifying them.


- Who ever told you that science was supposed to provide proof?

countless atheists on the net


You didn't get that from Popper or Dawkins, or anyone who understands science. It's a misunderstanding on the part of people who expect certainty. Could that be religionists?

you are an asshole! I am the one who said it doesn't, dumb ass! stop talking like you are setting me right, you moron,

Dawkins, Stenger and company place their faith in the probability engineered by scientific facts
- Where do you get this from? I don't even know what it's supposed to mean.

did I say that? where? i can't find where I said it.

In real science, theories are developed on the basis of observed facts, and then tested. Theories whose predictions are not consistent with the facts are then rejected in favor of a better model. I'm not sure how you turn this into a probability calculation. Perhaps you could explain with more clarity.

Everything can be subjected to probability that is beside the point, You have created a straw man to divert issue rom the one's I we were discussing

Thus the statements which are of special interest to the scientist are those with a high informative content and (consequentially) a low probability, which nevertheless come close to the truth.\

- I think that's a poor description. I'd say the theories favored by scientists are those that come closest to truth, as determined by observation and testing.
I remember wrttmg anything like that, show me where you got it.

Science doesn’t prove but Falsifies

Joseph Hinman (Metacrock) said...

- Science doesn't purport to give us proof. It's not like religion. Any scientist (including Dawkins) will tell you that theories are tentative, and always subject to falsification. Again, this appears to be another misunderstanding on the part of people who don't understand science.


I/m glad you finally learned that,

What this means in relation to the “fortress of facts” idea is that it transgresses upon the domain of science. Compiling a fortress of facts is beyond the scope of science and also denudes science of it’s domain.


right, that's why atheists are stupid. I am not making the fortress I', tearing it dow, remember dumb ass.

- Your "fortress of facts" is a fantasy. It certainly doesn't reflect the thinking of actual scientists.


That's right genius, that's why it's not my fortress of facts but yours, or rather is the atheists. They think the have a fortress of facts in science. I don't have that atheists do

You seem to be under the illusion that Popper and scientists have opposing views. There may be points of disagreement some scientists have with Popper, but in general, most of them are pretty well aligned with Popper's philosophy. I think the illusions you have about science are a product of your own misunderstanding.

Do you really atheists are scientists? some are but you seem to think those are synonyms. Or you think I think so. I never said scientists do the ff. I said atheists on the net do.

It is also worth pointing out that philosophy of science generally follows scientific practice. Popper didn't invent the idea of falsification. He observed the way science works, noting and describing the best practices. You might also be interested to know that philosophy of science has continued to develop (after Popper) along with the latest developments in science. Metaphysical views, in particular, have changed substantially in response to scientific advancements that make older metaphysical systems obsolete.


Popper is not universally agreed with. He was wrong and beaten as such by Thomas Kuhn in their dispute over Kuhn's theory, I like Popper. He's one of my favorite thinkers.

3:37 PM

Anonymous said...

O no it's not! science tells us nothing about reality. it is about hypothesis testing but those hypotheses are about the way the physicals worlds works. Regality potentially encompasses more.

This is nonsense. You assert "science tells us nothing about reality" then promptly admit that actually it is all "about the way the physicals worlds works"!

Religion claims personal, existential or phenomenological kinds of certainty.. That is not the same as this blanket idea that you think science offers.

Religion claims certainty, it offers the illusion of certainty. But it cannot hope to justify that certainty.

That doesn't apply to religious beliefs that are the result of revelation.

Heaven forbid your pet theory should have to be subject to the same rules.

If it is n fact revealed knowledge then it has to be true a priori, regardless of parlor tricks of probability. If it's not true then it lack of truth content merely reflects it's lack of being revealed by God. --that has nothing to do with the issue of FF/ Neither does your argumemt.

How do we know it is revealed knowledge, rather than delusion?

If we assume revealed knowledge comes from God, then it is trivially easy to show God exists, but that looks rather circular to me...

Obviously wrong. That is like saying facts don't matter. No one will agree to that.

Then how do you account for Popper saying the less likely theory is to be preferred?

I think the problem here is that you do not understand what Popper is talking about. I will admit that it could be me misunderstanding him, but I have had a reasonable stab at explaining his seemingly paradoxical statement. You have not.

That's irrelevant. what does this have to do with my argumemt?

It is an illustration of my point about the improbably theory being preferred. Which do you think is less probable (in Popper's sense) between Newtonian mechanics and relativity? Which do you think is preferred?

I do not think you understand Popper well enough to be able to answer that. And therefore your argument, based on a misunderstanding of Popper, is nonsense.

Pix

Joseph Hinman (Metacrock) said...

Joe:
O no it's not! science tells us nothing about reality. it is about hypothesis testing but those hypotheses are about the way the physicals worlds works. Regality potentially encompasses more.

Skep: This is nonsense. You assert "science tells us nothing about reality" then promptly admit that actually it is all "about the way the physicals worlds works"!

Good point Skep. I should have said doesn't tell us anything about any sort of ultimate realty or reality beyond our limited observations.



Joe: Religion claims personal, existential or phenomenological kinds of certainty.. That is not the same as this blanket idea that you think science offers.


Religion claims certainty, it offers the illusion of certainty. But it cannot hope to justify that certainty.

Religion doe not claim certainty. The Bible says we walk by faith not by sight, That's not a claim of certainty. It offers peace, security and salivation but only ultimate certainty. When we die we will know. But until then we live by faith,


Joe: That doesn't apply to religious beliefs that are the result of revelation.

Heaven forbid your pet theory should have to be subject to the same rules.

there is no promise of certainty in logic. certify about logic but not life. Life is a much more fluid proposition than is mere logic.

Joe: If it is n fact revealed knowledge then it has to be true a priori, regardless of parlor tricks of probability. If it's not true then it lack of truth content merely reflects it's lack of being revealed by God. --that has nothing to do with the issue of FF/ Neither does your argumemt.

How do we know it is revealed knowledge, rather than delusion?

Delusion does not bestow grace. Delusion is bad for you; it results in degermation. Devine revelation bestows Grace, brags peace., It transforms.

If we assume revealed knowledge comes from God, then it is trivially easy to show God exists, but that looks rather circular to me...

It is easy to show God exists. the problem is overcoming our childish rebellion that denies the obvious evidence.

Joe: Obviously wrong. That is like saying facts don't matter. No one will agree to that.

Then how do you account for Popper saying the less likely theory is to be preferred?


that does not mean the preposition with less logic and evidence is right.

I think the problem here is that you do not understand what Popper is talking about. I will admit that it could be me misunderstanding him, but I have had a reasonable stab at explaining his seemingly paradoxical statement. You have not.

That's irrelevant. what does this have to do with my argumemt? Suppose you have a murder trail the defended has47 witness who swore he was elsewhere and the prosecution has no witnesses. According to your understanding we should assume the defendant is guilty. I am pretty sure you are taking it out of context. I haven]t read Popper years soI'll have to study it.

It is an illustration of my point about the improbably theory being preferred. Which do you think is less probable (in Popper's sense) between Newtonian mechanics and relativity? Which do you think is preferred?

I'm no expert on relativity, This is what I've ben told by science profs:they are about two differed domains. Newton is still important below he speed of light. relativity is geared to light speed and more cosmic venues.

I do not think you understand Popper well enough to be able to answer that. And therefore your argument, based on a misunderstanding of Popper, is nonsense.

you obviously don;t understand it because think it means a propsoition with lesssupoort shuld be accepted as true. That's rather stupd.

Anonymous said...

Popper says "one should choose the less probable"

I just want to focus on this one point for now.

Pix: It is an illustration of my point about the improbably theory being preferred. Which do you think is less probable (in Popper's sense) between Newtonian mechanics and relativity? Which do you think is preferred?

Joe: I'm no expert on relativity, This is what I've ben told by science profs:they are about two differed domains. Newton is still important below he speed of light. relativity is geared to light speed and more cosmic venues.

The issue is about Popper. Which would Popper say we should choose the less probable?

Why can you not answer the question? I think it because you do not understand what Popper is saying.

you obviously don;t understand it because think it means a propsoition with lesssupoort shuld be accepted as true. That's rather stupd.

And yet that is what you said in the post:

According to Popper in choosing between two theories one more probable than the other, if one is interested I the informative content of the theory, one should choose the less probable.

I fully acknowledge that I could be wrong, but I think Popper is judging "probable" by how specific a theory is. Without background knowledge of the real world, a theory that predicts something precisely is less probable than something that gives an approximate answer.

If I predict the roulette wheel will land on red that is not much of a prediction. If I predict it will land of 13, that is less probable, and therefore more impressive when I get it right.

Relativity makes predictions that, on the face of it, are really quite unlikely. Without background knowledge it is very improbable. However, it gets those predictions right. It is that combination of making highly improbable predictions and getting the right that makes relativity the preferred theory.

Pix

Joseph Hinman (Metacrock) said...

Anonymous said...
Popper says "one should choose the less probable"

I just want to focus on this one point for now.

Pix: It is an illustration of my point about the improbably theory being preferred. Which do you think is less probable (in Popper's sense) between Newtonian mechanics and relativity? Which do you think is preferred?

I don't think you understand Popper's point. It is irrelevant because thread is not about that. Do you think that point of Popper's means that no preposition of superspy evidence should ever be trusted?


Joe: I'm no expert on relativity, This is what I've ben told by science profs:they are about two differed domains. Newton is still important below he speed of light. relativity is geared to light speed and more cosmic venues.

The issue is about Popper. Which would Popper say we should choose the less probable?


I doubt he would compare the two for the reasons I just stated. I don't think his point means the proportion with less evidence should be accepted.

this thread is about the atheist fortress of facts not Popper. I was kicking your ass that's why you tried the subject. but I wont let you.


Why can you not answer the question? I think it because you do not understand what Popper is saying.


You don't understand what he is saying. a proposition is not a theory per se.

you obviously don't understand it because you think it means a preposition with less support should be accepted as true. You seem to be applying Popper's theory to all proposition's when it's only about theories.

And yet that is what you said in the post:

According to Popper in choosing between two theories one more probable than the other, if one is interested I the informative content of the theory, one should choose the less probable.

I fully acknowledge that I could be wrong, but I think Popper is judging "probable" by how specific a theory is. Without background knowledge of the real world, a theory that predicts something precisely is less probable than something that gives an approximate answer.

I don't think my observation about fotress of facts deserves to be clled a theory,

If I predict the roulette wheel will land on red that is not much of a prediction. If I predict it will land of 13, that is less probable, and therefore more impressive when I get it right.


that i nit a theory, you don't understand what theory means,

Relativity makes predictions that, on the face of it, are really quite unlikely. Without background knowledge it is very improbable. However, it gets those predictions right. It is that combination of making highly improbable predictions and getting the right that makes relativity the preferred theory.


what you have done is an obvious clumsy face saving bullshit you are not even trying to apply it to the the theme of the thread...

Joseph Hinman (Metacrock) said...

I think you have missed the important prerequisite that several hypotheses are equally consistent with data consider the one with lowsest a priori probity.

two things you missed:

(1) several hypotheses are equally consistent with data


(2) consider the one with lowsest a priori probity


you can't prove this has any relevance to my views on fortress of facts.

Anonymous said...

I don't think you understand Popper's point.

I have already admitted that may be the case. however, I can explain why he says the less probable theory is preferred, and you cannot. I therefore conclude that I do understand him and you do not.

It is irrelevant because thread is not about that. Do you think that point of Popper's means that no preposition of superspy evidence should ever be trusted?

It seems to be a big part of the post.

I doubt he would compare the two for the reasons I just stated.

Relativity is the better model. All physicists will tell you that. Sometimes Newtonianb is good enough for what you need, but it is is still inferior.

I don't think his point means the proportion with less evidence should be accepted.

Nor do I. So not only have you misunderstood Popper, you have misunderstood me.

this thread is about the atheist fortress of facts not Popper. I was kicking your ass that's why you tried the subject. but I wont let you.

"Fortress of facts" is a phrase you invented, Joe. What exactly are you trying to defeat? A claim of your own devising.

I think you have missed the important prerequisite that several hypotheses are equally consistent with data consider the one with lowsest a priori probity.

That is EXACTLY what I have been saying. "Without background knowledge of the real world", i.e., the a priori probability.

Pix

Joseph Hinman (Metacrock) said...

Anonymous said...
I don't think you understand Popper's point.

so what? what if I don't. OK I know you need to save face since I kicked your ass. OK your face is saved. happy?

I have already admitted that may be the case. however, I can explain why he says the less probable theory is preferred, and you cannot. I therefore conclude that I do understand him and you do not.

so because I don't explain what you already know that means I don't know it? That's pretty stupid. especially since talking about this is just a red Herring to get away form the ass kicking I was giving you.

Joe:It is irrelevant because thread is not about that. Do you think that point of Popper's means that no preposition of superspy evidence should ever be trusted?

It seems to be a big part of the post.

because you keep putting stuff on.

I doubt he would compare the two for the reasons I just stated.

Relativity is the better model. All physicists will tell you that. Sometimes Newtonianb is good enough for what you need, but it is is still inferior.

who cares? it's not a fortress f facts.

I don't think his point means the proportion with less evidence should be accepted.

Nor do I. So not only have you misunderstood Popper, you have misunderstood me.


That's because you are not clear. I think you were trying to say that then realized you could not get away with it. beside I still to see you say why this matters to you?>

this thread is about the atheist fortress of facts not Popper. I was kicking your ass that's why you tried the subject. but I wont let you.

"Fortress of facts" is a phrase you invented, Joe. What exactly are you trying to defeat? A claim of your own devising.


so what if I invented it?

I think you have missed the important prerequisite that several hypotheses are equally consistent with data consider the one with lowest a priori probity.

That is EXACTLY what I have been saying. "Without background knowledge of the real world", i.e., the a priori probability.

I don't think you were clear about that aspect.

I take this attempt to change subject as surrender. You gave up on the topic. you know about Popper so good going man. Now I close the thread

im-skeptical said...

countless atheists on the net
- I've talked to countless theists who don't share your understanding of God. But when I argue with you, the argument is about what you believe, not about the "old man with a white beard". There are plenty of atheists who have a scientific understanding. There are plenty of atheists who are scientists. And you're arguing against them. So why don't you gear your argument to what they believe?

I am the one who said it doesn't, dumb ass! stop talking like you are setting me right, you moron
- And who do you think you are setting right?

I remember wrttmg anything like that, show me where you got it.

- Copied and pasted straight from your article.

Everything can be subjected to probability that is beside the point, You have created a straw man to divert issue rom the one's I we were discussing
- OK. Since you don't want to explain what you're talking about, I decided to find out for myself. I went to SEP: Karl Popper : Probability, Knowledge and Verisimilitude. Interesting. It explains what he means by the more probable theory, and it is as Pix suggested. What he's talking about is the theory that makes the most precise predictions (which is equated with information content) - NOT the theory that is most likely to be true by some measure of probability that could be assigned by theists to their God arguments. In fact, if I didn't know better, I'd venture to guess that this article is your source of information about Popper. The wording is remarkably similar. But I think you miss the real point of what he's saying. There is one crucial thing Popper said that you left out of your discussion: "Thus, the statements which are of special interest to science are those with a high informative content and (consequentially) a low probability, which nevertheless come close to the truth. That last phrase says that the theory must survive scientific testing and verification. As the article goes on to say: "the severity of the test to which a theory can be subjected, and by means of which it is falsified or corroborated, is of fundamental importance."

Joseph Hinman (Metacrock) said...

I told you this thread is closed. If you put any more stuff here i'll take it down,

I will answer this in the blog post on Monday.

Anonymous said...

I take this attempt to change subject as surrender. You gave up on the topic. you know about Popper so good going man. Now I close the thread

Wow. It is like you want to drive people away. You declare your opponent has surrendered and then say any further comments will be removed.

It is your blog, so you can do what you want, but we can choose not to post here, Joe.

Joseph Hinman (Metacrock) said...

You think it is correctly fine any time you start loosing to just hijack the subject to something you feel secure with, tonally unfair and of course it means you lose the debate. Not a debate judge in the country would not agree.

I told you this thing is closed. don't pit anything else om here I'll take it downs.