Notice there is no third kind of modal being. "It is commonly accepted that there are two sorts of existent entities: those that exist but could have failed to exist, and those that could not have failed to exist. Entities of the first sort are contingent beings; entities of the second sort are necessary beings."[2] That in so far as it goes establishes the fact that a thing is either necessarily or contingent there is no middle ground, no third option.
There are many different notions of necessity. There are different kinds of necessity they are not contradictions or different opinions they apply in different ways. For example logical necessity is not the same as metaphysical necessity, metaphysical or broadly logical necessity deals with the nature of existence.
...Something is “necessary” if it could not possibly have failed to exist. The laws of mathematics are often thought to be necessary. It is plausible to say that mathematical truths such as two and two making four hold irrespective of the way that the world is. Even if the world were radically different, it seems, two and two would still make four. God, too, is often thought to be a necessary being, i.e. a being that logically could not have failed to exist.
Something is “contingent” if it is not necessary, i.e. if it could have failed to exist. Most things seem to exist contingently. All of the human artefacts around us might not have existed; for each one of them, whoever made it might have decided not to do so. Their existence, therefore, is contingent. You and I, too, might not have existed; our respective parents might never have met, or might have decided not to have children, or might have decided to have children at a different time. Our existence, therefore, is contingent. Even the world around us seems to be contingent; the universe might have developed in such a way that none of the observable stars and planets existed at all.[3]
This is true in the cosmological argument.
The modal cosmological argument or “argument from contingency” is the argument from the contingency of the world or universe to the existence of God. The argument from contingency is the most prominent form of cosmological argument historically. The classical statements of the cosmological argument in the works of Plato, of Aquinas, and of Leibniz are generally statements of the modal form of the argument.[4]
The Universe itself is contingent and everything produced in nature is as well.
Karl Popper tells us:"Empirical facts are facts which might not have been. Everything that belongs to space time is a contingent truth because it could have been otherwise, it is dependent upon the existence of something else for its' existence going all the way back to the Big Bang, which is itself contingent upon something."[5] Contingent beings are those whose existence is caused or explained, "A contingent being (a being such that if it exists, it could have not-existed or could cease to exist) exists. This contingent being has a cause of or explanation for its existence. ... Therefore, what causes or explains the existence of this contingent being must include a non-contingent (necessary) being".[6]
Necessity/contingency broadly logical and causally related
This seems to create a dichotomy for some atheists in that they try to juxtapose two kinds of contingency against one another; There are Types of necessity and contingency but the distinction between broadly logical or "Metaphysical" necessity and the causal type reflected in my CA is not one of them. These two types were shown by Hartshorne to be united. The causal form of contingency is a marker for the broadly logical or metaphysical. This is my own idea.
Necessity is that which cannot cease or fail to exist; that for which one could contradict to speak of such things. Thus contingency is that which can cease or fail to exist.But it seems that ceasing and failing are bound up with causes and circumstances of existence in the natural world. Thus we can think of causality as an ontological marker spelling out for us the nature of contingency in the natural world. After all anything that depends for its existence upon a prior condition (even an ontologically prior condition that is not temporally prior) is contingent because it could cease or fail to exist, thus its contingency is marked by its causality.
Sources
[1]Garth Kemerling,"Necessary/Contingent," Philosophical Pages. 1997/2011 http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/n.htm#nec (accessed 3/4/19 )
[2]Matthew Davidson,"God and Other Necessary Beings", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),
[3] Tim Holt, "Argument from Contingency," Philosophy of Religion, 2008 http://www.philosophyofreligion.info/theistic-proofs/the-cosmological-argument/the-argument-from-contingency/(accessed 3/4/19 )
[4] Ibid
[5] Carol Popper quoted in Antony Flew, Philosophical Dictionary, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979, 242.
[6] Bruce Reichenbach, , "Cosmological Argument", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy(Spring 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL =
20 comments:
"Notice there is no third kind of modal being."
Not exactly correct. Rather, there is no third kind of modal being within the category of things that exist. If we accept the applicability of modal modifiers to things, then there are three (not only two) results:
(1) Impossible things
(2) Contingent things
(3) Necessary things
What is interesting about the first category here is that no one thinks there could, in fact, be anything that fits this category. It is empty (indeed, necessarily so). I suppose one could make a case that, in fact, this is the only non-empty category, but holding that, metaphysically, THINGS turn out somehow to be impossible, and I won't rule out the possibility that someone might be able to make an interesting case for this -- Buddhists or proponents of Advaita Vedanta, perhaps -- but that's not a gauntlet I'm especially interested in picking up just now.
Nor do most people doubt that the second category is non-empty.
So let's look at the third category: There are some necessitarians who appear to think that only the third category is non-empty -- that everything turns out to be necessary (Spinoza is widely reputed to have held such a view, for example). But within the context of your argument, the key question is whether the third category MUST be non-empty. And it is exactly this of which I am unconvinced.
To hold that the third category is necessarily non-empty is to hold that the range of possible worlds excludes what we can call "the empty world" -- a world in which nothing exists. If the empty world is a possible world, then the third category cannot be necessarily non-empty -- in fact, it must necessarily be empty. I am unaware of any argument that the concept of the empty world is contradictory, except one that goes like this:
1. If a necessary being exists, then there cannot be an empty world.
2. A necessary being exists.
--
3. There cannot be an empty world.
That is, the only way to argue that category 3 is non-empty is to presuppose that it is non-empty.
things that exist. If we accept the applicability of modal modifiers to things, then there are three (not only two) results:
(1) Impossible things
(2) Contingent things
(3) Necessary things
good point
What is interesting about the first category here is that no one thinks there could, in fact, be anything that fits this category. It is empty (indeed, necessarily so). I suppose one could make a case that, in fact, this is the only non-empty category, but holding that, metaphysically, THINGS turn out somehow to be impossible, and I won't rule out the possibility that someone might be able to make an interesting case for this -- Buddhists or proponents of Advaita Vedanta, perhaps -- but that's not a gauntlet I'm especially interested in picking up just now.
Strange but interesting
Nor do most people doubt that the second category is non-empty.
So let's look at the third category: There are some necessitarians who appear to think that only the third category is non-empty -- that everything turns out to be necessary (Spinoza is widely reputed to have held such a view, for example). But within the context of your argument, the key question is whether the third category MUST be non-empty. And it is exactly this of which I am unconvinced.
Then you are just denying what the argument strongly suggests because you don't wat it.
To hold that the third category is necessarily non-empty is to hold that the range of possible worlds excludes what we can call "the empty world" -- a world in which nothing exists. If the empty world is a possible world, then the third category cannot be necessarily non-empty --
I am no fan of possible worlds. there's no reasom to see vat three as empty when things like Math fit.
in fact, it must necessarily be empty. I am unaware of any argument that the concept of the empty world is contradictory, except one that goes like this:
three is not empty world. World is a structure. if 3 is empty there is no world because would be necessary. three is necessary and God fits it.
1. If a necessary being exists, then there cannot be an empty world.
2. A necessary being exists.
--
3. There cannot be an empty world.
That is, the only way to argue that category 3 is non-empty is to presuppose that it is non-empty.
three does not call for a necessary world.
Marxists, particularly Queer Theorists, see childhood innocence as a type of special bourgeois property accessible by some (privileged) kids and withheld unjustly and structurally from others. It's also an ideological fiction for preserving the status quo. They want it abolished.
Notice there is no third kind of modal being. "It is commonly accepted that there are two sorts of existent entities: those that exist but could have failed to exist, and those that could not have failed to exist. Entities of the first sort are contingent beings; entities of the second sort are necessary beings."
There is some sematic trickery going on here. It is reasonable to say "there are two sorts of existent entities: those that exist but could have failed to exist, and those that could not have failed to exist". So far so good. But when you label the former "contingent" there is an implication introduced that such entities depend on something else to exist.
That might be the case, but it does not follow from the claim. It is an additional claim that has been sneaked in through the backdoor.
The Universe itself is contingent and everything produced in nature is as well.
Continguent in the sense that it could hgave failed to exist? Or the more usual sense that it is continguient on something else? Or do you want to deflate the two?
Pix
Oops, that should be "conflate", not "deflate"!
Pix
Anonymous said...
Me:Notice there is no third kind of modal being. "It is commonly accepted that there are two sorts of existent entities: those that exist but could have failed to exist, and those that could not have failed to exist. Entities of the first sort are contingent beings; entities of the second sort are necessary beings."
There is some sematic trickery going on here. It is reasonable to say "there are two sorts of existent entities: those that exist but could have failed to exist, and those that could not have failed to exist". So far so good. But when you label the former "contingent" there is an implication introduced that such entities depend on something else to exist.
they do, There are no uncaused phenomena. Both senses of contingency are related.
That might be the case, but it does not follow from the claim. It is an additional claim that has been sneaked in through the backdoor.
It doesn't have to follow from the claim but I think it does, because knowledge of cause and effect is basic and universal
The Universe itself is contingent and everything produced in nature is as well.
all the more reason to call it contingent
Continguent in the sense that it could have failed to exist? Or the more usual sense that it is continguient on something else? Or do you want to deflate the two?
we just illustrated that those are related.
Pix
Where is your proof of the statement "There are no uncaused phenomena"? QM tells us otherwise, at least for some definitions of "uncaused"; for example radiolytic decay of a specific atom seems to happen at random, without any cause. Virtual particles are another example, and indeed, at the quantum level it seems quite a different story.
I appreciate that on some level we can say the atom decayed because it was unstable, because of the laws of nature or whatever, but that seems a different sense to the chain of cause and effect you seem to be talking about ("knowledge of cause and effect is basic and universal").
Hence, to me you are trying to slip this in "under the radar".
Pix
Where is your proof of the statement "There are no uncaused phenomena"?
QM tells us otherwise, at least for some definitions of "uncaused"; for example radiolytic decay of a specific atom seems to happen at random, without any cause. Virtual particles are another example, and indeed, at the quantum level it seems quite a different story.
Virtual particles are not uncaused. They are constricted out of pre existing particles. All QM phenomena is only "unca8sed" as a matter of speaking not because they pop 9mmto ex9stence out of nothing.
I appreciate that on some level we can say the atom decayed because it was unstable, because of the laws of nature or whatever, but that seems a different sense to the chain of cause and effect you seem to be talking about ("knowledge of cause and effect is basic and universal").
wrong. I'm talking about the creation of the universe. you have no example of universe popping out of nothing. using our universe is wrong because that is what is under discussion.
Hence, to me you are trying to slip this in "under the radar".
Take the UIVERSE the whole shoot/n match neither of us can prove how it got here. Bu the preponderance of the evidence tells us thing need causes. You have no cause to which you can ascribe the universe.
Virtual particles are not uncaused. They are constricted out of pre existing particles.
No they are not. They do arise from fields, but they do so randonmly. Nothing causes them to exist.
What about radiolytic decay? Is that cause and effect?
All QM phenomena is only "unca8sed" as a matter of speaking not because they pop 9mmto ex9stence out of nothing.
That is kind of my point. You need to be explicit what manner of speaking you are employing, because in at least one your claim is not true.
Take the UIVERSE the whole shoot/n match neither of us can prove how it got here.
There we agree.
Bu the preponderance of the evidence tells us thing need causes.
You are extrapolating from chairs and apples and the like to the whole universe. That seems very unsound.
We know that if you extrapolate the other way, to electrons and photons, the rules are very different. To suppose the unverse must have a cause because chairs and apples do is very dubious. Especially given you are also excluding God from this. Why should I imagine the universe more closely resembles a chair than it resembles God in this regard?
You have no cause to which you can ascribe the universe.
So what? You surely cannot think that it has to therefore must be God?
Pix
Anonymous: "you label the former "contingent" there is an implication introduced that such entities depend on something else to exist."
No. There are (as you appear to acknowledge) two different senses of "contingent". The sense that I am using the term is in simply "existing but possibly not existing".
The concept of a possible world can be metaphysically innocent in being devoid of any existential commitments. As I use it it just means, "a way actuality might have been."
Joe: "Then you are just denying what the argument strongly suggests because you don't wat it."
This is the philosophical stalemate. Consider the following very brief dialog:
Eric:"I think I can conceive that everything that exists is possibly such that it might not have existed."
Joe: "No you can't."
Our disagreement comes down to a fundamental different regarding modal intuitions. You say I'm denying the coherence of a necessary being because I am motivated to do so. I think this is an unfair charge that I'm guilty of motivated reasoning. I deny it. Rather, I am simply unpersuaded that necessity properly apply to existence.
In a modal ontological argument with a premise stating that there possibly exists a necessary being, I deny that this premise is self-evidently true.
Eric
No. There are (as you appear to acknowledge) two different senses of "contingent". The sense that I am using the term is in simply "existing but possibly not existing".
I was responding to Joe's argument. To me, it looks like he is using "continguent" to prove everything has a cause or is necessary.
Consider three types of things:
Necessary things - they necessarily exist
Caused things - they do not necessarily exist; their existence was caused by another thing
Spontaneous things - they do not necessarily exist, but appeared without any cause
I think Joe starts by dividing everything in to necessary and not necessary, but then labels the latter continguent, and so tacitly excludes spontaneous things from the not necessary group.
As he says in a reply about: There are no uncaused phenomena. Both senses of contingency are related.
I think the rest of your post is directed at Joe, and I tend to agree with it, though I am not sure that that is Joe's point.
Pix
Eric Sotnak
Anonymous: "you label the former "contingent" there is an implication introduced that such entities depend on something else to exist."
No. There are (as you appear to acknowledge) two different senses of "contingent". The sense that I am using the term is in simply "existing but possibly not existing".
Hartshorne showed that the two are connected,
The concept of a possible world can be metaphysically innocent in being devoid of any existential commitments. As I use it it just means, "a way actuality might have been."
fair enough
Joe: "Then you are just denying what the argument strongly suggests because you don't want it."
This is the philosophical stalemate. Consider the following very brief dialog:
Eric:"I think I can conceive that everything that exists is possibly such that it might not have existed."
Joe: "No you can't."
Our disagreement comes down to a fundamental different regarding modal intuitions. You say I'm denying the coherence of a necessary being because I am motivated to do so. I think this is an unfair charge that I'm guilty of motivated reasoning. I deny it. Rather, I am simply unpersuaded that necessity properly apply to existence.
You are right on motives. motives are irrelevant to logic.
In a modal ontological argument with a premise stating that there possibly exists a necessary being, I deny that this premise is self-evidently true.
I think you have to show that it's logically viable that there be no necessary being. You have not come close. You are merely asserting a possibility but it's logically mandated. You have not demonstrated that a universe can have only contingencies.
Spontaneous things - they do not necessarily exist, but appeared without any cause
You keep trying sneak a third category of being in the back door, there is nothing we know of that has no cause so it's a null wet. You argue for an origin of universe from that,
I think Joe starts by dividing everything in to necessary and not necessary, but then labels the latter continguent, and so tacitly excludes spontaneous things from the not necessary group.
As he says in a reply about: There are no uncaused phenomena. Both senses of contingency are related.
I have demonstrated may times chaging the terminology does not change the logic. you can't make illogical categories become logical by changing what you call them,
JH: "Hartshorne showed that the two are connected,"
If so, then Hartshorne is simply wrong, here. What is needed is an argument that for all x, x is possible if and only if x is dependent on something else, y. This is not analytically true, however.
But I'd like to raise what I think is a more serious worry for those who think there must be a necessary being. Suppose there is a necessary being. Let this being be G. According the cosmological argument you want to defend, G stands in relation to the series of contingent beings, C as cause to effect. We can leave it as an open question whether G is causally related to every member of C or to only one (or perhaps a few) members of C. Absent G, C is causally (explanatorily) incomplete.
G is a necessary being, so G exists in all possible worlds. But in different possible worlds, G causes different sets of contingent beings. So why does G cause one set of contingent beings in one possible world and different sets of contingent beings in different worlds? It won't do to say that G necessarily causes C, because then C is not contingent, but necessary. (If Necessarily(G) and Necessarily(G causes C), then Necessarily(C)).
So there must be a contingent reason for G's causing C. Call this C1. But then what accounts for C1? C2? We quickly arrive at an infinite regress of contingent explanations for G's causing C, which you have already rejected. But if we ever reach a point in the chain where G necessarily causes some contingent thing Cn, then Cn cannot be contingent, after all, for the same reasons given above.
I see only two options open to you:
Option 1: Reject the claim that not everything could be contingent. (This would obviously defeat the version of cosmological argument you've given.)
Option 2: Reject the inference rule that if something exists necessarily and necessarily causes something x, then x is necessary. But I can't see how this could possibly be defended as a coherent option.
Oops. I meant to say, above,
What is needed is an argument that for any existing thing x, x is possible if and only if x is either necessary or dependent on something else, y. This is not analytically true, however.
You keep trying sneak a third category of being in the back door, there is nothing we know of that has no cause so it's a null wet. You argue for an origin of universe from that,
I am not sneaking it in the back door, I am stating it very plainly!
It turns out your argument is comes down:
there is nothing we know of that has no cause
therefore it is impossible for something to have no cause
I think that is flawed logic, especially given you are extrapolating from every day objects like chairs and apples to the universe, and further because are events that have no cause at the quantum scale.
I have demonstrated may times chaging the terminology does not change the logic. you can't make illogical categories become logical by changing what you call them,
Wow, so you admit to changing the definition.
How about you edit the blog post to make that explicit?
Heaven forbid!
Pix
Oops. I meant to say, above,
What is needed is an argument that for any existing thing x, x is possible if and only if x is either necessary or dependent on something else, y. This is not analytically true, however.
1:41 PM
I don't think that iS what we NEED.The existence of God is an existential reality it can't be proven or disproven. It can only be understood as real through one's self authentication. My arguments only claim to provide rational warrant for belief not proof.
If so, then Hartshorne is simply wrong, here. What is needed is an argument that for all x, x is possible if and only if x is dependent on something else, y. This is not analytically true, however.
You need to read Hartshorne's book on the ontological argument.
But I'd like to raise what I think is a more serious worry for those who think there must be a necessary being. Suppose there is a necessary being. Let this being be G. According the cosmological argument you want to defend, G stands in relation to the series of contingent beings, C as cause to effect. We can leave it as an open question whether G is causally related to every member of C or to only one (or perhaps a few) members of C. Absent G, C is causally (explanatorily) incomplete.
G is a necessary being, so G exists in all possible worlds. But in different possible worlds, G causes different sets of contingent beings. So why does G cause one set of contingent beings in one possible world and different sets of contingent beings in different worlds? It won't do to say that G necessarily causes C, because then C is not contingent, but necessary. (If Necessarily(G) and Necessarily(G causes C), then Necessarily(C)).
I think what I said above answers this. The Distal and proximate stuff.
So there must be a contingent reason for G's causing C. Call this C1. But then what accounts for C1? C2? We quickly arrive at an infinite regress of contingent explanations for G's causing C, which you have already rejected. But if we ever reach a point in the chain where G necessarily causes some contingent thing Cn, then Cn cannot be contingent, after all, for the same reasons given above.
God is the distal cause of all that is not the proximate cause. Things presumably happen differently in different worlds. But we don't know that is the case-- it may be that this is the only world with people.
I see only two options open to you:
Option 1: Reject the claim that not everything could be contingent. (This would obviously defeat the version of cosmological argument you've given.)
Option 2: Reject the inference rule that if something exists necessarily and necessarily causes something x, then x is necessary. But I can't see how this could possibly be defended as a coherent option.
You have no proof there is another universe wit people im it. God is ultimately the cause of all things but he
s the direct cause of anything we know on earth now. All products of nature are contingent. God is not the product of anythinn,
Pixie:
Anonymous said...
[Joe's claim]You keep trying sneak a third category of being in the back door, there is nothing we know of that has no cause so it's a null wet. You argue for an origin of universe from that,
Pix: I am not sneaking it in the back door, I am stating it very plainly!
There can only be two categories, necessary and contingent. Everything you propose is just a form of contingency
It turns out your argument is comes down:
there is nothing we know of that has no cause
therefore it is impossible for something to have no cause
that is reasonable
I think that is flawed logic, especially given you are extrapolating from every day objects like chairs and apples to the universe, and further because are events that have no cause at the quantum scale.
Anonymous said...
You keep trying sneak a third category of being in the back door, there is nothing we know of that has no cause so it's a null wet. You argue for an origin of universe from that,
I am not sneaking it in the back door, I am stating it very plainly!
It turns out your argument is comes down:
there is nothing we know of that has no cause
therefore it is impossible for something to have no cause
I think that is flawed logic, especially given you are extrapolating from every day objects like chairs and apples to the universe, and further because are events that have no cause at the quantum scale.
wrong. There is no logical reason why we should not extrapolate to entire universe. After all science does this. Yes all science assumes the same physical laws on earth are the same rhw universe over.You offer no reason to think otherwise
Wow, so you admit to changing the definition.
where did I say that?
How about you edit the blog post to make that explicit?
I don't think I ever said it.
I don't think Joe's response to me adequately addresses the problem I had raised. In particular, I don't see how the distinction between proximate and distal causation is relevant to the question of whether, in either case, the causal relation is necessary or only contingent. A contingent distal cause is still contingent, and a necessary distal cause is still necessary. A contingent proximate cause is still contingent, and a necessary proximate cause is still necessary. So, let me try again:
1. If the existence of contingent beings implies the existence of a necessary being, then there is at least one contingent being C that is dependent on a necessary being. (Call this being G).
2. C either necessarily depends on G or C depends only contingently on G.
3. If C necessarily depends on G, then C is not contingent, but necessary (since there would then be no possible world in which C does not exist).
4. Therefore, C depends only contingently on G.
#3, above, mirrors the modal logic theorem that:
If Necessarily(x) and Necessarily(x entails y), then Necessarily(y).
[ASIDE: If the following theorem is also true, Joe's cause is hopelessly lost, so I am going to assume for the sake of continuing the argument that it is not: If Necessarily(x) and (x entails y), then Necessarily(y). Unlike the previous theorem, this allows for x to entail y in some possible worlds but not in others.]
I'll also reiterate that in using the language of possible worlds, I am not endorsing a commitment to modal realism. It is entirely consistent with all I am saying that possible worlds talk is just a facon de parler for talking about ways things might have been.
So now let's ask WHY, in the world where C exists, G causes C rather than not. There are two possibilities:
(A) There is no reason at all why G causes C. G's causing C is a "brute fact" - a fact for which no further explanation exists or can be sought. G just plain causes C for no reason at all. G doesn't have to cause C, but G does cause C. Notice that on this response, C is contingent in the sense "contingent upon" while G's causing C is contingent in the sense "actual but not necessary". Taking this option though invites the question of why, if facts can be contingent in this latter sense, beings can only be contingent in the dependent sense. That is, if truth can be a matter of brute fact, why can't existence?
(B) There is a reason why G causes C, but this reason is, itself, contingent (if it were necessary, then G's causing C would be necessary -- #3 above, again). On this second response, we simply cycle back to the choice between option A and option B regarding this contingent reason for G's causing C. Either we end with an infinite regress or a brute fact.
If you exclude both brute facts and infinite regresses of contingent explanations, there is no way to avoid Spinoza's conclusion on this point: "In nature there is nothing contingent, but all things have been determined from the necessity of the divine nature to exist and produce an effect in a certain way."
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