Tuesday, December 17, 2019

Ethical Naturalism and Value Systems: the Illusion of Moral Landscape (part 2)



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The Is/Ought Dichotomy

            The “is-ought” problem tells us that we can’t derive what should be just from a description of what is. If we look at what Harris is saying, he’s really not deriving a view of what ought to be by understanding what is, although he wants us to think he is. He thinks it’s possible to do this just by being real accurate with the “is.” But he’s already reduced reality so it wont include transcendent ought. So he’s already hedged his bets against the argument. In reality there is no reason why we should accept that the “ought” is already in place and that it’s already a given that pleasant physical circumstances as outcome are the only valid good available. This has not been established by anything. It’s just an assertion that is put in the position to be a default given that alternatives are ruled out ideologically. There’s nothing about biological facts that establish an “ought.” We might show that religious belief has harmed more people than Polio (perhaps) but if true that still would not tell us why it’s wrong to do so. Harris’s basic answer to this argument is that people who make such criticisms have too narrow a concept of science. “Science simply represents our best effort to understand what’s going on in the universe, and the boundary between it and the rest of rational thought cannot always be drawn.”[1]  That is his answer to the issue of is-ought, basically no answer at all. What difference does it make if it is our best efforts (which I doubt)? Best efforts don’t change is to ought. What difference does it make if we broaden our scope of understanding for science? What he’s really saying is that science is the only true ethics. In saying that, he’s clearing the way to replace real ethical thinking with the reductionist ideology that makes up his understanding of science. All the scientific precision there is can’t turn “is” into “ought”—there is simply no reason why facts by themselves represent what should be. As Philosopher Robert Nozick tells us:


Ethical truths find no place within the contemporary scientific picture of the world. No such truths are established in any scientific theory or tested by any scientific procedure—microscopes and telescopes reveal no ethical facts. In the guise of a complete picture of the world, science seems to leave no room for any ethical facts. What kind of facts are these, what makes them hold true?[2]


Brain Earp, again tells us:

Example: It’s a fact that rape occurs in nature — among chimpanzees, for instance; and there are some evolutionary arguments to explain its existence in humans and non-humans alike. But this fact tells us exactly nothing about whether it’s OK to rape people. This is because “natural” doesn’t entail “right” (just as “unnatural” doesn’t necessarily mean “wrong”) — indeed, the correct answer is that it’s not OK, and this is a judgment we make at the interface of moral philosophy and common sense: it’s not an output of science.
The domain of science is to describe nature, and then to explain its descriptions in terms of deeper patterns or laws. Science cannot tell us how to live. It cannot tell us right and wrong. If a system of thought claims to be doing those things, it cannot be science. If a scientist tells you she has some statements about how you ought to behave, they cannot be scientific statements, and the lab-coat is no longer speaking as a scientist. Questions about “How should we live?” — for better or worse — fall outside the purview of “objective” science. We have to sort them out, messily, by ourselves.[3]

If the current state of affairs (what is) is the basis of what should be than political repression and backward understanding of the environment and focus on short term needs only, as well as greed and even cruelty must be what should be. That certainly sums up what is as far as life on earth goes.
            Rachels defends ethical naturalism against the “is-ought” argument and his defense is a bit more involved than Harris’s. He argues that evaluative conclusions can sometimes be drawn from factual premises. His example is if the only difference between doing  A and not doing A is a child will suffer intense prolonged pain, then it’s better not to do A.[4] Wait, this in principle is no different than Harris’s answer and it’s based upon the same “trick.” I use the term advisedly because they may not intend to trick, but they are tricking themselves because there is clearly a value that’s being inserted into the process that is kept unspoken and asserted as though the it’s the only valid conclusion that comes form the nature of the case but it’s clearly loaded at the front before the example is made. The idea that doing is wrong because all other things being equal it would result in the pain of a child assumes form the outset that our values are such that paining children is wrong. This is fraught with a host of assumptions: that there is a right and wrong, that children are more innocent than adults, that it’s wrong to harm the innocent, that’s more wrong to harm the innocent than the not so innocent, and so on. Yes, these are values with which we all agree. There is, however, no evidence that they are arrived at logically as a result of some magic transmutation of “is” into “ought.” Rather the “ought” is assumed form the beginning, it is loaded into the example, otherwise why use a child? The basis of those values is proved by this example to be logically derived from the nature of the case but could well be derived from fine feelings or a sense of right intuited from the Spirit or any number of things. Its use as an emotional ploy suggests the flaw in using it, because it suggests a value already built in. He also argues that beliefs are tied to motivations, those stem from behavior and that is based upon “is,” upon the factual nature of the human psyche and other situations that are derived from the nature of the case.[5] Yes it is undeniable that an evocation of ethical duty or obligation must revolve around actual facts rather than mere abstractions or there is no actual ethical concern. That in no way means that the “ought” is derived form the mere facts of the nature of the case apart form the value systems employed to evaluate them.


Value systems

            Value systems make up the basis of ethical thinking. Intrinsic value is what supplies the reason for action in ethics.[6] Ethics is about what we do, how we live, as a result of examining our actions in relation to our values. We all agree that pleasant outcome; absence of pain is a good thing.[7] Yet we believe for different reasons. The reductionists try to justify it as an outgrowth of survival instinct, the Christian as an expression of God’s love. It matters which way we do it because the decision is ultimately the expression of a value system, that decision will determine how we decide our actions. If we write off human values as merely the opinions of a different set of mammals, if we say “o well marmoset actions are marmoset ethics,” that’s all it is just the way a different set of organisms spins the survival mode, then we might wind up justifying a whole set of dehumanizing actions. If we are led down the garden path by the priests of knowledge and taught to think of these dehumanizing actions as merely a means to an end, we may lose the human values that would enable us to regret such actions. Behind what might seem like split hairs lurk the justifications and rationalizations for destructive and dehumanizing decisions. One could see, for example, rationalizing loss of freedom by an appeal to concrete nature of the outcome and there fleeting transitory nature of the “merely human” value of freedom. The space between is and “ought” must be kept in order not to sanctify what “is.” The danger is too great that deriving “ought” from “is” will produce a way of thinking about “is” that forever links it with “ought.”
            One of the things that make ethical philosophy and moral philosophy seem so aloof, transitory and “unscientific” is the relative nature of their value systems. Value systems are relative and arbitrary to the extent that we either hold them or we don’t. We can’t prove what values we should hold. In order to be able to prove what value system we should hold to we would have to have a prior value system to put in place to say it with, if we could have that it would solve the issue there be no need to say it. That’s what the scientific ethics reductionists think they are doing; they think they are giving us a stable grounding in “is.” It’s really an appeal to the fortress of facts idea. The problem with that is that it begs the question about which value system we should assume. We can’t be confused by the humanitarian nature of the outcome oriented ethics. Just because it values things we deem “good” doesn’t mean it’s the only access to the good. Deontologists value happiness, peace, absence of carnage, too. The problem is, values come into conflict. Take Harris’s example, do we use our billion to cure malaria or help feed people? I assume he would base that upon which is killing the most. The problem there’s more to consider in the equation. What do we have to do to provide those particular goods? If we have to take food out of the mouths of people being sustained by that funding in order to save other lives with malaria have we produced a net good? We only shift around evils if we create starving masses to cure disease. By the same token a deontological approach could see feeding the hungry and curing disease both as values that must be met. This leads to the argument about replacing all other forms of ethics with consequentialist ethics. This is clearly something that Harris seeks to do. He defines ethics in such a way that ethics is about producing certain kinds of consequences, as we have seen.
            I stated above that intrinsic values are what motivate action in ethics. There are other kinds of values;[8] there are values that derived from the things they accrue, for example in consequentialist ethics various states or attitudes are moral values because the outcome of holding them is the desired outcome. For example the outcome of holding non racist attitudes is seen as clearing the way for freedom and human potential that leads to more happiness and less pain for people of color and even for those who would hold the prejudiced attitudes. Yet there’s also an intrinsic value there. The intrinsic value is one that is the object of the outcome; we might term it “pleasure,” more like “fulfillment,” “human potential.” What is the point of keeping people alive? Why should we care if more people die of Malaria or are harmed by religion, why care about either? We care because we value human life both in the sense of protecting it, and enhancing the quality of it. That is an end in itself. We can’t say why we value human life, except in terms of either expressing feelings or expressing ideas about the nature of the universe. We have no scientific data that tells us why we should value it. We can’t prove logically that we should. The fact that we do feel that we should may well be grounds of notion of the “self evident” nature of moral motions, but is not a scientifically provable or even logically provable proposition. The whole of ethical theory is about figuring out what to do with and how best to make use of these values we hold. We organize our thinking into schools of thought and design ethical systems for this purpose.
            The Strength of moral philosophy is it’s diversity of value systems. Diversity is strength and not a weakness. The assertion all three make, Harris, Churchland and Wilson is that consequntialist ethics is the only real basis for ethics. That’s clearly not the case if we go by the field of ethics itself. There’s no scientific proof for the assertion that teleological ethics is the only true basis for ethics without dragging a surreptitious value system into the equation, and thus if we look at moral philosophy and ethics as an academic field its loaded with other view points, with other values systems and other ways of implanting values. Consequence is only one of many. For example deontolgocal ethics asserts that there is intrinsic value in the acts themselves. For example there may be value in truth telling even though the result of telling the truth may be harmful.[9]Lying may be wrong even if no harm results. There are two main types of deontological theories, intuitionism which holds that moral principles are self evident upon reflection, and the second types is rationalism, which uses a second order principle is used to generate a set of first order principles.”[10] They both seem to ground ethics in duty.[11]This is just scratching the surface; there are many other views of ethics, including Virtue ethics where one focuses upon the kind of person one should be rather than means to act ethically,[12] and even aesthetic ethics which does not seek the good but the beautiful or the aesthetically fulfilling. Dorothy Emmett shows that aesthetic ethics can be as consistent and logical as any other kind.[13] To just assert that ethics is about one thing, pleasure over pain, stopping pain, outcomes that result in fewer deaths, is absurd. If we impose a hidden value system while pretending to ground values in a scientific fact we ignore the basis of all ethical thinking, not to mention the diversity of the field. Trying to shift from deontological or other form of decision making to outcome oriented ethics on the grounds that “this is obviously what ethics is about” is absurd.
            Values motivate ethical thinking and actions; we choose the ethical system that best serves our values. The flexibility to change form one system to another is strength because it allows for new approaches. It would be stifling to assert one system over the others and to close off alternatives by terming it “fact.” There are good arguments against consequentialism as an ethical theory. It’s been hinted at already that consequentialism ignores the basis of intrinsic value and thus can at times force the individual to violate intrinsic values in order to meet the demands of gaining certain out come. Various life boat scenarios often depict this kind of thinking. The life boat analogy was first proposed by Garrett Hardin (in 1974) its application was closely related to environmental ethics. The life boat idea imaged 50 people in a life boat with room for 10 more, but they are surrounded by 100 swimmers. Who will be let on to row? Garrett’s intention was to criticize the spaceship earth idea.[14] Life boat examples are often used in high school and perhaps middle school to introduce students to ethical thinking. Teachers are advised that students often go for the outcome oriented solution, so they have to be advised to think about other options: “Discussions about the lifeboat are influenced strongly by how the question is posed. Be sure to allow room for solutions that maximize fairness (i.e. drawing straws) by asking students to focus on how they are making their decision. Students often default to solutions that are outcome-based. It is useful to be able to show that there are other approaches that can be applied. ”[15] One might be led to let the old woman drawn because she can’t row and well as the middle aged man swimming more strongly  than she, unless of course one realizes that a higher value might be protecting the weak and taking care of those who can’t take care of themselves. Certainly the life boat idea does cast a spot light on the tendency of values to collide. It points up the potential for outcome oriented thinking to force upon the individual acts considered immoral by conscience. It’s then that we realize we need a system that recognizes the intrinsic nature of values and a flexibility that allows us to re-consider our options. We have no factual basis in science that would tell us, “yes it’s better to save this one and let the other drawn.” Now it’s true we don’t have a clear cut means of understanding the right choice in any other system either, but that’s not a reason to close off the option with the pretense that science give us the factual basis form which to act.
            Why should we laud one set of values over others? To use an example already given, we can choose human values over Marmoset values because we are human. We have no actual reason to suspect that marmoset’s think ethically, science might actually help us there. I’m not arguing that science is of no use. Yet since we are human and we know that we can think ethically, that in itself is reason enough to accept human values. We can also identify the intrinsic values. Values intrinsic to other species probably would not always be intrinsic to us, it makes no since therefore that we don’t use human values.




[1] Harris, Ibid., 29.
[2] Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge, Mass.: Bellknap Press, Harvard University Press, 1981, 399.
[3] Earp, Ibid.
[4] Rachels, Ibid., 4.
[5] Ibid., 6.
[6] Robin Attfield, Value, Obligation and Meta-Ethics, Amsterdam, Atlanta, Georgia: Editions Rodopi  B.V. Value Inquiry Book Series,1995, 29
MA (Oxon), PhD (Wales) has been Professor of Philosophy at Cardiff University since 1992. Robin Attfield read Greats (Literae Humaniores) at Christ Church and theology at Regent's Park College, Oxford.
[7] Nozick, Ibid., 399.
[8] Attfield, Ibid. 29-30.
[9] Lois P. Pojman, (editor), Moral Philosophy: A Reader. Indianapolis, In.: Hackett Publishing Company inc., Third edition.  2003, Originally 1993, 193.
[10] Ibid., 193
[11] Ibid., 193.
[12] Find, virtue ethics
[13] Find moral Prisim
[14] Garrett Hardin, “Life Boat Ethics, The Case Against Helping the Poor,” Psychology Today, September (1974) 38-40, continued  123-124.
[15] Teaching Background, “The Life Boat,” Teacher Instructions, hosted by Northwest Association for Biomedical Research. online resource:http://nwabr.org/sites/default/files/Lifeboat.pdf  accessed 5/24/13.

56 comments:

Eric Sotnak said...

How, exactly, do you think theism provides an account of 'ought' statements?

Joseph Hinman (Metacrock) said...

Jim, 7th stooge is having trouble posting he asked me to post this for him



I agree with you, Eric, that theism cannot give a more compelling account of the foundation for morality than atheism. Where I disagree with you is where you say that A punching B is wrong because the punching is unpleasant for B and that qualitative conscious experience can serve as the only foundation for value. The mere unpleasantness of an act doesn't tell us whether the act was justified or not. And if your conscious qualitative experiences are the basis for my morally respecting and valuing you, then my painlessly euthanizing you while you're asleep would mean that I haven't morally wronged you.

Joseph Hinman (Metacrock) said...

How, exactly, do you think theism provides an account of 'ought' statements?

two ways: divine revelation and moral compass the heart. That is more than just pleasure or pain or outcome

Cuttlebones said...

What Divine revelation do we have that tells us something that couldn't be arrived at otherwise.
And can we say that our "Moral compass" is more that a just a product of learning?
Is the "ought" simply because God says so?

Joseph Hinman (Metacrock) said...
This comment has been removed by the author.
Joseph Hinman (Metacrock) said...

What Divine revelation do we have that tells us something that couldn't be arrived at otherwise.

You can arrive at 'thou shalt not kill: based upon your feelings.But the dictator comes in and says "thou shalt kill any i wish killed I will kill you if you don't obey." Or another says I feel killing is fine who do we know your feelings are right? Well God is right because he is the creator,he tells us thou shalt not kill. arriving at the rule is not the trick grounding the rule is the trick.

And can we say that our "Moral compass" is more that a just a product of learning?

yes because in cultures with a totally different knowledge base still find murder wrong and lying wrong and so on,

Is the "ought" simply because God says so?

no it's NOT arbitrary,God has supreme knowledge so he knows right and wrong

Eric Sotnak said...

Reply to Jim:

"The mere unpleasantness of an act doesn't tell us whether the act was justified or not."

No. But moral justification won't be compelling without some grounding in qualitative conscious experience. That's why there is no serious question of whether or how our behavior toward inanimate objects is morally justifiable. Even if God commanded weekly computer maintenance, that wouldn't create a moral obligation toward computers to perform such maintenance (at leat I think not).

"...my painlessly euthanizing you while you're asleep would mean that I haven't morally wronged you."

Only if we are restricting ourselves to actual occurrent states of conscious experience and leaving out future and potential states of qualitative conscious experience. I would deny, however, that we need such a restriction. We can (and do) value our future experiences.

Joseph Hinman (Metacrock) said...

"The mere unpleasantness of an act doesn't tell us whether the act was justified or not."

No. But moral justification won't be compelling without some grounding in qualitative conscious experience.

says who?I think that is arbitrator and predicated upon teleological assumptions.


That's why there is no serious question of whether or how our behavior toward inanimate objects is morally justifiable. Even if God commanded weekly computer maintenance, that wouldn't create a moral obligation toward computers to perform such maintenance (at leat I think not).

yes but that does not mean it;s because ethics's based upon feelings, You are looking at an effect and deciding it;s a cause. It's that way because duty and obligation involve consciousness,


"...my painlessly euthanizing you while you're asleep would mean that I haven't morally wronged you."

Only if we are restricting ourselves to actual occurrent states of conscious experience and leaving out future and potential states of qualitative conscious experience. I would deny, however, that we need such a restriction. We can (and do) value our future experiences.

so you really will accept being killed in your sleep as long as you never know?

10:05 PM

Eric Sotnak said...

"so you really will accept being killed in your sleep as long as you never know?"

No, as I said, because we are not restricted only to occurrent states of conscious experience when it comes to assessing value. We can also value potential and future states of affairs. So, if I were in a permanent coma (with no degree of conscious awareness whatsoever) and it was a certainty that I could never recover, then I would be ok with you killing me in my sleep.

7th Stooge said...

"The mere unpleasantness of an act doesn't tell us whether the act was justified or not."

No. But moral justification won't be compelling without some grounding in qualitative conscious experience. That's why there is no serious question of whether or how our behavior toward inanimate objects is morally justifiable. Even if God commanded weekly computer maintenance, that wouldn't create a moral obligation toward computers to perform such maintenance (at leat I think not).


I guess if you define "grounding" broadly enough, I'd maybe agree with you. An uninhabited world of Louvres and Prados is morally valuable, IMO, even with no one there to appreciate it, although one could argue that such a world was grounded, ie caused, by conscious experiences. But you could broaden the example to a world of extremely complex organic beauty as being intrinsically more valuable than one of disgusting ugliness.

My point was that mere pleasantness doesn't tell us whether an action is right. There's the famous example of the wife who deceives her husband into believing she loves him. His entire life is spent under a pleasant delusion.

"...my painlessly euthanizing you while you're asleep would mean that I haven't morally wronged you."

Only if we are restricting ourselves to actual occurrent states of conscious experience and leaving out future and potential states of qualitative conscious experience. I would deny, however, that we need such a restriction. We can (and do) value our future experiences.


But if I'm dead there are no future experiences. As Nagel argues, I think persuasively, death is a bad thing for me even if there is no "me" to be the subject of the badness. So contrary to Epicurus, conscious experiences can't be the only things that are good and bad.

Joseph Hinman (Metacrock) said...

But if I'm dead there are no future experiences. As Nagel argues, I think persuasively, death is a bad thing for me even if there is no "me" to be the subject of the badness. So contrary to Epicurus, conscious experiences can't be the only things that are good and bad.

that is an excellent point Jim. I also wonder about virtue rather than consciousness as the key to conscious sentient life as moralistic.

Eric Sotnak said...

"But if I'm dead there are no future experiences."

Well, yes. And it is exactly those future experiences we would be deprived of, and it is such deprivation that we disvalue.

"conscious experiences can't be the only things that are good and bad."

I don't think there is any value without conscious valuing. To me it makes no sense to say x is valuable in the absence of any conscious valuing of x.

Joseph Hinman (Metacrock) said...

"conscious experiences can't be the only things that are good and bad."

I don't think there is any value without conscious valuing.

those are two different things



To me it makes no sense to say x is valuable in the absence of any conscious valuing of x.

I think you may be confussing episteology with meta etical theory

7th Stooge said...

But if I'm dead there are no future experiences."

Well, yes. And it is exactly those future experiences we would be deprived of, and it is such deprivation that we disvalue.


But Nagel's point is that deprivation is not necessarily an experience, so that values and disvalues are not always linked to conscious experiences. His example is that of a normal adult being transformed into a perfectly contented and well-cared for individual with the mental capacity of a three-month old infant. If that person lives out the rest of his life in that state, he's never aware of his deprivation, so no conscious state ever corresponds to it, and yet a bad thing has happened to him.

"conscious experiences can't be the only things that are good and bad."

I don't think there is any value without conscious valuing. To me it makes no sense to say x is valuable in the absence of any conscious valuing of x.


It's a bad thing for me ( a disvalue ) if I die even if my death means my non-existence and the end of all my conscious experiences.

Joseph Hinman (Metacrock) said...

these are excellent points Jo.O will wait to see what Eric says

Cuttlebones said...

What Divine revelation do we have that tells us something that couldn't be arrived at otherwise.
Joseph Hinman (Metacrock) said...
You can arrive at 'thou shalt not kill: based upon your feelings.But the dictator comes in and says "thou shalt kill any i wish killed I will kill you if you don't obey." Or another says I feel killing is fine who do we know your feelings are right? Well God is right because he is the creator,he tells us thou shalt not kill. arriving at the rule is not the trick grounding the rule is the trick.

A dictator saying it doesn't make it right or moral. It is not about feelings. (Well perhaps a little bit) It's about survival. Would they wish to be killed?
The question was whether we couldn't arrive at it without revelation.

And can we say that our "Moral compass" is more that a just a product of learning?

yes because in cultures with a totally different knowledge base still find murder wrong and lying wrong and so on,

It's not a totally different knowledge base.
We are all humans and that provides a common base. We are a social species and these are things that go to the heart of survival.

Is the "ought" simply because God says so?

no it's NOT arbitrary,God has supreme knowledge so he knows right and wrong

I never said it was arbitrary. But the "Ought" seems to come purely from God IS. I don't see how it solves the problem.

Cuttlebones said...

Blogger 7th Stooge said...

But Nagel's point is that deprivation is not necessarily an experience, so that values and disvalues are not always linked to conscious experiences. His example is that of a normal adult being transformed into a perfectly contented and well-cared for individual with the mental capacity of a three-month old infant. If that person lives out the rest of his life in that state, he's never aware of his deprivation, so no conscious state ever corresponds to it, and yet a bad thing has happened to him.

Who is making the assessment that something bad has happened to him?
By what measure are they making that determination?

It's a bad thing for me ( a disvalue ) if I die even if my death means my non-existence and the end of all my conscious experiences.

Again, who is making the assessment that it's a bad thing for you?
You, in the here an now? That would make it a conscious experience.

Joseph Hinman (Metacrock) said...

A dictator saying it doesn't make it right or moral. It is not about feelings. (Well perhaps a little bit) It's about survival. Would they wish to be killed?
The question was whether we couldn't arrive at it without revelation.

you don't get the point, There is no valid basis for grounding moral axioms apart from God.Not in feelings and not in logic.

And can we say that our "Moral compass" is more that a just a product of learning?

yes because in cultures with a totally different knowledge base still find murder wrong and lying wrong and so on,

It's not a totally different knowledge base.

so you even understand the argument going here? what are you arguing for? that contradicts your position.


We are all humans and that provides a common base. We are a social species and these are things that go to the heart of survival.

but we have conflicting views. we don't all agree on the same axioms.

Is the "ought" simply because God says so?

No God's verdict is not arbitrary its based upon love.

7th Stooge said...

But Nagel's point is that deprivation is not necessarily an experience, so that values and disvalues are not always linked to conscious experiences. His example is that of a normal adult being transformed into a perfectly contented and well-cared for individual with the mental capacity of a three-month old infant. If that person lives out the rest of his life in that state, he's never aware of his deprivation, so no conscious state ever corresponds to it, and yet a bad thing has happened to him.

Who is making the assessment that something bad has happened to him?
By what measure are they making that determination?


I think the argument goes that any reasonable person would make that assessment by the measure that something(s)of value have been taken away from the person who has died. By the same logic, something bad has happened to me if I have been suddenly transformed into a person with a mental capacity of a three-month of child. Even though I will never know that something bad has happened to me, the argument is that it's an objective fact that things of value have been permanently taken from me, and this deprivation is the locus of the badness.

It's a bad thing for me ( a disvalue ) if I die even if my death means my non-existence and the end of all my conscious experiences.

Again, who is making the assessment that it's a bad thing for you?
You, in the here an now? That would make it a conscious experience.


No. The assumption of the argument is that death is personal non-existence, so that the badness of my death cannot be experienced by me. But that's the whole point of Nagel's argument, that goodness and badness do not necessarily have to be restricted to conscious experiences.

Cuttlebones said...

Blogger Joseph Hinman (Metacrock) said...
you don't get the point, There is no valid basis for grounding moral axioms apart from God.Not in feelings and not in logic.

How is an unproven God a valid basis for grounding moral axioms?
Does wishing not to be killed simply come down to a feeling? It’s a biological imperative. Why is logic not a valid basis?

so you even understand the argument going here? what are you arguing for? that contradicts your position.

I’m saying what appears as a common conscience doesn’t need god. It can be based on our common humanness. How does that contradict my position that it is learned?

but we have conflicting views. we don't all agree on the same axioms.

Doesn’t that then go against your argument?

No God's verdict is not arbitrary its based upon love.

You said it was based on supreme knowledge.

Joseph Hinman (Metacrock) said...

Blogger Joseph Hinman (Metacrock) said...
you don't get the point, There is no valid basis for grounding moral axioms apart from God.Not in feelings and not in logic.

How is an unproven God a valid basis for grounding moral axioms?
Does wishing not to be killed simply come down to a feeling? It’s a biological imperative. Why is logic not a valid basis?

(1)We can warrant belief through rational means. We need not prove God's existence since belief is rational. Because there is good reason to believe.
(2)Simply wishing not to be killed does not prove killing is immoral.
(3)Morality evokes the word "ought." IT is how we ought to act. One can not establish an ought merely by establishing what is. Showing that I don't want to die or I don;t like something or I want something these are not moral reasons,they do not prove X is moral.so called biological imperative merely means I don;t want to die.




so you even understand the argument going here? what are you arguing for? that contradicts your position?

I’m saying what appears as a common conscience doesn’t need god. It can be based on our common humanness. How does that contradict my position that it is learned?

Because none of that establishes what ought to be. You cannot derive an ought from an is,merely showing something is doesn't prove what should be.

but we have conflicting views. we don't all agree on the same axioms.

Doesn’t that then go against your argument?

No it means we need a standard like God that is not based upon emotion and wont be swayed,not subject to selfish desire

No God's verdict is not arbitrary its based upon love.

You said it was based on supreme knowledge.

God has supreme knowledge but knowledge by itself can't establish an ought, it needs a motive force that is love, God can temper love with knowledge and knowledge with compassion.

Joseph Hinman (Metacrock) said...

Jim, great answers as usual. I have a question: are you going to appeal to God as the ultimate standard? otherwise if there is no knowledge of a wrong or an expedience how can a value system be brought into ploy unless you have a transcendent standard?

7th Stooge said...

Jim, great answers as usual. I have a question: are you going to appeal to God as the ultimate standard? otherwise if there is no knowledge of a wrong or an expedience how can a value system be brought into ploy unless you have a transcendent standard?

No, Joe, I don't think you need to appeal to God as the ultimate standard. We've talked about this before. I don't see how God can add anything to the rightness or wrongness of actions, other than as an exemplification or embodiment, but not as justification. I know you disagree.

Joseph Hinman (Metacrock) said...

what do you use instead for grounding?

Joseph Hinman (Metacrock) said...

I don't see how God can add anything to the rightness or wrongness of actions, other than as an exemplification or embodiment, but not as justification. I know you disagree.

1:29 PM


what about judgement? God is all knowing Judge

7th Stooge said...

what do you use instead for grounding?

Like Kant, the rational will.

7th Stooge said...

what about judgement? God is all knowing Judge

Even if God is the all-knowing judge, I don't see how that means that God grounds or justifies morality any more than a judge in a law court grounds or justifies the law he or she is adjudicating.

Joseph Hinman (Metacrock) said...

Because God's judgement extends all the way back to handing down the law itself.

Joseph Hinman (Metacrock) said...

what do you use instead for grounding?

Like Kant, the rational will.

That would be the same rational will that votes for Trump and allows us to sin chooses sin, rationalizes away the existence of God and so on? Since human will is in conflict with itself how do you establish a standard that decides the issues between conflicting values?

7th Stooge said...

That would be the same rational will that votes for Trump and allows us to sin chooses sin, rationalizes away the existence of God and so on? Since human will is in conflict with itself how do you establish a standard that decides the issues between conflicting values?

You're confusing what people actually choose with the rational will itself. People are obviously flawed and make mistakes. But to be rational the will would be motivated by justice and benevolence.

I know you're going to say that "God is justice and benevolence themselves." There's the "is" of identity and the "is" of predication. Even if God is the most perfect exemplification possible of justice and benevolence, he would still not be identical to these things. If he exemplifies them, that means they have an existence that is conceptually distinct from his existence. This means that any rational will can access these properties.

Joseph Hinman (Metacrock) said...

No I'm going to say we cant be our own grounding, we have to have a standard outside of ourselves. We will always choose the path of least resistance. Sin nature will always corrupt our choices.

That's not the same issue you raise when you say: " Even if God is the most perfect exemplification possible of justice and benevolence, he would still not be identical to these things. If he exemplifies them, that means they have an existence that is conceptually distinct from his existence. This means that any rational will can access these properties."

God is identical to those things he would have to be. What would create them apart from God? God is being itself hes prior to all things how could there be a moral standard above God? God is in a unique composition we are not in.

Joseph Hinman (Metacrock) said...

You're confusing what people actually choose with the rational will itself. People are obviously flawed and make mistakes. But to be rational the will would be motivated by justice and benevolence.

The ill itself cannot be grounding because our will is tainted with sin nature

Joseph Hinman (Metacrock) said...

what about judgement? God is all knowing Judge Even if God is the all-knowing judge, I don't see how that means that God grounds or justifies morality any more than a judge in a law court grounds or justifies the law he or she is adjudicating. on Ethical Naturalism and Value Systems: the Illusion of Moral Landscape (part 2)
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7th Stooge
on 1/2/20


Trying to make it analogous to the court system distorts the issue. The counts don't choose how moral axioms are grounded, To chose that you have to go ya back beyond the court system,

what do you use instead for grounding? Like Kant, the rational will. on Ethical Naturalism and Value Systems: the Illusion of Moral Landscape (part 2)


Kant did not use the rational will as grounding. That;s why he makes the moral argument he uses God as regulatory device because there is no other way to get a gormandizing that transcends our own desires

Eric Sotnak said...

Late reply #1:
"But Nagel's point is that deprivation is not necessarily an experience, so that values and disvalues are not always linked to conscious experiences. His example is that of a normal adult being transformed into a perfectly contented and well-cared for individual with the mental capacity of a three-month old infant. If that person lives out the rest of his life in that state, he's never aware of his deprivation, so no conscious state ever corresponds to it, and yet a bad thing has happened to him."

I distinguish between the consciousness of deprivation and deprivation itself. I believe it is possible to hold the latter to be a source of disvalue. So if you kill me painlessly, I can still hold that you have done me wrong even though I do not have any disvalued experiences. Rather, it is the deprivation of the experiences i would have had that is the source of my belief that you have done me wrong. It is true that I will not be aware that you have done me wrong, but I am not claiming that you do me wrong if and only if I have an unpleasant conscious experience of your doing me wrong. You have deprived me of something valuable.

I think we can say the same of Nagel's example. Suppose I would have preferred not to be turned into a happy idiot. Even if I am not aware that you have deprived me of a more cognitively nuanced life, I maintain you have still deprived me of something I value.

Similarly: Suppose I brainwash you into a perfectly happy member of my cult. On my view, it does not matter that you are a happy cult member. You have still been deprived of a life you would otherwise have chosen for yourself, and so I have wronged you.

I think all of this is fully consistent with maintaining that the source of life's value is still based on qualitative conscious experience.

7th Stooge said...

This is from an SEP Article: Kant and Hume on Morality

Hume and Kant both believe that philosophy should dig beneath the surface of morality and present a theory of its foundation. When it comes to morality’s foundation, they seem to agree on two things. First, morality’s foundation cannot be located in religion. Second, it cannot be found in mind-independent facts about the world. Yet they disagree about the rest of the story. Hume locates the foundation of morality in human nature, primarily in our emotional responses to the behavior of our fellow human beings. By contrast, Kant locates the foundation of morality in the rational nature that we share with all possible finite rational beings. He argues that morality’s foundation lies in the “autonomy” of the rational will. Kant’s notion of autonomy is one of the more central, distinctive, and influential aspects of his ethics. He defines autonomy as “the property of the will by which it is a law to itself (independently of any property of the objects of volition)” (G 4:440). According to Kant, the will of a moral agent is autonomous in that it both gives itself the moral law (is self-legislating) and can constrain or motivate itself to follow the law (is self-constraining or self-motivating). The source of the moral law is not in the agent’s feelings, natural impulses or inclinations, but in her “pure” rational will, which Kant identifies as the “proper self” (G 4:461). A heteronomous will, on the other hand, is governed by something other than itself, such as an external force or authority.

7th Stooge said...

No I'm going to say we cant be our own grounding, we have to have a standard outside of ourselves. We will always choose the path of least resistance. Sin nature will always corrupt our choices.

I didn't say "we." Rationality and autonomy are standards independent of ourselves. It's like the standard of rationality we aim for in thinking. It would be independent of us and independent of God as well since it would regulate God's nature and activities. How does God make A=A? How does God make it wrong to torture infants for one's amusement? Or for happiness to be preferable to misery? It doesn't make any sense to invoke a deity to ground such truths.

That's not the same issue you raise when you say: " Even if God is the most perfect exemplification possible of justice and benevolence, he would still not be identical to these things. If he exemplifies them, that means they have an existence that is conceptually distinct from his existence. This means that any rational will can access these properties."

God is identical to those things he would have to be. What would create them apart from God? God is being itself hes prior to all things how could there be a moral standard above God? God is in a unique composition we are not in.


That's not the same issue I raise as what?
Why would God have to be identical to these things? Is God identical to every abstract noun? To yellowness, to tallness, to spectacularity? Why? It makes more sense to say that God exhibits certain properties such as justice and benevolence, ie that God is exceedingly just and exceedingly benevolent, not that he IS justice or that he IS benevolence. It's not even clear what those phrases could possibly mean.

7th Stooge said...

Trying to make it analogous to the court system distorts the issue. The counts don't choose how moral axioms are grounded, To chose that you have to go ya back beyond the court system,

what do you use instead for grounding? Like Kant, the rational will. on Ethical Naturalism and Value Systems: the Illusion of Moral Landscape (part 2)


Kant did not use the rational will as grounding. That;s why he makes the moral argument he uses God as regulatory device because there is no other way to get a gormandizing that transcends our own desires


You're the one who first raised the analogy of the judge. I was just following your analogy. As for Kant, see the quote from the SEP article.

Joseph Hinman (Metacrock) said...
This comment has been removed by the author.
Joseph Hinman (Metacrock) said...

Jim I think there is a difference in speaking of "the basis of morality" and grounding axioms. Kant wanted a complete account of morality because he was truing to replace all of scholasticism with a totally new philosophy from ground up; Any such undertakings to build a complete moral philosophy is going to be complex.

Just because Kant said that doesn;'t mean that;s an adequate rounding for axioms. It does;t answer the criticisms I made about conflicting values.

Joseph Hinman (Metacrock) said...

You're the one who first raised the analogy of the judge. I was just following your analogy. As for Kant, see the quote from the SEP article.

Not a court judge, a person making a judgment value judgmenet,

Joseph Hinman (Metacrock) said...

That's not the same issue you raise when you say: " Even if God is the most perfect exemplification possible of justice and benevolence, he would still not be identical to these things. If he exemplifies them, that means they have an existence that is conceptually distinct from his existence. This means that any rational will can access these properties."

God is identical to those things he would have to be. What would create them apart from God? God is being itself hes prior to all things how could there be a moral standard above God? God is in a unique composition we are not in.


That's not the same issue I raise as what?
???


Why would God have to be identical to these things?

My founding predispose is that God = being itself, meaning God is the basis of everything. God is prior to all other things. I there are other eternal things they compete with God as beings themselves.



Is God identical to every abstract noun? To yellowness, to tallness, to spectacularity?

those are not real things except in Planitc philosophy. There is no yellowness. Toll things are not tall because they have tallness in them.

I would distinguish between abstraction and universals. Abstractions are just derived from qualities but universals are things that may actually exist and are always existing



Why? It makes more sense to say that God exhibits certain properties such as justice and benevolence, ie that God is exceedingly just and exceedingly benevolent, not that he IS justice or that he IS benevolence. It's not even clear what those phrases could possibly mean.

that's just repeating the same problem as saying "how could God be being?" If you don't understand the concept of being itself just say so.

Joseph Hinman (Metacrock) said...

Take the other way of saying being itself which is ground of being. If God is the ground of being there can't be other aspects of being that are coequal with God.

7th Stooge said...

Jim I think there is a difference in speaking of "the basis of morality" and grounding axioms. Kant wanted a complete account of morality because he was truing to replace all of scholasticism with a totally new philosophy from ground up; Any such undertakings to build a complete moral philosophy is going to be complex.

Just because Kant said that doesn't mean that;s an adequate rounding for axioms. It does;t answer the criticisms I made about conflicting values.


Kant grounded morality and moral axioms in the autonomous rational will, not in God. That was his whole point. He wrote about the autonomy of the rational will as "the supreme principle of morality," and as "the sole principle of all moral laws and the corresponding duties."

As far as conflicting values, you would have to rely on an autonomous will to rank them in each particular case.

7th Stooge said...

Not a court judge, a person making a judgment value judgmenet,

Which requires an autonomous will, as each person is the judge of his or her own actions. "If we say that the will of God is the norm of morality, we can still ask why we ought to obey the divine will. Kant does not say that we ought not to obey the divine will if it is manifested. But we must first recognize obedience to God as a duty. Thus before obeying God, we must legislate as rational beings. The autonomy of the moral will is thus the supreme principle of morality. Copleston, History of Phil. Vol. 6, Part 2, p.122

7th Stooge said...

God is identical to those things he would have to be. What would create them apart from God? God is being itself hes prior to all things how could there be a moral standard above God? God is in a unique composition we are not in.

But benevolence is the quality of being benevolent. How is that different in kind from the quality of being yellow or being tall? What created the quality of being yellow? What created the quality of being created? Did God create creation itself? You can see how that would pose a problem? Did God create freedom? And was he free to create freedom? After a certain point, it just seems as if you start to get unnecessarily tied up in linguistic knots.

God is identical to those things he would have to be. What would create them apart from God? God is being itself hes prior to all things how could there be a moral standard above God? God is in a unique composition we are not in.

Whenever we think we have God down to a formulation, I think we should be a little skeptical. Of course God is in a position we are not in, including any possible linguistic/dualistic formula.

My founding predispose is that God = being itself, meaning God is the basis of everything. God is prior to all other things. I there are other eternal things they compete with God as beings themselves.

I believe that God also comprehends change and becoming and what we would think of as 'non-being.'

hat's just repeating the same problem as saying "how could God be being?" If you don't understand the concept of being itself just say so.

I think I understand it. I just question whether that's the whole story.

Joseph Hinman (Metacrock) said...

Jim I think there is a difference in speaking of "the basis of morality" and grounding axioms. Kant wanted a complete account of morality because he was truing to replace all of scholasticism with a totally new philosophy from ground up; Any such undertakings to build a complete moral philosophy is going to be complex.

Just because Kant said that doesn't mean that;s an adequate grounding for axioms. It does;t answer the criticisms I made about conflicting values.

Kant grounded morality and moral axioms in the autonomous rational will, not in God.

foolish move.No wonder modern ethic theory has collapsed.

That was his whole point. He wrote about the autonomy of the rational will as "the supreme principle of morality," and as "the sole principle of all moral laws and the corresponding duties."

I was up on Kant when I was TA for that class on Kantian ethics but that was over 20 years ago.I am probably senile so I really don't remember it.

As far as conflicting values, you would have to rely on an autonomous will to rank them in each particular case.

why? why couldn't you receive as they are given from on high? You seem to be saying that to think bout moral axioms you must use your brain, That does not make make your brain the basis of the good.

Joseph Hinman (Metacrock) said...

As far as conflicting values, you would have to rely on an autonomous will to rank them in each particular case


why use will to rank them?t You have to use analytical reasoning not the will. sure you have to have will to be motivated to think about bu that doesn't ,,ale will the basis of the values

Joseph Hinman (Metacrock) said...

Not a court judge, a person making a judgment value judgmenet,

Which requires an autonomous will, as each person is the judge of his or her own actions.

that is not grousing axioms

"If we say that the will of God is the norm of morality, we can still ask why we ought to obey the divine will. Kant does not say that we ought not to obey the divine will if it is manifested. But we must first recognize obedience to God as a duty. Thus before obeying God, we must legislate as rational beings. The autonomy of the moral will is thus the supreme principle of morality. Copleston, History of Phil. Vol. 6, Part 2, p.122

you replace grounding axioms with "supreme principle of morality" then pretend you are talking about the same thing,

Morality is about being a free moral agent.Of course that means free will. But that is not the same as grounding axioms. having the will to obey axioms is not what what makes them good.

Cuttlebones said...

Joseph Hinman (Metacrock) said...

No I'm going to say we cant be our own grounding, we have to have a standard outside of ourselves. We will always choose the path of least resistance. Sin nature will always corrupt our choices


I don't see how we can have anything but our own grounding. If it is of God how does it get communicated to us?
I don't believe in "Sin Nature".

Joseph Hinman (Metacrock) said...

Joe:God is identical to those things he would have to be. What would create them apart from God? God is being itself hes prior to all things how could there be a moral standard above God? God is in a unique composition we are not in.

7:But benevolence is the quality of being benevolent. How is that different in kind from the quality of being yellow or being tall? What created the quality of being yellow? What created the quality of being created? Did God create creation itself? You can see how that would pose a problem? Did God create freedom? And was he free to create freedom? After a certain point, it just seems as if you start to get unnecessarily tied up in linguistic knots.

Like when Socrates asks if there are forms for things like mud and eye lashes,

Joe:God is identical to those things he would have to be. What would create them apart from God? God is being itself hes prior to all things how could there be a moral standard above God? God is in a unique composition we are not in.

7:Whenever we think we have God down to a formulation, I think we should be a little skeptical. Of course God is in a position we are not in, including any possible linguistic/dualistic formula.

that is not the same thing. saying that A ,must be the case logically given our premises about God is not at all the same as having God down to a formula.

Joe: My founding predispose is that God = being itself, meaning God is the basis of everything. God is prior to all other things. I there are other eternal things they compete with God as beings themselves.

7:I believe that God also comprehends change and becoming and what we would think of as 'non-being.'

Joe:that's just repeating the same problem as saying "how could God be being?" If you don't understand the concept of being itself just say so.

7:I think I understand it. I just question whether that's the whole story.


I'm sure I don't have the whole story but that;s what I got so far,

Joseph Hinman (Metacrock) said...


Cuttlebones
I don't see how we can have anything but our own grounding. If it is of God how does it get communicated to us?
I don't believe in "Sin Nature".

You are confusing the medium with the message.

Joseph Hinman (Metacrock) said...

grounding is what makes a moral axiom true or good I we do that our selves then every murderer is his own justification.

Cuttlebones said...

grounding is what makes a moral axiom true or good I we do that our selves then every murderer is his own justification.

So we ground our morals in God and we say they are true and good because God is true and good.
Why is God true and good? Because we define him as true and good.
Moral axioms are then grounded in our own definitions of true and good.

Joseph Hinman (Metacrock) said...

you must not be well read in the subject. There are tons of reasons to believe in God. There are all kinds of arguments skeptics can;t merganser. Read my book the Trace of God, no one has answered that, they are dumbfounded. I have 200 studies backimg-my view they have none 200 t0 0.

Cuttlebones said...

There are tons of reasons not to believe also.
I have read your book. I wasn't dumbfounded. Except by why you spent so much time railing against Proudfoot. I don't know that your 200 studies back up anything but I haven't read them all.

Joseph Hinman (Metacrock) said...

Cuttlebones said...
There are tons of reasons not to believe also.

few good ones

I have read your book. I wasn't dumbfounded. Except by why you spent so much time railing against Proudfoot. I don't know that your 200 studies back up anything but I haven't read them all.

Hood's work is brilliant. All I did was summarize.