If you recall last time I posted a prolegomena to an argument from laws of nature. In other words, an argument for existence of God based upon laws of physics and nature. That article was just thinking getting ready to make such an argument, Here I am making it. I encourage the reader to go back and read the article fist if you haven't already. The point is two fold: the folks on Secular Outpost were so dubious of any such argument and the presentation that set them off so deserved their ire (designed by Campus Crusade for Christ) [1], that I felt like I had to try to (a) prove to the atheists there is a potential argument there and show my fellow Christians how to find it, at to offer direction in which to move.
The bad argument on the website was purely a "god of the gaps" argument:
How is it that we can identify laws of nature that never change? Why is the universe so orderly, so reliable?"The greatest scientists have been struck by how strange this is. There is no logical necessity for a universe that obeys rules, let alone one that abides by the rules of mathematics. This astonishment springs from the recognition that the universe doesn't have to behave this way. It is easy to imagine a universe in which conditions change unpredictably from instant to instant, or even a universe in which things pop in and out of existence."[2]The only rational upon which the argument turns is the mystery concerning how laws work. That is a god of the gaps argument by definition, textbook. My arguments begins by stating a rational that, while it may hard to prove, is at least not a gap in knowledge, at least not only a gap. The problem with gaps is that they close up. Yet if we can demonstrate that mind is a more solid basis for the seeming law-like regularity of the universe that night make for a better explanation.[3] The argument:
1) mind is the most efficient and dependable source of ordering we know,
(2) Random ordering is usually inefficient and the odds are against it's dependability.
(3) The Universe Displays a Law-like efficiency and dependability in the workings of it's natural machinations.
(4) Such efficiency and dependability is indicative of mind as ordering principle (from 1,3), therefore, it is logical to assume mind as the best explanation for the dependability of the universe..
(5) A mind that orders the universe fits the major job description for God, Thus mind is the best explanation, assuming the choices are mind vs random chance.
Notice I said nothing about law implying a law giver. The rational for mind is not based upon analogies to law. This does raise the one real sticking point, premises 1-2. Can we prove that mind is the best explanation for law-like regularity? I'm going to assume that it's pretty obvious that (P3) universe displays like-like efficiency. Also I don't think it will be such a struggle to prove 4-5 linking a mind that orders the universe with God. Therefore I wont bother to argue those here. Thus I will concern myself primarily with P's 1-2.
Certain schools of philosophy hold that an inference to the best explanation is a valid argument. That is if one amid a variety of explanations has a more significant likelihood of coming true, and is more in line with prevailing theory and serves to explain more of the data then that hypothesis can be warranted as "the best explanation,"[4] Ratzsch goes on to quote Peter Lipton: "According to Inference to the Best Explanation … [g]iven our data and our background beliefs, we infer what would if true, provide the best of the competing explanations we can generate of those data (so long as the best is good enough for us to make any inference at all)."[5]
That complexity and efficacy are indicative of mind as an organizing principle might be hard or impossible to pull off but it makes sense on one level. Through complexity and fitedness one might deduce purpose or telos, and mind might be indicted in that sense.
All the richness and diversity of matter and energy we observe today has emerged since the beginning in a long and complicated sequence of self- organizing physical processes. The laws of physics not only permit a universe to originate spontaneously, but they encourage it to organize and complexify itself to the point where conscious beings emerge who can look back on the great cosmic drama and reflect on what it all means."
...The laws that characterize our actual universe, as opposed to an infinite number of alternative possible universes, seem almost contrived-fine-tuned, some commentators have claimed-so that life and consciousness may emerge. To quote Dyson again: it is almost as if "the universe knew we were coming." I cannot prove to you that this is design, but whatever it is it is certainly very clever][6]
Now the secularist skeptic might argue evolution demonstrates an organizing principle producing great complexity and in mindless fashion, While that might be the case the problem is evolution is surely the product of the law-like regularity and not it's cause. Presumably then we need laws to make evolutionary processes work and so we have not explained anything. even so the skeptic can always fall back on the fact that we don't have a world that we know is or is not designed by a mind to which we compare our own world. Even though P1 might make sense there is no way to prove it. Not having an undesigned universe to compare may mean that we can't prove the existence of God by the argument here advanced, It does not necessarily mean the argument is not a good one. If we forget about proof and talk about warrant: it may not be proof but it is probably the best explanation and that may warrant belief.
In arguments of this type, superior explanatory virtues of a theory are taken as constituting decisive epistemic support for theory acceptability, warranted belief of the theory, and likely truth of the theory. There are, of course, multitudes of purported explanatory, epistemic virtues, including the incomplete list a couple paragraphs back (and lists of such have evolved over time). Assessing hypotheses in terms of such virtues is frequently contentious, depending, as it does, on perceptions of ill-defined characteristics, differences in background conceptual stances, and the like. Still, in general we frequently manage rough and ready resolutions...[7]
The argument does turn on the premise of a design argument but it could be considered more than that. Hawking ascribes the origin of the universe to the laws of physics, particularly gravity He certainly seems to indicate that they are more than just descriptions of what happens. Yet he makes no attempt to explain where these laws come from. In the sense mind offers a more complete explanation it could be the "best."
Stephen
Hawking wrote a
book, The
Grand Design.
in which he argued that gravity
accounts for the existence of everything else:
If the total energy of the universe must always remain zero, and it costs energy to create a body, how can a whole universe be created from nothing? That is why there must be a law like gravity. Because gravity is attractive, gravitational energy is negative….Bodies such as stars or black holes cannot just appear out of nothing. But a whole universe can….Because there is a law like gravity, the universe can and will create itself from nothing in the manner described in Chapter 6. Spontaneous creation is the reason there is something rather than nothing, why the universe exists, why we exist. It is not necessary to invoke God to light the blue touch paper and set the universe going.[8]
Edger Anders discusses the problem with this approach:
So gravity is God. Unfortunately the authors have no time to tell us who created gravity (earlier they rule out God because no one could explain who created him). Nor can they tell us why matter and gravity should pop out of nothing, except to argue that ‘nothing’ undergoes quantum fluctuations. However, this requires that (like gravity) the laws of quantum mechanics pre-existed the universe and that ‘nothing’ possesses the properties of normal space, which is part of the created order and cannot be its antecedent.[9]
Were I involved in a debate ageist a seasoned great thinker or some professional philosopher this is not the argument I would use. I think it is a valid warrant for belief, the best explanation for law-like regularity.
Sources
[1] Bradly Bowen, Adamson's Cru [de] Arguments for God part 1, Secular Outpost, (April 25, 2016) blog URL:
http://www.patheos.com/blogs/secularoutpost/2016/04/25/adamsons-crude-arguments-for-god-part-1/
accessed April 28, 2016
[2] Marlyn Adamson, "Is There a God," Every Student, Published by Campus Crusade for Christ
On line resource, URL: http://www.everystudent.com/features/isthere.html
She sites fn 11:Dinesh D'Souza, What's So Great about Christianity; (Regnery Publishing, Inc, 2007, chapter
[3] I recently posted on criteria by which to judge best explanation.
[4] Ratzsch, Del and Koperski, Jeffrey, "Teleological Arguments for God's Existence", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
http://www.firstthings.com/article/1995/08/003-physics-and-the-mind-of-god-the-templeton-prize-address-24 accessed 1/1/16
Paul Davies is Professor of Mathematical Physics at the University of Adelaide in Australia and the twenty-fifth recipient of the Templeton Prize for Progress in Religion, which he received on May 3, 1995 at Westminster Abbey. His books include The Mind of God, God and New Physics, The Cosmic Blueprint, Superforce, and Other Worlds.
[7] Ratzsch, Ibid.
[8] Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow, The Grand Design, New York: Bantum Books, 2010. 180
[9] Edgar Andres, “Review: the Grand Design,” Challies'.com, Tim Challies, on line reouce, URL:
http://www.challies.com/book-reviews/the-grand-design acessed 10/4/15
Andres is Emeritus professor University of London. Physicist and an expert on large molecules. Born 1932
“...mind is the best explanation for law-like regularity...”
ReplyDeleteI actually don't see that a mind helps at all. Suppose physical system S obeys laws L. Well, why does S obey L rather than some other set of laws, L*? Because some mind M chose L rather than L* to govern S, you suggest. But how did M get S to obey L rather than L*? Is L an add-on to S? Could all the constituents of S have been exactly the same and yet be governed by L* rather than L? If so, then how does M ensure that S reliably continues to observe L and doesn't go off the rails? That is, what ensures the L-ness of S?
One possible answer is that M constantly exerts a causal influence on S. This would be like ensuring that a toy car on a table always moves in a circle because you are moving it with your arm – there is nothing about the car or the surface of the table which constrains its movement to a circular path.
But another answer is that S obeys L because of the inherent properties of the constituents that make up S. L is built-in; get S and you thereby have L. This would be like putting a motorized car on a circular track – the movement of the car is constrained to a circular path by the structure of the track.
Now before you ask why the track has the shape it does rather than some other shape, notice that this is really changing the question. Since on the view I am suggesting, the laws are ultimately “structural” features of the system itself rather than external add-ons, L is what happens when you have S. Instead of asking why S obeys L, you would now be asking why we have S that obeys L rather than S* that obeys L*.
In keeping with my persistent all-things-lead-back-to-Leibniz orientation, this largely recapitulates a dispute in Leibniz's correspondence with Samuel Clarke (or at least a point that Leibniz took to be in dispute), viz., whether God has to constantly exert influence on the world in order to ensure that all goes as he wants it to, or whether he can create a world which can afterwards be left entirely to govern itself. And perhaps that is a perfectly good question to ask, but it still matters that it is a different question. One thing at a time.
sorry it took me so long to get to this.
ReplyDeleteI actually don't see that a mind helps at all. Suppose physical system S obeys laws L. Well, why does S obey L rather than some other set of laws, L*? Because some mind M chose L rather than L* to govern S, you suggest. But how did M get S to obey L rather than L*? Is L an add-on to S? Could all the constituents of S have been exactly the same and yet be governed by L* rather than L? If so, then how does M ensure that S reliably continues to observe L and doesn't go off the rails? That is, what ensures the L-ness of S?
Law like aspects are indicative of mind. when things work and seem to flit together for a purpose that is usually an indication of planning. Thus mind is a better explanation for the nature of nature.
One possible answer is that M constantly exerts a causal influence on S. This would be like ensuring that a toy car on a table always moves in a circle because you are moving it with your arm – there is nothing about the car or the surface of the table which constrains its movement to a circular path.
But another answer is that S obeys L because of the inherent properties of the constituents that make up S. L is built-in; get S and you thereby have L. This would be like putting a motorized car on a circular track – the movement of the car is constrained to a circular path by the structure of the track.
even your language betrays a subliminal knowledge that there is purpose behind order, because nothing is built-kin by random chance. minds build in. As per the Hawking quote the innate qualities (scientific realism) are not explained by random chance but by physical law. hawking says gravity works as it does because physical law made it to.
Now before you ask why the track has the shape it does rather than some other shape, notice that this is really changing the question. Since on the view I am suggesting, the laws are ultimately “structural” features of the system itself rather than external add-ons, L is what happens when you have S. Instead of asking why S obeys L, you would now be asking why we have S that obeys L rather than S* that obeys L*.
It's not changing my argument, it's right on the point, you pulled a bait and switch creating your own question.
In keeping with my persistent all-things-lead-back-to-Leibniz orientation, this largely recapitulates a dispute in Leibniz's correspondence with Samuel Clarke (or at least a point that Leibniz took to be in dispute), viz., whether God has to constantly exert influence on the world in order to ensure that all goes as he wants it to, or whether he can create a world which can afterwards be left entirely to govern itself. And perhaps that is a perfectly good question to ask, but it still matters that it is a different question. One thing at a time.
5:18 AM
In setting up physical laws it appears God set things up to work in such a way so he wont have to mind the sore all the time. Not to say he's not minding the store in our lives.