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Monday, July 27, 2015

Transcendental argument for part 3 of 5


The actual argument

1) The TS's function is mutually exclusive, no other principle can superceed that of the TS since it alone grounds all principles and bestows meaning through organization of concepts.

(2) We have no choice but to assume the reality of some form o Tsed since we cannot funjction coherently without a TS.

(3) therefore, we have no choice but to assume the reality of some form of Tsed since the universe does seem to fall into line with the meaning we bestow upon it.

(4) Thus it is logical to assume that there is a Tsed that creates and organizes the universe.

(5) The signifier “G-o-d” is one version of the TS. That is, God functions in the divine economy as the TS functions in the metaphysical economy.

(6) Since God is a version of the TS, and since the TS and the God concept share a unique function that is mutually exclusive, the logical conclusion is that God and Tsed share identity; God is the Tsed.

(7) since the Tsed must be assumed to be actual (real) and God shares identity with it, then God musy be actual.

The first premise ((1) The TS's function is mutually exclusive, no other principle can supersede that of the TS since it alone grounds all principles and bestows meaning through organization of concepts), is rooted directly in observation (1), coherent view of the universe requires OP, and observation (2) Ops are summed up in a single over arching principle. These two observations are grounded in the nature of contingency and organizing. If there is a top to metaphysical hierarchy, and this top is necessary to Ops (which in turn are necessary to the world) then it follows that the overarching principle is necessary and unique. Its function is necessary and that makes it unique. No Other OP could handle the job without being the top of the metaphysical hierarchy.

Premise 2 ((2) We have no choice but to assume the reality of some form of Tsed since we cannot function coherently without a TS), is grounded directly in observation (1). That we can't function coherently without a TS has not been demonstrated here so far. This will be demonstrated in latter chapters. At this point I will simply point out that it can be established empirically. First by showing that the OP is all pervasive and secondly by showing that attempts to eliminate OP's only result in replacing them with more ops (observations (1) and (3)). Out of this material premise ((3) therefore, we have no choice but to assume the reality of some form of Tsed since the universe does seem to fall into line with the meaning we bestow upon it) is a logical conclusion. Note that premise (4) is a logical extension of all the premises, especially (3) grounded in the first three observations. At this point in argument TS is justified but not the deduction that the TSed is God; that will come, in the next premise.

Premise (4) is the first link to God from Tsed. In other words we know the God concept is a form of the TS (transcendental signifier). That is the idea of God, apart from God's actual reality, is one kind of TS (represented by the word “G-o-d—the transcendental signifier). The actual thing to which the word refers (the Tsed—Transcendental signified) is only theoretical, but this premise draws the logical conclusion from what has already been said that the Tsed is God. This follows logically because the all pervasive nature of the concept and its necessary to the overall hierarchy implies creation. In other words to be so all pervasive and (ontologically) necessary the Tsed would have to be creator. At this point we have basically described a generic God concept that would fit the basic concept of many world religions. Thus the premise: (4) Thus it is logical to assume that there is a Tsed that creates and organizes the universe.

What I just said about the TS and Tsed, is enshrined in the next premise: (5) The signifier “G-o-d” is one version of the TS. That is, God functions in the divine economy as the TS functions in the metaphysical economy. The premise also adds something, derived from the observations but not yet discussed; the link from God to TS based upon synonymous job descriptions.

The sixth premise: ((6) Since God is a version of the TS, and since the TS and the God concept share a unique function that is mutually exclusive, the logical conclusion is that God and Tsed share identity; God is the Tsed). Share unique function that is mutually exclusive means any thing that does X is God. Only God can do X. both A and B do X. If the premise is true than A and B must be one and the same. Say that only Superman survived krypton. Actually in the comics they had so many survivors of Krypton one begins to feel like only his parents did not survive. Say Superman is the only survivor, and it could be proved that Clark Kent is from Krypton, then he must be superman.

They function shared by God and the TS is the place each holds in the divine economy and the metaphysical economy respectively. The reality of the TS is found in premises 1-4, and the shared job description in 5. One could make the objection that I did state that TS is not necessarily God. That's true but TS is theoretical. I just argued that the TS that fits the reality, the Tsed, is synonymous with God. In other words, the TS's that work are those that fit God because that's what it takes to be the top of the metapysical hierarchy.

(7) since the Tsed must be assumed to be actual (real) and God shares identity with it, then God must be actual.

What is Metaphysical Hierarchy?

[either answer objection here or make a chapter: asserting ideas of MH that make the argument work]

A major objection that one might be raised here is that a lot people have misconceptions about the term. Most of the time they seem to think it means some special way or argument for God, or that's synonymous with their screwed up understanding of "supernatural" (which is not the right definition of that term either but that's another story). standard misconception that Metaphysics is about "things beyond the physical" that's not true. AT least not necessarily. For example the question of free will is a metaphysical question and the will is a real thing it's not a concrete thing in the physical. The question about mental vs physical is a metaphysical question. Some might say that these concepts can't be proven, are just made up and that I making up a concept that helps my argument. Metaphysics however need not include any of these things. In fact we can rationally include science as metaphysical. The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy tells us in its article "Metaphysics:"

It is not easy to say what metaphysics is. Ancient and Medieval philosophers might have said that metaphysics was, like chemistry or astrology, to be defined by its subject matter: metaphysics was the “science” that studied “being as such” or “the first causes of things” or “things that do not change.” It is no longer possible to define metaphysics that way, and for two reasons. First, a philosopher who denied the existence of those things that had once been seen as constituting the subject-matter of metaphysics—first causes or unchanging things—would now be considered to be making thereby a metaphysical assertion. Secondly, there are many philosophical problems that are now considered to be metaphysical problems (or at least partly metaphysical problems) that are in no way related to first causes or unchanging things; the problem of free will, for example, or the problem of the mental and the physical. 14



Conversely the idea that metaphysics is just making things up is also obviously false since the will and the mental and the physical are not made up.





notes
van Inwagen, Peter and Sullivan, Meghan, "Metaphysics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = . god

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