Of course in the nature of scientific realism we see ideology at work on both sides. They are not arguing about the empirical data suggesting how the workings of the physical world proceed. They are not arguing about a big pile of facts that are totally factual and do not require any sort philosophical component. These things are part of the discussion but the frame work of the discussion for both sides is clearly philosophical and thus ideological as well. Scientific realism in many of its versions distinguishes between ontological and epistemological views. In the world of Roy Bhaskar’s realism there commonalities with the Frankfurt school, that is with neo-Marxist social and political criticism.[1] It’s no less so for anti-realists who are working from a postmodern reading of constructivism. Whichever school prevails, science has to make the assumption that our observations really tell us what’s there, if they want rule out God and religion and other “primitive” things as “unscientific.” It wouldn’t really work to assume that the objects of scientific understanding are just “constructs” and then try to use them to rule out the reality of other ideas such as God. They have to make an assumption of a realist nature at some point. They can augment that assumption as a theoretical one, thus allowing a constructivist to remain a constructivist and still assume the reality of objects of scientific scrutiny. Otherwise we can’t assume string theory or mutliverse, or that there’s solidity at the basis of matter. To dismiss belief on the basis that we are just imposing patterns is also to dismiss the ability of science to predict the workings of natural world.
We can go
all the way on assuming Humean view (description only) if we are prepared to be
solipsists in the end. We can go to the other extreme and assume law like
regularity if we are prepared to impose our own ideas. The only logical way out
is to be consistent and follow what works, but that might just mean having to
refrain form ruling out some version of SN. What works is the assumption that
our perceptions are real. We don’t play on the freeway on the assumption that
our perception of patterns is just imposed and all that oncoming traffic is not
real. Solders on the battle don’t stand in the line of fire on the premise that
bullets are just theoretical constructs. We go with what works and what works
is to assume that when our perceptions of regular, consistent, and shared
(Inter-subjective) they are worth heading. One of the areas in which we should
make such assumptions is in the assumption that order and regularity is
inductive of prescriptive laws of nature, and in turn prescriptive laws are
indicative of the will and ordering of mind.
Order
bespeaks mind in that mind is the only example we know of purposive ordering. As
Vera Kistiakowsky stated, “The exquisite order displayed by our scientific
understanding of the physical world calls for the divine….I am satisfied with
the existence of an unknowable source of divine order and purpose.” [2]
This quotation shows us that it was not that long ago that it was understood in
science to view order as indicative of prescriptive laws at least in the sense
of being a creation of mind. I use the word “purposive” and that’s a key
because it is the hint of purpose that makes us think of mind. Why assume
there’s a purpose? The whole atheist concept of answering final cause and
design arguments is to divorce the universe form purpose. “Things are just
here” they tell us, “there’s no ultimate reason, there’s only the descriptions
of physics.” The problem is the description describes perfect order and
absolute regularity. These aspects fit the need to produce a life bearing
universe. That hints at purpose. Purpose hints at mind. The fact that it’s
bankable, it’s always there, it’s relentless order makes it seem prescriptive.
The concept of Cause and effect seems a prescriptive concept.
Systems
analysis approach to the question of laws raises the possibility of mind:
Other aspects of the systems approach
have made philosophers wary. (See, especially, Armstrong 1983, 66–73; van
Fraassen 1989, 40–64; Carroll 1990, 197–206.) Some argue that this approach
will have the untoward consequence that laws are inappropriately mind-dependent
in virtue of the account's appeal to the concepts of simplicity, strength and
best balance, concepts whose instantiation seems to depend on cognitive
abilities, interests, and purposes. The appeal to simplicity raises further
questions stemming from the apparent need for a regimented language to permit
reasonable comparisons of the systems. (See Lewis 1983, 367.)[3]
Cause and
effect might be taken as an example of prescriptive laws. In spite of the
descriptive nature of physical law in modern scientific outlook, cause and
effect is not made removed but still bears a crucial place in human thought. Some
argue that cause and effect is outmoded due to quantum theory. Quantum theory
(QM) posits acausal happenings such as the appearance of quantum particles.
That has been discussed in chapter (?, In connection with Krauss’s book). QM
doesn’t replace cause and effect in all of science. It’s only under very
specialized conditions that it can be assumed to be acausal and it’s only in
connection with a certain theoretical outlook. Of course the question of laws
is very complex now. We are not sure we know what laws are. The idea that the
universe contains a law of of some sort in an some heavenly realm and natural
process obey that law is ninetieth century, no one really thinks that way now.[4]
We can speak of general principles or “universals” of some sort. There
certainly do seem to be principles that are generally active and keep the
universe running along certain lines. We can these are “organizing principles.”
Calling them laws is sort of one sided because it conjures up images of a celestial
legislator. The term too directly links to the watch maker, law implies Law
giver. Organizing principle could imply any sort of origin source, personal or
impersonal, purposive or not. One such principle is cause and effect.
Descriptive
physical laws do not undermine the notion of causality. As James Franklin puts
it:
The notion of Cause remains crucial to
science, even though the most general physical laws do not mention causes. No
physical laws or interpretations of those laws call into question such facts as
that some diseases are caused by viruses...every technological application of science
requires the notion of an intervention that will effect change...That physical
laws are descriptive does not undermine the notion of causality. The motion of billiard
balls in interaction is described and predicted by purely descriptive of
conservation of momentum and energy, for example. That does not in any way
supersede our understanding that one ball hit another and caused it to go
flying off." The laws just describe the course of the causal
interaction." It's a description complete in one way but partial in
another, in the same way as a complete description of a person's actions
without reference to their motivations...[5]
Nor is causality equal to determinism. Determinism is often
confused with cause and effect but conceptually they are not the same and one
does not necessitate the other. The fact that they can get mixed up with each
other raises an important issue: the nature of cosmological issues as inherently
philosophical. None of the issue addressed so far can be resolved by just
observing facts; they all require philological investigation, and that means
that ideology can’t be far behind. Not that philosophical thinking is
inherently ideological, but it’s constantly opening the door. Ideology is like
a leach that seeks to attach itself to philosophical thinking every chance it
gets. The relative nature of prior probability of God based upon one’s personal
search, the nature of laws, the nature of purpose and order, the problem of
descriptions and how they very according to empirical observation, the
acceptance of strange phenomena (miracles), all the things we have touched upon so far require philosophical thinking,
thus run the risk of ideological connotation.
This raises
major conceptual problems for atheism. First because atheists tend to be
determinists to a large extent, but also because the naturalistic reading of
the universe (that’s just the way it happened) usually entails the implication
that this is the only way it could happen. “This is just the way things
happen,” it’s not amazing nor does it suggest purposes because they had to
happen this way due to cause and effect. The implication is they really
couldn’t happen in other ways, but such is not the case. Nature is all about
contingency and naturalistic being is contingent being. Even Karl Popper tells
us so; "Empirical facts are facts which might not have been. Everything
that belongs to space time is a contingent truth because it could have been
otherwise, it is dependent upon the existence of something else for its'
existence going all the way back to the Big Bang, which is itself contingent
upon something."[6]
Paul Davies tells us:
Some scientists have tried to argue
that if only we knew enough about the laws of physics, if we were to discover a
final theory that united all the fundamental forces and particles of nature
into a single mathematical scheme, then we would find that this superlaw, or
theory of everything, would describe the only logically consistent world. In
other words, the nature of the physical world would be entirely a consequence
of logical and mathematical necessity. There would be no choice about it. I
think this is demonstrably wrong. There is not a shred of evidence that the
universe is logically necessary. Indeed, as a theoretical physicist I find it
rather easy to imagine alternative universes that are logically consistent, and
therefore equal contenders for reality.[7]
If true this would mean the universe is contingent. That is
to say it is dependent upon some ontologically prior condition that makes it as
it is. That condition would have to entail some form of organizing principle
that makes for order and precision. The best thing we know for organizing is
mind. Davies begins to wax eloquent about efficiency and sufficiency of the
laws of physics, affirming their reality and then links to God:
Now you may think I have written God
entirely out of the picture. Who needs a God when the laws of physics can do
such a splendid job? But we are bound to return to that burning question: Where
do the laws of physics come from? And why those laws rather than some
other set? Most especially: Why a set of laws that drives the searing,
featureless gases coughed out of the big bang, towards life and consciousness
and intelligence and cultural activities such as religion, art, mathematics and
science?...You might be tempted to suppose that any old rag-bag of laws would
produce a complex universe of some sort, with attendant inhabitants convinced
of their own specialness. Not so. It turns out that randomly selected laws lead
almost inevitably either to unrelieved chaos or boring and uneventful
simplicity. Our own universe is poised exquisitely between these unpalatable
alternatives, offering a potent mix of freedom and discipline, a sort of
restrained creativity. The laws do not tie down physical systems so rigidly
that they can accomplish little, but neither are they a recipe for cosmic
anarchy. Instead, they encourage matter and energy to develop along pathways of
evolution that lead to novel variety-what Freeman Dyson has called the
principle of maximum diversity: that in some sense we live in the most
interesting possible universe [8]
This does leave the atheist in a pickle. I hesitate to evoke
this argument because it’s a double bind and I don’t like double binds, I think
they are often phony. Yet this one is problematic either way. If the universe
just has to be this way then it’s bound to be prescriptive with respect to
physical law. Thus it’s a contradiction to say laws are only descriptions. Thus
a descriptive universe must also be a contingent universe. That much is true,
but we can’t push it and say “either way it has to be God” that would mean
either prescriptive or descriptive is an implication of God, that’s a double
bind. It seems more honest to just say that what is described is order, and
that even though “laws” or organizing principles may be compelling they don’t
make a necessary universe, but they are aspects of a contingent universe that
is none the less ordered and prescribed by some higher principle. Then of
course the argument centers around weather or not that principle is mind. In
any case the contingent nature of the universe lends itself to several God
arguments hat involve the ordered nature of the universe.
The first
such example of a God argument is that of “fine tuning.” Fine tuning is a
subset of the anthropic principle, the idea that the universe is somehow
biased in favor of life bearing. Fine tuning says that there are target levels
that have to be hit exactly right in order for life to develop in a universe
and hitting each one of them is so vastly improbable that the odds indicate
some selection, some principle that is capable of selecting for life and controlling
events in such a way as to make things happen rightly for the furtherance of
life. This is evidence of mind behind the scenes. This is a design argument but
it avoids the usual pitfalls of design. That is most design arguments are
problematic because they don’t have a known designed universe to compare this
one too. Conversely they don’t have a universe that we know is not designed to
compare to. That makes it tough to say what actually design is. Yet we know
what must be design if we can attach probability to the development of life.
All that is not the target level is random and what hits the target must be
assumed as design because it’s so unlikely. As I have said I won’t go into
great depth on this argument, but just to give cursory explanation. The
argument has many critics and a lot of arguments against it, but it is also
very defensible if one does one’s homework. The major proponents of the
argument are probably Paul Davies and Robin Collins (Messiah
College in Grantham Pennsylvania).
[9]
Davies argues that there is a consensus among physicists and cosmologists that
the universe is for the building blocks of life. That is to say the
environments required for life are fine tuned.[10]
For
examples of fine turning we can turn to Andrei Linde who gives several. He
refers to these as “puzzles” that forced physicists to look more closely at the
standard theory.[11]
A second trouble spot is the flatness
of space. General relativity suggests that space may be very curved, with a
typical radius on the order of the Planck length, or 10^-33 centimeter. We see
however, that our universe is just about flat on a scale of 10^28 centimeters,
the radius of the observable part of the universe. This result of our
observation differs from theoretical expectations by more than 60 orders of
magnitude….
A similar discrepancy between theory
and observations concerns the size of the universe. Cosmological examinations
show that our part of the universe contains at least IO^88 elementary
particles. But why is the universe so big? If one takes a universe of a typical
initial size given by the Planck length and a typical initial density equal to
the Planck density, then, using the standard big bang theory, one can calculate
how many elementary particles such a universe might encompass. The answer is
rather unexpected: the entire universe should only be large enough to
accommodate just one elementary particle or at most 10 of them. it would be
unable to house even a single reader of Scientiftc American, who consists of
about 10^29 elementary particles. Obviously something is wrong with this
theory.
The fourth problem deals with the
timing of the expansion. In its standard form, the big bang theory assumes that
all parts of the universe began expanding simultaneously. But how could all the
different parts of the universe synchromize the beginning of their expansion?
Who gave the command
Fifth, there is the question about the
distribution of matter in the universe. on the very large scale, matter has
spread out with remarkable uniformity. Across more than 10 billion light-years,
its distribution departs from perfect homogeneity by less than one part in
10,000..... One of the cornerstones of the standard cosmology was the
'cosmological principle," which asserts that the universe must be
homogeneous. This assumption. however, does not help much, because the universe
incorporates important deviations from homogeneity, namely. stars, galaxies and
other agglomerations of matter. Tence, we must explain why the universe is so
uniform on large scales and at the same time suggest some mechanism that
produces galaxies.
Finally, there is what I call the
uniqueness problem. AIbert Einstein captured its essence when he said:
"What really interests ine is whether God had any choice in the creation
of the world." Indeed, slight changes in the physical constants of nature
could have made the universe unfold in a completeIy, different manner. ..... In
some theories, compactilication can occur in billions of different ways. A few
years ago it would have seemed rather meaningless to ask why space-time has
four dimensions, why the gravitational constant is so small or why the proton
is almost 2,000 times heavier than the electron. New developments in elementary
particle physics make answering these questions crucial to understanding the
construction of our world.[12]
The reason the list begins with the second example is
because the first example is the big bang itself, that’s not really fine tuning
per se. It is interesting that mentions it because he states that the question
of laws is still the major problem for physicists. This was back in 97 but
that’s still true. The final paragraph is crucial he says these puzzles could
have turned out differently and had that been the case the universe would have
been totally different. He even points out that aspects of it could have worked
out in billions of different ways. He doesn’t say it but that would suggest
that meeting the target levels in just the right way for life to flourish (at
least on one planet) is remarkable. There several standard examples used by
those who make the fine tuning argument.
Taking post
shots at fine turning is immensely popular. Almost everyone admits the universe
seems to be fine turned and that if these specifications were not met life
would not abound. Yet there are a number of scholarly articles that purport to
take the teeth out of the argument. Bradly Monton in an argument for British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science states:
The fundamental constants that are
involved in the laws of physics which describe our universe are finely tuned
for life, in the sense that if some of the constants had slightly different
values life could not exist. Some people hold that this provides evidence for
the existence of God. I will present a probabilistic version of this
fine-tuning argument which is stronger than all other versions in the
literature. Nevertheless, I will show that one can have reasonable opinions
such that the fine-tuning argument doesn't lead to an increase in one's probability
for the existence of God.[13]
Matthew Kotzen makes a minimalist defense of the argument
based upon the “likelihood principle” which seems somewhat in the vain of
Bayes’ Theorem.
The idea behind LP, then, is that if
one hypothesis makes E objectively more likely than another
hypothesis, then the fact that E actually does occur is some evidence
for the first hypothesis over the second. While there are certainly some
philosophers who have raised doubts about the core idea behind LP,2 that
core idea has been extremely influential and is accepted in some form by nearly
all so-called ‘Likelihoodists’ and ‘Bayesians’.[14]
He overcomes the anthropic bias argument that says when all
the evidence is taken into account we realize that fine tuning is just focusing
on something which should be expected as a unremarkable part of the cosmic
layout. He points out that critics mean different things by “take all evidence
into account” and the likelihood principle establishes the validity of the
argument. Of course the problem is this evokes the kind of selective bias
discussed above in connection with Bayes. Yet it may be the bias can be over
come but there wont new information on the divine reality as it is beyond our
understanding. The argument can’t make God more probable. It can, however,
point up the value in the warrant for belief bestowed by the evidence of fine
tuning. It can’t be proof of God’s existence, or lack thereof. Again, we are
confronted by the reality that one’s perspective plays a huge role in how one
sees God arguments.
The major
argument against fine tuning is the multi-verse, or “many worlds theory,”
(MWT). The idea is that if you only one space/time universe then the entire fine
tuning coincidences are so amazingly against the odds, but if you have a billon
such worlds, or even an unlimited supply, the odds against hitting the target
just go way down. It’s not remarkable to think that out of a billion planets we
just happen to be in one that hit it big for life. After all had we not been in
that kind of planet we wouldn’t know about it. That idea comes from Kant’s
attack on the cosmological argument. Of course there is no empirical proof to
support the idea of a multi-verse. There are mathematical models that seem to
support the idea. There is no real empirical proof of one, and probably never
will be. It’s really an act of faith to throw away the possibly of God merely
because there might be this other possibility that one clings to merely because
it answers a possibility we don’t wish to accept. Moreover, even with a
multi-verse the furthering of intelligent life and consciousness requires such
precision that the multi-verse mechanism would have to also be fine tuned to
produce a world with conscious agents in it. [15]
Just knowing that other words are possible or even that they exist is not
enough. We would have to know the hit rate, that is, what percentage of them
bear life? That’s important because just producing one intelligent life bearing
planet (not enough just to get any kind of life, but “higher order” life) would
still be amazingly amazing. So we need to know what percentage because only if
it’s a major percentage (maybe 15%) could we say it’s not amazing that there is
a such a world.
The
multiverse is also the reverse gambler’s fallacy.
Some
people think that if you roll the dice repeatedly and don't get double sixes,
then you are more likely to get double sixes on the next roll. They are victims
of the notorious gambler's fallacy. In a 1987 article in Mind, the philosopher
Ian Hacking sees a kindred bit of illogic behind the Many Universes Hypothesis.
Suppose you enter a room and see a guy roll a pair of dice. They come up double
sixes. You think, "Aha, that is very unlikely on a single roll, so he must
have rolled the dice many times before I walked into the room." You have
committed what Hacking labels the inverse gambler's fallacy.[16]
Another
objection to the theory of fine tuning would be to propose a higher principle
of organization that is responsible for the fine tuning, thus passing the
problem along to a higher level. An example of this is the inflationary model
of expansion. The article cited above by Linde contains his own attempt to do
this by trying to answer the issues or “puzzles” he raises by use of scalar
fields as part of the inflationary model.[17]
That’s really just putting the problem off a level, and the mechanism itself
would have to be fine tuned. "The
inflationary model can succeed only by fine-tuning its parameters, and even
then, relative to some natural measures on initial conditions, it may also have
to fine-tune its initial conditions for inflation to work."[18]
The notion that there might be higher mechanisms and deeper structures making
for life bearing and life flourishing universes could in itself be understood
as part of the order, and that might be seen as product of mind; it is still a matter of perspective.
Yet my
purpose in discussing it is not to add an independent argument but to use it as
a further support for my point that there is real distinction behind the
differences in perceive and descriptive laws of physics, the reality being
described is prescriptive in the sense that it is made up of a deeply
structured order that appears to be wrought for the purpose of producing
intelligent life and thus, we can understand that order as an organizing
principle that is the product of mind. This is apt to be understood as argument
from design and I really don’t want that. If it is a grand design then so be
it, perhaps I’ve found a way to make a design argument work, but I think it’s
more than that. I think the real argument has more to do with the need to
understand mind as the necessary basis or organizing principle. It has never
made much sense to me to think of some disembodied set of order just standing
around making things happen, yet there’s no reason for it. While design
argument might cast God in the anthropomorphic role of great building
contractor in the sky, the realization of a mind-based organizing principle
upon which the order and complexity of the universe depends might transcend
that anthropomorphic image. Certainly the need for such a principle to “fix the
game” of the universe and set the target levels is one more aspect that points
to mind.
Another
aspect of the problem, the question of God and how it arises in relation to our
observations of the universe is already seen in our look at Krauss’s book (A
Universe from Nothing) in chapter (?). In that review we presented the
problem with the book’s claim that scientific research proved the universe came
from nothing: the term “nothing” proved to be problematic, and rather than true
nothing it turns out there are prior conditions that seems to produce the most
fundamental aspects that we can trace back by way of universal origins. In fact
it seems absurd to claim the universe could have come from true absolute
nothing. There are two reasons why true absolute nothing is an absurd candidate
for universal origin—in point of fact I don’t know of scientist who actually
proposes this—as we have seen, Krauss doesn’t really propose that.
First, true
nothing offers no potential from which something might emerge. One might also
argue the force of presumption in empirical observation. No example we have of
anything gives us an idea that something can come from nothing. Everything we
observe has a cause. As we saw with Krauss, the assertion that the actual
nature of quantum particles is not an assertion of something form true nothing
because there are prior conditions form which the particles are emerging.[19]
Second, a state of true absolute nothing would be a state of timeless void,
there would be no becoming in a timeless void. The consensus of science is that
there is no change in a timeless void. As Hawking put it, “the concept of time
has no meaning before the beginning of the universe.”[20] One
theory from back in the 1980s that might help us understand the problem is that
of SUSY GUTS (grand unified theory). Dr. Sten Odenwald wrote an article that describes
this theory:
Theories like those of SUSY GUTS
(Supersymetry Grand Unified Theory) and Superstrings seem to suggest that just
a few moments after Creation, the laws of physics and the content of the world
were in a highly symmetric state; one superforce and perhaps one kind of
superparticle. The only thing breaking the perfect symmetry of this era was the
definite direction and character of the dimension called Time. Before Creation,
the primordial symmetry may have been so perfect that, as Vilenkin proposed,
the dimensionality of space was itself undefined. To describe this state is a
daunting challenge in semantics and mathematics because the mathematical act of
specifying its dimensionality would have implied the selection of one
possibility from all others and thereby breaking the perfect symmetry of this
state. There were, presumably, no particles of matter or even photons of light
then, because these particles were born from the vacuum fluctuations in the
fabric of spacetime that attended the creation of the universe. In such a
world, nothing happens because all 'happenings' take place within the reference
frame of time and space. The presence of a single particle in this nothingness
would have instantaneously broken the perfect symmetry of this era because
there would then have been a favored point in space different from all others;
the point occupied by the particle. This nothingness didn't evolve either,
because evolution is a time-ordered process. The introduction of time as a
favored coordinate would have broken the symmetry too. It would seem that the
'Trans-Creation' state is beyond conventional description because any words we
may choose to describe it are inherently laced with the conceptual baggage of
time and space. Heinz Pagels reflects on this 'earliest' stage by saying,
"The nothingness 'before' the creation of the universe is the most
complete void we can imagine. No space, time or matter existed. It is a world
without place, without duration or eternity..."[21]
When physicists speak of disturbing the summitry they are
not saying nothing can violate it, they are not saying these are laws of nature
that prevent anything form happening. They are saying if anything did violate
it, that event would mean the transitions form nothing to something. The
problem is, what would be there to violate it? What would cause it to happen?
Of course we don’t know but given what we do observe it seems there no good
candidates. First of all there would be no vacuum flux because that’s a product
of “creation” anyway. That would be logically and ontologically antecedent to
whatever would cause the emergence of something.
It would
seem that mind is still the best candidate for agent of change or organizing
principle. We are talking about moving from a position of order and profound
regularity to a emerging of some new aspect of reality that breaks the
regularity, a regularity we observe and assume to be unbreakable. Then
regularity has to go back because we don’t find that kind of emergence (nothing
to something) all the time. What could do that? It’s true something we don’t
understand might do it automatically with no thought involved, but it seems a
mind that writes the rules, and can re-write them at will, would explain it
more efficiently and with greater certainty. Of course it could be the case
that any number of things we don’t know about might produce the emergence of
energy and matter. Mind is the best candidate because the rules would have to
apply again as though they weren’t broken.
That would imply turning them on and off. Davies documents the priority
of physical law in our thinking about the origins of the universe:
It seems that almost all physicists who
work on fundamental problems accept that the laws of physics have some kind of
independent reality. With that view, it is possible to argue that the laws of
physics are logically prior to the universe they describe. That is, the laws of
physics stand at the base of a rational explanatory chain, in the same way that
the axioms of Euclid stand at the
base of the logical scheme we call geometry. Of course one cannot prove that
the laws of physics have to be the starting point of an explanatory scheme, but
any attempt to explain the world rationally has to have some starting point,
and for most scientists the laws of physics seem a very satisfactory one. In
the same way, one need not accept Euclid's
axioms as the starting point of geometry; a set of theorems like Pythagoras's
would do equally well. But the purpose of science (and mathematics) is to
explain the world in as simple and economical a fashion as possible, and Euclid's
axioms and the laws of physics are attempts to do just that.[22]
We have no concept of a law that would allow something to
emerge from true nothing. The agency that would allow that has to be eternal
(that is timeless existence). The reason is because a contingent answer would
have to be account for by yet more logically or ontologically prior conditions.
So this is kicking the answer down the road, it’s not really an answer unless
we posit a timeless agent. The timeless agent has to be able to control the
rules.
This leads
to the recognition of an even larger principle, that of necessity and
contingency. There are different kinds of necessity but in essence necessity is
the quality of not being dependent upon something else for existence. In some
arguments it is also reflected as the quality of not ceasing for failing to
exist. These two aspects of being meet and are actually the same, as the sense
of “not failing to exist” assumes independence from circumstances that would
limits existence. The definition of the second type of necessity is built into
the first. The corollary to necessary is ‘contingent.’ These are logical
categories, they can be observed logically not empirically. Just as we don’t
see causality we don’t see necessity or contingency. That doesn’t mean they are
not valid categories to think with. Since the definition of contingent involves
necessity, contingent things are dependent upon those things which are relatively
necessity to them; contingencies require necessities because that’s the idea.
Contingent things are those that require dependence upon logically or
ontologically prior conditions. Thus there cannot be a contingency without a
necessity. Since naturalistic things are contingency their very nature, as
effects of causes, (at least in as far as we have observed—we have no counter
examples) then necessity is necessary to the existence of contingency. Thus if
we find that the world of our physical being is contingent then we must assume
there is a necessary agent that is responsible I some way for its existence.
“Natural law” in itself is not a satisfactory explanation because the idea of
“law” can’t really be explained through the notion of uncaused disembodied set
of laws floating about. Of course the skeptic would say “these are not real
laws, they are passed by legislators they are just descriptions.” As discussed
already, what they described is an order and regularity as binding that is more
binding than legislature. Calling it a description doesn’t really explain it.
That the regularity would have to be suspended and re-imposed to allow for the
emergency of something form nothing; unless we assume an eternal agency, then
we are making an assumption that contradicts our observations.
If the
assumption is that of an eternal necessary aspect of being then we are
basically positing God. That is the basis of the definition of Christian God
according to the philosophers, as seen in the cosmological arguement.
The cosmological argument is less a
particular argument than an argument type. It uses a general pattern of
argumentation (logos) that makes an inference from certain alleged facts about
the world (cosmos) to the existence of a unique being, generally identified
with or referred to as God. Among these initial facts are that certain beings
or events in the world are causally dependent or contingent, that the universe
(as the totality of contingent things) is contingent in that it could have been
other than it is, that the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact possibly has an
explanation, or that the universe came into being. From these facts
philosophers infer deductively, inductively, or abductively by inference to the
best explanation that a first or sustaining cause, a necessary being, an
unmoved mover, or a personal being (God) exists that caused and/or sustains the
universe. The cosmological argument is part of classical natural theology,
whose goal has been to provide evidence for the claim that God exists.[23]
The skeptic might argue that the
agency can’t really be called God if it is minus personal sense of
consciousness and mind. We’ve already discussed by the assumption of mind is
best. Not only to turn on and off the rules but for the fine tuning, to say nothing
of a means of explaining the structure that can produce consciousness in us,
after there is no real reason why we should even be conscious.[24]
These are good reasons to assume that
God is real. They are not absolute proof, but they will always present a valid
reason for belief and it’s not likely they will be disproved or overturned. The
necessity/contingency dichotomy is absolute. It may not be to the liking of
empiricists but it is logical and it won’t be disproved as any physical
evidence of how the universe came to be atomically counts as description of
potentially contingent circumstances that require the assumption of an eternal
necessity. Let’s assume they did find something popping up out of nothing that
might still be taken as the product of a necessity that we don’t see. The
“nothing” isn’t photographed and identified as nothing; it can always be
understood as the place holder for a necessity that is beyond our
understanding. That means the issue can’t really be decided by either science
or philosophical argument. We are actually not doing science at this point, we
are fully ensconced in philosophy and theology, but these do not offer
certainty. The only kind of certainty we can get in terms of belief in God is
the personal kind that comes from entering the inner logic of belief and
finding that it works to further our lives and our sense of satisfaction with
life. It’s that kind of inner assurance that the skeptic refuses to seek. The
skeptic wants to be conquered by the facts, but confronted with facts that
indicate her world view is wrong, she raises the bar again and again so that
the facts no longer warrant belief. Then she refuses belief on the basis that
it’s not certainty. That’s why skeptics seek science and believers seek
experience.
Even though
it’s not “proof” and even though it’s not certainty in a factual sense, we can
still make arguments based upon assumptions and argue for warranted belief.
That is to say we can argue that belief in God is not proved but is warranted
rationally by the evidence. How much value there is in this approach may be a
matter of debate, but it’s probably necessary given the skeptic’s penchant for
reductionism. People can be cheated out of faith. People deceive themselves and
can be deceived into believing that the epistemic gaps warrant disbelief while
the warrant for belief is not enough to combat doubt because it’s not
certainty. Certainty in this sense is an irrational demand. Yet people can be
led down the path and indoctrinated to demand it. For this reason it’s
important to understand the validity of rational warrant. I base my view of
“rational warrant” on Stephen Toulmin’s idea of “warrant” in his argumentation
model. For Toulmin persuasion is primarily accomplished by grounding claims in
data and logic and then establishing warrant that is linking the data and logic
of the ground to the conclusion. So the warrant is the link that explains why
the data and logic necessitate the desired conclusion.[25]
It answers the question “why does the data show your argument to be true?” Of
course skeptics will invariably argue “that’s not good enough because it’s not
certain.” It can’t be certain. We can’t have certainty in an area where the
object of our knowledge is beyond or our understanding. At least we can’t have
the kind of certainty they demand. That’s not a good reason for ignoring the
warrant. If private personal certainty is all we can have then we should seek
it, especially when it brings much better results than scientific factual
certainty.
[1] Bhaskar, R.A., Philosophy
and the Idea of Freedom, London:
Blackwell. 1990
[2] Margenau, H and R.A. Varghese, ed. 1992. Cosmos, Bios,
and Theos:Scientists Reflect upon Science, God and the Origins of the Universe…
La Salle, IL, Open Court, p. 52.
qjoting Vera Kistiakawsky: bor in 1928,
Professor of physics at MIT, she served as president of the Association for
Women in Science in 1980-1981.”She had been a staff member of major research
installations and had combined teaching with basic research in nuclear physics
both at Columbia and Brandeis Universities before joining the faculty at MIT in 1963, and rising
in 1972 to the rank of Professor of Physics. She is now professor emerita
there.” From her webapte at Mt Holyoak college (she went to school there—class
of 48): URL: https://www.mtholyoke.edu/175/gallery/vera-kistiakowsky visited 2/8/13
[3], John W Carroll,
"Laws of Nature", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring
2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = .
Carrroll cites D. Lewis, , “New Work for a Theory of Universals”, Australasian
Journal of Philosophy, (1983) 61:367
[4]Santo D'Agostino, op cit.
[5] James Franklin, What
Science Knows and How it Knows it. Jackson Tennessee:Encounter books
2009, 64-65. Franklin teaches at University
of New South Wales, he’s a
mathematician who publishes on History of Ideas.
[6] Karl Popper quoted in
Antony Flew, Philosophical Dictionary, New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1979, 242.
[7] Paul Davies, “Physics
and the Mind of God, The Templeton Prize Address,” First Things. (1995).
Davies was born in 1946, he is recipient of the Templeton prize, the largest
monitory aware for scientific achievement, In the past he has taught at University
of Cambridge and is currently director of “BEYOND” center for fundamental
concepts in Science.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Collins attended Washington
State University.
He has a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Notre Dame where he studied under Alvin
Plantinga, and did two years in a Ph.D. program in Physics at U.T. Austin. Robin Collins' Curriculum Vita.
Accessed Feb 22, 2013.
URL: http://home.messiah.edu/~rcollins/VITA.htm
[10] Paul Davies (2003). "How bio-friendly is the
universe". Op cit
[11] Andrei Linde, “Self
Reproducing Inflationary Universe.” originally published Scientific American
oct 1997. now archived as pdf: URL:
http://mukto-mona.net/science/physics/Inflation_lself_prod_inde.pdf visited Feb 27,2013.
Linde is Russian, went to Mascow
University, he was one of the
originators of inflationary theory. He has been professor of physics at
Standford.
[12] ibid
[13] Bradely Monton, “God,
Fine Tuning and the Problem of Old Evidence.” British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science. Oxford
Journals. · Volume 57,
Issue 2 (2006)
405-424.
[14] Matthew Kotzen,
“Selection biases in Likelihood arguments.” British Journal for The
Philosophy of Science. · Volume 63,
Issue 4 , (2012) 825-839
[15] Martin Rees, Just Six
Numbers: The Deep Forces That Shape the Universe, NewYork: Basic Books, 2000.
[16] Jim Holt, "War of the Worlds: Do you believe in God? Or in
multiple universes?" Lingua Franca, December 2000/January 2001
[17] Andre Linde, op cit.
[18] Earman, John. Bangs, Crunches, Wimpers, and
Shrieks: Singularities and Acausalities in Relativistic Spacetimes. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995., p. 156
[19] See Albert’s review of
Krauss’s book, find in “disprove” chapter,
[20] Stephen Hawking, A
Brief History of Time, New York:
Bantam, 1988, p. 8
[21] Sten Odenwald, “Stellar
Fronteirs, to the Big Bang and Beyond,” Astronomy Magazine, Kalmback
Publishing, (May 1987) 90.
[22] Paul Davies, “When Time
Began,” New Scientist, (October 9,
2004) 4.
[23] Bruce
Reichenbach, "Cosmological
Argument", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2013
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL =
.
[24] David Chalmers, The
Conscious Mind, op cit, 84-90.
[25] Stephen Toulmin, “Part
III The Layout of Arguments: The Pattern of an argument: Data and Warrant,” and
“Backing Our Warrants,” The Uses of Argument. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003,
(originally 1958) 89-100.
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