It is capitalism and its technostructure which have dislodged civilizing influences (and Schweitzer himself included capitalism in the critique, 28). As long as the economic structures are expanding, the assumption is that civilization is intact. The illusion of stability is created because civilization has been confused with two different things: first, with its own infrastructure (or with that of civil society), and secondly, with the hierarchical trappings of power which maintain the infrastructure. Modernity understands Civilization as indoor plumbing, freeways, and home shopping. Some postmodernists confuse civilization with the imperialism which built the infrastructure.
For some time thinkers and social critics have warned that the foundations of modernity have collapsed. In reaction to the current malaise the realm of discourse in American public life has been closed around one particular social project: right-wing hegemony. With the death of the left, the failure of liberalism, the decline of the arts, and the ultimate decline of democratic values, new movements seek explanations and solutions. Most of these, however, consist of either uncritically imposing moralistic agendas, or, denying that foundations are possible. Negations is a journal of social criticism which seeks to expand the realm of discourse in American society through an interdisciplinary approach, drawing upon critical theory and praxis in the areas of art, history of ideas, political and social philosophy, political theology, and literary criticism. The editors of Negations feel that the most acute analysis and praxis lie in recovering the tradition of 20th century social criticism. We have chosen as springboards, points of departure, Albert Schweitzer, Karl Jaspers, C. Wright Mills, and Herbert Marcuse.
Specifically, what these thinkers have in common is the realization that economic forces render the public sphere synonymous with the commercial sphere. Art, religion, philosophy, ethics, political ideals, all else is reduced to "matters of taste" in the private realm. These vital areas of life, therefore, play a mitigated role in governing public discourse. Moreover, the public sphere has come to subsume the private; "matters of taste" become commodified and are themselves mere products. The process of civilized life is reduced to producing and consuming; serious public dialogue is reduced to a form of entertainment. Non-commodified needs, such as artistic expression, ethical values, or reflections upon our ultimate concerns, are marginalized. The closed realm of discourse reduces analysis of the cause of the crisis to a litany of its effects; "cultural relativism," declining "family values," or a failure of the educational system. The real problem lurking behind these symptoms is the inability of ultimate concerns to affect the social realm.
Albert Schweitzer is best known, not for social criticism, but for sacrificing a brilliant theological career to work in Africa as a doctor. His classic work, Quest for The Historical Jesus, set the stage for 20th century theological interpretation of the historical Jesus and eschatology. Schweitzer did write a philosophy of civilization. His work, The Decay and Restoration of Civilization, is outdated, somewhat ethnocentric, and almost quaint. Embedded within a simplistic discourse on the superiority of rationalism, however, are some ideas that are well worth taking seriously. While he may seem out of place among thinkers such as Marcuse and Mills, he anticipated much that they had to say.
Schweitzer's discussion of civilization begins with the concept of civilization itself. Civilization is, for Schweitzer, primarily a matter of ethical values which produce a free community, in which the full potential of the individual can be realized. This is not only an unscientific definition, but it flies in the face of the postmodern rejection of the individual. On the other hand, as Schweitzer points out, what is thought of as "civilization" today, comes from social scientists, who, in their positivistic zeal to rid modern thought of everything that cannot be quantified, defined civilization in terms of living arrangements and urban units. It is not that we object to the quantitative study of society, nor do we envision social sciences without a focus on living arrangements. Nevertheless, the concept of civilization has been reduced to that which can be studied quantitatively, gutted of its content and reduced to a mere form. Civilization, understood as a value, fosters a positive quality of life based on freedom, but civilization has come to be understood as a collection of practical ends which must be served for their own sake.
In The Dacay... (1923), Schweitzer warned of the collapse of civilizing influences, which were giving way to reductive and calculating forms of thought. Today there is a general feeling that Western culture is declining through a loss of moral values, but this notion is most often heard as right-wing campaign rhetoric, or a concern of fundamentalists. To understand these concerns in this way, however, is to misconstrue the nature of the forces at work. It is capitalism and its technostructure which have dislodged civilizing influences (and Schweitzer himself included capitalism in the critique, 28). As long as the economic structures are expanding, the assumption is that civilization is intact. The illusion of stability is created because civilization has been confused with two different things: first, with its own infrastructure (or with that of civil society), and secondly, with the hierarchical trappings of power which maintain the infrastructure. Modernity understands Civilization as indoor plumbing, freeways, and home shopping. Some postmodernists confuse civilization with the imperialism which built the infrastructure. Thus, civilization is often pitted against environmental concerns, blamed for the exploitation of the third world, or the oppression of women, as well as all the other problems of our technological existence, (all of which are really the consequences of loosing civilization, or of never having achieved it fully\'d1in other words, to end oppression and to accept marginalized people as fully participating members of society is a civilizing influence; one which has yet to be fully achieved).
Schweitzer's critique centered on the mode of production necessary for maintaining a burgeoning technological society, and the way of life that mode fostered (29). His analysis applied to the German situation of factory life in the 1920s, but much of what he had to say still bears consideration. German workers were overworked, underpaid, uneducated, and separated from the overall process of production, so that their work was meaningless and lacked any expression of craftsmanship. Contemporary work is less factory-oriented, but it is still overwork, and in general social pressures guide workers away from meaningful occupations. As Schweitzer pointed out, the main compensation for overwork is constant entertainment. Overworked, underpaid, undervalued, undereducated, the worker is diverted from any serious consideration about the overall goals and ends of life; from reading, and from intellectual pursuits (28). The current situation is merely an outgrowth of the former mode of life. Entertainment is one of the biggest growth sectors, (commodified leisure) but it serves a diversionary purpose in draining away time for serious reading and reflection. Even in 1923 Schweitzer saw that these trends were being designed into the economic structures (29). Even "meaningful" occupations too often reduce thought to mere calculation. On this point Schweitzer anticipates Jaspers.
Karl Jaspers reflected upon the end of Western civilization in Man In The Modern Age, likening it to the end of Hellenism before the dark ages (20). For Jaspers, the current phase in modernity (the 1920s) marked the turning point from human pursuits such as discursive reasoning, thought, understanding, and artistic production, to the dominance of a highly organized super-structure based upon reducing content to "technique." Art becomes "mere amusement and pleasure ( instead of an emblem of transcendence), science becomes mere concern for technical utility (instead of the satisfaction of a primary will to know), (137). He warned that the growing tendency to "wrap the world in apparatus," the building of a giant inter-connected infrastructure based entirely on calculation, would have a deleterious effect upon humanity. According to Jaspers, society faces the extinction of those qualities and aspirations which have always defined humanity, such as rational discourse and ethical norms. These warnings seem quaint when one considers that they were made before regular air travel in the days of radio. It may be that at each stage in technical development, society becomes more habituated to technique, closed in a technological womb that grows ever more content with closed possibilities for qualitative change. The contemporary litany of dangers, ecological destruction of the planet, the failure of the educational system, growing violence, and governmental control, should bare out the realization that society is complacent in the face of growing peril. Jasper's notion that discursive reasoning was being replaced by technique anticipates the work of C. Wright Mills in the 1950s.
Mills was a sociologist, an influence upon the early new left of the '60s, and a critic of the social sciences. He is best known for his work The Power Elite, and for coining that popular phrase of the 1960s, "military industrial complex." In his work The Sociological Imagination, however, he reflects upon the loss of the individual's power in society, and his own profession's complicity in the process. Mills was one of the first thinkers to use the term "post-modern" (which he hyphenated). For Mills, writing in the '50s, modernity had already passed away, post-modernity had dawned. "The ideological mark...[of the post-modern epoch] --that which sets it apart from the modern age-- is that the ideas of freedom and of reason have become moot; that increased rationality may not be assumed to make for increased freedom" ( 167). As with Schweitzer, Mills reflects that the technological structure separates people from control over or reflection upon the ends of their lives. "Caught in the everyday milieux of their limited lives, ordinary people cannot reason about the greater structures'rational and irrational'of which their milieux are subordinate parts" (168). The individual learns not to reason, but to rationalize the goals and ends of life, and his or her position in the overall scheme of things.
Given...the ascendant trend of rationalization, the individual 'does what he can.' He gears his aspirations and his work to the situation he is in and from which he can find no way out. In due course he does not seek a way out: he adapts. That part of his life which is left over from work he uses to play, to consume, to have fun. Yet this sphere of consumption is also being rationalized. Alienated from production, from work, he is also alienated from consumption, from genuine leisure. This adaptation of the individual and its effects upon his milieux and self results not only in the loss of his chance, but in due course of his capacity and will to reason; it also affects his chances and his capacity to act as a free [person]. Indeed, neither the value of freedom nor of reason, it would seem, are known to him. (170).
Mills ties this process directly to commodification, the accumulation of technological and commercial products, of "gadgets." The end result, according to Mills, is that society becomes filled with "cheerful robots," those who obey the programming of technique and cannot seek alternatives (171). Mills charged that the social sciences help to further the aims and methods of technique, hiding behind the " scientific objectivity," unwilling to mount any critique. Mills anticipates Herbert Marcuse's work, written in 1964, One-Dimensional Man. Marcuse is far too complex to present a full explication of his thought in this manifesto. Only the most cursory summation of one of his major points will be attempted. Marcuse, like Schweitzer and Jaspers, was born in Germany. He escaped to the United States in 1933 (on the day Hitler took power). Marcuse had been active in Marxist politics since his early youth. He studied with Heidegger and Husserl, and was a close friend of the latter. His thinking is grounded deeply in that of Hegel, but he draws more on the phenomenological tradition than other Marxist thinkers of his time. Marcuse was part of the "Frankfurt School," a group of thinkers in Germany which included Adorno and the young Habermas. In the early '60s he taught at San Diego, where he rose to meteoric fame with One-Dimensional Man. He was lauded as the great thinker of the '60s counter-culture, so much so that Ronald Reagan tried to have his credentials revoked.
Marcuse argues that the realm of public discourse is closed around a social project which features the constant supply of "false needs" to eagerly one-dimensional consumers (7-8). Any notion which does not support the social project is excluded from the public discussion. Within the confines of consumer society freedom becomes a concept reduced to terms of commercial transaction.
...The irresistible output of the entertainment and information industry carry with them prescribed attitudes and habits...The products indoctrinate and manipulate; they promote a false consciousness which is immune against falsehood. And as these beneficial products have become available to more individuals, in more social classes, the indoctrination they carry ceases to be publicity; it becomes a way of life. It is a good way of life'much better than before' and as a good way of life, it militates against qualitative change. Thus emerges a pattern of one-dimensional thought and behavior, in which ideas, aspirations, and objectives that, by their content, transcend the established universe of discourse and action are either repelled or reduced to terms of this [social-political] universe. They are re-defined by the rationality of the given system and of its quantitative extension. (12).
The seductive nature of the consumer life indoctrinates everyone into the social project, precluding any serious discussion of alternative forms of life, and excluding that which cannot be reduced to a product. Learning and thinking cease to be matters of thoughtful content and simply become a means of better maintaining the project; constant expansion of economic development. Alternatives are co-opted, then sold as products themselves.
Lurking behind the accumulation of false needs (technological version of bread and circuses) is operational thinking. This is what Marcuse means by "quantitative extension of the given system" (quotation above). " The trend [one-dimensional consumer society] may be related to a development in scientific method: operationalism in the physical, behaviorism in the social sciences. The common feature is a total empiricism in the treatment of concepts; their meaning is restricted to the representation of particular operations and behavior...In general, we mean by a concept nothing more than a set of operations...a positivism which, in its denial of the transcending elements of reason, forms the academic counterpart to the socially required behavior" (12). The positivist and reductionist tendencies of contemporary scientific thought, which props up the technostructure and furnishes it with "empirical proof," works to eliminate all concepts that cannot be quantified, and therefore, eventually commodified.
We refer to this total process, observed by Marcuse, Mills, Jaspers, and Schweitzer, as "the commodification of life." Whatever cannot be quantified, and then reduced to commercial transaction, is deemed unimportant, and relegated to the "subjective" realm as "matters of taste," (Moltmann 309). Marcuse argues that positivism has helped to foster the assumption that what is, is what should be. " What is," is the power of science to render as quantifiable anything " worth knowing." If a concept is not quantified, it must be a subjective matter of taste, and therefore, cannot be included in the public discussion. "What is," is the "negation" of further possibility. Thus, our most cherished aspirations, desires, and values become consumer products or selling points. Engagement with our existential concerns becomes the psychic hot-line," personal significance and meaning in one's life as an individual becomes the purchase of a large air-polluting automobile with "fine Corinthian leather" upholstery, freedom becomes a huge drink at the local convenience store, revolution becomes a basketball shoe, and democracy becomes a sound bite. Even thought is commodified, the life of the mind a mere product. Learning becomes a score on the GRE, knowledge becomes a diploma, thought becomes gathering data and publication, all of which indexes the "thinker" as a product worthy of purchase by industry or academia. The mercantile trappings of civilization have become the thing itself.
Nor is the closed realm of discourse only limited to advertising. The media on all levels creates a sense of the world as American public discourse, the agenda dictated by quantitatively derived economic necessity and the demands of the infrastructure. The public discussion about welfare, for example, rarely delves into the moral obligation of an economic system which requires that certain groups be frozen out. If vast segments of the population are trapped in poverty, or forced to migrate for work, if the manufacturing based is shipped to the third world and whole communities left with the fast food industry as the employer of first resort, that is simply the law of supply and demand; immutable, sacrosanct, economic cosmic Torryism. Practically the only time one hears moral values at work in a discussion on social programs is when the poor are subjected to a badly misconstrued version of the Protestant work ethic. The same situation can be seen on the environmental front, where the ecologists are the "special interests," and corporations the victims of " out of control" government regulation.
In his classic work Manufacturing Consent, Noam Chomsky argues that the minions of the media, reporters and editors, internalize the economic and political interests of the ownership (Chomsky). The ownership of media in America, however, is an ever shrinking and tightly closed realm; ever more limited to Disney and Murdock (Miller, 10). "...Such concentration will tend to inhibit those news departments lately swallowed up by this or that gigantic advertiser'news departments that were no great shakes to start with, but that now will seldom threaten the myriad interests of their respective parent companies" (Miller, 10). The new situation of media monopolization, since the Reagan era, has become so totally self referential, it threatens to pull the audience into a totally self contained world. Michael Eisner described it this way, "the Disney stores promote the consumer products which promote the [theme] parks, which promote the television shows. The television shows promote the company..." (in Miller, 9). Of course, television in general is dummied up to reduce the level of thought, and generally promotes a way of life based on constant entertainment and constant consumption. The one serious reflection on the world which is widely available, news, reflects the assumptions of the social elites in maintaining their project. The universe closes, tightly bud-like, around the basic notion of economic Torryism (what is, is what should be). Any serious attempt at qualitative change, or at presentation of further possibilities for life, is either co-opted or excluded altogether.
The very concept of "revolution" is trivialized and commodified, so that to rebel is to obey. When the term "revolution" is taken seriously, it is in connection with the right-wing legislative agenda, or the tax revolt. To use the term in this way, however, is simply to call for more of the same; more capitalism, more right-wing ideology. When "revolution" is used in connection with changing society in such a way as to bring about justice, promote free thought, or find alternatives to an oppressive cultural and social milieu, advertisers connect the usage to selling products. " The revolution," as it turns out, is really about basketball. All one need do is watch television (pay attention to the commercials this time) and one is inundated by an army of black-shirted, would-be beats, each with a three day growth of beard, hawking everything from automobiles to beer. "Break the rules. Stand apart. Keep your head. Go with your heart," says a t.v. commercial for Vanderbilt perfume, 1994 (Frank, 12). The revolution is about money. Thomas Frank's article, "Dark Age: Why Johnny Can't Dissent," (Baffler) documents the fact that dissent and counter-culture are the major growth industries, favorite targets of advertising today (12-13). All aspects of life are turned into commodities, even dissatisfaction with commodification. This is nothing new, however, it is exactly what Marcuse predicted when he said that dissent and counter-culture were merely the carnation on the lapel of capitalism ( ODM,10). Nowhere is the commodified rebellion more evident than in the brave and trendy rebellion of the ideological postmodernists, whose undermining of "logocentrism" has only served to negate the ability of the left offer a coherent option.
This is not to paint all " postmoderns" with a broad brush. "Postmodernity" is many things to many people, as is "postmodernism." Much of it offers insight for critique. In a sense, postmodernism offers the best help for the left. The projects of modernity seem to have failed in many ways. There is no getting around the fact that 19th century progress never made good on its claims, and the most significant result was a bigger pile of bodies. Postmodernism offers a deeper understanding of reality as socially constructed, although much of this could be gleaned from a reading of 19th century sociology. Deconstruction does offer a method for reading texts, and there are those whose scholarship and dedication toward this end is admirable. There are also those who know a catchy slogan when they hear it, and whose critique of modernity does not go beyond sloganism. Conversely, there is much in modernity that was never grasped, never tried, and never given the proper opportunity. We reject that type of postmodernism which is merely a knee-jerk reaction against anything that came before, and we especially reject that style of postmodernism which lauds "difference" at the expense of a unified movement against oppression.
What is left of the left has, like a character in a Beckett play, been stuck in the endgame of postmodernism. As with an actual "endgame" in chess, the postmodernists have worked the left into a position in which they have few moves left open to them, and no longer command the pieces to win the game; having eliminated any notion of progress (indeed, having eliminated the very ability to say that one thing is better than another, and having done away with the self, the individual, ethics, ideals, class analysis, class conflict, workers, solidarity, freedom, conscience, humanity, humanism, spirit, and all the other concepts which have motivated decent, and revolutionary organizing, since the peasant revolts of the 16th century). This version of the postmodern attack on the subject, the rejection of individualism, reason, etc., have only served to render the left apathetic, powerless, and divided; and to feed the process of commodification.
This kind of postmodernism attacks all motivating values, such as moral values, or the value of individualism, as though they are the structures which have created the modern malaise. They attack the reduced forms as though they are the ideals themselves. They attack civilization, as though it is the imperialism which comes from a misconstrual of civilization, they attack the one-dimensional false consciousness as though it is the notion of the self. The postmodern "attack on the subject" ( the rejection of the individual) began with the new left in Paris, May '68, and with the very critique of bourgeois individuality voiced by Marcuse and Mills. While these thinkers wanted an ever freer individual, however, one liberated from "false needs" or " gadgets," Derrida and Foucault took the opposite approach and turned to the destruction of individuality (although, it can be argued that their aim was really a sneaky defense of individual freedom). The effect was postmodern rejection of the self (Ferry and Renaut xxiii). Certain kinds of postmodernists will be apt to criticize Mills and the others on the grounds that freedom is illusory, reason is logocentric, and the self is a social construct. Schweitzer would probably answer, "Those born to slavery don't know to miss their freedom."
On the other hand, we cannot bring back the quaint 19th century rationalism of Schweitzer. The postmodernists have created a problem in the sense that ridding the left of the notion of progress, there is no more forward momentum (if only that were the only problem the left faces). Nevertheless, the notion of "progress," is laden with too much baggage, is too relative and general in meaning. One person's "progress" is another person's ecological disaster. We propose a vocabulary and a means of problem solving in lieu of talk about progress. Rather than speaking of a " march" of progress toward some teleological goal, which is actually some relative temporal value cast in the aura of the eternal, perhaps we can speak of "opening up" the closed realm of discourse, of the emergence of new possibility. If we cannot have progress in history, Hegel's inevitable " footprints of God in the sands of time," perhaps we can have Marcuse's "negation of the negation" (Katz, 200).
The "negation of the negation" is really a Hegelian term. Hegel didn't really speak of the dialectic as " thesis, anti-thesis, synthesis," but as a series of concrete situations negating and excluding possibilities. The fruition of possibilities over existing situations is "the negation of the negation." Marcuse took up this notion, and in fact, a collection of his essays is entitled Negations. There are two Marcusian terms which must be understood in order to make sense of the theory. First, the transcendent critical principle (TCP), and secondly, the revolutionary a priori. TCPs are principles from beyond the commodified closed realm of discourse, principles which in themselves offer the basis for critique, and which cannot be commodified. Marcuse thought he found such principles in art (Katz, 199-200). We think there is an even larger picture which can be understood through a combination of all four thinkers.
For Marcuse, the revolutionary a priori was an inherent basis for critique which exists within art qua art. Certain works, certain genres, even the notion of art itself may be commodified and pressed into service of the closed realm of discourse, but the revolutionary a priori can always be teased out, and a critique mounted. It is critique which breaks open the closed realm and opens up new possibilities, the negation of the negation. If we can bring values back into public discussion as points of critique, perhaps they will force an opening in the closed realm of discourse. Rather than the assumption that "what is, is what should be," possibility introduces the notion that "what could be is what should be." The approbation of non-commodified principles will, hopefully, alter the public discussion in such a way as to break open the closed realm. The major metaphor for progress in history was a "march forward," moving " ahead." The metaphor we would like to bring to the discussion as a replacement is that of a rose bud. The revolutionary a priori is a bud-likeness. The possibilities for change are inherent within the closed realm, but they must be opened up and caused to emerge to fruition.
Through the works of Schweitzer, Jaspers, and Mills, one might enlarge upon TCPs, and draw upon a range broader than that of art alone. Conversely, through Marcuse, one might search out a revolutionary a priori in the values and motivations which Schweitzer, Jaspers, and Mills draw upon for their solutions. For example, Schweitzer's appeal to reverence for life furnishes an example of a TCP. Schweitzer's notion of the ethical content of civilization might furnish a range of TCPs from the realm of value. This is the true importance of recognizing Schweitzer's point about the ethical content of civilization. Civilizing tendencies are applications of values, moral and ethical, which create living possibilities for the individual and society.
From each of our four thinkers we derive a piece of a possible solution. Schweitzer's solution was the application of discursive reason and reverence for life (as a specific example of the ethical content which he believed motivates civilization). Jaspers's solution lay in a realization of humanity's existential concerns in motivating the human spirit. Mills' solution was the application of reason to an analysis of the goals and ends of life; which manifested itself through a sociological analysis critical of the social sciences. Marcuse supplies the grand theory which is complex enough to unite the whole in a comprehensive framework.
One of the major problems with this theory is in selecting the values and in choosing between competing values. Moreover, the postmodernist position informs us of the culturally constructed and relative nature of all values. The problem of choosing between them should supply a large portion of the content of the journal. To bog down in the mire of postmodern constructivist relativism, however, need not be the fate of our task. It is not that postmodernism does not furnish us with valuable insights, nor is it the case that there is nothing to the constructivist outlook. It is simply that the relative and socially constructed nature of value should not dissuade us from the discussion. Let us take a Kantian approach. If we impose cultural constructs upon our sense data, and thus order the world, the world is the world of our constructs. The problem with the closed realm of discourse is that it limits the world by imposing certain constructs, and excluding others, and the range is constantly narrowed. If it is inevitable that the values we hold are merely cultural constructs, than let us increase the possible range of constructs available to us.
Therefore, as a journal, Negations is virtually unlimited in the range of topics which might be selected. Anything from media manipulation, to advertising, ecology, welfare, literary criticism, historical analysis, cultural criticism, almost all walks of life are touched by commodification.
In general, we seek scholarly articles from the arts and humanities and the social sciences. we use the rubric "interdisciplinary" to describe the range of disciplines form which we seek contributions, and by this term we mean to indicate the openness of the journal to publish a broad range of disciplines. We welcome quantitative work, but ask that it be tied to analysis.
The range of topics will be limited by the approach to commodification. We ask that articles center on one of two things, or both: 1) a critique of commodification (in whatever manifestation it can be seen) and/or; 2) a discussion of transcendent critical principles. We hope that this approach will contribute something to the struggle for fundamental change. We know that we face overwhelming opposition, we are a mosquito trying to drink the ocean, but we hope that all who read this article will lend their support in whatever way they can. We also feel that our contribution to scholarship itself is not minimal. We feel that scholarship need not hide behind objectivity, but that critique, in so far as it leads to understanding, is the best approach of true scholarship. We feel that the academic way of life is in the greatest peril from a commodified society; a society which values only technique and commodifies learning and thinking. We believe that we can contribute in an academic sense, and that the strength of the academy is the best defense against the forces of one-dimensionality. We call for the support of the reader, and the best support the reader can give is to read our journal.
Chomsky, Noam. Manufacturing Consent. Pantheon Books. 1988.
Ferry, Luc, and Alain Renaut. French Philosophy of The Sixties: An Essay On Antihumanism. trans. Mary H.S. Cattani. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1990 (originally 1985 by Gillmard).
Frank, Thomas. "Dark Age: Why Johnny Can't Dissent," The Baffler, no. 6.
Jaspers, Karl. Man In The Modern Age. Doubleday, 1957.
Katz, Barry. Herbert Marcuse and the Art of Liberation. Verso, 1982.
Marcuse, Herbert. Negations: Essays in Critical Theory. Trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro. Boston: Beacon Press, 1968.
____ One-Dimensional Man. Beacon Press, 1964.
Miller, Mark Crispin. "De-Monopolize Them: a Call For A Broad Based Movement Against the Media Trust." Extra: The Magazine of FAIR, Nov.-Dec. 1995, Vol. 8, no. 6.
Mills, C. Wright. The Sociological Imagination. New York, London: Oxford University Press, 1967 (originally 1959).
Moltmann, Jurgen. Theology of Hope: On The Ground And The Implications of A Christian Eschatology. SCM Press, Ltd. 1967 (originally published in Germany in 1965).
Schweitzer, Albert. The Decay and The Restoration of Civilization. trans. C.T. Campion. London: Unwin Books, 1967 (original German Publication 1923).