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Tuesday, July 02, 2019

Tillich’s ontology as illustration of depth in being

Image result for Paul Tillich
Tillich bounding to prove he's fit
notes 1=5 in previous paper

Another aspect of the depth of being is the diversity of being. Tillich develops many themes of meaning, diversity, and historicity in laying out the Gospel framework and translating it into his phenomenological take on the diversity of being. Human being, fallen nature, sin, redemption, new being in Christ, these are standard Christian themes but a good deal of his Systematic Theology is devoted to exploring them from the perspective of their relationship to being. What he’s doing there is demonstrating the depth of being ontologically and in terms of human experience (vol II of Systematic Theology). Volume I of that work is about “Being and God.” Here he deals with topics of “The Question of Being: Man, Self and World.” “God is the answer to the question implied in being” he says. [6] He first deals with reason and revelation. Then he moves into the question of being and its meaning. He says that in coming to terms with reason and its take on existential conflicts, one is forced into asking the most essential question of all, why is there something rather than nothing at all?But I have given this in Heidegger’s terms. Tillich puts it a bit differently “why is there something, why not nothing?”[7] He points out that to ask “why is there not nothing?” is to attribute a kind of being to nothingness. Thus as he puts it “one cannot go behind being.” What he’s saying is, like trying to imagine one’s own non existence, it can’t be done. We cannot get under being itself, its’ the furthest we can go back in our understanding, and it eludes our understanding. Thought is based upon being and it can’t go beyond its base. One can imagine the negotiation of things, however, and it can “describe the nature and structure of everything that is the power of resisting non being.”[8] Ontological questions, he points out, are not tautologies because of this ability to mentally play with being and non being. We are not merely saying “being is being” when we try to define what it is, because there’s a possibility of negating any particular form of being. The possibility of universality and less than universal aspect of forms of being make ontology possible. There are concepts which are less universal than being but more universal than any concept about being, thus these are “categories” of thought.
/...These categories form the basis of theological significance. These are central concepts that make theology “go,” so to speak (not Tillich’s phrase). These are ontological concepts, ontology is not theology. One can be an atheist and totally secular and do ontology as part of philosophy, and such a thinker would have to deal with these concepts. But in like manner all theologians must deal with them as well. While they are not theology per se they are essential to theology. The concepts are: (1) the structure implicit in the basic ontological question (why is there something rather than nothing?); (2) the elements which constitute ontological structure; (3) characteristics of being which are the conditions of existence; (4) categories of being and knowing. [9] The structure (1) is that the question presupposes an asking subject, and an object being asked about. This is the subject/object structure that is presupposed and that in turn assumes the structure of world and self; this as the basic articulation of being. That the self has a world to which it belongs and from which it will deduce the nature of its being precedes all other structures and will be the basic analysis which precedes all other analysis. [10] The elements of the ontological structure he groups into three sets of pairs: individuality and universality, dynamics and form, and freedom and density. These are polarities and the first expresses self referential nature of being.
The ontological concepts pertaining to number (3) (characteristics of being) “expresses the power of being to exist,” in Tillich’s own words, “and the difference between essential and existential being.” [11] There is a duality for Tillich between essential and existential thinking. One is inherent in the other, as existentialism is meaningless without an essentialism to play off it. No ontology can disregard these two aspects. [12] Existentialism is a revolt against the predominance of essentialism. Essentialism came to be identified in theology with “stasis” and existents with movement, or process theology. Tillich saw a unity between the two, one assuming the other. Tillich says essentialism is related to universalism, and we can’t deal with concepts in the world without universals. Thus existentialism has to assume essentialism and the two have to work together.[13] The fourth level deals with the categories of thought or the basic concepts. These he calls “structures of finite being and thinking.” I suppose the Kantian categories would be placed here. “If time and space are called ‘categories’ this is a derivation from the Kantian terminology which calls time and space forms of intuition. But the larger sense of category has been accepted generally, even in post Kantian schools.”[14] Tillich says that determining the exact nature and number of these categories is the on going and never ending task of philosophy. [15] He isolates four such categories: time, space, causality, and substance. These are categories that have the most theological importance. Quantity and Quality he says have less theological importance. He discusses other categories and their relation to the four points above, but I will forgo that as it really doesn’t have a direct bearing on the task before us here. He does focus on finitude at this point (p165) as having a major bearing on the ontological question of God.
....He’s going to argue that ontological concepts are a priori. What he means by a priori is not quite the same as most logicians understand it. We think of a prori as a tautological statement, a statement where we only need to know the meaning of the terms in order to understand the truth of the statement. Tillich makes it sound like the thinks a prori means empirical data. He says it’s ultimately a matter of experience. I don’t think he’s confusing it with empirical data. He is saying that the ultimate understanding of what terms mean is a matter of experience. In other words we think of a prori as statements like “all husbands are married men.” If we know what a husband is we know all of them are married men. Tillich is saying that the idea of husbands and marriage is not some eternal truth in a vacuum. We only have a concept of those terms because we live in a culture that has a convention of marriage. Thus in an ultimate sense the a priori concepts originate form the experience of a life world in which cultural constructs have a shared meaning. The concepts of Being, the categories, are a priori but in the same way rooted in our experience of being. As Tillich says “they constitute the very structure of experience itself.”[16] IF experience changes a new a priori will from. Tillich discusses process theology and the question of a static understanding of God. He identifies with a tradition from Scotus to Heidegger, picking up Bergson along the way, and moving toward indeterminacy in the ground of being. But it dose not remove a proristructure from ontology or Being.[17]
Still setting up the discussion of finitude and being, he moves to the prelude to that discussion, the self-world relationship. Every being participates in the structure of being, but man alone (in so far as we know) is aware of it. We are the only being we know that has alienation and estrangement. We can describe behavior but we do not know what the behavior means to others. We are the only being we know of that asks the ontological question (why is there something rather than nothing?) and the only one that can try to answer it. In Heideggerian terms, as Tillich puts it, we are only able to answer because we understand the nature of “being there.” Or Tillich speak, we experience “directly and immediately the structure of being and its elements. As stated above the ontological structure is the structure of the ontological question, the assumption and self and world, and that’s what we are moving to as a prelude of discussion of finitude. Then there is also no 2 from above the structure of being grouped into three sets of pairs: individuality and universality, dynamics and form, and freedom and density. These are polarities and the first expresses self referential nature of being. These are a prori concepts. Self and world is a basic part of this structure. Humanity is not merely a passive object of study, but a living consciousness in the process of learning and apprehending these structures first hand. Humanity cannot be turned into an object of study under the guise of making understanding easier. We are the student as well as the object, so to reduce humanity itself to an object is lose the phenomena of what it means to experience being the object or being thing studied. We can’t step outside of that experience and study it as an object dispassionately without changing our understanding of what that thing is we would study.[18] This leads into what Tillich discusses in The Courage To Be where speaks of the courage to be a part of and the courage to be apart from.[19]
As the ontological question implies humanity understands itself as having selves that live in a world. This is the organically a priori set up of asking the question. The relationship between self and world is dialectical, we must be a part of, and we must be apart from. To study, to understand to live, to know, to remain true to what we understand we must go play this game of tag, now standing alone as apart from the world, now standing with the world as part of it. There is no question of the existence of the self, according to Tillich. The Postmodernists made a big deal out of the idea there is no core self. That is a somewhat different question, however, depending upon what is meant by “core,” but there is clearly some form of self since someone had to write those articles, and since even making the argument “there is no self” would require that one be a self and understand something about the concept. According to Tillich the question is self awareness of self relatedness.[20] This is a dialectical relationship in another way as well, in that the relationship of self and world is part of the larger dialectic of being and nothingness, because it is part of the depth of being and part of the basic categories that emerge from ontological structure. So the importance of this is going to be that in the discussion of finitude the apprehension of our own finitude and what we make of that vis a vi Being itself and it meaning in terms of the object of ultimate concern is hinged upon self understanding, and understanding of self in relation to the world as a crucial aspect of the depth of being; thus this will figure into understanding being itself as indicative of the object of ultimate concern. As shall be seen the object of ultimate concern is indicative of the divine aspect of Being itself, or “holy being.”
The self world polarity is the basis of the subject/object structure of reason, according to Tillich. [21] The world is seen as a structured whole, as such it is called “objective” because the many self-world relationships in being all relate more or less the same basic idea of a world. The self is a structure of “centeredness” in terms of awareness, for this reason it is termed “subjective.” In other words subjective refers to the center of awareness which takes in the sense data and relates itself to that which is beyond itself, the world. Objective refers to the single “outside” nature of that which is shared in this awareness by the many selves. Reason is actually makes these, that is it makes the self a “self” and the world a “world.” This is because it is through our constructs of reason that we attach meaning to these terms and understand them in relation to each other, which is a function of their structured relationship. Without the structuring aspect of reason being would be chaos. “Where there is reason there is a self and a world in interdependence.”[22] In cognitive terms anything toward which the cognition is directed is considered an object, be it God, or individual items in nature, attitudes, or ideas. We cannot resist making God an object for this very reason. If we think about the concept of God we make God an object. This holds a danger, however, in that we tend to objectify that which we hold in this act of cognition. “If God is brought into the subject-object structure of being he ceases to be the ground of being and becomes one being among others (first of all a being beside the subject who looks at him as an object). He ceases to be the God who is really God. “[23] Various theologies try to escape this problem in various ways. The prophetic tradition insists that we cannot see God; sight is the most objectifying aspect of cognition. Knowledge of God is reveled and understood through man, thus even when God becomes the object God remains the subject (this is just how Tillich puts it).[24]Mysticism attempts to overcome the problem by ecstatic union. In whatever way the resolution is achieved it must be to acknowledge that no language of God can make God an object. Thus language about God must be either negative, or analogical.
There is another sense in which something is made into an object, according to Tillich, that is in robbing it of all of its subjective elements. That is, to turn something into a “thing.” We resist calling human beings “things” because our subjective qualities lead us to disvalue mere things as inhuman, and to value humanity because of its subjective elements. [25] One of Tillich’s major concerns is that God not be treated as a “thing.” For those who believe that Tillich is reducing God to the level of an impersonal force or mere abstraction this is another rebuff. But atheists reduce God to the level of a thing, and turn God into another thing in creation alongside all the many things we see in the world. This has nothing to do with personality but it does mean God can’t be conceived as just an impersonal force or a mere abstraction without defeating Tillich’s purpose. He does not include this argument, but it seems rather clear from what he says. The reductionistic atheist reduces all things to the level of “a thing” devoid of subjective elements. Atheists greatly fear subjectivity. That’s always the bottom line in all of their refutations of God arguments, “that’s subjective.” The reductionist view-point treats all sense data as “information” and information is a collection of things, which can be homogenized and abstracted into “data” and “reduced” to it’s most basic level which of course would lose any subjective elements as it loses the phenomena that makes the aspect that which requires reducing to fit into the atheist world view. The reductionist sees human perceptive powers and thought as side effects of chemicals and brain function that makes thought “mere subjectivity” and that is among the phenomena to be lost in explaining human consciousness. To reduce humanity to “a thing” one must reduce human consciousness to a mere epiphenomenon. Parmenides saw the basic ontological structure as the unity of being and the word (logos) in which it is grasped. Thus from this Tillich draws the observation that subjectivity is not an epiphenomena but a primary phenomena although related in polar opposite to objectivity.[26] One cannot derive subjectivity from objectivity or vice versa. The attempt to do so has meant either the subjugation of humanity to numbers and to machines, or the romantic rebellion and undisclosed abandon which sacrifice reason. Tillich asserts that the basic ontological structure cannot be derived. The relation is one of polarity. “What precedes the duality of self and world, of subject and object,” he asks? His answer is that this is a question in which “reason looks into its own abyss—an abyss in which distinction and derivation disappear, only revelation can answer this question.” [27]


[6] Tillich, ST I, 163.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid., 163-64
[9] Ibid, 164
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Tillich, History…, op cit, 541.
[14] Tillich, ST 1, 166
[15] Tillich, ST I, 164.
[16] Ibid, 166
[17] Ibid, 168
[18] Ibid., 169-170.
[19] Tillich, Courage…, op cit, find
[20] Tillich ST I 169.
[21] Ibid., 171
[22] Ibid, 172
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Tillich, System I, 173
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid, 174.

32 comments:

  1. I definitely agree with the last few sentences that reason look into its own abyss where distinction and derivation disappear and where only revelation can appear(my paraphrase).

    My problem with Tillich putting so much emphasis on Being is that there are things like consciousness, freedom, process, potentiality where it seems like 'being' and 'nothingness' intermingle or enter into a dialectical relationship, as you mentioned.

    If I think about what I 'am,' I'm not just what I factually am at the present. I'm my past and my future, I'm what I am not yet and no longer am. (Yes, I have to use the verb "am" but this points out an unavoidable limitation of language and thought.) There's this central paradox of being a person (we are what we are not), and if we, very finite creatures, are this way, how much more , infinitely more, would God transcend this being/nothingness binary?

    As I said in my previous post, we should be wary of putting too much emphasis on our categories and dualities. Perhaps terms like "Being" and "Nothingness", even if they have an 'absolute' meaning, may for the most part have meanings relative to the context of what we are talking about at the moment, and those absolute meanings may be beyond our reach.

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  2. If I think about what I 'am,' I'm not just what I factually am at the present. I'm my past and my future, I'm what I am not yet and no longer am. (Yes, I have to use the verb "am" but this points out an unavoidable limitation of language and thought.) There's this central paradox of being a person (we are what we are not), and if we, very finite creatures, are this way, how much more , infinitely more, would God transcend this being/nothingness binary?

    there you have being and becoming, But the infinite doesn't have becoming, it is already.

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  3. Even if that were true, and I'm not conceding that it is, that's not really my point. My point was that things like becoming and freedom point up that the being/nothingness distinction is not that simple or clear-cut. It's not necessarily a simple off/on switch.

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  4. The fact that there's something rather than nothing cannot be caused, because causation presupposes something and not nothing.

    The fact that there's order and not disorder cannot be caused, because causation presupposes order and not disorder.

    Since being and order cannot be caused, they cannot be contingent. Nor can they be impossible, because here they are. So being and order must be necessary.

    Since being and order are necessary and uncaused, they cannot be designed nor created. Since being and order were not designed nor created, they cannot be attributed to the will of an ultimate creator.

    Since being and order simply are, without the will of an ultimate creator, an ultimate creator is superfluous - and thus, by definition, also impossible.

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  5. ficciones said...
    The fact that there's something rather than nothing cannot be caused, because causation presupposes something and not nothing.

    Being has to be eternal. That fits with belief in God.

    The fact that there's order and not disorder cannot be caused, because causation presupposes order and not disorder.


    Order sure as hell is caused,God - Ordering principle.

    Since being and order cannot be caused, they cannot be contingent. Nor can they be impossible, because here they are. So being and order must be necessary.

    Order is an effect of a ordering cripple, Being is certainty accused. individual instances of being are caused not being itself,



    Since being and order are necessary and uncased, they cannot be designed nor created. Since being and order were not designed nor created, they cannot be attributed to the will of an ultimate creator.

    you have done nothing to substantiate this dilly idea

    Since being and order simply are, without the will of an ultimate creator, an ultimate creator is superfluous - and thus, by definition, also impossible.

    opinionated BS

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  6. That poster is unaware that being has two major forms: Being itself and the begins, the beings are temporal and contingent being itself is eternal. The beings are created by Being itself,which is God.

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  7. "The beings are created by Being itself, which is God."

    Nope, sorry. Here you've reified being.

    Being is not an entity, a thing that creates other things.

    Being is that-there-is-something.

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  8. The fact that there's something rather than nothing cannot be caused, because causation presupposes something and not nothing.

    The fact that there's order and not disorder cannot be caused, because causation presupposes order and not disorder.

    Since being and order cannot be caused, they cannot be contingent. Nor can they be impossible, because here they are. So being and order must be necessary.

    Since being and order are necessary and uncaused, they cannot be designed nor created. Since being and order were not designed nor created, they cannot be attributed to the will of an ultimate creator.

    Since being and order simply are, without the will of an ultimate creator, an ultimate creator is superfluous - and thus, by definition, also impossible.


    Sounds like there might be some equivocation going on.

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  9. ficciones said...
    "The beings are created by Being itself, which is God."

    Nope, sorry. Here you've reified being.

    Being is not an entity, a thing that creates other things.

    Being is that-there-is-something.

    11:34 AM


    noisome sorry you are ignorant m this is a major conversation in theology you kiniow nothing about, go read Tillich.

    who sassy God is an entity?

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  10. "Since being and order simply are, without the will of an ultimate creator, an ultimate creator is superfluous - and thus, by definition, also impossible."

    again that is just an unsubstantiated opinion

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  11. "Sounds like there might be some equivocation going on."

    Sounds like the beginning of an honest critique and an honest dialogue. But you need to lay out your ideas. Equivocation between what, and what?

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  12. sounds like you know everything, can you try to substantiate just one thing you said?

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  13. "who sassy God is an entity?"

    You do, when you write "The beings are created by Being itself, which is God."

    Your conception of being is insufficiently metaphysical and general. You've mixed it up with specific qualities to create a God like Santa creating toys in His cosmic toy-shop.

    There are reasons why specific things come to be. "Why is there this specific thing" is an empirical question. And such a question has answers, at least in principle. But "why are there things at all, why is there something and not nothing" is a metaphysical question, and the answer can't be a cause in the sense of (A) causes (B) - because (A) would already be something and not nothing.

    Everything can't come from something, because something would be everything. Since there's nothing that everything came from, we might say that everything came from - nothing. ;-)

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  14. Additionally, when you say that "being has two major forms" - well, neither of those are being itself, which would by definition subsume all forms of being. You're not actually addressing the question of being itself. You're just slicing up the pie and declaring one slice the boss.

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  15. Me"who sassy God is an entity?"

    ficcionesYou do, when you write "The beings are created by Being itself, which is God."

    Your reasoning here is circular you clealry think God is an entity you assert that any reference to God is reference to an entity,I did not say I regard God in that manner,

    Your conception of being is insufficiently metaphysical and general. You've mixed it up with specific qualities to create a God like Santa creating toys in His cosmic toy-shop.

    You mean Paul Tillich, John Macquarrie. and Has urs Von Balthesar do that.No we don't. "insufficiently metaphysical" (whatever the hell that means) nothing be more metaphysical than being itself,



    There are reasons why specific things come to be. "Why is there this specific thing" is an empirical question. And such a question has answers, at least in principle. But "why are there things at all, why is there something and not nothing" is a metaphysical question, and the answer can't be a cause in the sense of (A) causes (B) - because (A) would already be something and not nothing.

    stop tying to sound brilliant and think logically about what you just said. When Heidegger brought up that question as the metaphysical quandary he did not mean to imply that particulars are not caused. Obviously that does not undo the great chain of being from which the cosmological argument took it's shape. Christian theology is supremely metaphysical but always assumed the universe and all in it are
    God's creation. God is uncreated,and God is being itself




    Everything can't come from something, because something would be everything. Since there's nothing that everythin

    Your attempts to reinvent the wheel are not producing a round object, you need to study the thinkers of the Christian tradition. Yes everything in physical material reality can come from something and in fact must, since we everything natural is caused everything has to have a cause,logicality the cause can't be nothing so it must be it must be something,

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  16. Additionally, when you say that "being has two major forms" - well, neither of those are being itself,

    that;s what I had in mind when I said it. So obviously that what was the meaning. Is it a true statement? you have given me no reason to think it not so.


    which would by definition subsume all forms of being.

    It does. Everything is either being itself or a product of being itself


    You're not actually addressing the question of being itself. You're just slicing up the pie and declaring one slice the boss.

    You mean thinkers from St. Augustine to Paul Tillich are doing that, No you need read some books on this subject, I recommend Tillich's systematic theology Vol. I

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  17. A longer version of my argument is here.

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  18. The fact that there's something rather than nothing cannot be caused, because causation presupposes something and not nothing.


    the fact that something is eternal is derived from the eternal nature of being ,That is perfectly in line with my view. Cause presupposes something yet so does the God concept and so does being itself. So that statement the first one he makes is meaningless

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  19. no where in your argument do you ever give actual reason as to why being can't be created.

    You also ignore the fact that God is being itself. So the uncreated creator is being and the beings are merely participating in being. But the actual thing of being is God which is eteral,so your BS about being not being created actually does not speak agaisnt God who is not created.

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  20. the lynch pin of his argument:

    If there is something rather than nothing - being rather than utter nonbeing - then this cannot have a cause, since anything that might be called a cause must itself be in some sense. If being cannot have a cause, then it cannot be caused by a creator.

    Order is imposed by ordering principles. We know that causes exist in nature, so obviously his premise about being can't be caused does not apply. We observe the beings being caused all the time.

    Being itself is not caused but that's God who is known to be eternal so his argument tells us nothing,

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  21. Sounds like the beginning of an honest critique and an honest dialogue. But you need to lay out your ideas. Equivocation between what, and what?

    Being and order are uncreatable because you need being and order to create being and order. And as far as I can tell, that's all, folks! The entirety of the argument.

    If there is something rather than nothing -- being rather than utter nonbeing--then this cannot have a cause since anything that might be called a cause must itself be in some sense. If being cannot have a cause, then it cannot be causes by a creator.

    The first possible equivocation involves the word "being." The CA cannot entail that being as a metaphysical category is caused. That makes no sense. The argument is that finite contingent beings are caused or at least that there is some sufficient reason for the existence of such beings.

    If there is order rather than disorder, then this likewise cannot have a cause, since to say that something was caused is to presuppose that order was already in place.

    The order referred to, to make any sense, would have to be the order we see around us exhibited in finite, contingent beings. That's the second possible equivocation. This is why the CA is rarely if ever invoked to explain or justify the order of mathematics or logic.

    Other possible equivocations involve use of the words "cause" and "create." Since no one has a clear grasp of these terms, this problem is greatly compounded when talking about a supernatural, infinite God putatively 'causing' and 'creating' space time etc. To use these terms in this context is misleading and maybe a little tendentious. "Sufficient reason" would be less controversial.

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  22. Keep reading. I address your points in the longer version.

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  23. show me where you think you have answered anything I said.

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  24. "Being and order are uncreatable because you need being and order to create being and order. And as far as I can tell, that's all, folks! The entirety of the argument."

    Fascinating how no one can read the second half of my argument, the part that begins "Theists might say..." It's a miracle!

    "The first possible equivocation involves the word "being." The CA cannot entail that being as a metaphysical category is caused."

    Well, precisely. I'm undercutting the CA. I'm pointing out that being as a metaphysical category - somethingness - is necessarily uncaused and uncreated. So why posit a creator?

    "That makes no sense. The argument is that finite contingent beings are caused or at least that there is some sufficient reason for the existence of such beings."

    Here's a thought: individual finite contingent beings come into existence and pass out of existence. But contingency as a metaphysical category is necessarily uncaused. To assume that contingency can be caused or created is to assume that contingency already exists - that states of affairs can change, can come into and pass out of being. I should write an addendum.

    "The order referred to, to make any sense, would have to be the order we see around us exhibited in finite, contingent beings. That's the second possible equivocation. This is why the CA is rarely if ever invoked to explain or justify the order of mathematics or logic."

    My argument undercuts just about every species of philosophical argument for God - the CA, modal arguments, presuppositional arguments and so forth. Order in the most general metaphysical sense transcends both the order we see around us and the order of mathematics and logic.

    "Other possible equivocations involve use of the words "cause" and "create." Since no one has a clear grasp of these terms, this problem is greatly compounded when talking about a supernatural, infinite God putatively 'causing' and 'creating' space time etc."

    Let's talk about types of cause, in the Aristotelian sense: material cause, formal cause, efficient cause and final cause. We've determined that being and order cannot be brought into being by efficient and final causes, because both of those assume there is already being and order. And material and formal are analogues for being and order. So what's left?

    "To use these terms in this context is misleading and maybe a little tendentious. "Sufficient reason" would be less controversial."

    Well, there certainly is sufficient reason in necessity. Being and order are necessary.

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  25. "show me where you think you have answered anything I said."

    As I said to Mr. Stooge, no one seems to read and absorb the second half of my argument. Here it is again:

    Theists might say, well, how do you know that being and order aren't ultimately properties of, or somehow "within", God? But being and order transcend and are presupposed by the conception of any specific entity, such as a God - just as stone transcends any form it might possibly take - a mountain, a canyon, or a sculpture. Being and order don't entail God any more than stone entails Michelangelo's David.

    Note that this is so even if you try to equate God with "being itself", since being and order need not - and when understood in the most abstract, metaphysical, unconditioned and general sense, cannot - have the personal and providential qualities nor the agency associated with God. To put it another way, the conception of God necessarily involves being and order, but the conception of being and order doesn't necessarily involve God.

    It follows that any hypothetical godlike being would be contingent, merely representing one form that being and order might take. Since that contingent form would itself stand in need of causal explanation, it would not be the ultimate, eternal and transcendent God that classical theism strives to substantiate. Capital-G God is therefore impossible, and a small-g god, à la Zeus - though logically conceivable as a caused and contingent entity - cannot be the root of the metaphysical hierarchy, a position inherently filled by natural being and order. These are the true "first things", which are neither God nor created by God.

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  26. ficciones, did you see today's post? It's more on being itself



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  27. "Being and order are uncreatable because you need being and order to create being and order. And as far as I can tell, that's all, folks! The entirety of the argument."

    All that means is that if you have being and order existing eternally, a with God, then it can produce more being and order along the lines of it's own image. You say B/O are unrepeatable because you must already have them. But we do have them in God who is eternal ad not rated so why can't Gd create more of them?

    Fascinating how no one can read the second half of my argument, the part that begins "Theists might say..." It's a miracle!

    I read the whole thing,It;s utter BS.

    "The first possible equivocation involves the word "being." The CA cannot entail that being as a metaphysical category is caused."

    Again you never say why, Since we know we have causes in nature it is obvious that being can be caused, we see them caused all the time,

    Well, precisely. I'm undercutting the CA. I'm pointing out that being as a metaphysical category - somethingness - is necessarily uncaused and uncreated. So why posit a creator?

    Because God is uncased and um created. The average atheist will argue the oppose, that there is no uncased being. you have not undercut the CA because the CA does not put contingent natural beings on the same level as being itelkf. These are two different levels of being,

    "That makes no sense. The argument is that finite contingent beings are caused or at least that there is some sufficient reason for the existence of such beings."

    Here's a thought: individual finite contingent beings come into existence and pass out of existence. But contingency as a metaphysical category is necessarily uncaused.

    Here's another thought you are violating the dictum existence is not a predicate. You are making existent contingencies into double entities one for the thing itself the other for the contingent nature it fulfills, that's nonsense. Physical objects are contingent as to their mode of existnece but they are not endued with contingency as a dancer with gracefulness,


    To assume that contingency can be caused or created is to assume that contingency already exists - that states of affairs can change, can come into and pass out of being. I should write an addendum.

    that is a violation of the predicate rule. contingent things are contingent in mode not in essence,

    "The order referred to, to make any sense, would have to be the order we see around us exhibited in finite, contingent beings. That's the second possible equivocation. This is why the CA is rarely if ever invoked to explain or justify the order of mathematics or logic."

    My argument undercuts just about every species of philosophical argument for God..

    yes and the logic they are based upon, hey I just blew your argument out of the water,


    - the CA, modal arguments, presuppositional arguments and so forth. Order in the most general metaphysical sense transcends both the order we see around us and the order of mathematics and logic.


    that is BS you do noting to prove it, you argument so far is based on upon conflating mode with essence, you seem to just forget that in the natural world everything needs a cause and it is all contingent,

    "Other possible equivocations involve use of the words "cause" and "create." Since no one has a clear grasp of these terms, this problem is greatly compounded when talking about a supernatural, infinite God putatively 'causing' and 'creating' space time etc."

    show me some evidence that,I have a pretty idea that I know what both words mean,I took out the rest your basic assumptions are unsound,

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  28. "show me where you think you have answered anything I said."

    As I said to Mr. Stooge, no one seems to read and absorb the second half of my argument. Here it is again:

    Theists might say, well, how do you know that being and order aren't ultimately properties of, or somehow "within", God? But being and order transcend and are presupposed by the conception of any specific entity, such as a God - just as stone transcends any form it might possibly take - a mountain, a canyon, or a sculpture. Being and order don't entail God any more than stone entails Michelangelo's David.


    you are not proving anything, you are ask how do you Know? you just answer with more things that need proving.You being an order transcend a specific entity.

    (1) God is not an entity that's the point of saying he not a being but being itself,

    (2) analogies are not proof, saying order is not a property just as stone transcends any form it might possibly take. That's analogy not a proof, you don't show it relates


    (3) It's a meaningless analogy:"just as stone transcends any form it might possibly take " what the hell does that mean? whatever you mean by it that does not prove anything about God but I say it's a meaningless statement.

    Note that this is so even if you try to equate God with "being itself", since being and order need not -

    Need not what? do try to use complete sentences.


    and when understood in the most abstract, metaphysical, unconditioned and general sense, cannot - have the personal and providential qualities nor the agency associated with God.

    Really? how do you know? and why not because you can't imagine it?


    To put it another way, the conception of God necessarily involves being and order, but the conception of being and order doesn't necessarily involve God.


    That's really a different argument than you seemed to make above. although I admit its never very clear. Being does involve God. As Tillich says God is the word we use to describe being itself. Now in terms of order I don't think you have any idea what order is. You seem to assert its some sort of platonic forms as stone is a platonic form that transcends rocks. Order is imposed by some ordering principle. It might impersonal as or it might be designed, in the case of designed order it is imposed by a mind a plan in a mind. That's what Logos means That's why it is said Jesus is the logos because he's the ordering principle that imposed order upon creation,



    It follows that any hypothetical godlike being would be contingent, merely representing one form that being and order might take.

    Only if you assert God is a big man on thrown with a white beard,that's the point of talking about being itself,to get away from that kind of thinking.



    Since that contingent form would itself stand in need of causal explanation, it would not be the ultimate, eternal and transcendent God that classical theism strives to substantiate.


    I am not aware of any modern version of theism that limits God to some cartoon character like big man on a throne. Obviously you forget I'm defending God as being itself so he has no form



    5:59 AM

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  29. It follows that any hypothetical godlike being would be contingent, merely representing one form that being and order might take. Since that contingent form would itself stand in need of causal explanation, it would not be the ultimate, eternal and transcendent God that classical theism strives to substantiate.

    the Bible says God has no form That's why it;s a violation of the commandments to make a graven image. When God us seen in a certain way in the Bible it;s just a place holier just poetic image not God's form,

    Capital-G God is therefore impossible, and a small-g god, à la Zeus - though logically conceivable as a caused and contingent entity - cannot be the root of the metaphysical hierarchy, a position inherently filled by natural being and order. These are the true "first things", which are neither God nor created by God.


    God is being itself and talk about God is analogy

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  30. Fascinating how no one can read the second half of my argument, the part that begins "Theists might say..." It's a miracle!

    I did read it. I wasn't aware that it was worth responding to since I didn't see anything there that bolstered your case.

    You assume that God is an "entity" like Michelangelo's David. You also assume that being and order must inhere as ultimate properties of God and God alone. Being and order do not have to "entail" God. No one says the demonstration of God's existence is analytic. God's necessity wouldn't be logical but ontological.

    Note that this is so even if you try to equate god with "being itself," since being and order need not--and when understood in the most abstract, metaphysical, unconditioned, and general sense, cannot--have the personal and providential qualities nor the agency associated with God.

    Something can be complex on the level of properties while simple on the level of actual parts. I'd like to know where your absolute certainty about what is possible as to God's nature derives from ;)

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  31. Correction: You're not assuming the things I wrote that you think theists assume, but the hypotheticals you posit are all kind of silly :) That's what I meant. More to come as i have more time.

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  32. Here's a thought: individual finite contingent beings come into existence and pass out of existence. But contingency as a metaphysical category is necessarily uncaused. To assume that contingency can be caused or created is to assume that contingency already exists - that states of affairs can change, can come into and pass out of being. I should write an addendum.

    Metaphysical categories, asaik, aren't in the causal business. Even if there were nothing contingent, there would still "be" a category of contingency. It would happen to be a null category.(The copula "be" has to be used above not literally but more as a function of the limits of linguistic discourse.)

    My argument undercuts just about every species of philosophical argument for God - the CA, modal arguments, presuppositional arguments and so forth. Order in the most general metaphysical sense transcends both the order we see around us and the order of mathematics and logic.

    How does your argument undercut the existence of order in contingent beings? There is an abstract category of order, but this category has no self-evident causal power. For all we know this category is a generalization of the various species of order we encounter in experience. Unless you're a full on Platonist...?

    Let's talk about types of cause, in the Aristotelian sense: material cause, formal cause, efficient cause and final cause. We've determined that being and order cannot be brought into being by efficient and final causes, because both of those assume there is already being and order. And material and formal are analogues for being and order. So what's left?

    But I've never argued that being and order be brought about ex nihilo. That's absurd. Only that a certain type of being and order is brought about or at least explainable through sufficienct reason.

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