Sunday, March 06, 2011

What do you put in place of science to prove theology?:Tillich, Phenomenology and Theolgoical Method

Photobucket

Paul Tillich

Athesits are always talking about how stupid theology is. "I don't have to read the theology because I know it's stupid." I hear various ones (not all but many) say that all the time. I would like them to actually read some theology and tell me why it's stupid. Here is some theology for them to read. They are always saying "what else would you use but scinece?" What that really means is their self selected set of facts form scinece that back their ideology, excluding those that disprove their ideology. My answer to them is "phenomenology." But you have to read this to know how it works.

Enter Tillich

Born August 20, 1886, in Starzeddel, then a province of Brandenberg, Germany (now part of Poland), family moved to Berlin 1900. His father was a Luthern Pastor. He was ordained as a Luthern Pastor in 1912 and kicked around giving lectures at various universities: Berlin, Dresden and Frankfurt.[i]

His liberalism and opposition to the Nazi movement led to his dismissal in 1933. Fortunately, Reinhold Niebuhr, whom he had met in Germany, offered him a position at the Union Theological Seminary in New York. Tillich became a U.S. citizen in 1940, then took up a position at Harvard in 1954, followed by one at the University of Chicago in 1962, where he was to remain until the end of his life.[ii]

Paul Tillich is the central figure in the current effort; Heidegger is definitely a major influence upon Tillich. Be that as it may the great Theologian did not merely copy off the philosopher’s understanding of being. Tillich was a influenced by Heidegger philosophically, but was also his political enemy. The former was a leftist and a socialist, the latter a right-winger and Nazi. Tillich was coming from the perspective of a larger tradition; Christian theology is not all Aristotelian, there’s a whole Platonic wing that produced centuries of complex and brilliant ferment form which the average communicant is totally cut off. That tradition also has it’s own take on being. Tillich lived in that tradition like a fish lives in water. Perhaps it was Heidegger’s connection with the “life world” that gave him his connection to Nazism through the notion of the folks, the soil, the people and their traditions.[iii] It’s easy for us to judge looking back on Nazism as the emblematic evil, while we forget many intelligent people were duped by it. Perhaps it was Tillich’s connection with the medievalists and his love of the Platonic that enabled him to see the valuable connections in Heidegger’s ties to the past. Tillich was not a dusty scholar, however, stuck in the library with no connection to the life of the day. He was a vibrant intellectual of modernity and he constantly tried to bring his medievalism into the present and understand it in a modern light. He used Heidegger to modernize. Nevertheless, in the world of their present, however, Germany of the 1930’s these arid philosophical issues took on a concrescence of life and death.

Tillich’s response to the political situation of his day was a proving ground for his theological method, and he responded to the crisis of Germany in the twenties and thirties the same way he responded to modern theology; by relating the human situation in which he lived to the larger picture of faith and the Christian and seeking the psychological points of contact where the human perception of God manifested it in symbolic terms pointing to our ultimate concerns. Tillich contrasts “Kerygmatic” theology with “apologetics.” Kerygma refers to the unchanging truth, and this contrasted with the temporal situation, always in flux.[iv] Tillich’s concept of “the situation” includes the cultural context of time and place. Tillich is the embodiment of his own concerns. He more than any other theologian of the twentieth century, personified liberal theological credo; translating the timeless truth of the Gospel into the moment in one’s own cultural context, as he advocated doing.

Tillich’s major methodological move is called “correlation.” In a nut shell, he correlates the great truths of Christian doctrine, though an understanding of the symbols it uses, with the existential apprehensions within the current situation, when the two stack up in some way, he lined them up.[v] Tillich understood this as a philosophical task, even for theologians. The task of the philosopher must draw upon material from all realms of culture.[vi] One central question give focus to the entire inquiry: what does it mean to exist? Tillich understood this as an “existential” analysis. The cultural context of this term as used in that era meant that the question was central to human understanding.[vii] The term “existential” is closely related to phenomenology. Both deal with allowing the sense data to suggest the categories into which we organize the data. Both deal with human understanding as rooted in its own immediate life situation. It begins with the perspective of the individual in the concrete situation. One immediate implication of this aspect is that it might suggest that we ignore the phony Aristotelian perspective of which atheists try to hard to root themselves, the “rational man,” the “scientist” (meaning “reductionist”) who decides before the tally is ever made that there can’t be anything beyond the material. This “rational man” is a phony place to start because it automatically rules out the transcendent, the sacred, the aspects of human existence that have always meant the most to people. It assumes form the beginning that there’s “nothing there” and reality must be defined by pre set ideology involving the wearing of white lab coats.

As the term “existential” implies, the perspective is concerned with the meaning of existence. According to Tillich’s perspective of the existential self understanding rooted in the standard point of the meaning of existence was the primary issue and fundamental problem around which all of human understanding orbits. “Existence is the question which underlies all other questions.”[viii] Yet Tillich did not pin the answer upon existentialist dogma. Nor did he root the answer in the situation itself. The answer would not come from the situation but from the universal and timeless message brought by the symbols of the Christian faith. This is no retreat to the ivory tower; it’s an attempt to bring the truth of the message to the place where it is needed, the actual concrete situation of life, and to apply in a relevant way. Tillich said “the method of correlation explains the content of the Christian faith through existential questions and theological answers in mutual interdependence.”[ix]

The term “correlation” Tillich uses in three different ways. It can indicate the correspondence of a series of different sets of data; it can designate the interdependence of concepts; or it can designate the real interdependence of things in structural wholes.[x]

There is a correlation in the sense of correspondence between religious symbols and that which is symbolized by them. There is a correlation in the sense between concepts denoting the human and those denoting the divine. There is a correlation in the factual sense between man’s ultimate concern and that about which he is ultimately concerned. The first meaning of correlation refers to the central problem of religious knowledge…the second meaning of correlation determines the statements about God and the world, for example the correlation of infinite and finite. The third meaning of correlation qualifies the divine human relation within religious experience…[xi]

This is a crucial passage in Tillich, because these concepts, his take on symbols and their participation in what they symbolize, the use of symbols as the delivery system for revelation, meaning, answers, as well as the religion of the eternal and the temporal, these are the concepts which form the basic engine of his ontotheology. [xii] In the next chapter these concepts will be crucial in formulating the meaning of “being itself, “ or “the ground of being.” There has been a certain degree of fear expressed by various theological concerns that correlation relativizes the divine or makes God dependent upon man. Tillich argues that God is not dependent upon man but our understanding of God’s revelation to us is dependent upon our willingness to understand. Solidarity between humans and the divine is dependent upon our willingness to be in solidarity.[xiii] Thus it is also dependent upon our wiliness to seek correlation.

The methodology of correlation proceeds as follows: In analyzing the human situation the theologian demonstrates that symbols used in the Christian message offer answers to the existential questions that arise. The answers are much older than existentialism. Tillich points out that they are as old as humanity and they have been expressed in many ways since humans began to think philosophically.[xiv] In pondering our existential condition we realize that we are strangers in the world and we can’t penetrate beyond the surface level of science. In coming to grasp this realization we also realize that we ourselves are the answer to this problem. Because we are human, because we are trapped in an existential dilemma we automatically have the credentials and the method for moving beyond the surface level, which is the level of science, and penetrating the nature of being. Though our state as examples of being for itself we are able to understand the nature of existence. This is where we can employ philosophical thinking in understanding our own being. “whoever has penetrated into the nature of his own finitude can find the traces finitude in everything that exists. And he can ask the questions implied in his finitude as the question implied in finitude universally.”[xv]

The Scientific Argument

At this point I can hear the critics, the atheist reader saying “this approach still has none of the virtues of science.” The argument would say science is the only reliable and systematic means of verification for claims one makes about reality. Reliable and systematic are important, and that leads to the concepts of verification, prediction, replicability. Without scientific methods there are no way to guarantee such things, those are the bottom line of scientific work. The more ideologically oriented critic is going to be saying “this is all made up, this is just philosophy, and philosophy is made up crap, only with science can you have this assurance that you have a factually based solid principle.” I’ve already discussed the problem with that concept. Their “factually based” principles are based upon a selective set of facts. It should be enough to point out the ideological nature of a line of thinking to cast doubt upon it. We’ve already discussed the limitations of science. The argument originally is that science can’t get at God. God is beyond our understanding, not given in sense data, the basis of reality, and thus can’t be an object of empirical study. Given the fact that science is not available we are looking for alterative. This is not a matter replacing science with a mutually exclusive from of discovery. It’s a matter of what to do with the gaps where science can’t function.

First, there is an inherent foolishness in expecting theology to do what science does. The skeptics don’t like theology, they don’t want theology to do its job, they don’t understand its job. For atheists science is their er zots religion; it functions for them as a religion. They see theology as transgression against science because it’s a competing form of religiosity. Yet since science is limited in its ability to grasp the divine, it’s not a fit tool for the job. At least in the sense of replacing theology totally, science is not the tool. The skeptic is going to have to allow theology to do what it does, of course that assumes the skeptic listens long enough to get some idea of what theology is supposed to do. We can’t have scientific results, but we should not expect them. We can use science in a way that employs them where divine aspects overlap with empirical data, but we can’t expect the kind of “certainty” and selective pretense of “factual” view point that we from science. The ideology of scientism, the view that says only science counts as knowledge, doesn’t offer the sort of certainty it pretends to, it is merely the pretense of objectivity. The scientistic ideologue cuts off reality at the point where her data ends. If the scientific method cannot be used to deliver certainty then the scientistic adherent just assumes that there is no reality beyond that point. Reality is trucked and closed in on itself as only that which can be controlled through empirical understanding. There is a tendency among legitimate scientific thinkers to follow in the wake of the ideology. This demand for certainty and factualism is actually a bid for control. Phenomenology teaches us to open up to possibilities, to accept that reality is bigger than our understanding. We are not seeking to control but to discover.

Secondly, my standard is global knowledge. I do not push to replace science with theology but to use all we have and use it in an appropriate way. We should use science in conjunction with theology in a manner that employs scientific thinking and methods when and where they are appropriate for the task. There are areas where science is used effectively to tell us something about theological truth; the M scale developed by Ralph Hood that measures the validity of one’s “religious” experience with respect to it’s “mystical” authentication. A huge body of empirical scientific work has been done to understand the effect of mystical experience upon the receiver of that experience.[xvi] Yet, we can’t translate that data into an argument about the existence of God without understanding the proper limits of science and then using theological method in its proper perspective. We should never expect the same kind of results with get with science. We can employ scientific understanding in those areas where we have the possibility of empirical results, and extrapolate from those results by means of deductive reasoning.

The Co-determinate and the Logic of the lamp post

The logic of the lamp post says you should not search for your missing car keys in the dark. You can’t find the keys in the dark so search under the lamp post. If they are to be found that’s where you could find them. One might question this logic on the grounds if we weren’t standing near the lamp post but over in the dark that’s where they will be. Yet there is a lamp post in the quest to answer the God question, that lamp post illuminates the most likely ground. The lamp post is the co-determinate, the concept of Schleiermacher, the “signature,” the trace, the marker that accompanies the presence of God; that would be the effect of experiencing the presence of God. I set out these concepts to a greater degree in The Trace of God.[xvii] This is not phenomenology, although there are overlaps. The Trace of God deals with a huge body of scientific work, mainly from psychology of religion (a much larger sub-discipline than most people realize). This body of work consists of several hundred studies (I say 200 to be conservative) All of which demonstrate that religious experience is life transforming; that is to say it dramatically and profoundly changing life long term is a positive way. This includes self actualization, emotional healing, physical health, mental health, across the board. Those who have such religious experiences are much less likely to be depressed or mentally ill and feel their lives are purposeful and meaningful and score higher on happiness scales than do their religious counterparts, much less unbelievers.

Over the years numerous claims have been made about the nature of spiritual/mystical and Maslow’s “peak experiences”, and about their consequences. Wuthnow (1978) set out to explore findings regarding peak experiences from a systematic random sample of 1000 persons and found that peak experiences are common to a wide cross-section of people, and that one in two has experienced contact with the holy or sacred, more than eight in ten have been moved deeply by the beauty of nature and four in ten have experienced being in harmony with the universe. Of these, more than half in each have had peak experiences which have had deep and lasting effects on their lives. Peakers are more likely also, to say they value working for social change, helping to solve social problems, and helping people in need. Wuthnow stressed the therapeutic value of these experiences and also the need to study the social significance of these experiences in bringing about a world in which problems such as social disintegration, prejudice and poverty can be eradicated. Savage et al., (1995) provided clinical evidence to suggest that peakers produce greater feelings of self-confidence and a deeper sense of meaning and purpose. Mogar’s (1965) research also tended to confirm these findings.

Some researchers in the recent past have found that life satisfaction correlated positively with mystical / spiritual experiences, and these experiences were further found to relate positively to one’s life purpose (Kass, et al., 1991). In fact researchers are of the view that a positive relation between positive affect and mystical experiences may not be surprising given that intense positive affect is often considered to be one of the defining characteristics of these experiences (Noble, 1985; Spilka, Hood & Gorsuch, 1985). The few studies that investigated well-being measures, spirituality and spiritual experience have found that people who have had spiritual experiences are in the normal range of well-being and have a tendency to report more extreme positive feelings than others (Kennedy, Kanthamani & Palmer, 1994; Kennedy & Kanthamani, 1995)…A study by De Roganio (1997) content-analyzed and organized into a paradigm case examples found in themes of 35 lived-experience informants and 14 autobiographers who represented a wide range of people with physical disability and chronic illness. It was found that the combined elements of spiritual transformation, hope, personal control, positive social support and a meaningful energetic life enabled individuals to improve themselves and come to terms with their respective conditions. These experiences led many people to realize their own interest, sense of wholeness and unity, and to experience and integrate a deeper meaning, sense of self and spirituality within their lives….Some studies have offered a spiritual approach to addiction problems. Caroll (1993) found that 100 members of Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) benefited from spirituality which was found to correlate positively with having a purpose in life and the length of sobriety. Frame and Williams (1996), in their study of religions and spiritual dimensions of the African-American culture, address the role of spirituality in shaping identity, and conclude that reconnecting AA clients to their powerful spiritual tradition may be a crucial catalyst for personal empowerment and spiritual liberation. The finding was confirmed in a later study by Wif and Carmen (1996). Another study reported by Green et al., (1998) described the process of spiritual awakening experienced by some persons in recovery during the quest for sobriety. The data suggested that persons in recovery often undergo life altering transformations as a result of embracing a power higher than one’s self i.e., a “higher power”. The result is often the beginning of an intense spiritual journey that leads to sustained abstinence.[xviii]

The most important step in pulling together an understanding of the significance of this work was the development of the “M scale” (Mystical scale) by Ralph Hood Jr. the University of Tennessee, Chattanooga. Hood used the theories of W.T. Stace about the nature of mysticism to construct a questionnaire that measured how closely a person’s experiences conformed to the typology that Stace’s theory suggests.

The scale has been so successful it has become the standard operating procedure[xix] and replaces the former practice of the researcher trying to develop her own scale, a practice that led to as many scales as there were studies. The M scale is by far the most successful and has been cross culturally validated with great successes. It is based on the phenomenological categories of mystical study by W.T. Stace and makes certain assumptions of William James. Hood’s original measuring instrument, the REEM, was based upon the categories of James. The M scale follows the phenomenological development of Stace. The scale uses 32 items (these are questions that are asked of the subject). The items are organized with 16 Positive and 16 negatively worded. Independent studies supported Hood’s original design, (Caird, 1988, Reinert and Stifler, 1993).[xx] Originally M scale measured two factors: (1) Assesses items of an experienced unity (introvertive or extrovertive). (2) Assesses items of a experience of religious or non religious and knowledge claims. This is consistent with Stace’s concept that Mystical experience can be interpreted in many ways. Reinert and Stifler suggested religious items and knowledge items might emerge as separate factors. This would split the interpretative factors between religious and non-religious factors. That would not contradict Stace. There is a distinction between “spiritual” and “religious.” Mystical experience can be interpreted (as we have seen already) as “spiritual” without being thought religious, or as “mystical” without involving God. The two-item approach allows greater interpretation. But the interpretive factor was religious in nature. The assumptions made in the study and taken to answering the questions tended to be religious.[xxi]

Hood changed his strategy from two analytic factors to three (“the three factor solution”). The Three factor solution sets up three categories, which more closely follow the predictions of Stace based upon his reading of mystics and person experience. (“phenomenological”). The three categories for Stace were: Staces’ categories of Introvertive and extrovertive mysticism emerging as two separate factors. The third factor is an interpretive dimension where the respondent relates the experiences to knowledge claims (“God is love” or some such). Interovertive means the mystical experience is beyond word though or image, it is iner directed and not related to any outside phenomenon and I supposed to be beyond description. This will also be discussed more in chapter five (“Religious Apiori”). Extrovertive means the subject’s experience is related to nature or to some external image in the immediate environment, a sense of the numinous, the harmony underlying all of nature or something on that order.[xxii]

The M scale has been tailored to many different cultures and been verified and validated in a half dozen different countries, several cultures and religious traditions.

In a series of empirical measurement based studies employing the Mysticism scale introvertive mysticism emerges both as a distinct factor in exploratory analytic studies[xxiii] and also as a confirming factor analysis in cultures as diverse as the United States and Iran; not only in exploratory factor analytic studies (Hood & Williamson, 2000) but also in confirmatory factor analyses in such diverse cultures as the United States and Iran (Hood, Ghornbani, Watson, Ghramaleki, Bing, Davison, Morris, & Williamson. (2001).[xxiv] In other words, the form of mysticism that is usually said to be beyond description and beyond images, as opposed to that found in connection with images of the natural world, is seen through reflection of data derived form the M scale and as supporting factors in other relations. Scholars supporting the unity thesis (the mystical sense of undifferentiated unity—everything is “one”) have conducted interviews with mystics in other traditions about the nature of their introvertive mystical experiences. These discussions reveal that differences in expression that might be taken as linguistics culturally constructed are essentially indicative of the same experiences. The mystics recognize their experiences even in the expression of other traditions and other cultures. These parishioners represent different forms of Zen and Yoga.[xxv] Scholars conducting literature searches independently of other studies, who sought common experience between different traditions, have found commonalities. Brainaid, found commonality between cultures as diverse as Advanita-Vendanta Hinduism, and Madhmika Buddhism, and Nicene Christianity; Brainaid’s work supports conclusions by Loy with respect to the types of Hinduism and Buddhism.[xxvi]

The M scale developed by Hood has been validated by many studies in cross cultural context, while Greely’s Gallop Poll questions have been used both cross culturally and longitudinally.

The two major exceptions to the lack of shared instrumentation are the mysticism scale by Hood (1975) which has been used in quite a number of studies by Hood and others, and the repeated use of certain questions in survey research by Greeley and the Gallop Organization over a sixteen year period.[xxvii]

Holm (1982) “mysticism and intense experiences” demonstrates another level of cross-cultural validation.

Method: The author translated into Swedish several Hood scales designed to measure mystical experiences. The items describing religious experiences drawn from William James, on Hood’s (1970) Religious Episode Experience Measure (REEM) with narratives taken from Nordic anthologies. Eighteen teachers of religion and psychology each administered the scales to 6-9 persons.

Findings: The study replicated most of Hood’s findings with the same instruments. “The results of our empirical study of mysticism in a Finnish-Swedish environment largely coincide with Hood’s results in an American environment…The cross-cultural testing that some of Hood’s methods have received as a result of our research on another continuant and in another linguistic area means that the results have received a wider range of applications.[xxviii]

Holm (1982) presented a Swedish M scale administered to 122 Swedish “informants.” Factor I correlated best to non Christian profiles, while factor II worked best with those who had Christian assumptions. Holm accounts for a general mysticism factor and general religious factor. This parallels earlier research in Sweden (Solderblom—see Holm 82, 275-76) .[xxix]

The M scale has been validated with Iranian Muslims.

In a mostly Christian American sample (N = 1,379), confirmatory factor analysis of Hood's (1975) Mysticism Scale verified the existence of Stace's (1960) introvertive and extrovertive dimensions of mystical phenomenology along with a separate interpretation factor. A second study confirmed the presence of these three factors in not only another group of Americans (N = 188), but also a sample of Iranian Muslims (N = 185). Relationships of the introvertive and extrovertive factors with the interpretation factor were essentially identical across these two cultures, but the Americans displayed a stronger association between the two phenomenology factors. In both samples, the interpretation factor correlated positively with an intrinsic and negatively with an extrinsic religious orientation, and the introvertive factor predicted psychological dysfunction. Associations of the interpretation factor with relative mental health appeared only in the Iranians. These data offered general support for Stace's phenomenology of mysticism, although the ineffability he linked with interpretation proved to be as much or even more a feature of the introvertive experience, as hypothesized by Hood.[xxx]/[xxxi]

Tillich doesn’t deal with that sort of empirical data. Yet he does begin with empirical religious experience (but does not offer scientific data) and basic concepts like the eternal vs. temporal, the object of ultimate concern and basic ontological concepts grounded in human experience. This lamp post logic enables us to start from an empirical position backed by concrete data. From there we can follow Tillich as he moves from the empirical to the ideal and the symbolic. He has a whole philosophy of the symbolic that understands symbol as participating in that which is symbolized. Thus God can be both a concrete reality and a symbol of human experience. The concrete data provided by these psychological studies and the M scale furnishes us with an understanding of the experience as the co-determinate of the divine, the concept of Schleiermacher. “God is co-present in religious self-consciousness.”[xxxii] The empirical work in psychology referenced by The Trace of God [xxxiii] offer a means of grounding divine/human encounter in the concrete and the measurable. Thus the experiences are established a rational warrant for the assumption of the co-determinate based upon their content and their concrete effects. The experiences offer grounding in the practical to establish the relationship to the transcendent.

Before we can proceed to applying the method to demonstrate that it is a viable method of understanding we must first understand what we are talking about. The central theme of my approach is Tillich’s concept of God as being itself, or as it should be known from historical Christian theology, the superessential Godhead. The next chapter will be a discussion of Tillich’s view in an attempt to explain what it means. That view is heavily laden with philosophical (especially ontological) assumptions. The next three chapters are about explicating this concept. After that I will deal with applying this method to demonstrate something in the way of a truth content that the reader can cling to. I say all of this in hopes that the reader will not being reading the next chapter while thinking “where’s the science! This is just philosophical garbage, how does he know this? Where’s the science?” Yet what one will see in the way of Tillich’s views in this next chapter, an explication of his systematic theology with regard to the concept of ground of being (being itself) will actually demonstrate the method in action. We will see Tillich reasoning out from human experience in the act of being, to conclusions based upon understanding Christian doctrine in light of phenomenological apprehension.

Depth and Eternity

Two major examples that we will see used in the next chapter, concepts of depth and the eternal; by” depth” Tillich speaks of being having depth, as in “there more to it than meets the eye,” and he also uses the phrase in relation to depth psychology. For him the depth of being means “deep” in these of more to it and hard to understand requires knowledge and thought. This is all a reflection of the psychological effects of our experiences in being.

The eternal is also important in understanding human experience. We can’t know the experience of the infinite or the eternal but we can know the experience of the temporal. The disjunction between the concepts, knowing the temporal and longing for the eternal, and the psychological effect that has on human understanding forms an important basis in understanding the nature of being and its depth. Thus in all of his ontology Tillich is reflecting this dialectical approach that works between historical doctrine and human experience. The two coordinate at some point, but doctrines are shaped by humans. Ultimately it’s all a reflection of our understanding of being as gathered first hand from our participation in being.



[i] Sam Addision, Website for Gifford Lectures. “Authors, Paul Tillich.” URL http://www.giffordlectures.org/Author.asp?AuthorID=169 visited 10/20/10.

[ii] Ibid

[iii] find

[iv] Michael Gleghorn. “Paul Tillich’s Theological Method: A Summary Evaluation.” Online PDF file, URL: http://michaelgleghorn.com/documents/PaulTillichsTheology.pdf

visited 10/28/10. no pagination.

Gleghorn is a conservative from Dallas Theological Seminary so his ultimate evaluation of Tillich’s theology is negative. He finds that Tillich is prone to error due to his method. Yet his summary of Tillich’s view is cogent.

[v] Gayton B. Hammond, “An Examination of Tillich’s Method of Correlation.” Oxford Journals: Journal of The American Academy of Religion Vol XXXII, Issue 3, 248-251. On line version URL: http://jaar.oxfordjournals.org/content/XXXII/3/248.extract . Visited 11/8/10, Hammon is professor of Philosophy and Religion at Virginia Polythechnic Institute in Blacksberg Va. Ph.D. Vanderbilt, Yale Divinity School.

[vi] Ibid.

[vii] Ibid.

[viii] Ibid.

[ix] Paul Tillich quoted in Alistter E. McGrath, “Paul Tillich: Method of Corroletion,” The Christian Theology Reader. (online page 53) Maldan Ma, USA: Blackwell Publishing, Alister E. McGrath ed. first published 1995, second edition 2001-2004 Google books online version URL: http://books.google.com/books?id=yDls7tV0mRcC&pg=PA52&lpg=PA52&dq=Paul+Tillich+Method+of+Correlation&source=bl&ots=81AvGNSD_Z&sig=0deQITzlW4LAUyLi10IR0wZdolY&hl=en&ei=-2bJTNTjB4G0lQf66YDBAQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=2&ved=0CB0Q6AEwATgK#v=onepage&q=Paul%20Tillich%20Method%20of%20Correlation&f=true visited 11/8/10.

[x] Ibid.

[xi] Ibid.

[xii] Ontotheology, I understand that this term is used mockingly of thinkers such as Tillich. It’s like the term “phalologocentric” it’s a means of saying “this is out of date,” ‘this is opposed to our truth regime.” I therefore use it proudly and defiantly.

[xiii] Tillich in McGrath, Ibid.

[xiv] Ibid. 54

[xv] Ibid.

[xvi] J.L. Hinman, The Trace of God. Colorado Springs: Grand Viaduct, 2010.

[xvii] Ibid.

[xviii] K. Krishna Mohan, “Spirituality and Well Being, an Overview,” presentation made during the Second International Conference on Integral Psychology, held at Pondicherry (India), 4-7 January 2001. The text has been published in:
Cornelissen, Matthijs (Ed.) (2001) Consciousness and Its Transformation,
Pondicherry: SAICE on the Indian Psychology Insitute website URL:http://ipi.org.in/texts/ip2/ip2-4.5-.htm visited 11/11/10

[xix] Bernard Spilka, Ralph Hood Jr., Bruce Hunsberger, Richard Gorwuch. The Psychology of Religion: An Empirical Approach. New York, London: the Guildford Press, 2003, 323.

[xx]Ibid.

[xxi] Ibid,

[xxii] Hinman, Trace of God. Chapter four: “Studies.”

[xxiii] Ralph Hood Jr., W.P. Williamson. “An empirical test of the unity thesis: The structure of mystical descriptors in various faith samples.” Journal of Christianity and Psychology, 19, (2000) 222-244.

[xxiv] R.W. Hood, Jr., N.Ghorbani, P.J. Waston, et al “Dimensions of the Mysticism Scale: Confirming the Three Factor Structure in the United States and Iran.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 40 (2001) 691-705.

[xxv] R.K.C. Froman, Mysticism, Mind, Consciousness Albany: State University of New York Press, (1999) 20-30.

[xxvi] F.S. Brainard, Reality and Mystical Experience, Unvisited Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. (2000). See also D.Loy, Nonduality: A Study in Comparative Philosophy. Amherst, New York: Humanities Press.

[xxvii] David Lukoff and Francis G. Lu. “Transpersonal Psychology Research Review Topic: Mystical Experience.” The Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, vol. 20, no.2 (1988) 161

[xxviii] Ibid.

[xxix] Spilka et al, 326

[xxx] Hood, Ralph W. Jr., Ghorbani, Nima. P.J. Watson, Ghramaleki, Ahad Framarz, Mar N Bing.”Dimensions of the Mysticism Scale: Confirming the Three-Factor Structure in th United States and Iran.” Mournal for the Scientific Study of Religion 40:4 (2001) 691-705.

[xxxi] this block of quotations is from The Trace of God.

[xxxii] Thomas Heinrich Curran, Doctrine and Speculation in Schleiermacher’s Glaubenslehre. Berlin/New York: Waler de Gruyter and co. 1994.

[xxxiii] Op cit

Friday, March 04, 2011

Robret Bresson's Mochette (1967)

Photobucket


Bresson is a unique filmmaker. He didn't use professional actors. He insisted upon calling his actors "models" becuase they were not real actors. He didn't use much dialoague and shrugged off establishing shots and other techniques that are the ABC's of American film making. It is said that when Ingrid Bergman made her first film for Rossolini (who would become her husband, the two produced Isabella Rossolini ) she told him "this is my best side" he said "what? what best side what are the talking about?" The best side, the side to film a movie star from was standard first principle of Hollywood, but not used in Europe. Even standards used by European films Bresson did not use. He cuts off actors heads in the shot and focuses on objects in their hands.

I was never really aware of him until recently. The first Bresson film I saw Pick Pocket and that was a couple of weeks ago. He's now become one of my favorite film makers. He's always drawn to the films about those who do not fit in.

Director:

Robert Bresson

Writers:

Georges Bernanos (novel), Robert Bresson (scenario & adaptation and dialogue)



Cast overview:
Nadine Nortier Nadine Nortier ...
Jean-Claude Guilbert Jean-Claude Guilbert ...
Arsène
Marie Cardinal Marie Cardinal ...
Mouchette's Mother
Paul Hebert Paul Hebert ...
Mouchette's Father
Jean Vimenet Jean Vimenet ...
Mathieu - gamekeeper
Marie Susini Marie Susini ...
Mathieu's wife
Liliane Princet Liliane Princet ...
Schoolteacher
Suzanne Huguenin Suzanne Huguenin ...
Undertaker
Marine Trichet Marine Trichet ...
Luisa
Raymonde Chabrun Raymonde Chabrun


This is not a happy making movie. "Houseboat" or "the Flying Nun" it is not. No one in the world of this tragic fourteen year old girls is supportive of her. She is alone, she burdened and she comes to a bad end. The film opens with her mother in chruch praying and asking God what will be left of me when I'm not here, how will my children survive? That's the "theme" if there can be said to be a theme, the question the film asks: what is left of people in the hole the leaven in the fabric of society when they go? The next we see the mother she is she is in bed dying. We are never really told (or I may have missed it) what she dies of. She can barely speak, she can't get up. The daughter has accepted the role of mother both to her mother and to her siblings, one of whom is an infant. She is pushed around by her father who has no concern for her. He drives a truck that sells bootlegged liquor. He flops on his bed and pretends to drive using his hat as a steering wheel, making "vrooom vrooom" noises. This is the driector's way of showing that he is in a world of his own and doesn't care that his wife is dying or that his children are growing up with no support.

The basic immorality of the village is demonstrated in the illicit relationships of several of hte characters. The cops turn a blind eye to the father's bootlegging. They don't even care when it's in front of their faces. The economy of the village is based upon corruption. The major relations ships of the film consist of a feud between a poucher (Arsene) and a game keeper (Mathieu). They both love and compete with each other for Louisa. They are also locked in a struggle of their occupations which are opposed ot each other. The first shot after the mother in the chruch is of the game keeper watching the poacher snare partridges. Then the poacher watches from the bushes as the game keeper sets them free. We have a relationship based upon hatred, enmity, competition and on both levels subterfuge and dishonesty. This is a metaphor for the girl's life. She is the partridge being snared and killed by these two men.

We see Mouchette for the first time in school. the Children are singing a little song about Columbus and how he gave hope to his men. The girl refuses to sing. She punished but wont give in. She's filled with anger and rejects hope offered by the hypocrisy of the institution that helps to hold her back. Latter she is caught in a thunderstrom walking back from school and takes shelter in the woods. The Poucher finds her, having just had a confrontation in the rain and the woods with the game keeper. He thinks he's killed the game keeper, but he hasn't. He illicits an alibi form the girls, who seems willing to help. We can infer from the way they interact that even though she's afraid of him they have a history together, but it's not a good history. He takes her back to his cabin and rapes her.

The next day her mother dies. Rather than be sympathetic, the villagers are much more concerned that she doesn't have her crucifix and that somehow makes her a slut. The game keeper and his wife cross examine her becuase they are concerned what will furnish an alibi to the Arsene. The woman at the little village store tries to befriend her but winds up calling her a slut.She is extremely angry and has a confrontation with an old woman who gives her a shroud for her mother. She takes the shroud and rips to pieces, then she wraps herself in it and rolls down a long hill. the shroud comes off she rolls into a lake, goes under water and never comes up.

Bresson could be of any persuasion and one might, seeing this and other films, assume he's a secular person, perhaps even an atheist. He seems not to care about the issue of religion. Religion serves no real postive role in this film, and is not seen much in it. One scene where is pushed by her father and reaches into the font to bless herself with holy water. Then cut immediately to a scene where she is at her job in the bar where she is soaked from the sink of dishes. Bresson always links shots by immediate cuts so we know this is meant to be a contrast between the holy font and the bar room sink. She has a drop of holy water, she is immersed practically in "sin" water (if the bar's dish wash water can metaphorically suffice as such).

Yet Bresson, on the special material after the film, (DVD) in an interview says he is a believer. He was a life long Catholic and he was from a very prudish form of French Catholocism called "Jansenist." Those were the guys that Pascal was with. They were the puritons of French Catholicism. Yet the film could have been made by an atheist or just a completely secularist. Bresson says he would not want a summary of the film becuase if it could be summarize it would be terrible. I understand this to mean that a summary of what happens sounds really depression and as though the film has no value but is just a depression session. I find it inspiring in a horrible way. It's the dark side of the sublime. Bresson knows that great art doesn't preach and that there doesn't have to be a little moral message from everything. Not trying to read in a "moral" I can, however, consult my internal resonance meter. What resonates with me is the honest appraisal of adult relationships and how they can poison childhood. The chruch in this film is just an unfeeling institution that offers false hope. It's false because it's not offered well. The children are thought they must have hope being forced to sing about hope. The little girl who refuses to play hypocrite and sing is offered no hope.

Not to formulate a moral but just reflect upon what I glean from the film it demonstrates the effects of sin upon society and the individual; the poisoning of relationships and lives. How does this relate to the mother's question? What is left of the girl but a memory of a life that was never given a chance? A misunderstanding about the character of a victim.

this makes me angry

Just massive wholesale rejection of the topic merely becuase it's hard. what does it mean? Do they just want ear tickling stuff with no content? If something is a hard topic they don't know about they refuse to care about it?

I am daring anyone to show me what's wrong with the thinking on that last post.

40 hits for yesterday. I don't think the blog did that bad when it was brand new. I don't' see any reason to go on.

Wednesday, March 02, 2011

Phenomenology 2: Overview of Phenomenology; thinking and methiod


Photobucket




part 2 of 3



This is an overview; it doesn’t have that much to do directly with Tillich or theology. The Husserl ideas I’m going to discuss really have very little to do with Tillich. It is important to understand phenomenology its attitudes and its methods, to clear up some of the basic misconceptions about phenomenology as a whole before beginning the discussion Tillich and his concept of God, because pheneomonlogical attitude is very important to Tillich, as is Heideggerian phenomenology and its relation to ontology.

Gallagher and Zahavi demonstrate many examples of the term phenomenology being used wrongly by scientists to designate a first hand account of a phenomenon. One example they offer is atheist top gun Daniel Dennett who charges phenomenology with employing “introspective methodology.” Metzinger is sited as making similar comments.[i] As our authors point out, these citic’s arguments are based upon the accounts of difficulties with first hand approach to data generation. The conflict arises in differences between first hand accounts. Metzinger apparently takes “data” to be bits of information extracted by measurement devices. This is a tendency I observe in the critique of Proudfoot in the Trace…reductionists seek to eliminate the person, there is no personal first hand dimension to knowledge, it’s all mechanical and what can be produced in such a way as to quantify and end all dispute. According to Metazinger data must be extracted from a well defined intersubjective procedure, must be open to criticism, and constantly seeks impendent verification.[ii] The problem with phenomenology is that it supposedly doesn’t fit these characteristics because it’s introspective. Yet Gallagher and Zahavi dispute the idea that phenomenology is based upon introspection.

Consider Husserl’s Logical Investigations, a recognized milestone in the twentieth century philosophy and indisputably a work in phenomenological philosophy. In fact, Husserl himself to it to be his “breakthrough” to phenomenology. What kind of analysis does one find in this book? One finds Husserl’s famous attack on and rejection of psychologism; a defense of the irreducibility of logic and the ideality of meaning; analysis of pictorial representations; a theory of the part-whole relation; a sophisticated account of intentionality; and an epistemological clarification of the relationship between concepts and intuitions, to mention just a few of the many topics treated in the book. Does Husserl use an introspective method, and is this a work in introspective psychology? Anyone who reads logical investigations should answer ‘no,’ since what we find there are clearly philosophical arguments and analyses. Rather than concluding that shi work is not phenomenology, one should rather consider the hasty identification of phenomenology and introspective psychology.[iii]

To this response we might also add two more points. First, what the reductionsts are seeking to do is to pigeonhole phenomenology into the categories that allow for the big tricks of reduction to played on it: label, redefine, lose the phenomena. Secondly, because Phenomenology is not hard science it can’t be subjected to the methods of hard science and thus must be fitting into categories that would allow the reduction to take place. The reductionist cannot recognize the categories of phenomenological thinking or it would have to recognize the validity of another method and admit that there is more than one source of knowledge. This admission is counter to the basis of reductionism so it must be avoided, thus phenomenological categories must be ignored and phenomenological method must be fitted into reductionism’s categories.

Gallagher and Zahavi argue that many of Husserl’s observations were refined by subsequent thinkers such as Sartre, thus contradicting the notion that they were merely introspective. They point out that they can’t find an example of anyone rejecting Husserl’s views on the basis that they have better introspective data.[iv] Metzinger claims that phenomenology can’t generate a growth of knowledge; there is no way to reach an inter-subjective consensus on things likes “this the purest form of blue.” But, as Gallagher points out, the kinds of claims Metzinger uses as examples are not the kind usually made by phenomenological philosophers, “and to suggest so is to reveal one’s lack of familiarity with the tradition in question.”[v] As he says, “Phenomenologists would typically argue that it is a metaphysical fallacy to locate the phenomenal realm in the mind, and to suggest that the way to access and describe it is by turning the gaze inward.”[vi] The divide between inside and outside is a naive “common sense” metaphysics and is suspect when used as a clue to understanding consciousness, as Husserl points out.[vii] The charge of introspection is based upon the metaphysics of this divide between inner and outer. “To speak of ‘introspection’ is to (tacitly) endorse the idea that consciousnesses is inside the head and the world is outside.”[viii] That probably sounds entirely reasonable to a lot of reader, after all our brains do the perceiving they are in our heads, at least for most. The world is presumably outside our heads. But the problem is arraign one’s metaphysics to assume that all that is in the head is false and untrustworthy and all that is outside is objective and transparent, this is merely an attempt to arrange the world according to an ideology schematic rather than allowing the sense data to suggest the categories that we use to understand things. After all our understanding of the world is our only conduit by which we can understand. We have no other means but our perceptions, thus all the assumed “rock solid” of the objects we subject to reduction become merely the constructs we build in our heads according to pre conceived categories. Where else would these categories be kept but in our heads. Reductionism takes place in the mind. So the reductionist is fooling herself in thinking that the methods she chooses are immune to the same slipperiness of “subjectivity” and somehow become rock solid merely because they are examinations of things taken to be rock solid. That’s the mistake alluded to above that thinking that examining an objective reality makes the examination of it objective.

Nor is phenomenology merely a study of the subjective. Phenomenologists do not locate the phenomenal realm within the mind. Phenomenology is about the world as it actually is and as it appears to us, it is not about “inner truth.” [ix] Phenomenology is concerned with phenomena and their appearances. Some philosophers understand phenomena to mean the immediate givenness of the object. Yet most phenomenologist do not make an easy one-to-one association between phenomena and appearance. Appearances can be deceiving, but neither do they assume a reality behind the appearance. The appearance is not a smoke screen to get out of the way before we can discover the truth of the object. Phenomenologists do not understand reality as two separate realms, one of appearances and one of hidden realities. Rather than regard questions of reality and modes of appearance as unimportant or merely subjective such an investigation is of philosophical importance.[x] Husserl’s early investigations were based upon the consideration that he was providing a new epistemological foundation for science. He soon realized that “rather than focusing exclusively upon the objects of knowledge we should describe and analyze the experiential dimension in detail in order to disclose the cognitive contribution of the knowing subject.”[xi] Science is so absorbed in its investigation of the natural world it does not reflect upon its own presuppositions and “conditions of possibility.”[xii] To accomplish this we need to bracket our natural attitude because that will lead to naïve acceptance of “common sense” approach. This is not a form of skepticism. No one doubts that the world exists; the bracketing is not metaphysics but an aid to focus. It is rather a suspension of our natural inclination to regard the world as we do, as a world of appearances of objects to focus upon.

Husserl calls this suspension epoche’ (ep-osh-ae); “The purpose of the eopche’ is not to dobut, neglect abandon or exclude reality from consideration; rather the aim is to suspend or neutralize a certain dogmatic attitude toward reality.”[xiii] We are to focuss directly upon reality as it is given in whatever way it makes its appearance to us. In other words “the epoche’ is a change in attitude toward reality”[xiv] This will become important in dealing with Tillich the phenomenological attitude toward reality. What the epoche’ rules out is “taking the world for granted” as Gallagher and Zahavi put it.[xv] But this epoche is not a one time accomplishment, it’s not an attitude once adopted automatically delivers the goods. One must continually accomplish the adoption of this attitude and then begin other procedures as well. It is important to remember this attitude is not a turn inward. It is not a search of one’s inward self to find truth, although in dealing with the question of God and being itself one might have to turn inward at some point, in so doing one Is not doing phenomenology per se. Phenomenology is not closing off from the world around us or a turn inward to some inner truth. Phenomenology continues the connection to the world but regards the perception of it as well as the thing perceived.

The real difference with phenomenology as theological method, from past uses of theological method, is that it starts from human experience of life in the world, not from first principles or logical axioms. This is why the empirical evidence of religious experience will be so crucial, because that is a quantitative means of learning something about how certain humans experience their world in the relation to what they believe to be the divine. Of course this is not to rule out logic or first principles. The approach must be global. No one would demand this more than Tillich himself who believed that the method must be tailed to the problem. The problem of God and being is a global one. This problem involves all that is and all that we experience of life.

Inter-subjectivity

Moving beyond the subject/object dichotomy is a major aspect of phenomenological method. In the last chapter I discussed the pretense of objectivity. The alternate fear on the other side of the God camp is fear of subjectivity. The alternative to “subjectivity” is “iner-subjectivity.” Victory Daniels Emeritus, professor of psychology at Sonoma state university. Defines inter-subjective in this way:

intersubjectivity: The process of several, or many people, coming to know a common phenomenon, each through his or her subjective experience, and relating their experiences to each other.[xvi]

The inter-subjective is a major issue as it is the alternative to atheist fear of the subjective, and the inability to provide “objective” data in direct documentation of something is beyond our ability to understand and its not given in sense data. The only way to get at something that only be experienced and can only partially be described is to get at through the subjective experience. But the subjective experience is a problematic in terms of verification. Thus we need a chorus of subjective sources which can relate to each other and form an inter-subjective understanding.

A good example would be the occurrence of religious experiences of the kind referred to as “peak” or “mystical” that I talk about in The Trace of God. Mystics from around the world, throughout history and in all cultures have the same kinds of experiences; they describe them in the same way. Many people often believe intuitively that they do not have the same kinds of experiences but thanks to the empirical research done by Ralph Hood Jr. of the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga we know now that they do. Hood validated the writings of W.T. Stace who created a theory of mystical experience by reading many of the major mystics of the world. Thanks to Hood’s invention of the research study instrument called “the M scale” we are able validate the nature of a mystical experience and distinguish it form other kinds of “religious” or “strange” phenomena. Thus we can measure different kinds of experiences against each other and determine the differences and similarities in various mystical writings.[xvii]

Verification

When I make the argument that science can’t tell us about God, atheists are more likely than anything else to say that “science is the only form of verification that can systematically demonstrated every time.” Of course that is irrelevant to the issue that science can’t tell us about God. It is also untrue, there are other means of verification; it all depends upon what one wishes to verify. There are forms of verification for phenomenology, but the major pitfall that we must avoid expecting the sort of verification we have in science, we must not expect the kind of results we have in science. We can’t duplicate scientific results with phenomenology, but we can have a phenomenological form of variation. Again, phenomenology is complex, layered, dividing into schools and this is a shallow overview of phenomenology as it pertains to theological methods. I am not aiming to give the kind of depth to the topic that I would if the whole work was about phenomenology. Some suggest that the purpose of phenomenological method is to “’see’ the logic of meaning, of an experience, for any subject, rather than to discover causal connections or patterns of correlation.”[xviii] Of course this is phenomenology in psychology, not philosophy. That should be a sore subject with some atheists since the scientisitic type shows her true colors by rejecting as scientific any use of phenomenology on the grounds that “philosophy is just made up” but they totally ignore the fact that phenomenology is also used in science. Gallagher and Zahavi argue above that the purpose is to understand the perception of the perceiving subject rather than the material “essence” of a given object. Thus these two purposes coincide where the “social science” purpose also dealing understanding the perspective of the perceiving subject. To that extent verification, even scientific verification, is possible in verifying the inter-subjective perceptions of various subjects or in terms of the relation of the overall phenomenological methodology to some sort of “hard data.”

For example, I have seen atheists argue on the internet that inter-subjectivity is still subjective and as such has no validity and is merely a fantasy unsupported by any sort of hard data (as though subjective consciousness is not part of human experience). There is hard scientific data that supports the validity of inter-subjectivity as a category in human perceptions and demonstrates a biological basis for it. The discovery of mirror neurons is of great importance for the verification of inter-subjectivity.

G. Rizzolatti and V. Gallese found in experiments with primates that a set of neurons in the premotor cortex represents the visually registered movements of another animal. The activity of these mirror neurons presents exactly the same pattern of activity as appears in the movement of one's own body. These findings may be extended to other cognitive and emotive functions in humans. I show how these neurological findings might be “translated” phenomenologically into our own experienced sensations, feelings and volitions.[xix]

While hard data can verify aspects of phenomenological method, the danger, as Dukes points out, is that in search of such “hard data” confirmation subjects often wind up being treated as objects of experimental manipulations.[xx] Thus “phenomenology” winds up with the same problems that it tried to go around in hard science. Phenomenology offers an addition to human sciences, but only if it maintains its actual perspective and doesn’t expect to duplicate results of hard sciences.

Photobucket

Martin Heidegger

Heidegger and Being

Heidegger was the next evolutionary step beyond Husserl in the development of phenomenology. Husserl dealt with objects in much the way that Descartes did; we are conscious of them, they are intentionally conscious of them. In this version of phenomenology we understand the essential structures apart form the reality of objects.[xxi] He regarded them as objects and his version of phenomenology is about how we regard objects as actors on stage in the Cartesian theater. This approach of Husserl is known as “transcendental phenomenology.” Heidegger takes a different approach, known as “hermeneutic phenomenology.”[xxii] Heidegger deals with objects, aspects of our perceptions in being as we live our lives, in the way that fish regard water, as something so close to us, so all pervasive, so fundamental to existence that we don’t even notice it. Perhaps one of the best examples of this is his concept of “ready-to-hand.” Or an even better example would be the carpenter who is so use to his tools the use of them is second nature. He doesn’t have to be careful with the hammer he just hammers. He doesn’t think about what he’s doing because it’s so much a part of his being he doesn’t need to think about it. Such is our encounter with being and with most things in being. This is misleading because the subject is extremely complex. There is a multiplicity of opinions as to what Heidegger was really saying, and the philosopher himself doesn’t help by clarifying.[xxiii] Heidegger distinguishes first between a general sense of being for anything or everything, being itself, and the being of human beings that is aware of itself, what Sartre calls “being por soi,” being for itself. The being of inanimate objects Sartre calls “being en soi,” or “being in itself.” To distinguish between being in general or apart form any particular thing (being itself) and that of an individual, the use of the term “a being” is employed by translators, while Heidegger himself uses the German terms “Sein” (being) and das Seiende for the latter. Human being in particular Heidegger speaks of as Dasein, which is by its nature vested with an implied social dimension.

For Heidegger the Western tradition has erred with Aristotle in assuming humans are rational. We develop theories of rule keeping and decision making that assumes humans are rational; this turns out to be superficial. We are also irrational, we have depths and we are complex creatures, we don’t understand ourselves.[xxiv] The Western tradition erred with Plato in assuming that we can understand the world in a detached way by taking a step back and developing a theory of theory, “discovering the principles that underlie the profusion of phenomena.”[xxv] The mistake is in thinking we can have a theory of everything. Heidegger opposes the idea of a theory of everything. We cannot have a theory of what makes theory possible. This calls into question the foundations of Western thought.[xxvi]

Since Descartes philosophers have been struck with the epistemological problem of explaining how the ideas in our mind can be true of the external world. Heidegger shows that this subject/object epistemology presupposes a background of everyday practices into which we are socialized but that we do not represent in our minds. Since he calls this more fundamental way of making sense of things our understanding of being, he claims that he is doing ontology that is, asking about the nature of this understanding of being that we do not know--that is not a representation in the mind corresponding to the world—but that we simply are. [xxvii]

Heidegger sides with Kierkegaard rather than with Descartes. Cartesian doubt is phony, the Cartesian theatre of the mind is contrived and thought and awareness flow out of being rather than standing as a conclusion to a philosophical premise, “I think, therefore, I am.” As Dreyfus points out, refereeing to SK’s view “I am, therefore, I think.”[xxviii] Heidegger questions the concept that we gain control of our lives by clarifying the principles which govern our action. It may not be possible or even desirable to do so. These principles work best for us when they remain in the background. “What is important and meaningful in our lives is not and should not be accessible to critical reflection.”[xxix] There are many ways to put the reason, because our actions “lack seriousness” or because we can’t generalize properly, but probably the best reason for this is because when we try to clearly all the principles we construct pre conceived categories that are of necessity incomplete or wrong simply because we can’t know the principles and work by them at the same time.

This is an un-Heideggerian reason, its my reason but I think it applies to what he is saying: clarified categories are pre conceived and that contradicts the way we work in categories that are hidden. The success of the way we work with the principles is that we don’t know them, or don’t know all about them, we couldn’t use them properly if we were trying to figure them out all the time. Thus the answer is to allow the sense data to suggest the categories to us. Otherwise we try to group or herd sense data into the pre conceived categories. Heidegger calls this inexplicable background (the undisclosed principles) that enables us to understand, the understanding of being. These hidden functions, the principles, operate for all aspects of our lives. They are in the meeting of every person we encounter and in every confrontation with life we endure. Heidegger’s approach to working with these hidden principles without trying to explicate them is the source of such slogans as “back to the things in themsevles.” He’s trying to get under the formalized understanding of principles and encounter the actual principles themselves as they work from within. This is what he means by doing hermeneutics form within a hermeneutical circle. [xxx] Heidegger’s notion of being is very important to this work, as the concept of God as being itself (or the ground of being) is the central point, and Heidegger was a major influence upon Tillich, who is the central figure carrying the ball for he notion of God as being itself. Yet Heidegger’s notion of being is extremely complex. To really do it justice would require a book in itself. Therefore, the important part for my purpose is to understand what Tillich took away form Heidegger’s understanding of being itself. One thing Tillich didn’t get from Heidegger was the notion that God is being itself. So Tillich’s admiration for Heidegger had limits. Tillich’s view that God is being itself is rejected by Heidegger, also by Bautlmann , Barth, and Reinhold Neibuhr.[xxxi] Nevertheless it will be important to understand some basic ideas relating to Heidegger’s concept.

The one thing that stands out about Hediegger’s notion of being, and Tillich’s, I’m sure it will be the first major criticism made of this work, that there seems to be no there “there.” There’s no clear simple obvious sense in wich one can actually define Heidegger’s notion of being. It is clearly much more involved than just saying “being is a from of the verb “to be” and refers to the existence of things. This is primarily because Hediegger didn’t really seem to want to say “this is being, walk therein.” His view turns upon the hidden nature of being. It’s almost in his interest, one could say, not to define being too sharply. He argued that the question of being was the most important and fundamental question for philosophy, yet one that could never be answered.[xxxii] When we get into unraveling Tillich’s position we see that the complexity is of major importance. In regard to Tillich this comes under the heading of “depth of being.” For Heidegger we can’t just blurt out an answer because being is hidden and is something transparent to us but something we work in and is to close to us to really understand, like water for the fish. For Tillich there’s more to being than the bits we can see or experience, so it’s not just hidden but has depths, it’s deep and complex. Philipse Surveys the ground of American commentary on this point and finds an array of differing views. Dreyfus says Heidegger’s notion of being is “an intelligibility correlative with our everyday practices.”[xxxiii] According to Sheehan being itself refers to the “analogically unified meaning of being”[xxxiv] For Michael Zimmerman it’s “the history shaping ways in which entities reveal themselves.”[xxxv] Philipse argue that these are all aspects but don’t tally with all of Heidegger’s texts. It’s clear they all deal with the human experience of our own being rather than the fundamental fact of existence apart forms any specifics. That is crucial to understanding Hdiegger’s meaning, because he’s talking about Dasin, human being, what means to engage in our own human form of being; that does have a social dimension.

Heidegger’s interest in being as a philosophical question, and the notion that it is the most fundamental question, come from his reading of the dissertation by the nineteenth century philosopher Franz Brentano, who dealt with Aristotle’s interpretation of being; the notion of the fundamental nature of the quesiotn goes all the way back to the Greek philosopher.[xxxvi][xxxvii] Aristotle recognizes distinctions in the many ways being is used, Brentano reflected the diversity. Aristotle has four ways of understanding being: (1) (V7 Metaphysics, 1026a:33) Kata Sumbebekos, what something is said to be identically; (2) “being” in the sense of being true; (3) “being” in the sense of being potentially or actually; (4) Being as it is in the 10 categories. Heidegger analyses each of these aspects[xxxviii], but they are still only aspects of a reality that continually recedes the more one chases it. As Philipse puts it, “although Aristotle did analyze did analyze different meanings of being, he did not discover the one leading and fundamental sense from which the other meanings somehow derived.”[xxxix] Heidegger never does get to the answer, the upshot of all of his ferment is that toward the end of his life he intimated that being receded and was more hidden.[xl]

The social aspect in the analysis of human being will get Heidegger in trouble. Of course that’s his entre into the world of politics, or at least the intellectual tie to his philosophizing. I will not go into any detail on that matter. Heidegger was a Nazi, but history has allowed his philosophizing to continue despite his political blunder. Philosophers who were avowed enemies of the Nazis, such as Marcuse and Tillich, still wound up using Heidegger. Marcuse seems to have had no use for Heidegger personally after the war, but continue to think through the lens of his philosophy.[xli] The view seems very different from America, approaching these thinkers through the sterility of metaphysics and abstract ideas about being, divorced form the political realities and concrete life that brought these thinkers into conflict. When we plug in the historical and political things make more sense.



[i] Gallagher, op cit, 20. Dennett is sited for Consciousness Explained, 1991, 44.

[ii] Ibid.

[iii] Ibid.

[iv] Ibid.

[v] Ibid. 21

[vi] Ibid.

[vii] Ibid, Hsserl, Logical Investigations, is sited.

[viii] Ibid.

[ix] Ibid.

[x] Ibid. 22

[xi] Ibid. references Logical Investigations, 2001 edition 170

[xii] Ibid.

[xiii] Ibid, 23

[xiv] Ibid.

[xv] Ibid.

[xvi] Victor Daniels, Pdf lecture notes Sonoma State University web site: URL: http://www.sonoma.edu/users/d/daniels/phenomlect.html visited 6/16/10

[xvii] references to M scale in Trace of God (find)

[xviii] Sheree Dukes, Abstract: “Phenomenological Methodology” in the Human Scineces.” The Journal of Religion and Health, Neatherlands: Springer.Vol 23, no 3, Sept 1984. 197-203

Dukes was in the Department of Psychology Boston Universlity.

[xix] Dieter Lohmar. Abstract, “Mirror Neurons and the Phenomenology of Inter-Subjectivity.” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Netherlands: Springer, (Volume 5, no 1) March, 2006, 5-16.

Lohmar is at University of Koln, Germany.

[xx] Dukes, Ibid.

[xxi] Paul Gorner, “Heidegger, Phenomenology, and the essence of Technology.” Online Journal, Philosophy: University of Aberdeen. Websties URL: http://www.abdn.ac.uk/philosophy/endsandmeans/vol2no1/gorner.shtml visted 6/31/10

Paul Gorner is Lecturer in philosophy at the University of Aberdeen

[xxii] Hubert L. Dreyfus, Being in the World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, quotations from Being and Time by John Macquarrie, 1991, 2.

[xxiii] Herman Philipse, Heidegger’s Philosophy of Being: A Critical Interpretation Princeton New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998, 3. Online page number URL: http://books.google.com/books?id=D9y2rHPCOgsC&dq=What+is+Heidegger%27s+notion+of+being+itself%3F&source=gbs_navlinks_s visited 10/4/10. online page numbers apply

[xxiv] Dreyfus, Ibid, 1

[xxv] Ibid, 1

[xxvi] Ibid

[xxvii] Ibid, 3

[xxviii] Ibid.

[xxix] Ibid, 4

[xxx] Ibid

[xxxi] Walter Leibrecht, “The Life and Mind of Paul Tillich,” Religion and Culture: Essays in Honor of Paul Tillich, Walter Leibrecht ed. New York: Harper and Row, 1972 (originally 1959). Notes, 355 FN 2

[xxxii] Philipse, 8

[xxxiii] Hubert Dreyfus, in Ibid, 3

[xxxiv] Thomas Sheehan, in Ibid

[xxxv] Michael Zimmerman, in Ibid.

[xxxvi] Ibid, 5

[xxxvii] Ibid.

[xxxviii] Ibid.

[xxxix] Ibid, 6

[xl] Ibid, 8-9

[xli] I say this based upon an incident recorded by Barry Katz in his Marcuse and The Art of Liberation. Apparently Marcuse made one attempt to learn how it was that Heidegger could be Nazi, he was not satisfied with he answer (which was something like “it seemed right at the time) he made no more efforts to contact Heidegger.