God and Gratuitous Evil.

  Rashomon, 1950 Kurosawa's great classic film

reflecting upon the Human condition (see my 
Review)

Keith Parsons enters the discussion about God and evil on Secular Outpost [1] with a look at gratuitous evil. That means evil that God doesn't allow for any rational reason,In other words the kind thing about which one says "there's no excuse for that, God could just no reason to allow that." An example of gratuitous evil might be  what happened to the woman gunned down in Chicago while pushing her child in the stroller. She was shit by a stray bullet. One might be tempted to think  --I can see why God would allow the gunman to waste his life or even why he would allow the other member he was shooting at to be shot but why did God have to allow this woman to be hit by the stray bullet? In this piece I'm not going to deal with F inductive issues but to disagree with the approach to understanding gratuitous evil.

Gratuitous evil is evil that God would not permit. In Alvin Plantinga’s terms, God would not actualize such evils either strongly (i.e. by directly creating them) or weakly (i.e. by allowing free creatures to commit them). A gratuitous evil is one that God would have no morally sufficient reason for actualizing (strongly or weakly). God has a morally sufficient reason for actualizing an evil e in a world W if and only if e is necessary in W for some good g, and W, containing both e and g, is better (by whatever criterion) than any world W*, actualizable by God, where W* contains neither e nor g. Put simply, where W is the real world, God permits evil e because e is necessary for the realization of good g, and g is realized, and the world with both e and g is better than it would be with neither e nor g.[2]

The problem with this concept is that it seems to frame the alternative to gratuitous evil imn such very specific terms it seems to imply that the allowance of some forms of evil could serve no purpose. I want to distinguish between two types of evil. The one would be evil acts that directly lead to the good. one example, suppose the shooter of this woman repents gives his life to God because he is so remorseful for his act and thus changes his life, Thus his sin led to remorse and through that saves several future victims. Then the woman's death would not be in vain, So that evil would not be quite as gratuitous, although, of course, still evil. The other type would be consequential evil. That is to say, the  event itself would not lead to good consequences but allowing it would still be necessary to achieve a certain end. An example of this type might be the same event if the gunman never changes. But the skeptic might assert that since God is all powerful he should be able to stop that shooting or make the bullet miss.

If we take a larger view it may well be that God can't eliminate or micro manage every kind of problem such that he could intervene in all such cases. Of course the skeptic will always bring it down to "isn't God all powerful?" They will try to play off God's goodness against his power." For example saying God is either not good or not all powerful. Yet as I pointed out last tie while God is the most powerful aspect of being and while God has all authority, he does not have the ability to contradict logical necessity. He can't crate creatures who rally love him if he forces them to love him by creating them such that they could not do otherwise, Because love is a choice. It is not love i it's a circumvention of the will. This necessity of allowing free will means that God has to risk our makimng evil choices. If there are certain kinds of evil that will persisting possible worlds God is struct with allowing those so long free moral agents do not internalize the values of the good. This internalizing step comes though the search for truth, Thus God's existence cannot beyond question as it would be if God intervened every time something bad loomed on the horizon, So God must allow a real world in which random danger can strike at any time, From that point we cna works out the special situations in which will intervene if indeed he does,

Parsons seems nt to like free will defense, He certainty doesn't like this idea of unfailing  moral evil in all possible worlds ("trans-world depravity"--TWD).

The hackneyed example is that moral evil is permitted in the world because moral evil is necessary in our world for freely-chosen moral goodness, and there is no alternate world, actualizable by God, in which the overall balance of moral goodness to moral evil is better than in the real world. Perhaps there are possible worlds in which free creatures always choose to do good, and so, in those worlds, moral evil is not a necessary condition for moral goodness. However, perhaps no such world is actualizable by God. Perhaps, all possible free creatures suffer from what Plantinga calls “trans-world depravity,” that is, the “counterfactuals of freedom” (over which God has no control) are such that every free creature will freely choose to do some evil in any world in which it exists. In this case, not even God can create worlds with free creatures and no moral evil. Therefore, so far as human creatures can know (since we cannot know the counterfactuals of freedom) perhaps even the grossest moral evils are not gratuitous. I would add that, since we cannot know the counterfactuals of freedom, then neither can we know that moral evils are not gratuitous. Perhaps God could have created a better world after all. 

"Perhaps there are possible worlds in which free creatures always choose to do good, and so, in those worlds, moral evil is not a necessary condition for moral goodness." But the possibility of evil would have to exist in APW because Free will mist exist. Does that mean TWD? I don't know iof some evils mist be perormed in APW but I can see that might be the case. After all it might be the case that  to be a ree moral agent is to give in to temptation, unless the good is internalized, An example would be Reinhold Neibuhr's idea of sin natuer that h took from St. Augustine but then liberalized. The anxiety of self transcendence leads to evil choices as a matter of selfish self preservation unless and until we internalize the values of the good.[3] In this example sin nature is in effect anxiety that comes with self transcendence the ability to understand one's temporal plight in relation to the larger scheme thus all sentient beings who have moral natures woudl tend toward sin in this model.

Parsons states, "perhaps even the grossest moral evils are not gratuitous. I would add that, since we cannot know the counterfactuals of freedom, then neither can we know that moral evils are not gratuitous. Perhaps God could have created a better world after all." That does not seem to follow. Either way we can still know that there is a justifiable purpose in allowing consequential evil. Such evil is not gratuitous because it has to be allowed to achieve certain ends. But he doesn't stop there. He goes on to takes his position to absurdity. He is speaking of unwanted undeserved suffering he says "note that if if even one...instance...of suffering is gratuitous , that is if even one is such that God would have no morally sufficient reason for permitting it then God does not exist." It is odd that tyey are willing to take it down to that level

Would the atheists be willing to say that if one miracles happens there has to be a God? I doubt that they would but one thing I know they would never admit there was a miracle, But I don't necessarily object to the idea since it would be against God's nature to allow gratuitous evil. But I think I have just demonstrated that there is no such thing, All forms of evil that occur must be allowed weather they lead to direct and specific good or not They all are the result of necessities. That is not to say that the individual evils must be excused or or tolerated and in all those cases where they wrought by humans we could choose to prevent the. There may be instances in which God intervenes but we don't know the parameters. That doesn't mean there aren't any. It means that the causes of evil must be allowed and in those cases where God does act to prevent there are certain reasons we don't understand. We can understand the reasons for allowing evil generally. Overall I've explained that by the use of internalizing work of the search and the idea of keeping the search inviolable.[4]

The variables are too complex by far to tabulate probabilities. We can't know enough any given to say if there is or is not a rational reason for some kind of pain. The consequential pain is what we have in place of gratuitous pain; that is pain that has to be of necessity given the objectives of creation but has no direct positive outcome,or we may not know enough about the outcomes to say.



Sources


[1] Keith Parsons, "Gratuitous Evils: What are the Chances?" Secular Outpost, April 26,2016, BLOG url: http://www.patheos.com/blogs/secularoutpost/2016/08/26/gratuitous-evils-what-are-the-chances/#disqus_thread (Accessed 8/30/16)


[2] Ibid

[3] Reinold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man vol.I Nisbet &co. 1943
Niebuhr doesn't actually speak of internalization values of the good but he does compare the selfish resplne to comprehending justice. There is clearly an internalizing of values innovated,

[4] Joseph Hinman Soteriologocal Drama, The Religious a propri. website URL

http://religiousapriori.blogspot.com/2011/04/answer-to-theodicy-soteriological-drama.html

Further answers to Lowder's F Inductive Improbability of God arguments

famous photo of Vietnamese girl napalmed by 
Americans in Vietnam war

This is a continuation of last Wednesday's discussion about Jeff Lowder's argument on natural inequality renders God less probable.[1] "This is one of his F inductive" arguments [2]Because Jeff doesn't have the issue framed in terms of a theodicy argument or in terms of a problem of evil then can't apply so he dismisses my whole approach, My view is that the bottom line is the world does the world seem like the kind of world we would have if there was a God? To be able to answer that we have to know what God is like, That's a matter of special revelation and that means doctrine, 

Jeffery Jay Lowder I think it's rather one-sided for you (or any theist) to appeal to God's omnipotence when defending the possibility (or reality) of miracles, but then to downplay or implicitly deny His omnipotence when responding to atheistic arguments. Make no mistake: you just implicitly denied God's omnipotence. Why? Because if God exists, created physical reality, and used evolution to create complex life, then God is responsible for the fact that the distribution of natural endowments is the result of evolution. Your comment implies that God had no choice but to use evolution, which is false. If God exists, He is omnipotent. He can do anything that is logically possible. At the very least, God could have created us the way Ken Ham says he did, i.e., according to a literal interpretation of Genesis. So appealing to "evolutionary dispositions" is both irrelevant and denies God's existence (by denying God's omnipotence).[3]

(1) Omnipotence does not mean God has no balancing act between necessities

I have not stated a position on omnipotence, relative, it'not in the Bible. Maximal power is not necessarily omnipotence. The only term in the Bible translated as "all powerful" or omnipotent is used one time in one place, revelation. The word is "pantocrator" it means not "all powerful"as it can do anything but powerful in all places, or everywhere. In other words God has jurisdiction over everything. He is the proper power the authority.It means as the authority the one with the power but not necessarily power to do logically impossible things. That does not mean he can do logically contradictory things. While evolution is not a matter of logic that must mean necessarily that God has to balance one things against another. 

A major example is love and free will. If God wants us to love him he must give us free will. He cannot create us loving him that would not be real love. Real love requires free will. God can't go "I can do anything, I'll make them love." It would not be love to do it that way. Omnipotence does not mean the power to violate logical necessity. Thus there are limitations which means God must work with mitigation.

(2) free will is necessary for moral agency, the point of creation.

Without free will there could be no free oral agency, Thus in order to have free moral agents who willingly seek the good God must have a free will universe., That requires that people seek truth, only seeking allows us to internationalize the values of the good. If nature made everyone equal and nothing ever went wrong it would be pretty obvious the game is fixed. So free will requires a neutral world imn which people must search for truth, Thus the discernible processes of the world must be random,

(2) Evolution is just a mechanism of randomness, It's just a means of allowing the universe to be created impenitently of a micro managing agent. That doesn't mean God is not working at some fundamental sustaining level such as thought of the strong force.
(3) Evolution is logical expression of God's nature

Evolution doesn't have to be the only physical alternative but could nevertheless be God's tool of choice or any number of reasons (an expression of God's nature). The idea that God would not use evolution but would "zap things'" (special creation) is based upon a view that God is a big man, He thinks like a man he approaches creation like a craftsman building a cabinet. If we have a more sophisticated view of God as with  process theology evolution would be just a logical expression of God's nature. That would obviously be true for the God of process theology (diapolar between concrete and potential--in the concealment in process with creation).

At this point I invoked a concept "calling" to account for individuals of extraordinary virtue who serve God in powerful ways.

Me:

There may be certain people who are given gits because they are give the opportunity to serve God in some great way . Not all people could be the leader of the civil rights movement, Not all people were given the gifts of Martin Luther King., It's not unfair or immoral that God raises up a Martin Luther King, not everyone is willing to make the sacrifices that go with the gifts.

This evokes the charge of contradiction from Jeff. 

JJL:

This passage contradicts your first objection. You were just telling us that it isn't God's fault because the distribution of natural endowments is the result of evolutionary dispositions. But now you are claiming that God handed out "gifts" based upon how they would be used. That's a blatant contradiction. But let that pass.

No I t does not. First of all gifts are not deserved they are gratuities, One doesn't give gifts because they are earned or merited, merited giving is reward not gift. God is not giving MLK the chance to die for the civil rights movement because he deserves it, he's given the opportunity to subjugate his life to  cause because he chooses to respond to calling. It'snot a reward, Secondly I did not  that "God handed out 'gifts' based upon how they would be used." I did not say god raised up MLK because je would use the gift rightly. God created the job and MLK chose to take the job. Of course he didn't know that but being a minister hie understood calling. There were no doubt others similarly endowed who chose not to go down that path, Other did go down it but didn't go as far such Jesse Jacson. There is nothing immoral or wrong in that situation, God uses people who are willing to head the call. Only those with the endowment who are going to fill the slot. Someone without King's qualities wouldn't make it as leader. Maybe God gave kind a boost because he was needed. That is not the same as saying he was rewarded with leadership. He heeded a call.


JJL:

 A more important issue is this. Since natural endowments are mostly determined before birth (many at conception), no one deserves whatever endowments or lack of endowments they get. Martin Luther King, Jr. did nothing to deserve to be born with the endowments he got. 

That's right it was not a reward Being marketer for civil rights was not an enjoyment bestowed as a gift, it was a responsibility. King chose to live up the talk, which included his life lie being snuffed out. 

JJL:
But the most important issue is this. You are cherry-picking or, if you prefer, understating the evidence. Yes, MLK had certain natural endowments which enabled him to be the kind of person he was. But there are other people who had similar natural endowments and used them for evil. Think Adolf Hitler and Josef Stalin. Not anyone who decides to be evil could accomplish what Hitler and Stalin did; it takes certain natural endowments to be able to pull off their monstrosities. Once the evidence about the usage of natural endowments is fully stated, it seems absurd to think that natural endowments are distributed based on they would be used in life. If what you were saying were actually true, then there never should have been a Hitler or Stalin because God would have said, "Whoa! These guys are going to be evil. I'm not going to given them any gifts. In fact, maybe I will make THEM into microcephalics."

Again you have misinterpreted. I did not say gifts are given according how they will be used, I said certain people are called they choose to respond or not, The gifts are distributed by nature, God provides that but perhaps not specifically matching them up. Everyone has some natural ability. That is why we have liberal arts that's where the humanities come from. It's an expression of the imago die we all are made in the image of God. But some choose to use them wrongly.

The idea of God heading off the Hitler because they are going to do wrong is what I said can't be done. That is one of the logical necessities God must juggle. To have a moral universe God must risk our makimng evil choices, Now that is not the same as saying we have to have evil in order to have good, We have have the risk we have to risk the choice that doe wasn't mean we have to take it, There could be no evil if everyone chose to be evil. The variables are too complex to to make the kind so judgement about reality that you are trying to make.

As far as I'm commenced the F inductive aspect makes no real difference,I'm not saying it';s a gimick but it can be answered with ordinary theocracy arguments, see FN 2

[1] Joseph Hinman, "Does Inequality Make God less probable? Metacrock's Blog

http://metacrock.blogspot.com/2016/08/does-inequality-make-god-improbable.html (accessed 8/27/16)

[2] Jeff Lowder,"F inductive Arguments a New Type of Argument," The Secular Outpost , blog, March 21, 2014

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/secularoutpost/2014/03/21/f-inductive-arguments-a-new-type-of-inductive-argument/  (aacess 8/27/16)

“F-inductive argument”: an argument in which the evidence to be explained favors one explanatory hypothesis over one or more of its rivals, i.e., P(E | H1 & B) > P(E | H2 & B). Explanatory arguments are F-inductive arguments and have the following structure.1. E is known to be true, i.e., Pr(E) is close to 1.2. H1 is not intrinsically much more probable than H2, i.e., Pr(|H1|) is not much greater than Pr(|H2|).3. Pr(E | H2 & B) > Pr(E | H1 & B).4. Other evidence held equal, H1 is probably false, i.e., Pr(H1 | B & E) < 0.5.Good F-inductive arguments show that E is prima facie evidence — that is why (4) begins with the phrase, “Other evidence held equal.” They leave open the possibility that there may be other evidence which favors H1 over H2; indeed, they are compatible with the situation where the total evidence favors H1 over H2.F-inductive arguments are “stronger” than C-inductive arguments insofar as they show E not only adds to the probability of H2, but that E is more probable on the assumption that H2 is true than on the assumption that H1 is true. They are weaker than P-inductive arguments, however, because they don’t show that E is ultima facie evidence — they don’t show that E makes H2 probable.One final point. Although I believe I am the first to give F-inductive argument a name and place within Swinburne’s taxonomy of inductive arguments, the structure for such arguments is not mine. Paul Draper deserves the credit for that.
what may be more instructive is in an argument he makes "a good indiuctive argument for theism"

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/secularoutpost/2014/03/22/a-good-f-inductive-argument-for-theism-based-on-consciousness/

that would bevF inductive argument for theism naturalism. Supposedly naturalism is more inductive of secular thought and so the existence of natural world makes God less probable. But another argument forThwism of the kind would say consciousness makes God more probable because consciousnesses is inconsistent with naturalism.

The standards he's setting are arbitrary. There's no reason to think that nature is not indicative of God. It's a cultural constrict to think that spirit and nature are opposed. The whole problem with his method is that the standardanswers fortheodisy still line up agaisjnt his arguments,

Here is another one, He identities his style of argument with Rowe style arguments how they differ from Humean:

"Rowe-style arguments from evil focus on our inability to identify a God-justifying reason for allowing certain evils to occur. In a technical sense, Rowe-style arguments from evil do not even qualify as an arguments from evil. Rather, they are arguments from the failure of theodicy."

But then it looks like the way to deal with it would be to show that he's wrong and that we can identify God-justifying reason which I did, so why would that not be a good approach?

I think this is really key to my whole issue with this stuff,

[3] Jeff Lowder, "Evidential argument from evil," secular outpost August 21. 2016

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/secularoutpost/2016/08/21/an-evidential-argument-from-evil-natural-inequality/

Does Inequality Make God Improbable?

most problems of inequality are man made




On secular outpost Jeff Lowder makes an F inductive argument using the new problem of increased microcephaly to argue for the improbability of God. It really just boils down to saying that God is less likely because if God was moral and loving he would not distribute gifts unequally. The argument is about probability not proof. Children with microcephaly are examples of a larger problem of inequality of distribution of gits. The augment is made by Moti Mizrahi. Lowder is just amplifying the argument.[1]

Lowder statres:

The key point of Mizrahi’s argument, which he credits to an insight of John Rawls, is this:

… natural endowments are undeserved.Now, if natural endowments are undeserved, then the fact that one person is more innately endowed than another is arbitrary from a moral point of view. In that case, if one person has more natural talents or is more talented than another person, then that is an unequal distribution of natural talents. From a moral point of view, it is not fair that one person is taller, healthier, faster, thinner, more intelligent, more beautiful, more agile, and otherwise more naturally endowed than another person. Both did not deserve their shares of natural talents (or lack of natural talents, for that matter). The talented do not deserve to be talented just as the untalented do not deserve to be untalented. More generally, the haves do not deserve to have just the have-nots do not deserve not to have. (p. 6) [2]

First of all I disagree that this has anything to do with morality. There is no "distribution" there is natural evolutionary disposition,All God is doing is letting it ride. There may be certain people who are given gits because they are give the opportunity to serve God in some great way . Not all people could be the leader of the civil rights movement, Not all people were given the gifts of Martin Luther King., It's not unfair or immoral that God raises up a Martin Luther King, not everyone is willing to make the sacrifices that go with the gifts. Since gifts are part of certain aspect of the Christian tradition there is a theology of gifts. Now if God was willing to let the distribution of gifts ride so to speak, letting nature distribute them why would that be unfair. The recipients would not be receiving them out of any kind of special favor but by accident, except in rare cases where more is demanded of the person being given them.

The argument is based upon probability it's not proof. It's about likelihood. A concept of God that posits a loving God who makes unloving universe is less likely to be the case because of the inconstancy. Yet, the probabilistic nature of the argument does not negate the for sound premises I the distribution of gifts is not a moral failing the argument is not sound. That will soon be demonstrated.

Mizrahi frames the natural inequality version :

Now, since moral arbitrariness in the distribution of natural endowments gives rise to unequal distributions, which are unfair because they are undeserved, as when some (e.g., Albert Einstein) get all the cognitive goods, whereas others (e.g., microcephalics) get nothing, the problem is to say how could God—who is supposed to be omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent—allow for this sort of natural inequality. In other words, if God is morally perfect, why is the distribution of natural endowments so unequal? How could an all-good God be so unfair in distributing natural endowments? This is the problem of natural inequality, which is a new evidential (not logical or incompatibility) problem of evil, or so I argue. (pp. 6-7) [3]

I think the issue of microcephalics is is mis-categorized. It's not a matter of gift distribution, Normal endowments are not gits in the conventional sense, it's a matter of impediment acruel. That may seem like splitting hairs but I think it matters. There's a reason why we have to take the risk of nature with everything in life. That is based upon my concept I call soetriological drama. The purpose of creation (according to my theory--speculative only) is so that free moral agents will willingly choose the good. Choosing the good means primarily giving our lives to Christ but it also includes all aspects of being good, This requires a search for truth because of God just announced his presence we would resent it, we only seek to be good when we seek truth and find it ourselves. The most important thing therefore is the viability of the search. If nothing bad every happened to us and we were all equal inabilities we would not seek we would not need to seek truth. We would know God was real and we would resent God's commands. That may seem unrealistic to some but if one just thinks about the attitudes of people how many o us really want to be denied our own way? So the bottom line is we have to play out this search for truth amide a real world which is neutral in terms of God evidence. There are clues but leap of faith is always necessary. Read more about my theory. [4]


He sums up the issue:

But if theism is true, God is neither indifferent nor incapable of distributing natural endowments evenly. God is capable of distributing natural endowments evenly because God is by definition all-powerful. God is interested in the distribution of natural endowments because God is both loving and morally perfect. God’s love for his creatures, as well as his moral perfection, entails that God allows a state of affairs to obtain only if he has a good moral justification for doing so. But, as noted by both Rawls and Mizrahi, natural endowments are not morally justified. For example, there is nothing Michael Phelps did to deserve to be born with the kind of physiology which made his athletic achievements possible, just as there is nothing Nick Vujicic did to deserve to be born with no limbs.

That is not a reason why God should make everyone equal in ability. I can see the problem in abnormality like disease but interments of normal endowments there is no  nature should be Standa clause or why god should equalize all gifts. Natural endowments are a matter of random chance and they have to be to have a neutral world and maintain the search. It's nat a matter of salvation but...


Mizrahi connects it to salvation:

Furthermore, as Mizrahi notes, the lack or minimal presence of natural endowments relating to intellectual ability, such as microcephaly, can prevent people from responding to God appropriately. So the distribution of natural endowments, in some cases, also causes important restrictions on people’s ability to have a relationship with God. Again, blind nature is both indifferent to (and incapable of) taking such factors into account while conducting what Rawls calls the “natural lottery,” but God has no such limitations.[5]

That does not make it a matter of salvation, We do not need to be great theologians to be saved, Anyone can be saved anyone can have a Revelations with God, all relationships do not have to be the same. We are only accountable for the light we are given, We don't have to live up to more than we conceive of. Relationships with God can be extremely simple as long as they are honest, to the best of one's ability. Thinking that salvation is affected by one's intellectual ability makes salvation a meritocracy. Theological no no in Christianity,

God is not rendered less probable because the theory for the argument is wrong,

God wants free moral agents who willingly choose the good to live in amoral universe (one in which they are free to seek the good). Just sticking people in life and directly mandating the search would only result in resentment on the part of the creature. WE have to have free will to truly desire the good (and to love) but having free will means resenting the imposition of other minds.

But the search for good results in internalizing the values of the good then we don't resent God's rules. As Jesus said he who is forgiven much loves much. When we seek the truth and find it ourselves we have no problem with God's laws. But if the world is constructed such that we all know up front God is real then we have no search and we resent the rules.

so we need a neutral world in which one searches for truth

Sources

[1] Jeffery Jay Lowder, "An Evidential Argument from Evil: Natural Inequality," Augst 21,2016. Blog URL: http://www.patheos.com/blogs/secularoutpost/2016/08/21/an-evidential-argument-from-evil-natural-inequality/

[2] Ibid
[3] Ibid


[4] two articles on religious a priori
Soteriological drama: http://religiousapriori.blogspot.com/2011/04/answer-to-theodicy-soteriological-drama.html

12 angry Stereotypes  http://religiousapriori.blogspot.com/2011/04/twelve-angry-sterio-typesanswering-mark.html



[5]the rest of Lowder's argument is as follows:

I find Mizrahi’s paper very convincing, but I think it is also incomplete, since it never actually states the logical form of his evidential argument. But this problem is easily solved. Using the generic structure for F-inductive arguments, this passage (and the paper as a whole) inspire the following F-inductive version of the problem of natural inequality.
Let E = a statement about known facts about natural inequality: the unequal distribution of natural endowments (such as height, health, speed, weight, intelligence, beauty, agility, and so forth).
(1) E is known to be true.
(2) Theism is not much more probable intrinsically than naturalism, i.e., Pr(|T|) is not >! Pr(|N|).
(3) E is much more likely on the assumption that naturalism is true than on the assumption that theism is true, i.e., Pr(E | N) >! Pr(E | T).
So, (4) Other evidence held equal, theism is probably false, i.e., Pr(T | E) < 0.5.
Assessment
Premise (1) is beyond reasonable doubt.
Premise (2) is eminently plausible, for reasons which I have discussed on this blog many times before. (See the recent guest post by Paul Draper for a primer.)
This leaves premise (3). The justification for (3) may be summed up as follows:
On naturalism, E is just what we would expect. If naturalism is true, all animals are the byproducts of unguided evolution by natural selection, which is both indifferent to the distribution of natural endowments and incapable of distributing them fairly. Everything else held equal, on naturalism, we would expect natural endowments to be distributed randomly (such as in the shape of a bell curve)....



This leaves (4), which is the inference drawn from (1)-(3). 4 follows deductively from (1)-(3) as a natural consequence of Bayes’ Theorem.
I conclude that the problem of natural inequality, especially as manifested in individuals with microcephaly or other severe intellectual disabilities which prevent a relationship with God, is strong, prima facie evidence against God’s existence
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 Jeff Lowder,"F inductive Arguments a New Type of Argument," The Secular Outpost , blog, March 21, 2014

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/secularoutpost/2014/03/21/f-inductive-arguments-a-new-type-of-inductive-argument/  (aacess 8/27/16)

“F-inductive argument”: an argument in which the evidence to be explained favors one explanatory hypothesis over one or more of its rivals, i.e., P(E | H1 & B) > P(E | H2 & B). Explanatory arguments are F-inductive arguments and have the following structure.1. E is known to be true, i.e., Pr(E) is close to 1.2. H1 is not intrinsically much more probable than H2, i.e., Pr(|H1|) is not much greater than Pr(|H2|).3. Pr(E | H2 & B) > Pr(E | H1 & B).4. Other evidence held equal, H1 is probably false, i.e., Pr(H1 | B & E) < 0.5.Good F-inductive arguments show that E is prima facie evidence — that is why (4) begins with the phrase, “Other evidence held equal.” They leave open the possibility that there may be other evidence which favors H1 over H2; indeed, they are compatible with the situation where the total evidence favors H1 over H2.F-inductive arguments are “stronger” than C-inductive arguments insofar as they show E not only adds to the probability of H2, but that E is more probable on the assumption that H2 is true than on the assumption that H1 is true. They are weaker than P-inductive arguments, however, because they don’t show that E is ultima facie evidence — they don’t show that E makes H2 probable.One final point. Although I believe I am the first to give F-inductive argument a name and place within Swinburne’s taxonomy of inductive arguments, the structure for such arguments is not mine. Paul Draper deserves the credit for that.
what may be more instructive is in an argument he makes "a good indiuctive argument for theism"

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/secularoutpost/2014/03/22/a-good-f-inductive-argument-for-theism-based-on-consciousness/

that would bevF inductive argument for theism naturalism. Supposedly naturalism is more inductive of secular thought and so the existence of natural world makes God less probable. But another argument forThwism of the kind would say consciousness makes God more probable because consciousnesses is inconsistent with naturalism.

The standards he's setting are arbitrary. There's no reason to think that nature is not indicative of God. It's a cultural constrict to think that spirit and nature are opposed. The whole problem with his method is that the standardanswers fortheodisy still line up agaisjnt his arguments,

Against infinite causal regression

The Infinite causal regress is an important issue in dealing with the cosmological argument, especially the Kalam version, and the argument form final cause. It basically means that any infinitely recurring causality for any event is impossible, since one never actually arrives at a cause. The importance of this argument applies not only to the now largely abandoned notion of an oscillating universe, but to any finite causes of space/time. This is because in light of the impossibility it means that the ultimate cause of the universe must be a final cause, that is to say, the cause behind all other causes, but itself uncaused and eternal. These are two major issues because they indicate why the ultimate cause of the universe has to be God. Since arbitrary necessities are impossible, the ultimate cause cannot be something which is itself contingent, such as an eternal singularity. The ultimate cause, or "final cause" must be God, since God is a logical necessity.

I have been discussing this argument with Eric Sotnac on another thread. It really comes down to  a standoff as he argues there is no formally logical self contradiction in an infinite series of cause since each event in the series is caused it's not something from nothing. I can't really show a formally stated reason why it is a contradiction, or logically impossible, except that it doesn't account for the origin of things. If we trace back the links (say in big bang, big crunch) toward the origin of things, we just go back eternally. We never arrive at an origin so we never have one. That is not satisfying, where did the universe come from that does not do it for me.


Moreover, I get the impression that since we never get to the origin there's no reason to assume ICR. That means It's warranted. Technically it may not be a contradiction but it's warranted as a solution either. There is a good reason not accept it, besides the fact that it doesn't deliverer the goods: It's an arbitrary necessity. By that I mean there is logical reason or even a physics reason for it to be. It's a contingency (naturalistic origin or the cosmos such as big bang) but over as a necessity (eternal necessary series of cause and effects) with not actual origin or reason for being. It's only real function is to avoid a God argument. Eric argues that it's not arbitrary but the arbitrary aspect is that it's a contingency with no real reason and never supplies an origin.

At this point we might look at it in terms of my brute fact tie breaker. We could look at the ICR as a brute fact. It just is, there is no reason for it we can't privilege belief and assume there must be a reason so that's all there is. But it's not satisfying because it doesn't really explain. When we compare this to the notion of being itself and Tillich's idea of being having depth we can contrast arbitrary no reason with purpose and reason. Being Por Soir gives reason (in religious parlance is love) to think there is meaning and purpose. Being has to be necessary and eternal since something can't come from nothing. Eternity might yield necessity in an ontological since because it would need no cause. But in choosing between purpose and brute act I think I would rather choose purpose. Granted, at bottom line that is intuitive.

Then there is an empirical reason not to accept ICR, or to see it as unwarranted. Atheist Philosopher Quentin Smith argues that the universe is both finite (not eternal) and uncaused. He gives good evidence that the universe is not eternal but can't provide good evidence that is uncaused, Thus he winds up sup-lying Good evidence for the Cosmological Argument.[1] He argues for a finite past based upon the amount of radiation and entropy. Each new cycle would the universe getting bigger and longer thus as we go back in time it get's smaller and shorter. “This disallows an infinite regress into the past, for a regress will eventually arrive at a cycle that is infinitely short and a radius that is infinitely small; this cycle, or the beginning of some cycle with values approaching the values of this cycle, will count as the beginning of the oscillating universe.”  [2]The amount of radiation present in the universe Indicates a finite past.Infinite past would mean infinite radiation, but the radiation present in the universe is finite. [3] "The conclusion that the past is finite also follows from facts about entropy; if an infinite number of previous cycles have elapsed, each with increasing entropy, then the present cycle would be in a state of maximum entropy-but in fact it is in a state of relatively low  entropy.” [4]See my article about Smith's article. [5]

There are other theories such M theory, string theory on steroids. That is too complex to go into here. There is no empirical evidence for the theory. It is not certain it would provide an origin story anyway.  There's self causation through quantum tunneling but that is self contradiction at it's core. That is answered by DC's "flashpoint,"  although I prefer "Crisis on Infinite Earths." 

ICR is based upon circular reasoning, or something like it. They need the universe not to be created, they need a naturalistic cause. They need that cause to be eternal since a limited cause would need an explanation. So they loop the process back around. The premise the universe is a never ending series of beginnings and endings, rests upon the conclusion, that the universe is eternal.

Sources

[1]Quentin Smith, “The Uncaused Beginning of the Universe.” The British Journal of the Philosophy of Science, (1988, Vol., 55, no. 1), 39-57.

[2] Ibid

[3] Ibid

[4] Ibid

[5] Joseph Hinman, "Universe is finite but is it uncaused Atheist Philosopher herlps." The Religiojs a priori, online resource, accessed 8/22/16 http://religiousapriori.blogspot.com/2016/03/universe-is-finite-but-is-it-uncaused.html