Premise 1: Either God has reasons for his commands or else his commands are arbitrary.
Premise 2: If God’s commands are arbitrary, then they do not ground moral obligations (since arbitrary commands cannot ground moral obligations).
Premise 3: If God has reasons for his commands, then those reasons would be reasons for us independently of God’s commands.
Premise 4: If there are reasons for us that are independent of God’s commands, then those reasons, rather than God’s commands, ground our moral obligations.
Therefore, 5: Whether God has reasons for his commands or not, his commands do not ground moral obligations.[1]
I have previously outlined a position that says that love is the basis of ethics, or the moral, and that is based upon God's character. Thus it is not the case that those reasons, being the motivation and ground are of moral motions, are not independent independent of God.[2]
The position that I outlined answers this argument;
Premise 1: Either God has reasons for his commands or else his commands are arbitrary.
Premise 2: If God’s commands are arbitrary, then they do not ground moral obligations (since arbitrary commands cannot ground moral obligations).
Meta: God's commands are not arbitrary so we can strike those two.God has reasons.
Premise 3: If God has reasons for his commands, then those reasons would be reasons for us independently of God’s commands.
Meta:The reasons are not independent of God they are based upon his character,
Premise 4: If there are reasons for us that are independent of God’s commands, then those reasons, rather than God’s commands, ground our moral obligations.
Meta:But the reasons refer back to God as their grounding
Therefore, 5: Whether God has reasons for his commands or not, his commands do not ground moral obligations.
Meta:
Meta:
If His commands don't ground moral obligation his character to which they refer does. Thus morality is not separate from God. Moral motions are not predicated upon grounding independent of God. The fact that God is creator of all thing has to be a stronger basis for grounding than any innocuous "reasons" which may or may not be independent of God's commands. If for no other reason because God's omniscient nature furnishes a basis for grounding that succeeds all other human derived reasoning.
Meta:
I don't think it's at all obscure; I have referenced St. Agustin and the more relatively recent work of Joseph Fletcher famed in late 60s for his Situation ethics. Saying love is the background of the moral universe means moral axioms are derived from love, agape. That explains how reasons are based upon character. Since God loves, he values love thus prescribes love as the basis of moral action. The motivation of love is God's reason for mandates various moral axioms. We we can also love we understand that.[4]
Moreover, it seems quite obvious that if God is not only creator of all things but all knowing then God would have to be superior to any other source of grounding for all moral axioms,
To which I responded:
Meta:Yes I think love has a necessary connection to God if one understands the Christian concept of God. Most Christians take 1st John as more than metaphor when it says "God is love," we consider that an essential attribute of the Divine.
Jason counters:
"I did not say that love has no necessary connection to God. I said that the value of love has no necessary connection to God."[6] I think what he's getting sat is the idea that we can value love independently of God even though love may be synonymous with God in reality in our minds it can be understood as separate and we are still motivated to love. The same may be said of moral axioms. I think i see this position staking up in his statements:
As I pointed out, Premises 3 and 4 are the controversial ones. In the previous post, I made a case for Premise 3. In this post, I will make a case for Premise 4. There are two aspects of Premise 4, which are important to treat separately as much as possible. They are: (A) the reasons for our actions (which, importantly, are independent of and prior to God’s commands) ground our moral obligations; and (B) God’s commands (which are grounded in these reasons) do not ground our moral obligations. I will make a separate case for each of these aspects.[7]Of course premise four says:
- Premise 4: If there are reasons for us that are independent of God’s commands, then those reasons, rather than God’s commands, ground our moral obligations.
The problem here is that this seems to be begging the question.Just because we don't recognize the necessary connection between God, morality, and love, doesn't mean it doesn't exist. So P4 has to demonstrate a true independent nature for those moral reasons or else it;s merely arguing from a mistaken impression.
Jason's goal seems to be disproof of divine command theory (DCT). I say this because his reasons for upholding 4 basically amount to indictments of divine command theory. He says: "I will therefore make a case that, once we grant that there are reasons that exist prior to and independent of God’s commands, there is no obstacle to granting that some such reasons are strong enough and of the right sort to constitute moral obligation." That is problematic There are may different versions of DCT zn my my understanding I am not a DCT guy. To me the ED is only a problem in so far as it stipulates the possibility of a rival source for God's authority in moral grounding. To me that can only be pulled off if the atheist can truly separate moral grounding from God. I don't see that being accomplished here, since the moral values that are supposedly independent of God are only independent of his explicit commands but not from God per se via God's love.
Notes
[1] JASON THIBODEAU, "The Euthyphro Dilemma, Part 3: Reasons and Moral Obligation," The Secular Outpost. (March 6, 2019)
[2] J.L.Hinman, "Love: The Basis of Everything," Metacrock's Blog (Dec 17,2005)
http://metacrock.blogspot.com/2005/12/love-basis-of-everything.html
The first time I can remember making this composition explicit was in about 2002 in my virtual office on the CADRE website that is long gone. This article on my blog will do as the official representative of my enunciation of that position. But the virtual office version was specifically about the Euthyphro dilemma.I have made many of versions of this claim that Love is the basis of morality.
[3] THIBODEAU, "The Euthyphro Dilemma, Part 3: ..." comments.
[4] Ibid
[5] Ibid
[6] Ibid
[7]THIBODEAU, "The Euthyphro Dilemma, Part 3: ..." comments. Original article
Premise 3: If God has reasons for his commands, then those reasons would be reasons for us independently of God’s commands.
ReplyDeleteMeta:The reasons are not independent of God they are based upon his character,
The premise doesn't say "independent of God" it says "independently of God's commands." The idea is that reasons that lead God to command x would also be reasons for us to do x, if we knew what those reasons were. The command is not what makes doing x right.
So, suppose God's character leads him to command x. Presumably, there is a general principle that would go something like this: "having character C leads God to command x. The goodness of x isn't a function of God's commanding x, but rather of his having character C. In other words, the reason for God's commanding x is that God has C. But now we can ask this: "Why does having C lead God to command x (rather than something else)?" It seems part of the answer has to be that having a character like C is good, and that as a general rule, anyone with a character that is good would command x -- there are features of x, that is, that fit with a good character and that would not fit with a bad character. So any being with a good character would command x (rather than something else). But now the obvious question is what those features of x are such that it fits with a good character. And those, I take it, are "reasons for us independently of God’s commands."
Eric, I think a standard Xian answer is just that anyone with a good character is already partaking somehow of God's character. So their goodness is not Independant of God.
ReplyDeleteEric Sotnak said...
ReplyDeletePremise 3: If God has reasons for his commands, then those reasons would be reasons for us independently of God’s commands.
Meta:The reasons are not independent of God they are based upon his character,
The premise doesn't say "independent of God" it says "independently of God's commands." The idea is that reasons that lead God to command x would also be reasons for us to do x, if we knew what those reasons were. The command is not what makes doing x right.
Yes I agree with that but it doesn't fulfill the anti-clerical idea of the ED. It doesn't establish a standard higher than God. It merely means that people can be good apart from understanding who God is or what he wants. That doesn't mean they are metaphysically independent of God. Thus it does not refute anything in Christian theology
So, suppose God's character leads him to command x. Presumably, there is a general principle that would go something like this: "having character C leads God to command x. The goodness of x isn't a function of God's commanding x, but rather of his having character C. In other words, the reason for God's commanding x is that God has C. But now we can ask this: "Why does having C lead God to command x (rather than something else)?" It seems part of the answer has to be that having a character like C is good, and that as a general rule, anyone with a character that is good would command x -- there are features of x, that is, that fit with a good character and that would not fit with a bad character. So any being with a good character would command x (rather than something else). But now the obvious question is what those features of x are such that it fits with a good character. And those, I take it, are "reasons for us independently of God’s commands."
that does not establish a moral authority higher than God which to me is the real pay off of the ED. Nor does it establish a soeteriological value to such good acts,
7:56 AM
Mike Gerow wrote: "anyone with a good character is already partaking somehow of God's character. So their goodness is not Independant of God."
ReplyDeleteYes, but that's not the point here. The question is whether goodness is independent of God's commands. If so, then strictly speaking we don't have a divine command theory or authoritarian ethic, which is what is targeted by the Euthyphro dilemma.
"It doesn't establish a standard higher than God."
ReplyDeleteI really don't think that is the point of the ED. Rather, the point of the ED is to rebut the idea that morality derives from God's authority - that God makes, or creates morality.
If it is true that "having a character like C is good, and ... as a general rule, anyone with a character that is good would command x", then what we have is an account of morality on which God has a good character, which is why his commands are good. But if God does not exist, it could still be true that anyone having a good character would make good commands, or would do good. God's existence is no longer a necessary condition for the existence of morality. It would just be the case that no perfect exemplar of morally good character existed.
So Joe isn't really arguing against the ED as far as I can understand since he isn't defending any version of divine command theory. I think he's saying that God's character is love, love is the ground of the moral law, and since God is the ground of reality, that there can't be any higher ground for morality than God.
ReplyDeleteAs for your point, Erik, that God's existence is no longer a necessary condition for the existence of morality, maybe Joe could say that no one could have the norm of moral perfection in their minds without a perfect exemplar to inspire it.
I still think there's something wrong with Joe's argument. Definitionally, nothing positive or favorable is independent of God's character, but just how metaphorically are we to take that statement?
Eric Sotnak said...
ReplyDelete"It doesn't establish a standard higher than God."
I really don't think that is the point of the ED. Rather, the point of the ED is to rebut the idea that morality derives from God's authority - that God makes, or creates morality.
I know there are more sophisticated uses of it and different atheists do different things with it. Bit I think that is one use to which it is put.
"Sovereignty: If there are moral standards independent of God's will, then "[t]here is something over which God is not sovereign. God is bound by the laws of morality instead of being their establisher. Moreover, God depends for his goodness on the extent to which he conforms to an independent moral standard. Thus, God is not absolutely independent."
--Murray, Michael J.; Rea, Michael (2008). An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion. Cambridge: Cambridge. ISBN 978-0521619554."
Eric:
If it is true that "having a character like C is good, and ... as a general rule, anyone with a character that is good would command x", then what we have is an account of morality on which God has a good character, which is why his commands are good. But if God does not exist, it could still be true that anyone having a good character would make good commands, or would do good. God's existence is no longer a necessary condition for the existence of morality. It would just be the case that no perfect exemplar of morally good character existed.
But we are talking about two different kinds of good under those two different conditions,It might also be begging the question to assume we would have a capacity for oral motions without God.
7th Stooge said...
ReplyDeleteSo Joe isn't really arguing against the ED as far as I can understand since he isn't defending any version of divine command theory. I think he's saying that God's character is love, love is the ground of the moral law, and since God is the ground of reality, that there can't be any higher ground for morality than God.
As for your point, Erik, that God's existence is no longer a necessary condition for the existence of morality, maybe Joe could say that no one could have the norm of moral perfection in their minds without a perfect exemplar to inspire it.
good points Jim.I am really interested what Eric will say to that.
I still think there's something wrong with Joe's argument. Definitionally, nothing positive or favorable is independent of God's character, but just how metaphorically are we to take that statement?
I don;t see a wrong there can you elaborate?
7th Stooge said: "no one could have the norm of moral perfection in their minds without a perfect exemplar to inspire it."
ReplyDeleteBut why should we accept this claim? Are there any other cases where having a concept of something depends on there being something that perfectly exemplifies it? If not, stipulating that it must be so in the case of good character seems ad hoc.
"In an article on the Secular Outpost Jason Thibodeau presents a version of the Euthyphro dilemma (ED) like this:
ReplyDeletePremise 1: Either God has reasons for his commands or else his commands are arbitrary.
Premise 2: If God’s commands are arbitrary, then they do not ground moral obligations (since arbitrary commands cannot ground moral obligations).
Premise 3: If God has reasons for his commands, then those reasons would be reasons for us independently of God’s commands.
Premise 4: If there are reasons for us that are independent of God’s commands, then those reasons, rather than God’s commands, ground our moral obligations.
Therefore, 5: Whether God has reasons for his commands or not, his commands do not ground moral obligations."
A terminological point: This argument is not the Euthyphro dilemma (and I did not call it that). This is the arbitrariness argument (AA). The Euthyphro dilemma is as follows:
Either (i) The reason that God commands morally obligatory actions is that they are morally obligatory or (ii) Morally obligatory actions are morally obligatory in virtue of the fact that God commands them.
The problem (the "Euthyphro problem" (EP)) is that if we take option (ii) then it appears that (a) morality arbitrary, (b) morality is contingent, and (c) it is possible that some horrible action is morally obligatory (and/or that some compassionate action is morally wrong; and/or that some neutral action is morally wrong or morally obligatory).
Modern versions of divine command theory (DCT), including those that appeal to God's love, do not fully resolve the problem. Most of them are focused on (b) and (c). I maintain that no version of DCT can resolve (a). The problem is that once DCT acknowledges that God has reasons for his commands, DCT ceases to be plausible (due to (AA)). I've been writing about this and I will continue to make the case for this conclusion, at the Secular Outpost.
"Sovereignty: If there are moral standards independent of God's will, then "[t]here is something over which God is not sovereign. God is bound by the laws of morality instead of being their establisher. Moreover, God depends for his goodness on the extent to which he conforms to an independent moral standard. Thus, God is not absolutely independent."
ReplyDeleteNote that the claim here concerns independence from the divine WILL. Once again, the target here is DCT. I don't see Murray's remark here as problematic for theism -- just for DCT.
But why should we accept this claim? Are there any other cases where having a concept of something depends on there being something that perfectly exemplifies it? If not, stipulating that it must be so in the case of good character seems ad hoc.
ReplyDeleteGood point. I wasn't defending that position, only trying to anticipate what Joe's response might be.
I still think there's something wrong with Joe's argument. Definitionally, nothing positive or favorable is independent of God's character, but just how metaphorically are we to take that statement?
ReplyDeleteI don;t see a wrong there can you elaborate?
I thought you said that "God is love" is meant to be understood metaphorically, like "Bruce Lee is Kung Fu action."
ReplyDeleteI thought you said that "God is love" is meant to be understood metaphorically, like "Bruce Lee is Kung Fu action."
Obviously the statement is metaphor does that mean it's a lie? does it mean it's wrong? Is it totally different than the metaphor implies? don't metaphors indicate a truth content and connection rather than difference?
God is still the origin of love, the basis of all things
Of course, but there are several different meanings of the word "is." Even if God is the "origin" of love in some sense doesn't necessarily mean that God is identical to love or a substitutable term.
ReplyDelete7th Stooge said...
ReplyDeleteOf course, but there are several different meanings of the word "is."
Bill Clinton thought so
Even if God is the "origin" of love in some sense doesn't necessarily mean that God is identical to love or a substitutable term.
yes it does. God is the only real example of perfect love. I never said we cn substitute "God" for "love." You go on your wedding night and say "honey I God you"? I don;t think so.