tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post7407384063195197105..comments2024-03-28T00:48:19.961-07:00Comments on Metacrock's Blog: Mind and Emergent propertyJoseph Hinman (Metacrock)http://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comBlogger73125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-61139662342634716192017-09-14T10:24:30.030-07:002017-09-14T10:24:30.030-07:00we have 69 comments. we two posts uncommented on
...<b>we have 69 comments. we two posts uncommented on</b><br /><br />It takes so much THOUGHT to comment intelligently on theological concepts tho! <br /><br />Science and maths are so simple!<br /><br /><br />Okay, so iow, Ima just lazy ... ;-)Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-63268076515392721622017-09-14T07:54:21.831-07:002017-09-14T07:54:21.831-07:00A. Any explanation has to explain what the colour ...<i>A. Any explanation has to explain what the colour red looks like. As far as I can tell no other theory has made any more progress than weak emergence.<br /><br />B. Why do you get to decide which the default explanation is? As it is at the moment, we do not know, and that makes weak emergence just as valid as other theories - and more likely than those proposing some new fundamental to the universe.</i><br /><br />My point was, there has to be a hypothesis, a conjecture, some basis to a claim, and the contention of philosophical non-physicalists is that there isn't one for a physical/Newtonian explanation for qualia &tc. That is to say, no explanation seems possible EVEN IN PRINCIPLE. Ergo, strong emergence (at best) wins by default. (And this is exactly the same argument you've already been over and over with Jim on this thread.) <br /><br />So, anyway, if you wanna claim deduciblability in principle, show me how and why. Give me a clue! - give a reasonable conjecture. (You're the one who is assuming the unknown and seemingly unexplainable CAN be explained in terms of known principles, after all... so the onus would seem therefore to be on you.)<br /><br /><i><br />C. Are you aware science has progressed since Newton?</i><br />Sure. But otoh a lot of 20th/21rst century science (physics in particular) has been about drilling down to discover how complex, unpredictable and bizarre the universe is underneath....<br /><br />As I said before, if - eg - you try to conjecture some quantum aspect to consciousness, be careful cuz according to the dominant theory you lose locality; i.e. the hub of conscious perception could be "located" anywhere via quantum entanglement instead of "in the brain" where you'd like it to be, perhaps trillions of light years away or perhaps even no specific place at all.Mike Gerowhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14630695728013930638noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-11394403269189778432017-09-14T07:24:25.677-07:002017-09-14T07:24:25.677-07:00another complaint is the comments are so unfocused...another complaint is the comments are so unfocused on the post, the post to which this is a comment section is always the topic, stick to the topic,Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-89060243163973399232017-09-14T07:00:37.254-07:002017-09-14T07:00:37.254-07:00we have 69 comments. we two posts uncommentted on...we have 69 comments. we two posts uncommentted on Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-16660814848848096552017-09-14T05:40:09.339-07:002017-09-14T05:40:09.339-07:00MG: 1. IF some entity "perceives", how w...MG: <i>1. IF some entity "perceives", how would it be possible to claim to know HOW they perceive if you don't even know WHAT they perceive?</i><br /><br />The robot car gives an example. We can readily see how it perceives, but as you indicated, I doubt we can really appreciate what it perceives.<br /><br />MG: <i>2. Consciousness could be emergent phenomena, but as only a strong emergence, UNLESS, that is, you can show how consciousness (incl. its qualia and sensation aspects) is deductible from Newtonian physical forces....which would (once again) require you to answer some absurd questions along the lines of how the color red might look to the weak economy is electromagnetic force and so on and so on....</i><br /><br />A. Any explanation has to explain what the colour red looks like. As far as I can tell no other theory has made any more progress than weak emergence.<br /><br />B. Why do you get to decide which the default explanation is? As it is at the moment, we do not know, and that makes weak emergence just as valid as other theories - and more likely than those proposing some new fundamental to the universe.<br /><br />C. Are you aware science has progressed since Newton?<br /><br />MG: <i>OR OTHERWISE perhaps you're postulating some unknown (superstringish) aspect of nature that could accnt for it? If so, what exactly would define that new concept as "physical" or not? In the absence of even being able to conjecture its nature at all, at least by present understandings? (As I asked previously on Doxa.)</i><br /><br />Not at all. I have been arguing <i>against</i> this position in my discussion with 7th Stooge.<br /><br />PixAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-6229260603876194342017-09-14T00:58:02.020-07:002017-09-14T00:58:02.020-07:00Leaving the two questions I've asked before......Leaving the two questions I've asked before....<br /><br />1. IF some entity "perceives", how would it be possible to claim to know HOW they perceive if you don't even know WHAT they perceive? <br /><br />2. Consciousness could be emergent phenomena, but as only a strong emergence, UNLESS, that is, you can show how consciousness (incl. its qualia and sensation aspects) is deductible from Newtonian physical forces....which would (once again) require you to answer some absurd questions along the lines of how the color red might look to the weak economy is electromagnetic force and so on and so on....<br /><br />OR OTHERWISE perhaps you're postulating some unknown (superstringish) aspect of nature that could accnt for it? If so, what exactly would define that new concept as "physical" or not? In the absence of even being able to conjecture its nature at all, at least by present understandings? (As I asked previously on Doxa.)<br /><br />Otherwise, well, you might try an eliminativist argument a al Daniel Dennett? But so far, I don't think you've taken up that approach? Mike Gerowhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14630695728013930638noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-58503225035511399152017-09-14T00:03:23.197-07:002017-09-14T00:03:23.197-07:00MG: I dunno that looking up source code could dete...MG: <i>I dunno that looking up source code could determine exactly what a robot "perceives" either? A robot is made up of materials that ultimately stem from natural sources too, after all, not just source code. </i><br /><br />I meant that we could determine if Fords and Chevys see it in the same way, which is different to understanding how they perceive it, so I would agree with you. But then, that is my position, that the "consciousness" of a robot is emergent from its software and hardware, just as our consciousness is.<br /><br />PixAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-67017493072447540942017-09-13T14:10:31.306-07:002017-09-13T14:10:31.306-07:00Not sure what your point is. I thought you guys we...<i>Not sure what your point is. I thought you guys were saying irreducible consciousness is true; that would mean it has a function, which is to give us consciousness. If you want anyone to take your claims seriously (and not put the in the same bracket as astrology and homoeopathy), then you do indeed need to show how it can function.</i><br /><br />iirc, even some evolutionary biologists agree that human type of consciousness is pretty superfluous to all functionality and they take it to be only a "by-product" of evolution.Mike Gerowhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14630695728013930638noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-19525106417140997592017-09-13T14:00:02.880-07:002017-09-13T14:00:02.880-07:00No it would not. People here (you too?) are claimi...<i>No it would not. People here (you too?) are claiming a mental aspect to the universe, and that means that the images received by your eye have to cross the threshold from physical to mental. And once in the mental, then... who knows?</i><br /><br />I'm claiming (and I think Jim is also claiming....) only that physicalism can't account even in principle for the actual existence of some well-known phenomena -- ie sensations and qualia -- so mine is a far humbler claim than what you suggest. The existence of those seeming-irreducible phenomena, otoh, also does not demonstrate the existence of an integrated, non-physical self either, tho. Of course not - & no moreso than Descartes' "Cognito" ever did....<br /><br />Otherwise -- yeah -- who knows? If such phenomena could be explained, the explanation would likely have to be in physical/mechanical terms, which would likely make all those things part of the physical world after all, no? But lack of knowledge about a thing (or perhaps even the impossibility of acquiring positive knowledge of a thing) does not indicate the nonexistence of a thing. IOW, no-one can just reduce reality to "what I can explain"! <br /><br />Doh!<br /><br /><br /><i>People perceive consciousness as something entirely different to anything else. No one who ask that question because no one cares (or if you do, look at the source code). Robot cares are not mystical because we can look at the source code, human consciousness is. The assumption is that the latter must be fundamental different. Why?</i><br /><br />I dunno that looking up source code could determine exactly what a robot "perceives" either? A robot is made up of materials that ultimately stem from natural sources too, after all, not just source code. <br /><br />"Tous autres est tous autre" as Derrida said. ;-)<br />Mike Gerowhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14630695728013930638noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-69189200601917039972017-09-13T12:05:19.491-07:002017-09-13T12:05:19.491-07:00Here are some links that will introduce you to thi...Here are some links that will introduce you to this question. I'll be glad to entertain any questions or comments you might have AFTER you familiarize yourself a little bit with the subject. Note: I am far from an expert in this question. I have only just begun and have barely skimmed the surface of it myself.<br /><br />https://video.search.yahoo.com/yhs/search;_ylt=A0LEVvOLbrlZZEkASTonnIlQ;_ylu=X3oDMTByMjB0aG5zBGNvbG8DYmYxBHBvcwMxBHZ0aWQDBHNlYwNzYw--?p=The+Knwledge+Argument+Youtube&fr=yhs-mozilla-003&hspart=mozilla&hsimp=yhs-003#id=3&vid=407b79c720efb100e4e93a1bf7a7d28a&action=view<br /><br /><br />https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/<br /><br /><br />http://www.consc.net/<br /><br /><br />http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/maydede/mind/Nagel_Whatisitliketobeabat.pdf7th Stoogehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11527850994226457613noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-4701077370583747992017-09-13T12:01:38.571-07:002017-09-13T12:01:38.571-07:00Mike Gerow: Vision would work the same as without ...Mike Gerow: <i>Vision would work the same as without it....</i><br /><br />No it would not. People here (you too?) are claiming a mental aspect to the universe, and that means that the images received by your eye have to cross the threshold from physical to mental. And once in the mental, then... who knows?<br /><br />Mike Gerow: <i>No one is claiming at this point that irreducible consciousness has any function. It just is & its ineluctability is, in fact, at the core of the issue. Do, no one has to prove its "good" for anything! The fact that motorized automatons can FUNCTION without consciousness just makes the fact that humans (and likely some other biological organisms) really do perceive things seem all the more odd, unnecessary and evolutionistically pointless....</i><br /><br />Not sure what your point is. I thought you guys were saying irreducible consciousness is true; that would mean it has a function, which is to give us consciousness. If you want anyone to take your claims seriously (and not put the in the same bracket as astrology and homoeopathy), then you do indeed need to show how it can function.<br /><br />And what makes you think robot cars do not have a rudimentary consciousness, say comparably to an ant?<br /><br /><i>Could someone ask of automated cars, "where Chevy's see red would Fords see green?"<br /><br />Would the question make any sense? </i><br /><br />People perceive consciousness as something entirely different to anything else. No one who ask that question because no one cares (or if you do, look at the source code). Robot cares are not mystical because we can look at the source code, human consciousness is. The assumption is that the latter must be fundamental different. Why?<br /><br />PixAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-59703615004456973752017-09-13T11:57:05.389-07:002017-09-13T11:57:05.389-07:00Pix: Just to be clear, that one paragraph of yours...Pix: Just to be clear, that one paragraph of yours seemed to be arguing that there was no way to determine which is the best answer, while the rest of your posts indicated the above, hence I asked for confirmation<br /><br />What one paragraph? I prob'ly said something to the effect that we can never know for sure, but that applies to nearly all knowledge! <br /><br />Pix; So we are back to discussing why we should imagine the concepts and the arguments relate to the real world in the absence of any empirical data<br /><br />Once again, it's not in the absence of empirical data. (Pssst...your scientism is showing again!) What do you think of the entire philosophy of mind field or philosophy in general or metaphysics in general? Do you think that those fields and the problems they cover relate to the real world? What roles do empirical data play in evaluating arguments in those fields? Whatever answers you give (if any), apply those answers to my position. The irreducibility of consciousness is a position in the philosophy of mind. In that field, and in most of the rest of philosophy, arguments have to be constrained by agreed on facts but those facts cannot DETERMINE the positions. If they could, there'd be no dispute.<br /><br />Pix: Why you consider a lack of empirical data to be a secure a basis for knowledge I have no idea; to me it indicates we do not know. Compare to, say, relativity, which has a huge amount of empirical data to confirm its relationship to the real world - how you can possibly compare the two is beyond me. <br /><br />It's not the lack of empirical data. That would be a "consciousness of the gaps" argument. It's the nature of the concepts themselves. Really, Pix, this is like high school level stuff. <br /><br />Pix: I thought I did acknowledge it. What bit of "I am assuming that if it cannot be resolved empirically then it cannot be resolved" is being unable to acknowledge it?<br /><br />My point was that these statements of yours indicate that you take empirical data as the only true basis or justification for knowledge. THAT IS THE POSITION YOU NEED TO EsTABLISH. THAT IS THE ARGUMENT THAT YOU NEED TO MAKE WHICH YOU HAVE NOT MADE. That belief of yours is not empirically derived. It's not an empirical statement. It's a philosophical position. <br /><br />Pix: Not quite. You start with a clear idea of what it might be, and go about testing that. That is how science is done.<br /><br />But your getting a clear idea f what it might be depends on a theoretical framework. Science requires foundations and pre-suppositions. It's not just a set of techniques.<br /><br />Pix: But I am not necessarily talking about science. If I want to know what you wrote in your last post, I look at the empirical data. If you want to decide if your hypothesis matches reality then you test it against empirical data. Otherwise it is just what might be in a fantasy world. <br /><br />Philosophy aims at being about the "real world." But naive understandings of what the real world are taken uncritically, on faith, are generally inadequate for answering questions having to do with the interpreation of "the real world," what the real world entails, what things are included in it and what things excluded, the meaning of the real world. The world does not come with its meaning already inscribed in it. So humans came up with this field call "philosophy" that deals with such questions that naive posits cannot and are not meant to answer. We humans, at least some of us, crave meaning and not just instrumental success and technical prowess. The agreed on facts still have to be interpreted as to what they mean, what the "whole" means. To say that these questions cannot be answered absent empirical data to decide them is t take a philosophical position that needs to be justified and cannot be taken on naive faith. YOu can;t appeal to empirical data to justify it because that's obviously circular.7th Stoogehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11527850994226457613noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-89335359314301906132017-09-13T11:29:29.275-07:002017-09-13T11:29:29.275-07:00Mike: a thought cured to me, could the fact that w...Mike: a thought cured to me, could the fact that we can build machines that can sorta "see,"in a rudimentry kind of way, even be taken as better evidence FOR some kind of panpsychic aspect in nature than against it?<br /><br />Has anyone ever argued it like that? <br /><br />I'm not sure. An interesting thought.7th Stoogehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11527850994226457613noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-91906949968028857092017-09-13T11:01:05.221-07:002017-09-13T11:01:05.221-07:00Jim, a thought cured to me, could the fact that we...Jim, a thought cured to me, could the fact that we can build machines that can sorta "see,"in a rudimentry kind of way, even be taken as better evidence FOR some kind of panpsychic aspect in nature than against it? <br /><br />Has anyone ever argued it like that? Mike Gerowhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14630695728013930638noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-1128081891389191512017-09-13T10:50:05.571-07:002017-09-13T10:50:05.571-07:00Vision would work the same as without it....
No ...Vision would work the same as without it....<br /><br /><br />No one is claiming at this point that irreducible consciousness has any function. It just is & its ineluctability is, in fact, at the core of the issue. Do, no one has to prove its "good" for anything! The fact that motorized automatons can FUNCTION without consciousness just makes the fact that humans (and likely some other biological organisms) really do perceive things seem all the more odd, unnecessary and evolutionistically pointless....<br /><br />Could someone ask of automated cars, "where Chevy's see red would Fords see green?"<br /><br /><br />Would the question make any sense? <br /><br />Mike Gerowhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14630695728013930638noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-24108118188887990252017-09-13T10:37:25.385-07:002017-09-13T10:37:25.385-07:00Mike Gerow: Px, for one thing, it's easy to im...Mike Gerow: <i>Px, for one thing, it's easy to imagine how the brain as an physical machine-like thing constructs images out of electromagnetic forces because we're staring devices that do something like that. But how does electricity "see?" . What colour does red look like to electricity? If the strong electromagnetic force could see thru the perceptions of the weak electromagnetic force would it see red where the weak force sees green?</i><br /> <br />Robot cars give us a great example of how something physical, without consciousness, can see. What does a car or a road sign look like to a robot car? Undoubted it is different to how we experience it, but I thnk it shows that it is possible to experience a sight without recourse to mysticism.<br /><br />Now let us do the reverse the question. Anyone here want to explain how vision work with an irreducible consciousness?<br /><br />PixAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-81932155391099357782017-09-13T08:01:45.483-07:002017-09-13T08:01:45.483-07:00Px, for one thing, it's easy to imagine how th...Px, for one thing, it's easy to imagine how the brain as an physical machine-like thing constructs images out of electromagnetic forces because we're staring devices that do something like that. But how does electricity "see?" . What colour does red look like to electricity? If the strong electromagnetic force could see thru the perceptions of the weak electromagnetic force would it see red where the weak force sees green? <br /><br />...me, at least, I wouldn't have a clue how to even begin conjecturing how natural forces could possibly "see, " "smell," or otherwise perceive things for themselves. <br /><br />OTOH, the universe isn't thought to be locative on a quantum level, so if biological consciousness is a quantum phenomena, it could be "located" anywhere or maybe even nowhere at all....<br /><br /><br />Hard problem: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness<br /><br /><br />Mike Gerowhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14630695728013930638noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-50726791944485792982017-09-13T01:32:47.902-07:002017-09-13T01:32:47.902-07:00Mike: Okay, but I'm not sure that if I had you...Mike: Okay, but I'm not sure that if I had your pain, it really would be my pain .... esp cuz even pain is partly constructed (most often by our added worries about its underlying causes) ... no? If I had YOUR pain, I might experience it as pleasure, most esp if I was sure it wasn't realy MY pain!<br /><br />Right. It's confusing the way I put it, but maybe the confusion is unavoidable due to the puzzles inherent in consciousness. What I meant was that the only way you could experience my pain would be from a first person point of view, even if that scenario is metaphysically impossible or meaningless.<br /><br />Mike:.... but my point is merely to complexify and show the difficulties of even defining "pain".... um, in terms of some "objectivity" .... since, after all, only subjects and not objects are believed capable of feeling "pain"<br /><br />I agree. We can define "pain" in other ways, in terms of functionalism or epistemology or whatever but there's that nagging sense that what's essential to pain's been left out.<br /><br />Mike: This topic is sure a "pain", tho.... <br /><br />My brain hurts!7th Stoogehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11527850994226457613noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-67389114965560899282017-09-13T00:28:20.153-07:002017-09-13T00:28:20.153-07:007th S: I agree. They're both physical concepts...7th S: <i>I agree. They're both physical concepts. It's uncontroversially accpeted. The nature of the concepts is not in question, so analogy to the consciousness problem..</i><br /><br />Just because we label gravity and electromagnetic force as physical concepts, you do not get to pretend they are entirely separate to conscious. Consciousness affects the physical and is itself affected by the physical. We KNOW there is a strong interaction between the two.<br /><br />How does that interaction work, do you think? Your belief in an irreducible consciousness is based on the arguments and reasoning, so talk me through them. How does consciousness affect the physical world? How does the physical world affect consciousness? Then we can discuss why this new fundamental might or might not affect the laws of science.<br /><br />My guess is that actually there is no explanation about how this new fundamental interacts with the universe excerpt in the most vague terms.<br /><br />7th S: <i>Empirical data would be equally accessible in principle to all competent observers. ...</i><br /><br />Why?<br /><br />Clearly that would be preferable, but why is it a requirement?<br /><br />Pix: <i>Seriously? Yes, I absolutely am assuming that! If you want to argue about the nature of consciousness in another world, you can do so without me.</i><br /><br />7th S: <i>I've been doing so without you since this thread began!</i><br /><br />As long as we are clear that what you are arguing for relates to another world and not this one...<br /><br />7th S: <i>The question has to do with what the nature of reality is. You can't assume the answer because that's what we're disagreeing over. You have to establish it. You're embedding the conclusion of the argument in one of your premises.</i><br /><br />Can you explain?<br /><br />Relativity is about the nature of reality, but we do not start worrying about whether it is the real world.<br /><br />7th S: <i>Imagine that we're debating whether some version of "physicalism" is true. You argue that physicalism is obviously the case because everything that's real is physical.</i><br /><br />Or imagine we are arguing about the periodic table; we would be assuming we were talking about the real periodic table in the real world... So?<br /><br />Sorry, I am not getting your point here.<br /><br />7th S: <i>"What does the real world entail?" is and has always been the question. And yes, your continual assumption of the conclusion in your premises does explain everything about our problems even getting this discussion off the ground!</i><br /><br />We are discussing the nature of the real world (which is what science, for example, does). Are we discussing whether this is the real world? Not as far as I am concerned! I am assuming it is.<br /><br />For the record, whenever we have these discussions, I am assuming they are about the real world.<br /><br />PixAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-90120222090325243872017-09-13T00:15:49.388-07:002017-09-13T00:15:49.388-07:007th S: No, I'm saying that I'm fairly conf...7th S: <i>No, I'm saying that I'm fairly confident that consciousness is irreducible, due to the nature of the concepts and the arguments involved and because there's no way presently conceivable that empirical evidence would have any bearing on the nature of the concepts. That's as secure a basis for knowledge as we usually ever have.</i><br /><br />Just to be clear, that one paragraph of yours seemed to be arguing that there was no way to determine which is the best answer, while the rest of your posts indicated the above, hence I asked for confirmation.<br /><br />So we are back to discussing why we should imagine the concepts and the arguments relate to the real world in the absence of any empirical data.<br /><br />Why you consider a lack of empirical data to be a secure a basis for knowledge I have no idea; to me it indicates we do not know. Compare to, say, relativity, which has a huge amount of empirical data to confirm its relationship to the real world - how you can possibly compare the two is beyond me. <br /><br />7th S: <i>Right, so you're assuming that it's either empirically knowable or not knowable at all. That's the crux of the question right there, the point that has to be established and the point you just keep blithely assuming without feeling any need to justify. You have this huge blind spot that you just seem unable to acknowledge.</i><br /><br />I thought I did acknowledge it. What bit of "I am assuming that if it cannot be resolved empirically then it cannot be resolved" is being unable to acknowledge it?<br /><br />In contrast you seem to have this blind faith in claims that are utterly unsupported by empirical data, and seem unable to give any reason to suppose the claims relate to reality.<br /><br />7th S: <i>To empirically research some subject, you first have to have a clear idea of what that thing is, what questions to ask, how to ask them and how to know when they've been answered. Empirical research depends on an agreed upon theoretical framework. The problem of consciousness occurs at a much more basic, conceptual level. It's a question of establishing a theoretical framework. You can't assume one when the problem IS establishing and justifying one in the first place!</i><br /><br />Not quite. You start with a clear idea of what it <i>might be</i>, and go about testing that. That is how science is done.<br /><br />But I am not necessarily talking about science. If I want to know what you wrote in your last post, I look at the empirical data. If you want to decide if your hypothesis matches reality then you test it against empirical data. Otherwise it is just what <i>might</i> be in a fantasy world.<br /><br />PixAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-27503841334849256832017-09-12T15:18:38.756-07:002017-09-12T15:18:38.756-07:00Pix: The electromagnetic force and gravity are asp...Pix: The electromagnetic force and gravity are aspects of one seamless reality, neither reducible to the other. However, if our laws of science were missing one, then they would be way off in numerous places. The absence of a fundamental of the universe is not something that you can miss - especially something that has such an influence on the world around us.<br /><br />I agree. They're both physical concepts. It's uncontroversially accpeted. The nature of the concepts is not in question, so analogy to the consciousness problem..<br /><br />Pix: So what is your point? If you mean that a theory of consciousness will depend on subjective experiences, then that does not contradict anything I have been saying. Subjective experiences are still empirical data. Clearly objective data are to be preferred, but we have to take what we have.<br /><br />Empirical data would be equally accessible in principle to all competent observers. This model of knowledge is blocked when the thing in question is essentially NOT accessible equally.<br /><br />Pix; Seriously? Yes, I absolutely am assuming that! If you want to argue about the nature of consciousness in another world, you can do so without me.<br /><br />I've been doing so without you since this thread began!<br /><br />The question has to do with what the nature of reality is. You can't assume the answer because that's what we're disagreeing over. You have to establish it. You're embedding the conclusion of the argument in one of your premises.<br /><br />Imagine that we're debating whether some version of "physicalism" is true. You argue that physicalism is obviously the case because everything that's real is physical.<br /><br />Pix: Certainly I was assuming we were discussing the real world. Guilty as charged! I guess that means you are not talking about the real world. That actually explains a lot...<br /><br />"What does the real world entail?" is and has always been the question. And yes, your continual assumption of the conclusion in your premises does explain everything about our problems even getting this discussion off the ground!7th Stoogehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11527850994226457613noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-47726137215527117982017-09-12T15:00:58.999-07:002017-09-12T15:00:58.999-07:00Pix: I am not assuming it can be empirically resol...Pix: I am not assuming it can be empirically resolved, I am assuming that if it cannot be resolved empirically then it cannot be resolved.<br /><br />Right, so you're assuming that it's either empirically knowable or not knowable at all. That's the crux of the question right there, the point that has to be established and the point you just keep blithely assuming without feeling any need to justify. You have this huge blind spot that you just seem unable to acknowledge.<br /><br />Pix: That really is not how it works. A researcher who thinks it can be resolved a certain way will look for the empirical evidence to support his or her hypothesis. It is only after numerous such attempts are fruitless than you question whether it can be resolved at all. The only way to know if it can be determine empirically is to determine it empirically, so this idea of doing it in two stages is nonsense.<br /><br />To empirically research some subject, you first have to have a clear idea of what that thing is, what questions to ask, how to ask them and how to know when they've been answered. Empirical research depends on an agreed upon theoretical framework. The problem of consciousness occurs at a much more basic, conceptual level. It's a question of establishing a theoretical framework. You can't assume one when the problem IS establishing and justifying one in the first place!7th Stoogehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11527850994226457613noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-78430086326359392262017-09-12T14:52:37.209-07:002017-09-12T14:52:37.209-07:00Pix: As far as I can tell, you are saying that the...Pix: As far as I can tell, you are saying that there is (or may well be) no way to determine which is the best answer. Is that right? I think that that is a reasonable position - obviously it cannot be shown to be true, but I can understand why someone would hold that opinion, and I would not be able to argue against it.<br /><br />No, I'm saying that I'm fairly confident that consciousness is irreducible, due to the nature of the concepts and the arguments involved and because there's no way presently conceivable that empirical evidence would have any bearing on the nature of the concepts. That's as secure a basis for knowledge as we usually ever have.7th Stoogehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11527850994226457613noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-14423004536035520022017-09-12T13:08:00.184-07:002017-09-12T13:08:00.184-07:007th S: Because the mental and physical, according ...7th S: <i>Because the mental and physical, according to Nagel, are aspects of one seamless reality. They are the same thing, BUT that does not mean that one is reducible to the other, because of the serious philosophical problems that follow. The simpler, more elegant and more explanatory solution is the one Bertrand Russell proposed which is Nagel's as well. I don't know if that is the right one but it's worth consideration as a philosophical question.</i><br /><br />The electromagnetic force and gravity are aspects of one seamless reality, neither reducible to the other. However, if our laws of science were missing one, then they would be way off in numerous places. The absence of a fundamental of the universe is not something that you can miss - especially something that has such an influence on the world around us.<br /><br />7th S: <i>Yes, "based on." Not the experiences as experiences. The empirical method, whether it's in organized science or the everyday sense, uses experiences or appearances as a means to get at the objective reality that those appearances signify or are caused by. By "objective reality" is meant what is observable in principle by all competent observers. One problem is that reality is not just "objective" reality. It includes subjective points of view as well. An empiricist would take her experiences or what "appears" to her as a way to understand what is objectively real. But this method can't apply when the thing of interest is the appearances themselves. The appearances themselves are not equally accessible in principle to all competent observers. I have privileged access to my pain that you do not and cannot have (if you did have it, then it would be your pain) and vice versa. Consciousnes is essentially linked to an irreducible first-person ontology, a subjective ontology. I can't "strip away" teh subjective aspects of my experience to get at the objective reality underlying it because it's the subjective aspects themselves that are the thing I'm interested in.</i><br /><br />So what is your point? If you mean that a theory of consciousness will depend on subjective experiences, then that does not contradict anything I have been saying. Subjective experiences are still empirical data. Clearly objective data are to be preferred, but we have to take what we have.<br /><br />7th S: <i>You're assuming again that "the real world" is physical reality. The question is whether maths are real! There you go again!</i><br /><br />Seriously? Yes, I absolutely am assuming that! If you want to argue about the nature of consciousness in another world, you can do so without me.<br /><br />7th S: <i>Assuming the point at issue once again. Yeehaw.</i><br /><br />Certainly I was assuming we were discussing the real world. Guilty as charged! I guess that means you are not talking about the real world. That actually explains a lot...<br /><br />PixAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-46236257731228176592017-09-12T13:02:51.929-07:002017-09-12T13:02:51.929-07:007th S: With philosophical disputes, the observable...7th S: <i>With philosophical disputes, the observable facts are not determinative. If such facts were determinative, it wouldn't be a philosophical question but one for experimental science.</i><br /><br />I agree with the second part, but then how do we determine which is best? Hopefully them will be clear in the rest of your post...<br /><br />7th S: <i>So the philosophical question is whether consciousness is a physical concept at all and thus whether or not it is understandable and explainable through experimental science. You keep assuming that the answers to those questions are "yes' with no argument or justification. that's why you are begging the question. I hope you can see how your reasoning is circular...That being said, it's hard to even conceive of an experiment that would confirm or disconfirm these positions. There may be in the future, but as I've said, all knowledge can be overturned, but that potential does not and should not prevent us from having justified beliefs.</i><br /><br />As far as I can tell, you are saying that there is (or may well be) no way to determine which is the best answer. Is that right? I think that that is a reasonable position - obviously it cannot be shown to be true, but I can understand why someone would hold that opinion, and I would not be able to argue against it.<br /><br />Previously you seemed to be making the rather more definite position that consciousness was not reducible, and I was objecting to taking such a position when not supported by empirical data.<br /><br />7th S: <i>I propose the thing I've been proposing for the last half dozen comments. Through the strength scope depth of the arguments and reasoning. We cannot ASSUME that this is a question resolvable through empirical means because the question is WHETHER it is resolvable that way.</i><br /><br />I am not assuming it can be empirically resolved, I am assuming that if it cannot be resolved empirically then it cannot be resolved.<br /><br />7th S: <i>You first have to establish why you think it is an empirical matter and THEN we can say "We don't know" or "We have to wait on further data" etc. AFTER you've established your position, then researchers can get to work trying to explain consciousness empirically. I hope this helps...</i><br /><br />That really is not how it works. A researcher who thinks it can be resolved a certain way will look for the empirical evidence to support his or her hypothesis. It is only after numerous such attempts are fruitless than you question whether it can be resolved at all. The only way to know if it can be determine empirically is to determine it empirically, so this idea of doing it in two stages is nonsense.<br /><br />PixAnonymousnoreply@blogger.com