tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post7023953397796405473..comments2024-03-28T08:35:59.048-07:00Comments on Metacrock's Blog: Mind is not Reducible to Brain part 2Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)http://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comBlogger7125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-54906966956257313962017-06-09T10:04:47.022-07:002017-06-09T10:04:47.022-07:00"There are, however, empirical data that impl..."There are, however, empirical data that imply the brain is not necessary to mind. One such datum is the humble amoeba. They swim; they find food they learn, they multiply, all without brains ..."<br /><br />There are a few issues with this. <br /><br />First, do amoebas have mental states? Since the mind-brain thesis has to do with mental states being identical to brain states or wholly caused by brain states, if amoebas do not have mental states then their existence seems irrelevant here. e.g. they cannot show that mental states exist without brain states since it is not the case that amoebas have mental states. <br /><br />Second, in a sense the materialist thesis would ultimately be "Mental states are identical to or are wholly caused by physical states". We limit ourselves to physical states of our brains since brain states appear to be the only relevant physical states to our mental states. Hurting my foot could cause a change in my mental states, but if the connection between my foot and brain is severed then I certainly wouldn't have a connection between my mental states and the physical state in my foot. Since the materialist thesis is really about mental states being identical to physical states, or being wholly caused by physical states, it doesn't help the non materialist to cite the amoeba since amoebas act with a physical body. Even if we said amoebas KIND OF have mental states insofar as they can multiply, find food, learn, or whatever, it would still be the case that they do so with a physical body. The only thing that could help here is if amoebas performed such tasks without the use of a physical medium at all.Ryan Mhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15738381414795204410noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-68907504142147856102017-06-09T07:59:19.942-07:002017-06-09T07:59:19.942-07:00If you agree mid is emergent of brain and is a fur...<i> If you agree mid is emergent of brain and is a further damson that is more than physical although continegnet upon the physical brain then we are on the same page.</i><br /><br />We are not on the same page. There is nothing about "emergence" that implies "more than physical". The color of gold is an emergent property. This is something that is difficult or impossible to explain in terms of basic particle physics. But there's nothing immaterial about it. It's just the way matter behaves at another level of analysis.im-skepticalhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08267710618719895303noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-81933325477491911802017-06-09T07:02:00.533-07:002017-06-09T07:02:00.533-07:00IMS said: "I have always been uncomfortable w...IMS said: "I have always been uncomfortable with the way theists describe materialists' view of mind. They say things like "mind is equivalent to brain". But that's not true. That's like saying "walking is equivalent to legs". They aren't the same thing. Mind is a function of the brain"<br /><br />This is a pet peeve of mine, as well. Even die-hard identity theorists, when they are being careful, don't say mind=brain. Rather, what they say is that every mental state is a brain state.Eric Sotnakhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06162425851889399481noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-11221249784496092702017-06-09T06:35:23.356-07:002017-06-09T06:35:23.356-07:00I think issues about mind in terms of an apologeti...I think issues about mind in terms of an apologetics context tap out to a dispute about the soul. A lot of reductionist equate mind with illusion as though there's no mind it;s phenomenon. If you agree mid is emergent of brain and is a further damson that is more than physical although continegnet upon the physical brain then we are on the same page. The difference is I believe that when we die God can keep the pattern tougher that makes up our consciousness.Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-84239659611486629022017-06-08T07:38:02.420-07:002017-06-08T07:38:02.420-07:00Joe, you said in your article that the amoeba is a...Joe, you said in your article that the amoeba is an example of mind without brain. Or perhaps I just didn't understand what you are saying at all. So what are you saying here?<br /><br />And by the way, I have always been uncomfortable with the way theists describe materialists' view of mind. They say things like "mind is equivalent to brain". But that's not true. That's like saying "walking is equivalent to legs". They aren't the same thing. Mind is a function of the brain. Actually, if you read what they say, they speak about emergence. Mind is an emergent phenomenon. But that doesn't imply that is isn't purely physical. All it really means is that it isn't amenable to explanation at the lowest level (as in particle physics), but is better explained at a different level of analysis. Nevertheless, all of that is still entirely dependent on the underlying physics. (For example, chemistry describes behavior and properties of materials that are entirely dependent on the underlying physics, but better understood at a different level of analysis.)im-skepticalhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08267710618719895303noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-17544666232043764382017-06-07T23:57:35.399-07:002017-06-07T23:57:35.399-07:00All of which raises the question: what makes you t...All of which raises the question: what makes you think that biological function is equivalent to having a mind? Surely you don't think that multiplying means consciously performing mathematical operations. But if you actually think they have conscious experience, where is your evidence for that?<br /><br /><b>I didn't say it was. equivolant would mean that mind is basically a biological function, that would be reduction, I say it;s emergent that means it goes beyond it, As for dualism I said I don't know I can see the possibility but it see s to me that emergence is a perfectly fine way to account fr it.<br /><br />I don't get what you think you are saying with "Surely you don't think that multiplying means consciously performing mathematical operations. But if you actually think they have conscious experience, where is your evidence for that?" </b>Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-19957424887684560842017-06-07T14:32:55.273-07:002017-06-07T14:32:55.273-07:00There are, however, empirical data that imply the ...<i>There are, however, empirical data that imply the brain is not necessary to mind. One such datum is the humble amoeba. They swim; they find food they learn, they multiply, all without brains ...</i><br /><br />All of which raises the question: what makes you think that biological function is equivalent to having a mind? Surely you don't think that multiplying means consciously performing mathematical operations. But if you actually think they have conscious experience, where is your evidence for that?<br /><br />im-skepticalhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08267710618719895303noreply@blogger.com