Tuesday, December 27, 2011

Properly Basic Belief and Extraordinary Claims

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Dec 28, CARM, Christian apologist Occam:


It still seems to me, after discussing the subject with atheists for a little while, that there are significant counter-examples to the claim that every belief must be supported by sufficient evidence:

(1) The past exists.
(2) The external world exists.
(3) People other than myself have minds.

Now, maybe I'm wrong in thinking that we hold these beliefs without sufficient evidence, but for the purposes of this thread, let's assume I'm right. What follows from that?

For one thing, it follows that the statement, "there is not enough evidence for the existence of God," is insufficient as an explanation of one's atheism. After all, if there are counter-examples to the claim that every belief must be supported by sufficient evidence, then the fact that there is not sufficient evidence for a belief does not, in and of itself, explain why one does not hold that belief.

So, if I'm right that there are counter-examples to the claim that every belief must be supported by sufficient evidence, I think that atheists should explain their atheism in terms of properly basic belief rather than in terms of evidence.

How might they do this? Well, they might say that their atheism is a properly basic response to the suffering and other evils that they see in the world. The atheist might say that he can just look at, say, an infant born with severe deformities, and know that there is no God. This might be stronger than the traditional argument from evil, which, being an argument, allows the theist to divert the discussion away from the sheer horror of evil, and turn it into an abstract discussion of the argument's formal validity.

This illicits Response by Atheist "Ben The Biased"
see ibid pot no. 3

Or we could just use your standard for evaluating beliefs...

Quote
Originally Posted by Occam View Post
I wouldn't put Sagan's dragon in the same category as God, because it's crazy. There are obviously some things that can be known in the properly basic way, and some that can't.


I could just as easily say that I wouldn't put God in the same category as the past, the external world, and other minds because it's crazy.
my response to both:

Meta:

I don't think the problem is with the concept that everything needs sufficient evidence. That's basically what a rational warrant is. The term essentially means just that (0r "good reason to believe it").

Even Plantinga's idea of properly basic is not saying there's no reason to believe something you just believe it anyway. It's saying that one need not have to prove what one finds valid as a warrant for belief.

Now atheists have always assumed they have that in the form of an absence of convincing evidence. Really I am not included to dispute that. It seems reasonable to me to say "I don't find X conciliating as a reason to believe Y so, therefore,I don't believe Y." That also means that if one say "well, I do believe Y becuase I do find X convincing" then they really can't back on it.

I think what all of this points to is a sense of tolerance and let believers believe and unbelievers not believe.
Now enter the "extraordinary claims" (ECREE) bit:
Atheist poster Captian Obvious (post 5):

Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence, not less or no evidence.
So, for the notion that "people other than myself have minds" to be analogous to the notion of god, you have to suggest that they have approximately the same probability.

Even if, (which I don't accept) I believe that people have minds without sufficient evidence to do so, that does not compel me to accept every claim for which there is insufficient evidence. It certainly doesn't compel me to accept claims that would actually run counter to existing measurable evidence (depending on how god is defined).
I have posted several blog spots on this concept (ECREE) over the years. the last three are basically the same one form 2008 and that's probably the best answer I have given it. The most recent was in 20011.

My Answer to him:
Meta:

Originally Posted by CaptainObvious View Post
Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence, not less or no evidence.

Meta:
no they don't. I have never been able to find a logical reason from anyone why that should be true and not the dictum "adequate means of proof are adequate." That's matter of definition. If something is "adequate" then by definition it's enough.


the whole issue is going to revolve around what's what, that is, what really constitutes "extraordinary" and "adequate?"


CA:
So, for the notion that "people other than myself have minds" to be analogous to the notion of god, you have to suggest that they have approximately the same probability.
Meta:

No you don't. you have no way to attach probability to God. the whole concept is silly. That's like saying "what's the probalby that something is real rather than all reality being illusion?" How can make a basis for measurement? If all of reality is an illusion then obviously the idea that it's not illusory is part of the illusion.

Even if, (which I don't accept) I believe that people have minds without sufficient evidence to do so, that does not compel me to accept every claim for which there is insufficient evidence. It certainly doesn't compel me to accept claims that would actually run counter to existing measurable evidence (depending on how god is defined).
there are some levels of knowing that are illusive and must be based upon a judgment rather than proof.

2 comments:

Brap Gronk said...

"Even Plantinga's idea of properly basic is not saying there's no reason to believe something you just believe it anyway. It's saying that one need not have to prove what one finds valid as a warrant for belief."

I haven't read any of Plantinga's books on rational warrant/proper basicality yet (they're on my wish list), but I have seen this notion that belief in God is a rationally warranted belief used by several apologists (especially Randal Rauser). Based on the blog postings and comments I have read, I believe some or all of the following are implied when one claims a belief is rationally warranted or properly basic (please correct me if I'm wrong):

- It does not need to be proven.
- It should be considered valid sans defeaters. (In other words, true until proven false.)
- It can be considered axiomatic.

I'm perfectly ok with any or all of those three statements being considered true for a rationally warranted belief, and I consider them true for the three examples listed at the beginning of this post (existence of the past, the external world, and other minds). But I don't think they address the sufficient or necessary conditions for something to become a rationally warranted belief in the first place. They may be the "X" in:

If A is a rationally warranted belief, then X.

But I'm wondering what is the "Y" in:

If Y, then A is a rationally warranted belief.

As I said, I haven't read Plantinga's books so I don't know how he defines Y. I think my initial attempt at defining Y would involve sensory data, which is why I have a problem declaring belief in God as rationally warranted.

But before I get any deeper into that, can you explain, in a paragraph or two, how Plantinga defines Y?

Miles said...

Like the Bertrand Russell reference in there with the baby.