tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post6196450631759175727..comments2024-03-28T15:31:02.860-07:00Comments on Metacrock's Blog: Plantinga's Possible World's ArgumentJoseph Hinman (Metacrock)http://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comBlogger11125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-27471717864319153232010-08-14T06:53:16.885-07:002010-08-14T06:53:16.885-07:00I didn't mean that last comment as an insult t...I didn't mean that last comment as an insult to you. I assume your reasons are more complex that the list implies.Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-34163099613547724732010-08-14T06:51:51.106-07:002010-08-14T06:51:51.106-07:00Brap, the full answer I have in mind would make a ...Brap, the full answer I have in mind would make a good essay for the blog. I'll try to post that on Wednesday.<br /><br />Thumbnail answer: Any given argument might be rationally warranted, depending upon how it's argued. Rational warrant is like "logical permission to believe something" not actual proof.<br /><br />A person is logically justified in not believing something if they truly have no reason to believe it.<br /><br />However, there's a point at which one can go beyond the line of credulity. For example the reasons you gave for no believing would only be understandable for someone who never actually read a book and knows nothing about modern thought at all.<br /><br />More on that latter.Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-88620446103744222022010-08-13T19:10:48.908-07:002010-08-13T19:10:48.908-07:00Meta,
Since you mentioned rationally warranted be...Meta,<br /><br />Since you mentioned rationally warranted belief in your most recent comment, I have a question for you. Let’s assume someone is unaware of the case you present for belief being rationally warranted. Let’s also assume the seven points below are true for this person. Would you agree that non-belief is rationally warranted for that person, given the following seven points, or any subset of these points?<br /><br />1. I have never seen God.<br />2. I have never heard God.<br />3. I don’t know anyone who has ever seen God, or claimed to have seen God.<br />4. I don’t know anyone who has ever heard God, or claimed to have heard God.<br />5. I am not aware of any evidence of God’s interaction with our world. Natural laws can explain how things work and why things happen, as far as I know.<br />6. Humans have wondered about the origins of the earth, the sun, the stars, and themselves for a long time. Many creation myths were developed in ancient times in an attempt to explain these origins, and these creation myths are easily proven to be untrue given the current state of scientific knowledge. The account of creation in the book of Genesis appears to be another easily disproven creation myth.<br />7. I have read “The Demon-Haunted World” by Carl Sagan, and I can’t think of anything in that book I disagree with.<br />==========Brap Gronkhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03075378067530053755noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-8373104848068368152010-08-12T07:40:44.295-07:002010-08-12T07:40:44.295-07:00"I think the point is that terms like "o..."I think the point is that terms like "omnipotence" are not meaningful so why use them? Why allow a meaningless word to be the standard?"<br /><br />I think that's a question for Plantinga to answer, since he uses the terms "omniscient" and "omnipotent" in P2.<br /><br /><br /><b>why that dirty so and so! wel when I'm king we are not going to do that anymore!</b><br /><br /><br />"The question, do we have to show an example of whatever quality we suppose God has, thus demonstrating that such quality must be in every possible world?"<br /><br />If you want to provide a convincing argument that P4 is true, then yes, showing an example of maximal greatness, which can be done by showing an example of maximal excellence (P1), which can be done by showing an example of omniscience, omnipotence, or moral perfection (P2), seems like a reasonable request.<br /><br /><br /><b>why have to do that when the point of the argument is not "Hey looki there's some empirical aspect of God we can point to" but rather that if God is possible at all he can't be just possible but must be necessary, if necessary than must be in all worlds, thus in this world.</b><br /><br /><br />"The arguments turns upon the idea that God is conceived as possible in this possible world, then God must exist in all because otherwise he would not be possible in this one (that's the thing about God can't be merely possible since he's necessary) that is the rationale for the argument, not necessarily any particular attribute."<br /><br />Again, doesn't P4 imply the attributes listed in P2 are being exemplified in this world?<br /><br />well for the sake of defending P's argument, though I would word it differently, I don't see why we have to show that (not that we can't) because that's not the point of the argument.<br /><br /><br />"But if you want an attribute and that's your "price" so to speak for considering the argument, rather the omnis I use:<br /><br />eternal necessary being.<br /><br />but then invovles employing another argument to prove this argument."<br /><br /><b>Not necessarily, just a teak. ie: omnipresence is guaranteed through eternal necessary being (if you understand eternal as also Infinite)<br /><br />we can understand omnipotent as excluding nonsense such as "make square circles"<br /><br />we can understand omniscience as confined to the knowable so it doesn't' mean negating uncertainty.<br /><br />If that's the case then the same argument P makes is still based no upon demonstrating the attributes but upon the transmutation from possibility to necessity.</b><br /><br /><br /><br />Exactly my point. The truthiness of P4 is not a given by any means and requires other arguments to support it.<br /><br /><b>except it doesn't because you made an illegal move. there's no reason to move from what the arguments turns upon to demanding this empirical show of things that should have to be demonstrated because they are beyond human understanding and becasue that's not what the argument turns upon.</b><br /><br /><br /><br /> Those who accept P4 as true don't need the possible worlds argument to convince them of God's existence, because they're already convinced.<br /><br /><br /><b>that's true, all God arguments are just talking points to give the skeptic an inroad. But skeptics don't want inroads.<br /><br />both belief and unbelief are world views and that mean paradigm. that means you don't shed them until your paradigm breaks down.<br /><br />But I don't give arguments to prove God exists but to prove that belief is rationally warranted.</b>Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-36955293143912742092010-08-12T07:40:29.364-07:002010-08-12T07:40:29.364-07:00"I think the point is that terms like "o..."I think the point is that terms like "omnipotence" are not meaningful so why use them? Why allow a meaningless word to be the standard?"<br /><br />I think that's a question for Plantinga to answer, since he uses the terms "omniscient" and "omnipotent" in P2.<br /><br /><br /><b>why that dirty so and so! wel when I'm king we are not going to do that anymore!</b><br /><br /><br />"The question, do we have to show an example of whatever quality we suppose God has, thus demonstrating that such quality must be in every possible world?"<br /><br />If you want to provide a convincing argument that P4 is true, then yes, showing an example of maximal greatness, which can be done by showing an example of maximal excellence (P1), which can be done by showing an example of omniscience, omnipotence, or moral perfection (P2), seems like a reasonable request.<br /><br /><br /><b>why have to do that when the point of the argument is not "Hey looki there's some empirical aspect of God we can point to" but rather that if God is possible at all he can't be just possible but must be necessary, if necessary than must be in all worlds, thus in this world.</b><br /><br /><br />"The arguments turns upon the idea that God is conceived as possible in this possible world, then God must exist in all because otherwise he would not be possible in this one (that's the thing about God can't be merely possible since he's necessary) that is the rationale for the argument, not necessarily any particular attribute."<br /><br />Again, doesn't P4 imply the attributes listed in P2 are being exemplified in this world?<br /><br />well for the sake of defending P's argument, though I would word it differently, I don't see why we have to show that (not that we can't) because that's not the point of the argument.<br /><br /><br />"But if you want an attribute and that's your "price" so to speak for considering the argument, rather the omnis I use:<br /><br />eternal necessary being.<br /><br />but then invovles employing another argument to prove this argument."<br /><br /><b>Not necessarily, just a teak. ie: omnipresence is guaranteed through eternal necessary being (if you understand eternal as also Infinite)<br /><br />we can understand omnipotent as excluding nonsense such as "make square circles"<br /><br />we can understand omniscience as confined to the knowable so it doesn't' mean negating uncertainty.<br /><br />If that's the case then the same argument P makes is still based no upon demonstrating the attributes but upon the transmutation from possibility to necessity.</b><br /><br /><br /><br />Exactly my point. The truthiness of P4 is not a given by any means and requires other arguments to support it.<br /><br /><b>except it doesn't because you made an illegal move. there's no reason to move from what the arguments turns upon to demanding this empirical show of things that should have to be demonstrated because they are beyond human understanding and becasue that's not what the argument turns upon.</b><br /><br /><br /><br /> Those who accept P4 as true don't need the possible worlds argument to convince them of God's existence, because they're already convinced.<br /><br /><br /><b>that's true, all God arguments are just talking points to give the skeptic an inroad. But skeptics don't want inroads.<br /><br />both belief and unbelief are world views and that mean paradigm. that means you don't shed them until your paradigm breaks down.<br /><br />But I don't give arguments to prove God exists but to prove that belief is rationally warranted.</b>Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-30151086363587286022010-08-12T06:58:22.368-07:002010-08-12T06:58:22.368-07:00"I think the point is that terms like "o..."I think the point is that terms like "omnipotence" are not meaningful so why use them? Why allow a meaningless word to be the standard?"<br /><br />I think that's a question for Plantinga to answer, since he uses the terms "omniscient" and "omnipotent" in P2.<br /><br /><br />"The question, do we have to show an example of whatever quality we suppose God has, thus demonstrating that such quality must be in every possible world?"<br /><br />If you want to provide a convincing argument that P4 is true, then yes, showing an example of maximal greatness, which can be done by showing an example of maximal excellence (P1), which can be done by showing an example of omniscience, omnipotence, or moral perfection (P2), seems like a reasonable request.<br /><br /><br />"The arguments turns upon the idea that God is conceived as possible in this possible world, then God must exist in all because otherwise he would not be possible in this one (that's the thing about God can't be merely possible since he's necessary) that is the rationale for the argument, not necessarily any particular attribute."<br /><br />Again, doesn't P4 imply the attributes listed in P2 are being exemplified in this world?<br /><br /><br />"But if you want an attribute and that's your "price" so to speak for considering the argument, rather the omnis I use:<br /><br />eternal necessary being.<br /><br />but then invovles employing another argument to prove this argument."<br /><br />Exactly my point. The truthiness of P4 is not a given by any means and requires other arguments to support it. Those who accept P4 as true don't need the possible worlds argument to convince them of God's existence, because they're already convinced.Brap Gronkhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03075378067530053755noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-18854956911587804122010-08-12T03:26:03.736-07:002010-08-12T03:26:03.736-07:00I think the point is that terms like "omnipot...I think the point is that terms like "omnipotence" are not meaningful so why use them? Why allow a meaningless word to be the standard?<br /><br />The question, do we have to show an example of whatever quality we suppose God has, thus demonstrating that such quality must be in every possible world?<br /><br />The arguments turns upon the idea that God is conceived as possible in this possible world, then God must exist in all because otherwise he would not be possible in this one (that's the thing about God can't be merely possible since he's necessary) that is the rationale for the argument, not necessarily any particular attribute.<br /><br />But if you want an attribute and that's your "price" so to speak for considering the argument, rather the omnis I use:<br /><br />eternal necessary being. <br /><br />but then invovles employing another argument to prove this argument.Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-50742382106240414432010-08-11T19:19:47.719-07:002010-08-11T19:19:47.719-07:00"p1 is true without regard to weather or not ..."p1 is true without regard to weather or not God exists. WE do not have assume there's a God for p1 to be true."<br /><br />Agreed.<br /><br />"If there is no exemplification of it is still true none the less that if MG exists it must do so in every world."<br /><br />Agreed. I especially like the first seven words of that sentence.<br /><br />"How could something be MG and not be in every world?"<br /><br />It can't.<br /><br />"that means p4 is also true becasue it come out of p1."<br /><br />Don't you need some exemplification of omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection to claim p4 is true? The definition of "exemplify" I am using is "to show or illustrate by example." If I need to think of exemplification differently, please let me know.Brap Gronkhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03075378067530053755noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-14294087893550444052010-08-11T08:04:50.709-07:002010-08-11T08:04:50.709-07:00we could start with a previous proposition saying ...we could start with a previous proposition saying "Either God exists or not, if so then God must exist necessarily, and if not then God's existence must be impossible."<br /><br />but should should go without saying, especially after the discussion about the modal argument. This argument is basically the modal argument from another view point:<br /><br />P1 A thing has maximal greatness if and only if it has maximal excellence in every possible world.<br /><br />P2 Whatever has maximal excellence is omniscient, omnipotent and morally perfect.<br /><br />P3 There is a possible world in which the property of possessing maximal greatness is exemplified.<br /><br />P4 The property of possessing maximal greatness is exemplified in every possible world.<br /><br />P5 If maximal greatness is exemplified in every world, then it is exemplified in this world.<br /><br />p1 is true without regard to weather or not God exists. WE do not have assume there's a God for p1 to be true. If there is no exemplification of it is still true none the less that if MG exists it must do so in every world. How could something be MG and not be in every world?<br /><br />that means p4 is also true becasue it come out of p1.Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-71899315372940413732010-08-11T07:54:30.421-07:002010-08-11T07:54:30.421-07:00No I already explained that Maximal greatness is t...No I already explained that Maximal greatness is the alternative to the omnis. The phrase "all knowing" is meaningless because it's ambiguous as to what is knowable...are possibilities that never came to pass knowable? Is the uncertainty principle knowable? <br /><br />Moral perfection is not an impossibility or a self contradictory attribute.<br /><br /><br />I can certainly think of a possible world without an omniscient being or thing. In fact, I'm not aware of an omniscient being in this world.<br /><br /><b>but here you are begging the question. Because you are assuming that God is just adding a fact to the universe. God is not one single being or thing, but the basis of all things.<br /><br />Moreover, the point is you can't have something like the J/C God and say it's confined to one possible world. If go exists necessarily then God must exist in all possible worlds.</b><br /><br /><br />It looks to me like one has to accept the existence of an omniscient being in order to accept P4, which is part of an argument that is trying to prove the existence of an omniscient being.<br /><br /><b>NO it's more like you don't get what it's saying. God is not just a thing in the universe. If God exist in world God must exist in all word for if God does exist in one possible world that means that possible world is contingent upon the basis of all things. That would mean therefore that all things are so contingent, that there must be a basis of all possible things.</b><br /><br />If God does not exist then there is basis of all things. But how could there not be a basis for all things because being itself must be the basis or else whatever it is that's the first thing and gives rise to all else is the basis. To say there is no basis is like dying there is no up.Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-37306444658836599272010-08-11T04:28:40.979-07:002010-08-11T04:28:40.979-07:00"P4 follows from P1 and P3."
I'm no..."P4 follows from P1 and P3."<br /><br />I'm not seeing how P4 can be considered true without begging the question. P4 is: "The property of possessing maximal greatness is exemplified in every possible world."<br /><br />Possessing maximal greatness implies having maximal excellence, which implies omniscience, omnipotence and moral perfection. I can certainly think of a possible world without an omniscient being or thing. In fact, I'm not aware of an omniscient being in this world.<br /><br />It looks to me like one has to accept the existence of an omniscient being in order to accept P4, which is part of an argument that is trying to prove the existence of an omniscient being.Brap Gronkhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03075378067530053755noreply@blogger.com