tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post4416668470222655696..comments2024-03-28T15:31:02.860-07:00Comments on Metacrock's Blog: Does Inequality Make God Improbable?Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)http://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comBlogger23125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-12108894995843079472016-08-29T13:21:10.520-07:002016-08-29T13:21:10.520-07:00ok I see the problem. I was only thinking about th...ok I see the problem. I was only thinking about the world we live in not possible worlds. But I still don't why my argument on evil isn't right.Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-61882071420880218012016-08-29T10:17:48.449-07:002016-08-29T10:17:48.449-07:00I will explain the consciousness point again.
St...I will explain the consciousness point again. <br /><br />Statement 1 - If theism is true then consciousness exists. <br />Statement 2 - If naturalism is true then consciousness exists. <br /><br />Statement 1 is true but statement 2 is false. Statement 1 is true because consciousness existing is a logical implication of God existing. If God exists, then God necessarily is conscious. Since it is logically impossible for God to exist yet consciousness to fail to exist then the probability of consciousness existing given theism is 100%. <br /><br />Now contrast that with naturalism. If naturalism is true then consciousness is possible. However, on naturalism there are possible worlds where no conscious beings exist. i.e. [there are possible worlds where no conscious beings ever come into existence]. Since naturalism can be true while consciousness fails to exist it follows that naturalism does not imply the existence of consciousness so statement 2 is false. As a result we cannot conclude that the probability of consciousness existing given naturalism is 100%, but rather we must conclude that the probability of consciousness given naturalism is greater than 0% but less than 100%. <br /><br />From what we can see here, the probability that consciousness exists given theism is greater than naturalism. As a result, premise 3 in the F-inductive argument is successful. Ryan Mhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15738381414795204410noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-9776371628885638422016-08-29T01:27:14.782-07:002016-08-29T01:27:14.782-07:00btw I appreciate your patience, i was confused abo...btw I appreciate your patience, i was confused about E because I saw where Jeff called it evil once and then other sources said evidence, I think the deals evil in the case the argument he is doing is evidence,rather he said a certain kind of evil Come to think of it it was of a n evidential sort.<br /><br />In the matter of the problem of evil. All versions of the argument turn on the dilemma that God is either not good or not all powerful if he allows evil. My view allows for God to be all powerful in certain way but hot in the sense of violating logical necessity and not in the sense of just doing anything with no constraints. Does that not afect the argument?Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-4599333538339377062016-08-29T01:17:15.132-07:002016-08-29T01:17:15.132-07:00Ok you have not said anything here that I did not ...Ok you have not said anything here that I did not think was beings aid, I wasn't sure in some things but you generally confirmed that I was on the right tack., so since I do understand at least generally why you understand my point?<br /><br />The assertion that Consciousness is less probable if the world is naturalistic, I do not buy, I think it;'s obvious I am conscious, I don't know about you, You may bv a PZ I am not. to me consciousness is a done deal either way.<br /><br />Does that not throw off the F inductive finding?<br /><br /><br /><br />Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-4522831906894657482016-08-28T16:40:20.235-07:002016-08-28T16:40:20.235-07:00When doing inductive arguments, "E" usua...When doing inductive arguments, "E" usually stands for "data" which many people refer to as "evidence". It is misleading to call it evidence since F-inductive arguments are a test to see if data in fact is evidence for a proposition. i.e. it trades upon two different senses of "evidence". <br /><br />I will rephrase the F-inductive argument using plain language. <br /><br />(1.) Some specific data is known to be true, i.e., Probability of the Specific data is close to 100%.<br />(2.) Hypothesis 1 is not intrinsically much more probable than its negation, hypothesis 2, i.e., Probability of Hypothesis 1 is not much greater than the probability of Hypothesis 2.<br />(3.) The Probability of the specific data given both (hypothesis 2 and our background knowledge) is greater than the probability of the specific data given (hypothesis 1 and our background knowledge). <br />(4.) Other evidence held equal, hypothesis 1 is probably false, i.e., Probability of hypothesis 1 given our background knowledge and specific data is less than 50%<br /><br />I will just focus on the F-inductive argument for theism. <br /><br />God, if God exists, is necessarily conscious since God possesses properties which require some form of consciousness. i.e. God is omniscient and knowledge is only possessed by conscious beings, so since God is necessarily omniscient it logically follows that God is necessarily conscious. <br /><br />Since God is necessarily conscious the probability that consciousness exists given theism is 100%. On naturalism, if consciousness is possible it is still (As far as we know) a metaphysical possibility that it fail to exist. As a result, the probability that consciousness exists given naturalism is less than 100%. <br /><br />Now we can just sub in the relevant terms into the F-inductive argument structure. For simplicity I will only use line 3:<br /><br />(3.) The Probability of that consciousness given both(theism and our background knowledge) is greater than the probability that consciousness exists given both (naturalism and our background knowledge). <br /><br />As stipulated here, the probability that consciousness exists given theism is 100% whereas it is less than 100% if naturalism is true, so the probability of consciousness is greater given theism than naturalism. As a result, as I show by subbing in the relevant details in premise 3 we obtain an F-inductive argument for theism based on consciousness. <br /><br /><br /><br /><br />Ryan Mhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15738381414795204410noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-77241003334599488112016-08-28T16:26:40.929-07:002016-08-28T16:26:40.929-07:00Ryan, all I see is I say "i can see flaws in ...Ryan, all I see is I say "i can see flaws in your ideas." you say "that doesn't count because you have not phrased it in the right format. I don't do analytic philosophy, I do continental. These re ideas they can be discussed in discursive ways. Iv you can't discuss them in this way they just gimmicks. You have mystification of knowledge. wrap your ideas in a certain for of presentation matching that form is all that counts with you.<br /><br />simply put the whole issue is one if God is good and all powerful why does he allow pain,suffering and evil. This does not require a comparison of hypotheses weighed against each other for probability.<br /><br />If I know a reason why God must allow these things that reasons renders moot any argument based upon comparison of the probability of hypotheses. No probability needed. God must allow suffering, Pain and evil, no getting around it, He must risk the possibility that we will all make evil choices. It is just that simple. That doesn't make God less probable because its necessary given the ends.<br />Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-58544857018168382652016-08-28T15:56:39.788-07:002016-08-28T15:56:39.788-07:00This comment has been removed by the author.Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-80817428089881547692016-08-28T15:49:04.375-07:002016-08-28T15:49:04.375-07:00This comment has been removed by the author.Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-7996768673416581762016-08-28T15:46:43.180-07:002016-08-28T15:46:43.180-07:00This comment has been removed by the author.Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-64137826731307988822016-08-28T11:04:07.598-07:002016-08-28T11:04:07.598-07:00Do you simply not understand Jeff's post?
Le...Do you simply not understand Jeff's post? <br /><br />Let us look at Jeff's layout of an F-inductive argument structure:<br /><br />1. E is known to be true, i.e., Pr(E) is close to 1.<br />2. H1 is not intrinsically much more probable than H2, i.e., Pr(|H1|) is not much greater than Pr(|H2|).<br />3. Pr(E | H2 & B) > Pr(E | H1 & B). <br />4. Other evidence held equal, H1 is probably false, i.e., Pr(H1 | B & E) < 0.5.<br /><br />We will use two different pieces of data separately; 1. a material world exists and 2. consciousness exists. <br /><br />T = theism<br />N = naturalism<br />M = material world<br />C = consciousness<br /><br />First let us examine the F-inductive argument for theism based on C. While N and C are logically compatible, N does not logically imply C. We could say that on naturalism there are possible worlds where consciousness exists and possible worlds where consciousness fails to exist. Since naturalism is logically compatible with C but does not imply C it follows that the Pr(C | N) is less than 1 but greater than 0. In contrast, T logically implies C. If God exists then God necessarily is conscious. As a result, in every world where God exists, consciousness must also exist. So the Pr(C | T) = 1. <br /><br />Following the F-inductive format we get this:<br /><br />1. C is known to be true, i.e., Pr(C) is close to 1.<br />2. N is not intrinsically much more probable than T, i.e., Pr(|N|) is not much greater than Pr(|T|).<br />3. Pr(C | T & B) > Pr(C | N & B). <br />4. Other evidence held equal, N is probably false, i.e., Pr(N | B & C) < 0.5.<br /><br />The crucial premise is 3, and Jeff is correct in his analysis of it. Jeff is correct since Pr(C | T) = 1 whereas the Pr(C | N) < 1. <br /><br />Second, let us look at whether M is evidence for N over T. This case is like the reverse of the consciousness case. N logically implies M, so Pr(M | N) = 1. In contrast, T is logically compatible with M but T does not imply M since God could create worlds with no material at all, or God could not create any world at all. As a result, the Pr(M | T) is less than 1 but greater than 0. So again, if we follow the structure of F-inductive arguments then we get this:<br /><br /><br />1. M is known to be true, i.e., Pr(M) is close to 1.<br />2. T is not intrinsically much more probable than N, i.e., Pr(|T|) is not much greater than Pr(|N|).<br />3. Pr(M | N & B) > Pr(M | T & B). <br />4. Other evidence held equal, T is probably false, i.e., Pr(T | B & M) < 0.5.<br /><br />Again, Jeff's reasoning works since Pr(M | N) = 1 whereas Pr(M | T) < 1. <br /><br />Jeff's arguments work from the following assumptions:<br /><br />Assumption 1 - [The logic of F-inductive arguments]<br />Assumption 2 - [a set of standard definitions of naturalism, theism, a material world, and consciousness]<br />Assumption 3 - [The logical implications of the definitions of naturalism, theism, a material world, and consciousness].<br /><br />To dispute Jeff's arguments you need to dispute one of the assumptions. Assumption 1 won't work unless you want to scrap inductive logic. You would realistically need to dispute the second assumption but honestly that isn't fruitful either. <br />Ryan Mhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15738381414795204410noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-84389925199389868852016-08-28T03:12:52.088-07:002016-08-28T03:12:52.088-07:00there is no reason why physical world is indicativ...there is no reason why physical world is indicative of no God or consciousness indicative of God. God is being itself all o being is indicative of God and atheists can believe in consciousnesses, the dichotomy is ideological.Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-12927870457453252282016-08-27T17:06:45.680-07:002016-08-27T17:06:45.680-07:00What is wrong with Jeff's example? It seems to...What is wrong with Jeff's example? It seems to logically follow by the rules laid out by the logic of F-inductive arguments. Ryan Mhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15738381414795204410noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-89935679357058412212016-08-27T14:48:07.498-07:002016-08-27T14:48:07.498-07:00cut and pasted right out of the above link by Lowd...cut and pasted right out of the above link by Lowder<br /><br /><br />In the cosmological argument against theism, I pointed out that naturalism entails a physical universe whereas theism does not. Since a physical universe exists, it follows that the universe is evidence favoring naturalism over theism.<br /><br />The parallel argument based on consciousness goes like this. Theism entails that consciousness exists whereas naturalism does not. Since consciousness does exist, it follows that consciousness is evidence favoring theism over naturalism.<br /><br /><br /><b>an exact quote using it to explain f inductive. example., simple example, I;m saying the formulation is mere an ideological approach to theology</b>Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-28671999184599845792016-08-27T14:41:44.462-07:002016-08-27T14:41:44.462-07:00eff very clearly gives reasons for why he thinks a...eff very clearly gives reasons for why he thinks any data is evidence for naturalism and against theism. He has never asserted that "nature" is evidence for naturalism over theism and that anything in the natural world must be evidence for naturalism over theism. There is nothing arbitrary about Jeff's standards; You are simply strawmanning Jeff. <br /><br /><br /><b>I think you misunderstood me,l I probably wasn't clear, however I quote that right out of his argument consciousness is argument for theism,</b><br /><br />I'd like to see you defend your claim that {consciousness exists, naturalism is true} forms an inconsistent set. If {consciousness exists, naturalism is true} literally forms an inconsistent set then supernaturalism must be true since consciousness exists. If you can show your claim is true then you can show that naturalism is certainly false.<br /><br /><b>no my point that dicotomy is false you can be a naturalist and believe in consciousness and you can believe in God and be basically a naturalist in a sense except for beloief in god,</b>Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-50289665668770121202016-08-27T10:18:40.448-07:002016-08-27T10:18:40.448-07:00Joe,
Jeff very clearly gives reasons for why he ...Joe, <br /><br />Jeff very clearly gives reasons for why he thinks any data is evidence for naturalism and against theism. He has never asserted that "nature" is evidence for naturalism over theism and that anything in the natural world must be evidence for naturalism over theism. There is nothing arbitrary about Jeff's standards; You are simply strawmanning Jeff. <br /><br />I'd like to see you defend your claim that {consciousness exists, naturalism is true} forms an inconsistent set. If {consciousness exists, naturalism is true} literally forms an inconsistent set then supernaturalism must be true since consciousness exists. If you can show your claim is true then you can show that naturalism is certainly false. Ryan Mhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15738381414795204410noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-1828833681398443052016-08-25T20:50:29.751-07:002016-08-25T20:50:29.751-07:00I don't know how Jeff defines morality He didn...I don't know how Jeff defines morality He didn't explain that.I use it the term the way it's used in common by thinkers like Kant, G.e. More, John Rawls, Alisdaire McIntyre and other.My students weren't confused my my use of the etm.Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-5024748341214447042016-08-25T11:14:14.337-07:002016-08-25T11:14:14.337-07:00Maybe you'd like to define whatever it is you ...Maybe you'd like to define whatever it is you think is "morality", and whether it has anything in common with Jeff's definition. Uzzahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13162604780902407408noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-49372866789765042252016-08-24T22:09:19.371-07:002016-08-24T22:09:19.371-07:00I have given a perfectly valid reason to disrupt t...I have given a perfectly valid reason to disrupt the link between equality distribution and morality, but they are so delighted with their own methdos they don't even bother to consider the issue.Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-47551826745962492992016-08-24T21:19:00.736-07:002016-08-24T21:19:00.736-07:00zza said...
Jesus Christ dude, I waited three days...zza said...<br />Jesus Christ dude, I waited three days for THIS? With an hour and a bottle of Jack Daniels I could have scribbled that out.<br /><br /><b>lighten u on the Jack Daniels you pissed out too many brain cells to understand the argument</b>Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-1645549403943462172016-08-24T21:17:43.485-07:002016-08-24T21:17:43.485-07:00Ryan M said...
The crucial premise for you to disp...Ryan M said...<br />The crucial premise for you to dispute is premise 3, but you don't seem to actually do that in your response. Despite noting the argument is an F-inductive argument it appears you still treat it as a deductive argument.<br /><br /><b>clearly wrong. the most important things to negate the oink between inequality and morality, that is what I did</b>Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-24815731442080333092016-08-24T20:25:17.224-07:002016-08-24T20:25:17.224-07:00‘Now, since moral arbitrariness in the distributio...‘Now, since moral arbitrariness in the distribution of natural endowments gives rise to unequal distributions, which are unfair because they are undeserved, as when some (e.g., Albert Einstein) get all the cognitive goods, whereas others (e.g., microcephalics) get nothing, the problem is to say how could God—who is supposed to be omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent—allow for this sort of natural inequality. In other words, if God is morally perfect, why is the distribution of natural endowments so unequal? ’<br /><br />Yes, speaking NT-wise, it's quite a mystery why God allows some to be born wealthy, "high ID'd", and with so much "wisdom in their own eyes" as to seem virtually "unsavable." (Even though we should add, yeh, as Christ says, "with God, all things are possible." ;-) ) <br /><br />I think you've understated the theological case against exactly such 'priviledge' as the argument just assumes is desirable when it comes to Xian ideas of redemption, Joe. In the Gospels, it's a downright disadvantage, and that idea is reaffirmed later on (in one way or another) by pretty much all the "apostolic" NT authors....<br /><br />And even beyond that, even assuming a more secular POV, I still think "advantage" as is defined here might turn out to be quite a bit harder to judge and measure than the argument rather naively assumes...<br /><br />"After a time, you may find that having is not so pleasing a thing, after all, as wanting. It is not logical, but it is often true." - Mr. Spock. Mike Gerowhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14630695728013930638noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-50184260121230676062016-08-24T14:57:31.682-07:002016-08-24T14:57:31.682-07:00Jesus Christ dude, I waited three days for THIS? W...Jesus Christ dude, I waited three days for THIS? With an hour and a bottle of Jack Daniels I could have scribbled that out. Uzzahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13162604780902407408noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-45663585042564648472016-08-24T06:03:27.815-07:002016-08-24T06:03:27.815-07:00The crucial premise for you to dispute is premise ...The crucial premise for you to dispute is premise 3, but you don't seem to actually do that in your response. Despite noting the argument is an F-inductive argument it appears you still treat it as a deductive argument. Ryan Mhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15738381414795204410noreply@blogger.com