tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post2507365707241058037..comments2024-03-29T01:14:19.030-07:00Comments on Metacrock's Blog: Modal ArgumentJoseph Hinman (Metacrock)http://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comBlogger21125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-86121044633549593222011-06-16T17:41:25.492-07:002011-06-16T17:41:25.492-07:00I saw that, I figured it was you.that's great....I saw that, I figured it was you.that's great. would you mind talking by email? Metacrock@aol.com.<br /><br />thanks.Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-4875104877927313692011-06-16T17:10:37.058-07:002011-06-16T17:10:37.058-07:00<> I'm address it now under an alias.<> I'm address it now under an alias.Joshua Rasmussenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03271147200091927898noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-15061388097127128442011-06-16T12:45:51.336-07:002011-06-16T12:45:51.336-07:00Thanks for answering. I would like to have further...Thanks for answering. I would like to have further discourse on God arguments. I need people advise me on the books I'm witing (and when it's reading to review it). If would be willing to help please let me know.<br /><br />I thought you might be that Rassmusen's son. o well.<br /><br />Also please either go over to carm and spank them for their treatment of your argument, or give me your arguments here and I'll post them on my blog.<br /><br />It's not exactly about your argument it's about an argument by weaver they call "Rassmussen like"<br /><br /><a href="http://forums.carm.org/vbb/showthread.php?54944-Weaver-s-%28Rasmussen-like%29-Cosmological-Argument&highlight=Rasmussen" rel="nofollow">here</a>Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-32696006187154144012011-06-16T09:14:06.857-07:002011-06-16T09:14:06.857-07:00thanks. I'm not sure if I'm completely tra...thanks. I'm not sure if I'm completely tracking your question--and if not, I apologize. <br /><br />I think it's useful to distinguish between one's seeing that something is possible and one's failing seeing that something is impossible. E.g., I might fail to see that the denial of Goldbach's conjecture is impossible (because I perceive no contradiction in its denial), but if it's true (and it plausibly is true), then it's necessarily true. Now one's failure to see a contradiction in something might provide prima facie evidence that it's possible. So, one's failure to see a contradiction in the proposition that god exists might provide prima facie evidence that that proposition is possibly true. But we should be cautious: something "could" still be impossible even if we don't perceive a contradiction in it (the "could" is epistemic, not logical). <br /><br />Moreover, one might reason this way. I perceive no <i>internal</i> contradiction in the concept of ~god. Therefore, ~god is possible. Therefore, god is impossible. Therefore, the concept of god has an unforeseen <i>external</i> contradiction. This is a bad argument, of course. But it's no different in form from this one: I perceive no <i>internal</i> contradiction in the concept of god. Therefore, god is possible. Therefore, ~god is impossible. Therefore, the concept of ~god has an <i>external</i> contradiction. <br /><br />So, I don't think it suffices to point out that there's no internal contradiction in the concept of god. If the claim is that there's no <i>external</i> contradiction, then it may be harder to see that that's true without an additional argument... At least, that's how I'm seeing things. <br /><br />...I wasn't alive in the 70s. :)Joshua Rasmussenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03271147200091927898noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-7587390671154113232011-06-16T06:59:39.647-07:002011-06-16T06:59:39.647-07:00also Joshua are you related to the Rassmussen who ...also Joshua are you related to the Rassmussen who did the major study on Nuclear power plant safety i the 70s?Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-5204390814351801772011-06-16T06:52:32.901-07:002011-06-16T06:52:32.901-07:00thanks for your excellent post Rasmussen. I have h...thanks for your excellent post Rasmussen. I have heard of you but have not seen stuff yet. I appreciate your reponse. I would love to see you take on Space money on CARM, that's where they attacked your argument in a thread.<br /><br />one question. if I accept that god can be continued with contradiction doesn't that blow the argument that they must com eup with the contradiction? My argument to the impossibility side of the dilemma is that there is no concept of contradiction ni god. If I a stipulate that there could be doesn't' that give away the store?<br /><br />my understanding of the whole Ontological principle is that it's true by definition and if we just know the terms we can understand how it's true. If it's possible to conceive God with contradiction doesn't blow this principle?Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-37049025395818368642011-06-15T17:51:10.108-07:002011-06-15T17:51:10.108-07:00Interesting post and discussion. I'm with Meta...Interesting post and discussion. I'm with Metacrock that if God exists, then it is necessary that God exists (and I'm a recent phd graduate from ND :)). But I have a different objection to offer and then a way to reply.<br /><br />Metacrock supports the possibility premise (that God's existence is possible) on the grounds that we can conceive god analytically without contradiction. But why couldn't one find it just as easy to conceive ~god analytically without contradiction? It seems just as easy for me to conceive the one as the other. So, without a <i>further</i> reason to think that the ~god conception is contradictory, it seems to me that we are at a stalemate. (Perhaps this actually gets at the heart of Kris' objection.) <br /><br />Now for my reply. We can argue for the possibility premise as follows:<br /><br />(1) necessarily, every beginning POSSIBLY has an explanation.<br /><br />support: for each beginning, we can coherently conceive it having a beginning, and there's no "reverse" argument that defeats this.<br /><br />(2) possibly, there is a beginning to the exemplification of being contingent.<br /><br />support: we can coherently conceive this, and there's no "reverse" argument that defeats this.<br /><br />(3) Therefore, possibly a beginning to the exemplification of being contingent has an explanation.<br /><br />(4). no contingent thing could possibly explain the beginning of the exemplification of being contingent (as that would entail that a contingent thing exists prior to all contingent things, which is plainly impossible).<br /><br />(5) therefore, it's possible for there to be a necessary thing capable of explaining the existence of all contingent things.<br /><br />(6) necessarily, a necessary thing capable of explaining the existence of all contingent things would be maximally excellent.<br /><br />support: if it weren't maximal, then it's degree of excellence would be on a continuum of more and less and so would be contingent and so would be explicable (because we can conceive of an explanation; and no reverse argument defeats this). But nothing could explain its degree of excellence without circularity--see my paper, "From a Necessary Being to God" for details.<br /><br />(7) therefore, it's possible that a maximally excellent, necessarily existing being exists.<br /><br />(8) therefore, it's possible that god exists.<br /><br />There you go. :)Joshua Rasmussenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03271147200091927898noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-51020444199014035262011-05-03T18:42:38.652-07:002011-05-03T18:42:38.652-07:00I stated studying the modal argument in about 1985...I stated studying the modal argument in about 1985.Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-30686227565803603422011-05-03T15:13:48.843-07:002011-05-03T15:13:48.843-07:00It is clear from this conversation who has "s...It is clear from this conversation who has "studied this stuff" and who has not.<br /><br />Of course in that last paragraph when I said "propositional logic," I was referring to propositional modal logic. <br /><br />Your claim that Hartshorne's argument isn't trying to prove that God exists seems clearly false--the conclusion of the argument is 'g', which, interpreted, means "God exists."<br /><br />You may not think there is any such thing as metaphysical necessity, but it's not a "made up concept" if by that you mean I made it up. It's a philosophical concept that is used quite often.<br /><br />Hartshorne's proof attempts to show that God exists, using just the tools of modal propositional logic. I have explained why that can't be done, and Plantinga, as quoted by you, agrees with me. (By the way, you should have simply asked me for a copy of his email to me, as I invited you to do--the one he sent you turns out to be almost identical in wording to the one he sent me.) He agrees that you can not derive a contradiction from "God does not exist" using just the tools of propositional logic. This, in turn, means that Hartshorne's proof fails if it is meant to be a proof that God exists--and I don't see how it can be interpreted otherwise.<br /><br />Using Hartshorne's argument, by the way, one could just as easily prove "-g" in exactly the same way.<br /><br />One could also prove both that the Goldbach conjecture is true and that it is false.<br /><br />(BTW I'm bothered by this--it looks like we can prove a contradiction from true premises using propositional modal logic. That's odd!)<br /><br />The argument form simply doesn't work if we try to interpret "g" as involving concepts like existence and truth. Some other logical system needs to be used, if any will work.<br /><br />Again, main points:<br /><br />God's necessity isn't provable using propositional modal logic.<br /><br />But Hartshorne's proof is an attempt to prove God's necessity using propositional modal logic.<br /><br />Therefore, Hartshorne's proof doesn't work.<br /><br />And God's necessity must be cashed out in some sense other than "necessary according to propositional modal logic."<br /><br />I suggest no logic will get you God's necessity. You'll have to look at something like "metaphysical" or "absolute" necessity. Plantinga suggests you could prove god's necessity in second-order logic, but I don't know how that's supposed to work.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-76314029507670801982011-05-03T06:37:06.876-07:002011-05-03T06:37:06.876-07:00Hi Metacrock,
I look forward to seeing your post ...Hi Metacrock,<br /><br />I look forward to seeing your post dealing with the proof.<br /><br />To clarify my view on God's existence, it's that God's existence is not _logically_ necessary (nothing's existence is, it's the nature of (propositional) logic) but it's fair to say God'e existence is _metaphysically_ necessary. <br /><br /><b>that's an old argument made by John Hick. It's true that God's existence has to be ontologically necessary it is also logically necessary. you are misconception what the argument proves.<br /><br />The argument proves God can't fail to exist. It's not logical necessity in the sense of a tautology because that is merely linguistic and doesn't require an argument. It's logically necessary in the sense that it can't fail to exist.</b><br /><br /><br /><br />There are many things that are metaphysically necessary which are not logically necessary. For example, it is metaphysically necessary that anything that is blue all over is not green anywhere--but it's not logically necessary!<br /><br /><br /><b>you are equivocating bewteen aspects of logical necessity. Here you are using some made up category called "metaphysically necessary" to mean actual.</b><br /><br /><br /><br /> There is no contradiction contained within the statement "this thing is both green and blue all over." Yet the statement can't be true, because of the metaphysics of color. The impossibility is metaphysical, not logical.<br /><br />Similarly, the impossibility of God's existence would be metaphysical, not logical.<br /><br /><b>that's total bull shit. God cannot fail to exist, ti's not a matter of empiricism there's no such thing as Metaphysical necessity. Metaphysics is not a form of proof.</b><br /><br /><br />You can't use propositional logic to prove God's existence, because propositional logic can't look inside the proposition "g" to see what it's talking about. It must treat "g" just like any other proposition (that's what propositional logic does by definition) and since any [i]other[/i] simple proposition can be shown to be contingent in propositional logic, it follows that the simple proposition "g" must be contingent in propositional logic, no matter what it means.<br /><br /><b>sorry you are totally out of it. You need to study this stuff much better. the modal argument is not positionally that's why ti's called model, it deal modal oporaters..<br /><br />no kind of logic an prove the existence of God because it's beyond our understanding.That's not even if the goal the argument. Please try to come up to speed.Read a bunch of posts form this blog going back over the last couple of years.<br /><br />goodle "rational warrant." and "realizing God."</b>Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-49704915552087616012011-05-03T06:26:00.399-07:002011-05-03T06:26:00.399-07:00on that latest post I include the email Plantinga ...on that latest post I include the email Plantinga sent me in response to your argument.Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-4179020811431233582011-05-02T11:56:35.578-07:002011-05-02T11:56:35.578-07:00Also, I invite you (in a wholly friendly fashion) ...Also, I invite you (in a wholly friendly fashion) to show my posts to your logician friend whom you said you've been discussing this with, and see what they have to say. One mistake I certainly made was to claim that you can take _any_ propositional expression and build a maximally consistent set of propositions around it. That was strictly wrong--it only works if the propositional expression is not itself a contradiction.<br /><br />Also, it is standard in logic and in philosophy in general, when someone claims that a statement implies a contradiction, that other logicians and philosophers think that person has a responsibility to show what that contradiction is and how it's derived. If he doesn't do that, no one else has any basis upon which to evaluate his claim.<br /><br />If someone says "'God does not exist' implies a contradiction," no one is equipped to give a relevant reply until that person has explained how the contradiction is supposed to arise.Kris Rhodeshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15340539700756639797noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-75526567029639533852011-05-02T11:53:11.829-07:002011-05-02T11:53:11.829-07:00Hi Metacrock,
I look forward to seeing your post ...Hi Metacrock,<br /><br />I look forward to seeing your post dealing with the proof.<br /><br />To clarify my view on God's existence, it's that God's existence is not _logically_ necessary (nothing's existence is, it's the nature of (propositional) logic) but it's fair to say God'e existence is _metaphysically_ necessary. There are many things that are metaphysically necessary which are not logically necessary. For example, it is metaphysically necessary that anything that is blue all over is not green anywhere--but it's not logically necessary! There is no contradiction contained within the statement "this thing is both green and blue all over." Yet the statement can't be true, because of the metaphysics of color. The impossibility is metaphysical, not logical.<br /><br />Similarly, the impossibility of God's existence would be metaphysical, not logical.<br /><br />You can't use propositional logic to prove God's existence, because propositional logic can't look inside the proposition "g" to see what it's talking about. It must treat "g" just like any other proposition (that's what propositional logic does by definition) and since any [i]other[/i] simple proposition can be shown to be contingent in propositional logic, it follows that the simple proposition "g" must be contingent in propositional logic, no matter what it means.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-86676574102168563812011-04-30T05:19:48.320-07:002011-04-30T05:19:48.320-07:00I'm going to deal with the alleged "proof...I'm going to deal with the alleged "proof" on Monday.<br /><br />this is total brainlessness. It wouldn't be if you just admit you are atheist then you can claim ignorance.n o Chrsitian would ever says God is not necessarily that's totally stupid.<br /><br />a contingent God is not worthy of worship. If God is eternally contingent then worship the thing he's contingent upon.<br /><br />you must be a gnostic.Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-78688976416379396522011-04-30T05:15:42.508-07:002011-04-30T05:15:42.508-07:00"There's nothing special about "god ..."There's nothing special about "god exists" in this regard--as far as any propositional logic system can tell, "god exists" is just a proposition like any other. That's the nature of propositional (and modal propositional) logics. They're not equipped to prove that any particular proposition is [i]true[/i] (that is, unless it is tautological, which is a term with a particular technical meaning which does not admit "god exists" as included in the class), only that it validly follows or fails to validly follow from the hypothesized truth of other propositions."<br /><br /><b>Right, it's not about proof. It's about rational warrant.</b><br /><br />"That's the argument from the nature of propositional logic--propositional logic just isn't the right tool for the job, basically (nor is modal propositional logic).<br /><br />Perhaps a modal predicate logic would do the trick but for whatever reason, I've never actually seen that attempted. This may be because modal predicate logics are (so I hear) necessarily incomplete, but I'm not sure.<br /><br />If you think there is a contradiction to be derived from the statement "God does not exist," then it's up to you to show what that contradiction is and how it is to be derived. A contradiction, of course, is a statement of the form "A and not-A."<br /><br /><br /><b>NO wrong:<br />(1) Hartshorne's argument is s5 modal.<br /><br />(2) ask Plantinga; (where do you teach logic, notre Dame I doubt doubt it, he does).<br /><br />(3) Wrong to think it's my burden of proof to show that "God does not exist" is a contradiction. It's not my argument, thus it's not my burden. It's the atheist argument so their burden.</b><br /><br />"You may be thinking this is all beside the point because it's simply supposed to be part of the definition of God that he exists necessarily. If that's the definition of God, then if God exists, then God necessarily exists. But what I've shown, actually, is that there is no such thing as something which exists necessarily. The nonexistence of [i]anything[/i] is logically consistent."<br /><br /><b>Bull shit you have not shown anything. Where's the argument? all you've done is assert your opinion.</b><br /><br /><br /><br />"So God doesn't exist necessarily. So [i]if[/i] it's part of the definition of "God" that god exists necessarily, then God doesn't exist."<br /><br /><b>you are making from a charge that to the assertion that contra of the chruch must be true. that's a fallacy in itself.</b><br /><br /><br /><br />"Of course I believe God exists. I just don't think it's part of the definition of "God" that god exists necessarily. He exists logically contingently just like every other object it is possible to talk about."<br /><br /><b>It's pathetic how little you know and how arrogant you are. I've talked many times to the top expert in the world on this argument I don't think you have.<br /><br />yes obviously it is part of the defiton of God that if he exist s(the IF PART IS A BIG YOUR MAJESTY) then he must do so necessarly. otherwise you are worshiping a ontignernt god. how the hell can a continent God be the king of the universe? he's not better than Zeus he can be dpossed.<br /><br />shape up and learn some theology. No Christian philosopher in the heifer of the faith has ever said God was contingent no one!<br /><br />yes sweet heart the choice is either necessary or contingent those are the only choices, impossible, necessary and contingent.</b>Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-29192760614690044712011-04-29T21:29:13.805-07:002011-04-29T21:29:13.805-07:00There's nothing special about "god exists...There's nothing special about "god exists" in this regard--as far as any propositional logic system can tell, "god exists" is just a proposition like any other. That's the nature of propositional (and modal propositional) logics. They're not equipped to prove that any particular proposition is [i]true[/i] (that is, unless it is tautological, which is a term with a particular technical meaning which does not admit "god exists" as included in the class), only that it validly follows or fails to validly follow from the hypothesized truth of other propositions.<br /><br />That's the argument from the nature of propositional logic--propositional logic just isn't the right tool for the job, basically (nor is modal propositional logic). <br /><br />Perhaps a modal predicate logic would do the trick but for whatever reason, I've never actually seen that attempted. This may be because modal predicate logics are (so I hear) necessarily incomplete, but I'm not sure.<br /><br />If you think there is a contradiction to be derived from the statement "God does not exist," then it's up to you to show what that contradiction is and how it is to be derived. A contradiction, of course, is a statement of the form "A and not-A."<br /><br />You may be thinking this is all beside the point because it's simply supposed to be part of the definition of God that he exists necessarily. If that's the definition of God, then if God exists, then God necessarily exists. But what I've shown, actually, is that there is no such thing as something which exists necessarily. The nonexistence of [i]anything[/i] is logically consistent. So God doesn't exist necessarily. So [i]if[/i] it's part of the definition of "God" that god exists necessarily, then God doesn't exist.<br /><br />Of course I believe God exists. I just don't think it's part of the definition of "God" that god exists necessarily. He exists logically contingently just like every other object it is possible to talk about.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-60913177339202928502011-04-29T21:28:59.647-07:002011-04-29T21:28:59.647-07:00I'll try to rephrase my objection for clarity....I'll try to rephrase my objection for clarity.<br /><br />Hartshorne's statement of the argument begins with the line:<br /><br />g --> N(g)<br /><br />Which, interpreted, (remembering that the arrow stands for the _strict_ conditional,) means "Necessarily, if god exists, then necessarily god exists."<br /><br />This statement is false, and I can prove it. <br /><br />To show that a statement of the form "Necessarily, X" is false, you must show that there is a possible world in which X is false. So my claim is that there is a possible world in which "g -> N(g)" is false (where this -> is not the strict conditional but the material conditional instead).<br /><br />In order for a material conditional to be false, it must be that its antecedent is true and its consequent false. So my claim must be that there is a possible world in which god exist but does not exist necessarily.<br /><br />Cashing out what "necessarily" and "possible" mean in standard interpretations of modal logic, (assuming S5 here) we have now a statement of my claim in detail:<br /><br />There is a maximal set of propositions containing no contradiction which contains the proposition g, and there is a maximal set of propositions containing no contradictions which contains the proposition not-g.<br /><br />Presumably you agree about the first part. My task then is to prove that there is a maximal set of propositions containing no contradictions which contains the proposition not-g.<br /><br />But this is trivially proven, simply by reference to commonplaces about how logic (much less modal logic) works. For any proposition not-X whatsoever, we can build a maximally consistent set of propositions around it simply by running through every propositional variable a, b, c and so on, assigning it to either 'true' or 'false', and then constructing every possible propositional statement with connectives and determining its value from those of its constituent propositional variables.<br /><br />This is a standard lemma at the basis of every system of modal logic--take any propositional expression whatsoever, and you can build a maximally consistent set of propositions around it.<br /><br />Continued in next post...Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-20729642790429101982011-04-29T08:40:44.756-07:002011-04-29T08:40:44.756-07:00No Chris you are wrong. The atheist argument you ...No Chris you are wrong. The atheist argument you support is fallacious. It is a contradiction to say there is no God, that is what the argument illustrates.<br /><br />It starts with an either/or, however, not with just an assertion that God has to be necessary. The atheists only option is to demonstrate the impossibility of God.<br /><br />Until they demonstrate that we have every reason to believe there has to be a God.Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-84980958411548366202011-04-28T11:47:01.169-07:002011-04-28T11:47:01.169-07:00Hi Metacrock,
You and I used to interact on CARM ...Hi Metacrock,<br /><br />You and I used to interact on CARM many many years ago. I was one of those Christian Universalist types the powers-that-be didn't like very much.<br /><br />Anyway, the modal argument you give here doesn't work because it begins with the premise "If god exists then it is logically necessary that god exists." This is not true. It could be that God exists and yet doesn't exist logically necessarily. For what it means for it to be logically necessary is that there is no possible world in which God does not exist. Yet for there to be no possible world in which God does not exist, it would have to be that the proposition "God does not exist" either is or implies a contradiction. But it isn't and it doesn't. So there is a possible world in which God does not exist. So it's not logically necessary for God to exist--whether or not he actually does exist. Therefore its false to say that if God exists then it's logically necessary that he exist.<br /><br />-Kris RhodesKris Rhodeshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15340539700756639797noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-25599985584076995122011-04-24T12:05:09.962-07:002011-04-24T12:05:09.962-07:00those are not epithets one often hears of the moda...those are not epithets one often hears of the modal argument, but thanks.Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-66953105618368062082011-04-24T10:13:33.055-07:002011-04-24T10:13:33.055-07:00That's informative and inspiring!
Happy momen...That's informative and inspiring!<br /><br />Happy moments, praise God.<br />Difficult moments, seek God.<br />Every moment, thank God.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com