tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-49251503673397744702007-12-04T05:02:00.000-08:002007-12-04T05:02:00.000-08:00the Derridians basically lost the argument to Pink...<I>the Derridians basically lost the argument to Pinkham, the student of Chomsky, who unfortunately is an atheist. But Chomsky could make Mincemeat of the decons. meaning in language does not derive from difference or from signifies but from context.<BR/><BR/>that was the basis of the whole argument between Derrida and Searl. So Searl deserves credit to for taking it back to J.L. Austin.</I><BR/><BR/>Yeah, I tend to think in terms that difference is the field from which meanings can be drawn, but difference is not sufficient to move us towards a determination of meaning - context is required. That's why when you say "I love you" to someone they don't think you might be ordering a cheeseburger. Context is contingent, but that doesn't mean it's insufficient to regulate meaning in a real sense.<BR/><BR/>I think maybe embryonic stem cells could be a good illustration of the point - what they will become is contingent on a number factors that interact with the coded material they contain, but that they will become bone cells, neurons, muscle cells, etc. developing into tissues and organs and such is defined by the context of the development process within the womb and the interaction between the embryonic cells, the mother, and the process itself. You generally don't have to worry that a human mother is going to give birth to a yak, even though human genetic material has no small number of factors in common with that of a yak (though the two are not the same, just as two signifiers are not the same).<BR/><BR/>In a similar fashion, the mystical or religious experience could be seen as a real encounter with a reality that is beyond the temporal order and yet interacts with it, but the way such experiences are expressed within the culture of the one having the experience are contingent - is that the track to take with this? I already agree with the conclusion, that it is reasonable to assume there is something legitimately causing these experiences that is "Other" to us and to the material order. I'm just trying to shore up in my mind how to get there.<BR/><BR/>It's early and I'm having trouble holding a thought, so I hope this is coherent.<BR/><BR/>I like the Thomas Reid argument too, I just didn't have any comments. I don't have as good a background with this philosophy stuff as I do in Biblical studies. ;-)Jason Barrhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09351713443189464171noreply@blogger.com