tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post1358091399372680067..comments2024-03-28T15:31:02.860-07:00Comments on Metacrock's Blog: Tie breaker: God cannot be a brute factJoseph Hinman (Metacrock)http://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comBlogger44125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-60219001332051043472016-08-03T18:52:11.039-07:002016-08-03T18:52:11.039-07:00Accordingly to Mary Jane Rubinstein's book on ...Accordingly to Mary Jane Rubinstein's book on multiverse theories, even Aristotle, in his Metaphysics, postulated more than the one "unmoved mover" ....<br /><br />“a single movement must be produced by something single” (1073a). So far, so good; this argument is what will allow him in a few pages to establish the singularity of the cosmos based on the singularity of its mover.But then Aristotle reminds us that this “single movement” applies not only to “the whole universe,” but to the “planetary courses” as well (1073a). And because each of the planets (or “stars”)44 is a substance, “it is clearly necessary that the number of substances eternal in their nature and intrinsically unmovable (and without magnitude …) should equal that of the movements of “stars is a substance, “it is clearly necessary that the number of substances eternal in their nature and intrinsically unmovable (and without magnitude …) should equal that of the movements of the stars” (1073a). What has happened here is that without justifying the leap, Aristotle has attributed to each planet the “single movement” of premise (3), declaring that there must be as many “single movers” as there are planetary courses. Then, through a perfectly inscrutable calculus, he goes on to reveal the number of courses to be either fifty-five or forty-seven.."<br /><br />But what if every subatomic particle is actually a "substance" and it's OWN unmoved mover? Then the entire multi/universe might be a working out of relations between them, which makes sense according to their "unpredictable" or "noncausal" nature in QM theory, and this democratic sitch would not necessarily infer either a singular cause or an ICR? Which likely jives for process theists and atheists too.....<br />Mike Gerowhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14630695728013930638noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-15307900873006914582016-08-02T20:46:54.385-07:002016-08-02T20:46:54.385-07:00Mike Gerow:
I think someone who embraces a liberta...Mike Gerow:<br />I think someone who embraces a libertarian account of free will could say something along those lines.<br /><br />Suppose God created world w1 and in that world he is asked why. He could answer “Because I wanted to create a world and there was no better world.”<br /><br />Suppose he created w2, instead, and was asked why he created it. Again, I think he could answer, “Because I wanted to create a world and there was no better world.”<br /><br />But if he is asked, “but why did you create w1 instead of w2?” I don’t see how he can answer other than to say something like: “No reason. Since w1 and w2 are both equally good, there was no reason to create either in preference to the other. So there was no sufficient reason to choose either in preference to the other. I just picked at random.” This looks like Joe’s “let the dice fall where they may” answer, earlier in the comments.<br /><br />PSR has fallen by the wayside here, and good riddance to it, I say.<br /><br />But without PSR, I don’t see how Joe can defend his claim that contingencies <b>must</b> all be grounded in necessities (that sure sounds like an endorsement of PSR to me).<br />Eric Sotnakhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06162425851889399481noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-63798395989993597422016-08-02T15:17:28.038-07:002016-08-02T15:17:28.038-07:00I would not define a brute fact in that way nor wo...I would not define a brute fact in that way nor would I define a sufficient reason in that way. My definitions would be the standard definitions used by philosophers. Ryan Mhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15738381414795204410noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-36502982084732200892016-08-01T15:41:29.241-07:002016-08-01T15:41:29.241-07:00Eric, couldn't we argue, "contra" L...Eric, couldn't we argue, "contra" Leibniz and along the lines of N. of Cusan, that an omnipotent God should and would be able to create an INFINITE number of 'best possible worlds', all of which are equally perfect, and so there would be no reasons for some particular choices in some particular (possible) world, and no way to choose 'the best' between the variations, but wouldn't that much more vast creation glorify God more? <br /><br />Doesn't Lieb. just assume there (so to speak) that the "creation equation" is integratable? - that it would just "naturally" have to converge, and not diverge? <br /><br />:-PMike Gerowhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14630695728013930638noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-81332768343452048092016-08-01T13:15:21.853-07:002016-08-01T13:15:21.853-07:00If there is at least one brute fact then the PSR i...If there is at least one brute fact then the PSR is false. If God's choice to create this world over any other is simply a brute fact then theism is in no better a position than non theism with respect to explaining how the contingent aspects of reality came to be. In each case we find a terminus in a brute fact.<br /><br />that depends upon how you define both BF and SR. I by BF you mean anything without a highre purpose an d by SR you mean a physical explanation then every gum wrapper on side walk is BF and yet has a sufficient reason,lacks a higher reasomn,Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-13384957705697358802016-07-31T19:38:41.259-07:002016-07-31T19:38:41.259-07:00"...the view that God sometimes does somethin..."...the view that God sometimes does something without having any reason for his choice, besides seeming to be impossible, is hardly compatible with his glory. Suppose that God, facing a choice between A and B, opts for A without having any reason for preferring it to B. I see nothing to praise in that, because all praise should be grounded in some reason, and in this case we have stipulated that there is none. By contrast, I hold that God does nothing for which he does not deserve to be glorified." (from Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics, section 3)Eric Sotnakhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06162425851889399481noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-35728401757075737612016-07-31T14:03:14.689-07:002016-07-31T14:03:14.689-07:00Ryan, unless "God's choice" just IS ...Ryan, unless "God's choice" just IS sufficient reason?<br /><br />I think, as I said above, the whole question about 'free will choice' is huge here. Is a free will choice a kind of "reason"? (In the sense that libertarians conjecture a type of action for which, although there may be "reasons", it is not caused by them, but is essentially the result an agent's decision.) <br /><br />How is the concept of "reason" in different versions of the PSR related to "cause", as in naturalistic "causes" or not? Can someone's choice be a "reason"?Mike Gerowhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14630695728013930638noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-80991497309880728592016-07-31T12:26:40.253-07:002016-07-31T12:26:40.253-07:00If there is at least one brute fact then the PSR i...If there is at least one brute fact then the PSR is false. If God's choice to create this world over any other is simply a brute fact then theism is in no better a position than non theism with respect to explaining how the contingent aspects of reality came to be. In each case we find a terminus in a brute fact. Ryan Mhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15738381414795204410noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-49795541506758032482016-07-31T09:39:39.764-07:002016-07-31T09:39:39.764-07:00Eric, it could be a brute fact that God chose SOME...Eric, it could be a brute fact that God chose SOME aspects of reality arbitrarily, but does that make ALL of reality a "brute fact?" <br /><br />Here's a couple of arguments...<br /><br />1) What if some important (moral) choices can't be made for "reasons" because, just as it seems to us, there is no final moral calculus that can ultimately decide between opposing kinds of moral "goods"? If God then makes an "arbitrary" choice, say by choosing "mercy for mankind" over "justice," is that only a brute fact? The "reason" is God's choice, so wouldn't we be right to claim it's more like a revelation--a free expression of the "kind of God" that God has chosen to be? <br /><br />2) Isn't space like that for spontaneity, play, self-expression (for us as well as God) a "good" in itself?<br /><br />How does free will or a free decision, if there ever is such a thing, relate to brute facts and the PSR?Mike Gerowhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14630695728013930638noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-15955097370258750332016-07-31T06:28:29.770-07:002016-07-31T06:28:29.770-07:00Why did God choose this particular world in prefer...Why did God choose this particular world in preference to all the others? He just did (he "let the chips fall where they may"). In other words, it is a brute fact that he chose this world rather than some other.<br /><br />Eric Sotnakhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06162425851889399481noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-5814265932840384342016-07-31T02:13:41.047-07:002016-07-31T02:13:41.047-07:00But if the explanation is always the same no matte...But if the explanation is always the same no matter which world God creates, then I would say we don’t have an explanation for one choice rather than any other.<br /><br /><br /><b>but you are kimd of assumimg <br />god is like aa 18th century rational man he's going to have specific reasons for making each world. I assume he has one formula and let's the chips fall where they may but the reason for for the chips falling is the same reason for doing it, I'm assuming it's an intuitive instinctive kind of reason.</b>Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-68453080899971570112016-07-30T21:40:30.716-07:002016-07-30T21:40:30.716-07:00... but would there have to be any real answer to ...... but would there have to be any real answer to those questions besides "according to my current tastes," or something else that doesn't really tell us much? Moreover, with any person, we might suspect there's really some internal or subconscious reason, some contingent "need" being met by their choice (either health-wise or addictively-speaking) even tho they're not aware of it? That's different with God, of course, whom we assume neither has such "needs" nor lacks any form of self-awareness. <br /><br />Seems like, in any case, an infinite God couldn't express his-or-herself fully in a finite creation? There would have to be some "choices" and/or limitations imposed? Which then could be the whole of his or her (essential)"reasons" for many "choices". (Also, why Nicholas of Cusa and some others predicted that God would have created an infinite number of worlds, I guess, tho obviously it doesn't follow from what we're saying here that God would NEED to do that...)Mike Gerowhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14630695728013930638noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-3381808583894792722016-07-30T20:50:33.221-07:002016-07-30T20:50:33.221-07:00If God creates w1, love is the reason.
If God crea...If God creates w1, love is the reason.<br />If God creates w2, love is the reason.<br />If God creates w3, love is the reason.<br />If God creates w1 rather than w2, love is the reason.<br />If God creates w2 rather than w3, love is the reason.<br />…<br />But if the explanation is always the same no matter which world God creates, then I would say we don’t have an explanation for one choice rather than any other.<br /><br />Analogy:<br />A: Why did you order pancakes? <br />B: Because I was hungry.<br />A: If you had ordered waffles, instead, why would that have been?<br />B: It would have been because I was hungry.<br />A: Yes, but why would you have chosen waffles instead of bacon and eggs?<br />B: Because I was hungry.<br /><br />Sorry, but I would say B has not satisfactorily answered A.<br /><br />Eric Sotnakhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06162425851889399481noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-34922109337738296232016-07-30T17:15:13.630-07:002016-07-30T17:15:13.630-07:00It wouldn't be too hard, in context of Joe'...It wouldn't be too hard, in context of Joe's elucidation, to answer that, Eric, since the assumption is God creates out of expression of love, who would then be the same for all worlds? <br /><br />I think Platinga's thing, that there are an infinite number of possibile worlds, all we can expect is. ' good enough' world -- which handles the BOAPW issue... and (I think) the case where God creates some worlds that are "better" than others, too? <br />Mike Gerowhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14630695728013930638noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-81502436597551658652016-07-30T08:34:37.969-07:002016-07-30T08:34:37.969-07:00I thought I had sated already stated everything ba...I thought I had sated already stated everything back to love, any reason God could have would be the consequence of the property of love or being,Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-67499828949845626922016-07-30T06:19:58.056-07:002016-07-30T06:19:58.056-07:00The point isn't what the content of God's ...The point isn't what the content of God's reason is, the point is how that reason relates to God.<br /><br />Let's try one more time:<br /><br />Suppose God creates w1 for reason r1. What is the reason for God's having r1? If r1 is a consequence of any property that belongs to God necessarily, then doesn't it follow that r1 is also necessary? Why doesn't God have r1 is every possible world? In other words, if God exists necessarily, then how can he have different properties in different worlds?Eric Sotnakhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06162425851889399481noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-22336476566075455762016-07-29T22:46:19.778-07:002016-07-29T22:46:19.778-07:00Even on the assumption that there is a best possib...Even on the assumption that there is a best possible world, I don't think it follows that God would necessarily create it, so it would not follow that if God necessarily exists then the best possible world necessarily exists. Rather, I think what we can derive from God's goodness and the existence of a best possible world is that "If God exists and God creates a world then the world God creates is the best possible world". That conditional does not imply that God does in fact create, so even if hypothetically God necessarily would create the best possible world if God were to create at all it would not follow that God would necessarily create the best possible world. Rather, God's creative act could still be a contingent fact. <br /><br /><b>I never said I agree about BPW. This is the best possible world given what God had in mimnd for it I'k sure but I know he could have done better, it all depends upon the goal.</b>Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-50890344123489862412016-07-29T22:42:03.656-07:002016-07-29T22:42:03.656-07:00Consider all of those possible worlds. Only one wa...Consider all of those possible worlds. Only one was chosen in preference to all the others. Why? If it isn't because it was better, then was there no reason?<br /><br /><b>that does not follow. Just because we don't know the reason doesn't mean there is not one. I aam not saying there are no other worlds just that every possible world si not real.</b><br /><br /><br /><br /> Suppose we asked God why he chose this particular world, and he answered that it was because R. Then we ask if he had chosen one of the other worlds, what the reason would have been in that case, and he answered, "R." In other word, exactly the same reason would be given for creating any of the infinitely many good possible worlds, and so there is therefore NO REASON for creating this particular world in preference to any of them. God would have "just plain chosen it" which means there would be no sufficient reason for God's particular choice in preference to infinitely many alternative possible choices. Opponents of PSR can shrug and say "so what?" but proponents of PSR cannot.<br /><br /><br /><b>supposed God's answer was the most brilliant thing you ever heard and you had nothing to come back with?</b>Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-18187596665396372182016-07-29T18:52:30.090-07:002016-07-29T18:52:30.090-07:00Mike Gerow wrote: Could proponents assert that &qu...Mike Gerow wrote: <b>Could proponents assert that "God's choice' IS by itself a sufficient reason? </b><br /><br />It is a sufficient reason for the world that he creates, but it doesn't explain his choice of that world over others. That is, if you could ask God, "Why did you choose world A instead of world B?" For God to reply, "Because A is the one I chose" doesn't really answer the question.Eric Sotnakhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06162425851889399481noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-18083869311626690172016-07-29T08:38:26.391-07:002016-07-29T08:38:26.391-07:00God would have "just plain chosen it" wh...<b> God would have "just plain chosen it" which means there would be no sufficient reason for God's particular choice in preference to infinitely many alternative possible choices. Opponents of PSR can shrug and say "so what?" but proponents of PSR cannot.</b><br /><br />Could proponents assert that "God's choice' IS by itself a sufficient reason? <br /><br />This is the tact Joe's getting at with his Sartrean en-soir and pour-soir thing, I think, that God and perhaps other conscious beings have a capacity to transcend the PSR.Mike Gerowhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14630695728013930638noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-89058910271208285402016-07-29T07:58:37.386-07:002016-07-29T07:58:37.386-07:00Mike Gerow wrote: Eric, Platinga gets around that ...Mike Gerow wrote: <b>Eric, Platinga gets around that simply by surmising that there would be an infinite number of possible worlds God could have created, thus no 'best possible' one.</b><br /><br />Consider all of those possible worlds. Only one was chosen in preference to all the others. Why? If it isn't because it was better, then was there no reason? Suppose we asked God why he chose this particular world, and he answered that it was because R. Then we ask if he had chosen one of the other worlds, what the reason would have been in that case, and he answered, "R." In other word, exactly the same reason would be given for creating any of the infinitely many good possible worlds, and so there is therefore NO REASON for creating this particular world in preference to any of them. God would have "just plain chosen it" which means there would be no sufficient reason for God's particular choice in preference to infinitely many alternative possible choices. Opponents of PSR can shrug and say "so what?" but proponents of PSR cannot.Eric Sotnakhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06162425851889399481noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-50021377309159489312016-07-29T01:44:35.334-07:002016-07-29T01:44:35.334-07:00Even on the assumption that there is a best possib...Even on the assumption that there is a best possible world, I don't think it follows that God would necessarily create it, so it would not follow that if God necessarily exists then the best possible world necessarily exists. Rather, I think what we can derive from God's goodness and the existence of a best possible world is that "If God exists and God creates a world then the world God creates is the best possible world". That conditional does not imply that God does in fact create, so even if hypothetically God necessarily would create the best possible world if God were to create at all it would not follow that God would necessarily create the best possible world. Rather, God's creative act could still be a contingent fact. <br /><br />Ryan Mhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15738381414795204410noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-34787237344452020962016-07-28T22:28:54.369-07:002016-07-28T22:28:54.369-07:00how do I know this is not the BOAPW? Because I'...how do I know this is not the BOAPW? Because I'm not rich. we will know for sure if it's the hell world come November.Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-66291990483047299212016-07-28T22:26:33.159-07:002016-07-28T22:26:33.159-07:00Eric, Platinga gets around that simply by surmisin...Eric, Platinga gets around that simply by surmising that there would be an infinite number of possible worlds God could have created, thus no 'best possible' one.<br /><br /><b>O damn I knew that! </b>Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11516215.post-9741252902519092012016-07-28T22:25:32.078-07:002016-07-28T22:25:32.078-07:00If I have understood correctly, Joe’s view is that...If I have understood correctly, Joe’s view is that God exists necessarily, but that the properties that belong to him in relation to the creation of this particular world are contingent. This means he could have had different properties by choosing to exercise his creative powers differently. Suppose God had not created the world that he did. Suppose God had chosen, instead, to create an absolute hell of a world. If he had done so, what would the reason have been for his having done so?<br /><br /><br /><b>depends upon what you mean by properties. To me that word connotes a generic quality such as gold is heavy. gold will still be heavy whether its molten or solid. so IO say God's properties would be the same but his relationship or function would be different had he not created,</b><br /><br />But maybe God could not have created a hell world. Perhaps this is not merely something he would not do, but something that would be impossible for him to do. At the very least, perhaps it is necessary that if God creates a world, that world is at least minimally good. But why should we believe that? It seems the only answer is that God’s goodness is an essential perfection. So in order for God to create a miserable world, he would have had to have lacked one of his defining/essential properties. So it is necessary that God creates a good world, but only contingent which good world he chooses to create. <br /><br /><b>I think there are things God can;'t do. Bible says he can[t lie. He cant fail to exist he can't do nonsense like smell next Thursday.</b><br /><br />Ok. So now let’s consider the range of worlds that are minimally good that were all in God’s power to create. We got this one. Why? Because God is good. But why not one of the other worlds? No reason? God just picked this one at random? Suppose he had picked one of the other worlds, instead. Then wouldn’t we have to say the reason he picked that one was because he is good. And if he had picked a still different world, it would also have been because he is good. But no answer is forthcoming as to why he chose this world rather than any of the other minimally good worlds, unless we say (with Leibniz) that God is not just good, but perfect, and therefore he chose this world in preference to all the others because it is the best, and no other world could have been chosen without God being less than absolutely perfect, which is impossible. So, this world turns out to be necessary.<br /><br /><b>we don't know why this world. presumably because it's a free will world.</b><br /><br />So to prevent this rehash of Leibniz’s problem, I return to the crucial question: How is it possible for a necessary being to possess contingent properties without violating PSR?<br />6:54 PM <br /><br /><b>that may turn on the distinction between relational properties and generic properties.</b>Joseph Hinman (Metacrock)https://www.blogger.com/profile/06957529748541493998noreply@blogger.com